Reversed, Rendered, and Opinion Filed May 23, 2023
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-21-00981-CV
HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY COMPANY, Appellant
V.
JANERY FRANCOIS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 68th Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DC-17-08336
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Partida-Kipness, Nowell, and Wright1
Opinion by Justice Partida-Kipness
This appeal involves a dispute over the allocation of a third-party settlement
in a workers’ compensation case. Appellant Hartford Accident & Indemnity
Company, the workers’ compensation carrier, appeals the trial court’s judgment
following a bench trial. Hartford challenges the trial court’s allocation of the
settlement amount and award of additional attorney’s fees of $10,000. We conclude
the trial court’s allocation was erroneous and the additional award of attorney’s fees
1
The Hon. Carolyn Wright, Justice, Assigned
was an abuse of discretion. We reverse the judgment and render the judgment the
trial court should have rendered.
BACKGROUND
Appellee Janery Francois sustained a work-related injury in 2015. Hartford
paid Francois $356,669.73 in medical and indemnity benefits under her employer’s
workers’ compensation policy. Francois sued the owner and operator of the building
where she sustained her injury, Parmenter Realty & Investment Company, Inc., and
settled that claim for $150,000. Hartford then intervened in the lawsuit and asserted
its subrogation rights. Hartford and Francois disagreed on how the $150,000
settlement should be allocated in relation to the workers’ compensation lien. At the
center of the dispute was the parties’ disagreement of how to calculate “the net
amount recovered” by Francois under section 417.002(a) of the Texas Labor Code.
See TEX. LAB. CODE § 417.002(a) (“The net amount recovered by a claimant in a
third-party action shall be used to reimburse the insurance carrier for benefits,
including medical benefits, that have been paid for the compensable injury.”). The
dispute proceeded to a bench trial.
At trial, Francois’s counsel maintained the “net recovery”2 is determined after
counsel’s 40% contingency fee is taken out of the gross settlement. Using this
framework, Francois calculated the “net recovery” to be $85,206.03 as follows:
2
Francois’s counsel referred to the “net amount recovered” of section 417.002(a) as the “net recovery”
at trial. These terms are not interchangeable. To accurately reflect the parties’ arguments, however, we will
use the term “net recovery” in this opinion when that is the term used by Francois below.
–2–
$150,000 (𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡)
− $60,000 (40% 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑓𝑒𝑒)
−$4,793.97 (𝑝𝑟𝑜 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠)
$85,206.03 (𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦)
Counsel next argued that the trial court could award him additional attorney’s
fees under section 417.003 because Hartford did not participate in the lawsuit against
Parmenter Realty. See TEX. LAB. CODE § 417.003(a).3 Francois’s counsel agreed any
fees awarded under section 417.003 could not exceed one-third of the “net
recovery.” See id. § 417.003(a)(1). Using that formula, counsel concluded he was
entitled to an award of $28,117.98 as section 417.003 attorney’s fees, which was
one-third of the net recovery of $85,206.03. By subtracting the section 417.003 fees
from the net recovery, Francois’s counsel argued Hartford’s recovery should be
$58,088.05:
$85,206.03 (𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦)
−$28,117.99 (§ 417.003 𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑠)
$58,088.04 (𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑑 ′ 𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦)
Finally, Francois’s counsel argued he was entitled to attorney’s fees of
$10,000 defending the intervention and participating in the bench trial. He sought
3
Section 417.003(a) of the labor code provides:
(a) An insurance carrier whose interest is not actively represented by an attorney in a third-party action
shall pay a fee to an attorney representing the claimant in the amount agreed on between the attorney
and the insurance carrier. In the absence of an agreement, the court shall award to the attorney payable
out of the insurance carrier's recovery:
(1) a reasonable fee for recovery of the insurance carrier’s interest that may not exceed
one-third of the insurance carrier’s recovery; and
(2) a proportionate share of expenses.
TEX. LAB. CODE § 417.003(a).
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those fees under section 37.009 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code and
maintained he was entitled to such fees because Hartford refused to negotiate a lesser
recovery. Francois characterized Hartford’s unwillingness to negotiate a lower
subrogation lien as an improper tactic and intentional failure to follow established
law.
Hartford, in contrast, argued that under the “first money” rule, Hartford’s
recovery is calculated by subtracting section 417.003 fees and expenses from the
gross settlement. Hartford’s calculation was simple:
$150,000 (𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡)
−$50,000 (§ 417.003 𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑠)
−$4,793.97 (𝑝𝑟𝑜 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠)
$95,206.03 (𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑑 ′ 𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦)
The trial court adopted Francois’s proposed allocation. Following a bench
trial, the trial court rendered judgment on Hartford’s declaratory judgment claim and
awarded $57,088.04 of the settlement to Hartford, and $92,911.96 to Francois and
her counsel. The $92,911.96 awarded to Francois and her counsel was comprised of
the following: (1) attorney’s fees of $60,000, which was 40% of the gross settlement,
(2) reasonable and necessary expenses of $4,793.97, and (3) section 417.003 fees of
$28,117.99, which was one-third of the “net recovery” calculated by the court. The
trial court also awarded Francois’s counsel additional attorney’s fees of $10,000
pursuant to TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.009. This appeal followed.
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ANALYSIS
Hartford brings two issues on appeal. First, Hartford challenges the trial
court’s allocation of the settlement amount. Second, Hartford contends the trial court
abused its discretion by awarding Francois’s counsel $10,000 in additional
attorney’s fees.
I. Allocation of Settlement
In its first issue, Hartford contends the trial court’s settlement allocation failed
to award Hartford the statutorily-required “first money” from Francois’s third-party
settlement. Hartford maintains it should have recovered $95,206.03, not $57,088.04
as awarded in the judgment. We review this issue de novo because it presents the
Court with a question of law concerning statutory interpretation and application.
Empower Texans, Inc. v. Dallas Cnty., 648 S.W.3d 664, 669 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2022, pet. denied) (citing Bush v. Lone Oak Club, LLC, 601 S.W.3d 639, 647 (Tex.
2020)).
An employee may seek damages from a third party who is liable for an injury
that is compensable under the labor code. TEX. LAB. CODE § 417.001(a). When a
benefit is claimed by an injured employee, the insurance carrier is subrogated to the
rights of the injured employee. Id. § 417.001(b). The distribution of the proceeds
recovered from third parties is governed by section 417.002, which provides:
(a) The net amount recovered by a claimant in a third-party action shall
be used to reimburse the insurance carrier for benefits, including
medical benefits, that have been paid for the compensable injury.
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Id. § 417.002(a).
It is well-established that an insurance carrier is entitled to recover all benefits
paid to an injured worker out of the “first money” the worker recovers from a liable
third party. See, e.g., Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Ins. Co. of Am., 568 S.W.3d 650, 651,
655–56 (Tex. 2019) (citing TEX. LAB. CODE §§ 417.001–.002) (the insurance carrier
has the right to “the first money a worker receives from a tortfeasor,” and “the
employee has no right to any sums recovered from a third party until the carrier is
reimbursed in full.”) (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted); see also Tex.
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ledbetter, 251 S.W.3d 31, 35 (Tex. 2008) (“carrier gets the first
money a worker receives from a tortfeasor”); Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Baker, 87 S.W.3d
526, 530 (Tex. 2002) (“For decades, the law has been that, under the Workers’
Compensation Act’s subrogation provision, ‘the first money paid [to] or recovered
by the employee, or his representatives, belongs to the compensation carrier paying
the compensation, and until it is paid in full, the employee, or his representatives,
have no right to any funds.’”) (quoting Fort Worth Lloyds v. Haygood, 151 Tex. 149,
246 S.W.2d 865, 869 (1952)). The subrogation right “creates a lien in favor of the
insurance carrier in the amount it has paid to an employee out of the first money
recovered from the third-party tortfeasor.” Tex. Workers’ Comp. Ins. Fund v.
Alcorta, 989 S.W.2d 849, 851 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.).
“[U]ntil a carrier is reimbursed in full, ‘the employee or his representatives
have no right to any of such funds.’” Ledbetter, 251 S.W.3d at 36 (quoting Capitol
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Aggregates, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 408 S.W.2d 922, 923 (Tex. 1966)). “Thus,
rather than the employee owning the money and being forced to disgorge it, the
carrier is first entitled to the money up to the total amount of benefits it has
paid, . . . .” Argonaut Ins., 87 S.W.3d at 530. “After the carrier is fully reimbursed,
then any additional money goes to the employee.” Delgado v. Tex. Mun. League
Intergovernmental Risk Pool, No. 13-09-00126-CV, 2009 WL 2712416, at *2 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 31, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing TEX.
LAB. CODE § 417.002(b)). “First-money reimbursement is essential to the workers’
compensation system because it reduces costs to the carrier and, thus, to the
employer and the public.” Delgado, 2009 WL 2712416, at *2–3; Ledbetter, 251
S.W.3d at 35 (noting another benefit of first-money reimbursement is the prevention
of “double recovery by workers.”).
However, a “first money” recovery does not always result in an insurer
recovering the full amount of the settlement. Rather, the subrogation amount must
be calculated in accordance with section 417.003, which provides that the
employee’s attorney may recover certain attorney’s fees and “a proportionate share
of expenses” as compensation for pursuing the third-party action. TEX. LAB. CODE §
417.003(a). That provision states:
(a) An insurance carrier whose interest is not actively represented by an
attorney in a third-party action shall pay a fee to an attorney
representing the claimant in the amount agreed on between the attorney
and the insurance carrier. In the absence of an agreement, the court shall
award to the attorney payable out of the insurance carrier’s recovery:
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(1) a reasonable fee for recovery of the insurance carrier’s
interest that may not exceed one-third of the insurance
carrier’s recovery; and
(2) a proportionate share of expenses.
Id. § 417.003(a). “By enacting section 417.003, the legislature intended to
compensate claimants who perform work for the benefit of a subrogated insurance
carrier and to prohibit the worker’s compensation carrier from obtaining a ‘free ride’
from the efforts of the claimant’s attorney.” Caesar v. Bohacek, 176 S.W.3d 282,
285 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.).
Here, it is undisputed that Hartford provided workers’ compensation coverage
and paid Francois $356,669.73 in medical and indemnity benefits. The parties also
agree Hartford did not participate in the underlying third-party action, and the
settlement was procured solely by the efforts of Francois’s counsel. As such, sections
417.001, 417.002(a), and 417.003(a) apply to the allocation of Francois’s settlement
with Parmenter Realty. TEX. LAB. CODE §§ 417.001, 417.002(a), 417.003(a). The
parties disagree, however, with the application of those provisions to the settlement.
The dispute centers on the definition of “net amount recovered” in section
417.002(a) and how to calculate section 417.003 fees. Francois maintains the “net
amount recovered” is the settlement amount minus her counsel’s 40% contingency
fee and pro rata expenses. Hartford, in contrast, contends the “net amount recovered”
is $150,000 (the gross settlement) and section 417.003 must be calculated from that
amount. We agree with Hartford.
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Chapter 417 of the labor code does not define “net amount recovered.” TEX.
LAB. CODE § 417.002(a). Two of our sister courts, however, have defined “net
amount recovered” as Hartford does here and explained how section 417.002 and
417.003 work together to allocate third-party settlement funds. See Alcorta, 989
S.W.2d at 852; see also Delgado, 2009 WL 2712416, at *4.
For example, in Alcorta, the third-party settlement of $20,035.00 was less than
the subrogation lien of $28,031.11. Alcorta, 989 S.W.2d at 850. The trial court
allocated the settlement amount by awarding Alcorta’s attorney the amount of fees
for which she had contracted, $8,014.00, or approximately 40% of the recovery,
awarding Alcorta costs of court in the amount of $813.50, and awarding the carrier
the remaining balance of $11,207.50. Id. at 851. The San Antonio Court of Appeals
concluded the allocation was erroneous because the fees awarded to counsel
constituted “an impermissible circumvention of the statutory limit on attorney’s fees
as to the carrier’s subrogation recovery.” Id. at 852 (citing TEX. LAB. CODE §
417.003(c)). The Alcorta court noted that the Fund’s “recovery was $20,035.00,”
(i.e., the gross settlement), and the amount of fees permitted under the statute could
not exceed one-third of that recovery. Id. at 851–52 (noting that section 417.003 fees
“are payable out of the carrier’s subrogation recovery in an amount not to exceed
one-third of the insurance carrier’s recovery.”). In so holding, the court explained
the relationship between sections 417.002(a) and 417.003, and defined “net amount
recovered” as the settlement amount minus section 417.003 fees:
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The “net amount recovered” by the employee is the third-party recovery
less the employee’s attorney’s fees. That is, by statutory design, the
“first money” owed to the carrier—the net amount recovered under
section 417.002(a)—is a sum which has been reduced by allowable
attorney’s fees under section 417.003. Defining “net amount
recovered” in this manner gives meaning to both sections 417.002 and
417.003.
Id. at 852 (internal citations omitted).
The Thirteenth Court of Appeals similarly used the gross settlement amount
as the “net amount recovered” from which it then calculated the appropriate Chapter
417 allocation. Delgado, 2009 WL 2712416, at *4. In that case, Delgado received
$25,028 in settlement proceeds from the third-party tortfeasor, and the trial court
awarded Delgado’s trial attorney fees of $8,342.66, which was one-third of the
settlement proceeds. Id. The appellate court affirmed the allocation “[b]ecause the
award of attorney’s fees comports with section 417.003 of the labor code, . . .” Id.
In reaching that conclusion, the Delgado court explained that the “net amount
recovered” under section 417.002(a) is “the ‘first money’ owed to the carrier” and
“is a sum which has been reduced by allowable attorney’s fees under section
417.003.” Delgado, 2009 WL 2712416, at *3 (quoting Alcorta, 989 S.W.2d at 852).
In both Alcorta and Delgado, the subrogation lien exceeded the third-party
settlement. Under those circumstances, the “net amount recovered” was calculated
by subtracting the fees and proportionate expenses permitted under section 417.003
from the total settlement amount. We agree with this approach.
–10–
Under Chapter 417, the insurance carrier has the right to “the first money a
worker receives from a tortfeasor,” and “the employee has no right to any sums
recovered from a third party until the carrier is reimbursed in full.” Stevenson v.
Texas Mut. Ins. Co., No. 05-21-00464-CV, 2022 WL 1514670 at *2 (Tex. App.—
Dallas May 13, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (quoting Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Ins.
Co. of Am., 568 S.W.3d 650, 655–56 (Tex. 2019)). Hartford is, therefore, entitled to
the first money Francois recovered in the settlement with Parmenter Realty, and
Francois has no right to the settlement money until Hartford is paid in full. See
Stevenson, 2022 WL 1514670 at *2. Here, the settlement amount ($150,000.00) does
not exceed the amount of Hartford’s subrogation interest ($356,669.73). Where, as
here, the settlement amount does not exceed the subrogation interest, the carrier is
entitled to the full amount of the settlement minus payment of attorney’s fees and
expenses that the carrier must pay to the claimant’s counsel pursuant to section
417.003. See id.; see also Delgado, 2009 WL 2712416, at *3; Alcorta, 989 S.W.2d
at 852. We conclude the trial court erred by using a “net amount recovered” that was
less than the total settlement to allocate the settlement under Chapter 417.
Further, the trial court abused its discretion by awarding Francois’s counsel’s
attorney’s fees in excess of one-third of the total settlement. The $92,911.96 awarded
to Francois and her counsel included: (1) attorney’s fees of $60,000, which was 40%
of the total settlement, (2) reasonable and necessary expenses of $4,793.97, and (3)
additional attorney’s fees of $28,117.99, which was one-third of the “net recovery”
–11–
calculated by the court. Section 417.003 caps any fees awarded to a claimant’s
attorney at “one-third of the insurance carrier’s recovery.” TEX. LAB. CODE §
417.003(a). As discussed above, Hartford’s recovery for the purposes of section
417.003 is the total settlement of $150,000. The trial court’s award of $88,117.99 in
fees is 58.7% of the total settlement and therefore, in excess of what is permitted
under the statute.
Applying the authorities cited above, we conclude Hartford was entitled to
recover $95,206.03, which is the full amount of the $150,000 settlement minus
section 417.003 fees of $50,000 and proportionate expenses of $4,793.97 properly
awarded to Francois and her counsel.4 See TEX. LAB. CODE § 417.003(a); see also
Stevenson, 2022 WL 1514670 at *2. We sustain Hartford’s first issue, reverse the
trial court’s judgment on Hartford’s declaratory judgment action, and render
judgment awarding Hartford $95,206.03 and awarding Francois and her counsel
$54,793.97.
II. Additional Attorney’s Fees
In its second issue, Hartford argues Francois’s counsel was not entitled to
additional attorney’s fees under Chapter 37 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
4
To support her allocation calculation, Francois relies on Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v. Parrent,
No. 05-96-01144-CV, 1998 WL 182803, at *1(Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 20, 1998, no pet.) (not designated
for publication). We find Lumbermens Mutual inapplicable. Because the case was decided before January
1, 2003 and was not designated for publication, it has no precedential value. See City of Dallas v. Gatlin,
329 S.W.3d 222, 228 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.) (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 47.7(b)). Further, the
opinion applied a prior and now-repealed statute. Lumbermens Mut., 1998 WL 182803, at *1, n.2 (noting
that the workers’ compensation act applicable there was repealed in December 1989 and replaced by a new
workers compensation act effective January 1991).
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Code (the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act or UDJA). We review an award of
attorney’s fees for an abuse of discretion. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at San
Antonio v. Mata & Bordini, Inc., 2 S.W.3d 312, 319 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999,
pet. denied).
The UDJA provides that a trial court may award costs and reasonable
attorney’s fees when doing so is equitable and just. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §
37.009. The UDJA “entrusts attorney fee awards to the trial court’s sound discretion,
subject to the requirements that any fees awarded be reasonable and necessary,
which are matters of fact, and to the additional requirements that fees be equitable
and just, which are matters of law.” Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex.
1998). “Unreasonable fees cannot be awarded [under the UDJA], even if the [trial]
court believed them just, but the court may conclude that it is not equitable or just to
award even reasonable and necessary fees.” Id. A party need not prevail to be
awarded attorney’s fees under the UDJA. Castille v. Serv. Datsun, Inc., No. 01-16-
00082-CV, 2017 WL 3910918, at *10 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 7,
2017, no pet.) (mem. op.); Hunt v. Baldwin, 68 S.W.3d 117, 135 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.). The question of whether a fee award is equitable
and just “is not susceptible to direct proof but is rather a matter of fairness in light
of all the circumstances.” Ridge Oil Co., v. Guinn Invs., Inc., 148 S.W.3d 143, 162
(Tex. 2004). Hartford argues the award of $10,000 in attorney’s fees was not
equitable and just. We agree.
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First, the award of additional fees to Francois is in direct contravention of the
limit on fees imposed by section 417.003 and constitutes a windfall for Francois.
TEX. LABOR CODE § 417.003(a) (the fee awarded by the trial court may not exceed
one-third of the carrier’s recovery). By awarding the additional fees, the amount of
fees awarded to Francois’s attorneys exceeds one-third of the net amount recovered
(in this case, the full settlement amount) and, therefore, violates the labor code. See
Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Barron, No. 05-96-00488-CV, 1998 WL 32710, at *4 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Jan. 30, 1998, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding award of $1,500 of
additional fees was improper because (1) the fees caused the plaintiff’s fees award
to exceed the amount permitted by section 417.003, and (2) such fees were not
recoverable under section 38.001 because the plaintiff failed to plead for Chapter 38
fees).
Second, Francois provides no basis for such an award, nor any reason why
such an award is equitable and just. Francois’s counsel argued at trial that additional
fees should be awarded because Hartford “deliberately refused to agree to a three-
way split” of the settlement and relied on a Louisiana case to refuse the three-way
split:
But I believe Hartford in this situation deliberately, deliberately refused
to agree to a three-way split knowing that they should, and knowing
what the law is. And they came into your court talking about some
Louisiana case that they brought, completely different calculations.
And because of what they did and how they acted, that’s why I believe
in addition to how we believe the split should be done, I believe we
should be awarded attorney’s fees.
–14–
According to Francois’s counsel, the carrier, employee, and employee’s counsel
“always” agree to split a settlement three ways, and he has entered into those
agreements “dozens of times.” But Francois cites no authority to support an
argument that Hartford was under any obligation to reduce its lien and accept a
three- way split. Instead, counsel relied on a 1998 opinion from this Court to argue
Hartford was either required to agree to Francois’s proposed allocation of the
settlement funds or acted in bad faith by refusing the allocation. See Lumbermens
Mut. Casualty Co. v. Parrent, No. 05-96-01144-CV, 1998 WL 182803, at *1(Tex.
App.—Dallas Apr. 20, 1998, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
The reliance on Lumbermens Mutual is misplaced. That case has no
precedential value because it was decided before January 1, 2003 and was not
designated for publication. See City of Dallas v. Gatlin, 329 S.W.3d 222, 228 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.) (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 47.7(b)). Further, the opinion
applied a prior and now-repealed statute. Lumbermens Mut., 1998 WL 182803, at
*1, n.2 (noting that the workers’ compensation act applicable there was repealed in
December 1989 and replaced by a new workers compensation act effective January
1991). Moreover, neither Lumbermens Mutual nor Chapter 417 required Hartford to
accept any payment less than the total amount of its subrogation lien. On the
contrary, Hartford has a statutory right to recover the entirety of the lien. See TEX.
LAB. CODE §§ 417.001–.002. As for Hartford relying on Louisiana law, the record
shows no such reference or reliance. Hartford consistently cited to binding Texas
–15–
Supreme Court authority, including Ledbetter and Argonaut Insurance, persuasive
appellate court cases, and the plain language of the statute to support its arguments
concerning the proper allocation of the settlement. See, e.g., Ledbetter, 251 S.W.3d
at 35; Argonaut Ins., 87 S.W.3d at 530.
Hartford was well within its rights to seek the full amount of reimbursement
permitted under Chapter 417. The award of additional attorney’s fees penalizes
Hartford for pursuing its statutory rights and is not equitable or just. See Mata &
Bordini, Inc., 2 S.W.3d at 319 (“Because both parties had legitimate rights to pursue,
the trial court did not act unreasonably or capriciously in determining that each party
should bear its own attorney’s fees.”). Under this record, we conclude the trial court
abused its discretion by awarding Francois additional attorney’s fees of $10,000. We
reverse the trial court’s award of those fees.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erroneously allocated the settlement in this case and abused its
discretion by awarding Francois additional attorney’s fees under the UDJA.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and render judgment that
Hartford recover $95,206.03, and Francois recover attorney’s fees of $50,000 and
pro rata expenses of $4,793.97.
/Robbie Partida-Kipness/
210981f.p05 ROBBIE PARTIDA-KIPNESS
JUSTICE
–16–
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
HARTFORD ACCIDENT & On Appeal from the 68th Judicial
INDEMNITY COMPANY, District Court, Dallas County, Texas
Appellant Trial Court Cause No. DC-17-08336.
Opinion delivered by Justice Partida-
No. 05-21-00981-CV V. Kipness. Justices Nowell and Wright
participating.
JANERY FRANCOIS, Appellee
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
court is REVERSED and judgment is RENDERED that appellant HARTFORD
ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY COMPANY recover $95,206.03 and appellee
JANERY FRANCOIS recover attorney’s fees of $50,000 and pro rata expenses of
$4,793.97.
It is ORDERED that appellant HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY
COMPANY recover its costs of this appeal from appellee JANERY FRANCOIS.
Judgment entered this 23rd day of May 2023.
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