NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE
JESSIE LEWIS, Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
SUPERIOR COURT MARICOPA COUNTY, et al., Defendants/Appellees.
No. 1 CA-CV 22-0215
FILED 6-1-2023
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. LC2021-000382-001
The Honorable Kathleen H. Mead, Judge, Retired
REVERSED AND REMANDED
COUNSEL
Jessie Lewis, Tucson
Plaintiff/Appellant
Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
By Johnny Jacquez
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
LEWIS v. SUPERIOR COURT, et al.
Decision of the Court
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Andrew M. Jacobs delivered the decision of the Court, in which Vice
Chief Judge David B. Gass and Judge Brian Y. Furuya joined.
J A C O B S, Judge:
¶1 Jessie Lewis appeals the superior court’s dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction of his putative petition for special action that challenged his
2014 superior court criminal proceedings and conviction. Because Lewis’
petition is in substance one seeking post-conviction relief, the superior
court had jurisdiction over it. We reverse and remand for the superior court
to consider Lewis’ petition under Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 In 2015, a jury convicted Lewis of a weapons misconduct
offense. The court sentenced him to 11 years’ incarceration. This court
affirmed on direct appeal after an independent review of the entire record.
State v. Lewis, 1 CA-CR 15-0301, 2016 WL 4045317, at *1–2, ¶¶ 1, 3, 6 (Ariz.
App. July 28, 2016) (mem. decision); see Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738,
744 (1967). Lewis thereafter unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief
many times. See generally State v. Lewis, 2 CA-CR 2023-0053-PR, 2023 WL
2770660, at *1, ¶ 1 (Ariz. App. Apr. 4, 2023) (mem. decision); State v. Lewis,
1 CA-CR 21-0371 PRPC, 2022 WL 872215, at *1, ¶ 1 (Ariz. App. Mar. 24,
2022) (mem. decision).
¶3 This appeal arises from a successive request for post-
conviction relief Lewis raised in November 2021. Lewis petitioned the
superior court for relief from his conviction by filing what he styled as a
petition for special action. Lewis cited subsections of Special Action Rule 1
and attached a supporting declaration. See Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 1, 4(d).
Lewis’ filings are captioned with his criminal case number, and the superior
court initially (and correctly) directed Lewis’ filing to its department that
handles criminal post-conviction matters. However, upon determining that
“[i]n substance, these submissions seek special action relief,” the court
redirected the matter to its Lower Court Appeals division (LCA).
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LEWIS v. SUPERIOR COURT, et al.
Decision of the Court
¶4 The LCA then dismissed Lewis’ putative petition for special
action for lack of jurisdiction in an unsigned order lacking finality under
Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c). The LCA explained it “reviews
matters from municipal and justice courts,” and “does not have jurisdiction
to review the rulings of another superior court judge.” After Lewis filed a
premature notice of appeal, this court stayed the matter. During the stay,
Lewis requested, and the superior court entered, a final signed judgment.
¶5 We have jurisdiction over Lewis’ appeal from the superior
court’s dismissal of his putative special action under Article 6, Section 9, of
the Arizona Constitution, and Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) §§ 12-
2101(A)(1) and -120.21(A)(1).
DISCUSSION
¶6 The issue before us is whether the superior court abused its
discretion by dismissing Lewis’ putative special action petition for lack of
jurisdiction. See Bilagody v. Thorneycroft, 125 Ariz. 88, 92 (App. 1979). “An
abuse of discretion occurs when the reasons given by the court for its action
are clearly untenable, legally incorrect, or amount to a denial of justice.”
State v. Riley, 248 Ariz. 154, 167, ¶ 7 (2020) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
¶7 To answer that question, we look at the substance of Lewis’
filing and not its label, as our law requires. See Application of Buccheri, 6
Ariz. App. 196, 198 (1967) (stating “[s]ubstance” is “of the essence”
notwithstanding that a filing is “labeled otherwise,” and determining
petitions contesting detention in prison were collateral attacks on the
defendant’s conviction and sentence). For their part, both parties treat
Lewis’ filing as one for special action. Lewis relies on Article 6, Sections 1,
14(11), and 18, of the Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. § 12-123, to assert
that the court has jurisdiction over extraordinary writs, and thus, over his
petition. The state in turn explains why Lewis’ filing fails as a special action,
but (hinting at the right answer) suggests that if Lewis’ filing fails he might
be better served by filing a request for post-conviction relief.
¶8 Much as the law does not allow the parties to stipulate to
subject-matter jurisdiction, the superior court is likewise not bound by
Lewis’ incorrect characterization of his filing, which attacks his 2014
conviction. Though presented as a petition for special action, Lewis’
petition challenges his conviction and seeks habeas corpus review and relief
afforded by the post-conviction statutes and rules. See generally Ariz. Const.
art. 6, § 18 (granting superior court power to issue writs of habeas corpus);
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LEWIS v. SUPERIOR COURT, et al.
Decision of the Court
A.R.S. §§ 13-4231 to -4241 (governing post-conviction); A.R.S. §§ 13-4121 to
-4147 (governing habeas corpus); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32 (governing post-
conviction review after trial). That Lewis challenges his conviction is
underscored by the claims in the petition that the state violated Lewis’
constitutional rights at trial, his request for an evidentiary hearing under
the post-conviction statutes and Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal
Procedure, and his plea for relief that the court “overturn [his] illegal
conviction” and discharge him from prison pursuant to A.R.S § 13-4131(A),
which governs habeas corpus remedies.
¶9 Rule 32.3(b) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure
requires that the superior court treat Lewis’ petition as one for post-
conviction relief and apply the procedures in Rule 32. As relevant here, that
rule states:
(b) Other Applications or Requests for Relief. If a court receives
any type of application or request for relief--however titled--that
challenges the validity of the defendant’s conviction or sentence
following a trial, it must treat the application as a petition for post-
conviction relief. If that court is not the court that convicted or
sentenced the defendant, it must transfer the application or
request for relief to the court where the defendant was
convicted or sentenced.
(Emphasis added). The comment to Rule 32.3 reiterates and contextualizes
the rule explaining that:
Rule 32 does not restrict the scope of the writ of habeas corpus
under Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 14. See A.R.S. §§ 13-4121 et seq.,
which provides a remedy for individuals who are unlawfully
committed, detained, confined, or restrained. But if a
convicted defendant files a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
(or an application with a different title) that seeks relief
available under Rule 32, the petition or application will be
treated as a petition for post-conviction relief.
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.3 cmt.
¶10 Our statutory law drives home the point that Lewis’ filing is
a request for post-conviction relief. Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-4233,
from which Rule 32.3(b) is derived, states:
A proceeding pursuant to this article is a part of the original
criminal action and not a separate action. It displaces and
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LEWIS v. SUPERIOR COURT, et al.
Decision of the Court
incorporates all trial court post-trial remedies except post-trial
motions and habeas corpus.
If a defendant applies for a writ of habeas corpus in a court
having jurisdiction of his person attacking the validity of his
conviction or sentence, that court pursuant to this article shall
transfer the cause to the court where the defendant was
convicted or sentenced and that court shall treat it as a petition
for relief under this article and the procedures of this article apply.
A.R.S. § 13-4233 (emphases added). As the statute makes clear, the superior
court must treat Lewis’ mislabeled special action as the request for post-
conviction relief it actually is.
CONCLUSION
¶11 Because A.R.S. § 13-4233 and Rule 32.3(b) require that the
court treat Lewis’ putative special action petition as one for post-conviction
relief, the superior court abused its discretion by dismissing Lewis’ petition.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AA
5