James R. Penny v. City of Winterset and Christian Dekker

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 22-1026
Filed June 7, 2023

JAMES R. PENNY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

CITY OF WINTERSET and CHRISTIAN DEKKER,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Madison County, Stacy Ritchie,

Judge.

A plaintiff appeals an adverse summary judgment ruling that dismissed his

claims for injuries sustained after a collision with a police cruiser. REVERSED

AND REMANDED.

Gary Dickey of Dickey, Campbell & Sahag Law Firm, PLC, Des Moines, for

appellant.

Zachary D. Clausen and Douglas L. Phillips of Klass Law Firm, L.L.P., Sioux

City, for appellees.

Heard by Greer, P.J., and Badding and Chicchelly, JJ.
 2

BADDING, Judge.

In this appeal from an adverse summary-judgment ruling, we are asked to

decide whether the district court erred in concluding as a matter of law that a police

officer who was responding to an emergency was not reckless in driving through

a stop sign at a highway intersection and crashing into a vehicle. See Iowa Code

§ 321.231 (2020). Because reasonable minds could differ on how this issue should

be resolved, we reverse the court’s ruling and remand for further proceedings.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

The crash that led to this litigation occurred just after sunset on an overcast

evening in March 2018 at the intersection of Highway 92 and N. 10th Street in

Winterset. The speed limit on Highway 92, which runs east to west and has no

traffic control devices, is fifty-five miles per hour. N. 10th Street has a twenty-five-

mile-per-hour speed limit, with stop signs controlling north- and south-bound traffic.

N. 10th Street turns into Cedar Bridge Road north of Highway 92. The following

image depicts the intersection, marked by the red pin, where the collision occurred:

At roughly 8:20 p.m., Officer Christian Dekker of the Winterset Police

Department was at home eating supper when he received an emergency service
 3

call for an unconscious person at a nearby motel on Cedar Bridge Road. The

crash occurred minutes later while Dekker was responding to that call.

Traffic was light as Dekker headed north-bound on N. 10th Street toward its

intersection with Highway 92 in his police cruiser—with his emergency lights and

sirens activated. Meanwhile, James “Judd” Penny was traveling west-bound on

Highway 92 in his 1967 Chevrolet pickup, on his way to a high school rugby game.

When Penny was a few hundred yards away from the intersection at N. 10th St.,

he stopped for a second unit that was also responding to the emergency.1 Penny

got back on the highway and “was back up to full speed”—fifty to fifty-five miles

per hour—“fairly quickly after that.” As Penny neared the intersection, Dekker blew

through the stop sign at N. 10th Street and into the highway without stopping,

broadsiding Penny’s pickup with the cruiser’s front end. Neither saw the other

coming. Dekker suffered a laceration to his scalp, while Penny’s injuries were

more severe.

In March 2020, Penny sued the City of Winterset and Dekker, alleging

Dekker’s recklessness in the scope of his employment as a police officer caused

Penny damages. In time, the defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing

“[t]here is no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that . . . Dekker was

reckless.” They claimed it was undisputed that Dekker “believed he had a clear

view of the intersection” with “no reason to think that the way he was driving was

likely to result in harm to someone, or cause an accident” because he “did not

know that James Penny was approaching from his right.”

1The approximate point where Penny thought he pulled over for the other unit is
shown by the blue dot on the above image.
 4

In support of that claim, the defendants pointed to a witness statement

Dekker wrote a couple of hours after the crash, in which Dekker said:

Approximately 3-4 blocks from the intersection of Highway 92 and
10th Street, I saw as Officer Camp turned north onto Cedar Bridge
road also running code. I looked east to clear traffic, you can see
west bound traffic for 1/2–1/4 mile as you approach the intersection.
I didn’t see any vehicles approaching. I remember seeing 1 single
light, however, I believed it was part of a farm house on the North
side of 92. As I approached the intersection of 10th & 92, I cleared
left (East Bound) and proceeded into the intersection. As I entered
the intersection, there was a loud bang . . . .

At his deposition, Dekker explained that by “clearing the intersection,” he meant

that I looked to my right, to my left. Typically I would look several
times. In this instance I can see right for quite a ways, and so once
I cleared right and I determined there was nothing approaching me
from the right, then I went left, saw . . . one vehicle to the left and
determined it was far enough away and then proceeded through the
intersection.

Dekker’s deposition ended with his conclusion “that there was nobody there.

Obviously Mr. Penny was there, but it was my determination that he was not there

when I cleared to the right.” Based on these facts, the defendants argued in their

supporting brief that Dekker drove “with due regard for the safety of all persons”

and not with “reckless disregard for the safety of others,” so the defendants could

not be held liable. See id. § 321.231(5).

Penny resisted, arguing a genuine issue of material fact existed and should

be resolved by a jury on whether Dekker acted recklessly. He disputed whether

Dekker “look[ed] to the east before crossing Hwy 92 in derogation of the stop sign

on 10th St., because if he had looked he would have seen Judd Penny’s truck on

the highway.” And Penny contended that Dekker “did not look for cross traffic for
 5

a sufficient period of time to perceive whether any cars were on Hwy 92 before

crossing against the stop sign.”

In support of his resistance, Penny offered a crash data retrieval graph from

Dekker’s cruiser, which showed that Dekker was traveling at nearly sixty miles per

hour with the accelerator throttled at about thirty-five percent fifteen seconds

before the crash. The brake was applied in four separate intervals in the thirteen

seconds right before the crash, with vehicle speed decreasing to about thirty miles

per hour in that interval. But in the last second before the crash, Dekker agreed at

his deposition that he accelerated through the intersection, explaining: “I was

braking on the way down the hill, and then once I would deem that the intersection

was clear, I would cover the accelerator with my foot until I believed it was okay to

proceed through that intersection and then I would accelerate through the

intersection, yes.” The technical collision investigation from the Iowa State Patrol

confirmed Dekker’s recollection, noting that data from the cruiser’s “black box”

showed

that approximately 5 seconds before the crash, Officer Dekker was
traveling at 44 mph and was applying the brake. Approximately 2
seconds before the crash, Officer Dekker was traveling 30 mph with
no brake applied. At the time of the collision, Officer Dekker was
traveling approximately 25 mph with no brake applied.

Penny submitted two expert reports with his resistance. Forensic expert

David Billington discussed Dekker’s speed in the seconds before the collision and

found that he “made no effort to stop or proceed with caution at the stop sign, but

rather enter[ed] the intersection with approaching cross traffic at a speed which

was higher than the posted 25 mph speed limit.” He also concluded “[t]he evidence

is clear that Mr. Penny was approaching the intersection and was fully available to
 6

be seen by Officer Dekker,” and Dekker “did not afford himself the time necessary

to properly discern [whether] the lights he saw was a building or an approaching

vehicle.” Billington believed Dekker should have slowed down, assessed the

intersection, and determined whether approaching vehicles were yielding. He

concluded that Dekker caused the collision “by a lack of experience or the

intentional disregard for the safety of the general motoring public” and stated his

actions were reckless.

Penny’s other expert witness, accident reconstructionist Todd Hall, said that

after reviewing law enforcement documents and video,2 he would “[o]pine that

there is no evidence to indicate that Officer Dekker was unable to see Judd Penny

in the several seconds leading up to the collision—that he had enough time to stop

because Penny was able to be seen.” At his deposition, when asked whether his

truck’s headlights were working, Penny testified: “I know in the video you can see

the lights pretty clearly . . . .” Later, he reiterated that he had reviewed “a video of

the approaching police car, and you can see my—my truck and the two lights.”

Penny continued: “The camera shows [a] full view of the highway. He would have

had full view of me. He was up on the hill, like an eagle eye view. He could see

everything.” For his part, Penny said that he was “just proceeding through the

intersection as [he] always would” with no expectation that somebody would “be

coming through the stop sign.” As he looked back on the accident, Penny “counted

the seconds and from the time that [Dekker] was coming down the hill and would

have seen me and the rate of speed that I was going, there was just no time.”

2No videos, from the police cruiser’s dash cam or otherwise were submitted to the
district court as part of the summary judgment record.
 7

A brief hearing was held in May 2022, following which the district court

issued a ruling granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and

dismissing the action. Relying on Bell v. Community Ambulance Service Agency

for Northern Des Moines County3 and Estate of Fritz v. Henningar,4 the court

reasoned that because Dekker did not have to navigate through traffic, did not

accelerate as he went through the intersection, and “did not have reason to believe

that any vehicle nearby was unlikely to yield to his emergency lights and siren,”

“his assumption that the path in front of him would remain clear was reasonable.”

The court concluded that “no reasonable jury could find that [Dekker’s] driving was

reckless under Iowa Code section 321.231.” Penny appeals.

II. Standard of Review

“The standard of review for district court rulings on summary judgment is for

correction of errors of law.” Kunde v. Est. of Bowman, 920 N.W.2d 803, 806

(Iowa 2018). Summary judgment is appropriate only when the moving party has

shown “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving

party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3). “In

determining whether a grant of summary judgment was appropriate, we examine

the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, drawing all legitimate

inferences that may be drawn from the evidence in his or her favor.” Homan v.

Branstad, 887 N.W.2d 153, 163–64 (Iowa 2016). “Where reasonable minds can

differ on how an issue should be resolved, a fact question has been generated,

3579 N.W.2d 330 (Iowa 1998).
419 F.4th 1067 (8th Cir. 2021); No. C19-2046-LTS, 2020 WL 6845944 (N.D. Iowa
Nov. 20, 2020).
 8

and summary judgment should not be granted.” GreatAm. Fin. Servs. Corp. v.

Natalya Rodionova Med. Care, P.C., 956 N.W.2d 148, 153 (Iowa 2021) (citation

omitted).

III. Analysis

Iowa Code section 321.231(1) “provides liability protections to drivers of

emergency vehicles in certain situations,” including where, as here, the driver of

an authorized emergency vehicle is “responding to an emergency call.” Martinez

v. State, 986 N.W.2d 121, 123 (Iowa 2023). Police vehicles using an audio or

visual signaling device, like Dekker was, may “[p]roceed past a . . . stop sign, but

only after slowing down as may be necessary for safe operation,” and “[e]xceed

the maximum speed limits so long as the driver does not endanger life or

property.”5 Iowa Code § 321.231(3), (4). These protections do not, however,

“relieve the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle . . . from the duty to

drive . . . with due regard for the safety of all persons, nor shall such provisions

protect the driver . . . from the consequences of the driver’s . . . reckless disregard

for the safety of others.” Id. § 321.231(5). “An emergency vehicle operator who

harms another person by driving with reckless disregard for the safety of others

thus may be held liable for civil damages.” Martinez, 986 N.W.2d at 124.

A plaintiff seeking recovery based on actions of a driver of an authorized

emergency vehicle must show the protected actions were performed in a reckless

manner. See Hoffert v. Luze, 578 N.W.2d 681, 685 (Iowa 1998).

To prove recklessness under the statute, a plaintiff must show that
the officer “has intentionally done an act of an unreasonable

5 It is undisputed that Dekker was driving an emergency vehicle with his lights and
siren activated while responding to an emergency call.
 9

character in disregard of a risk known to [the officer] or so obvious
that [the officer] must be taken to have been aware of it.” And even
then, the officer can only be liable if the dangerous act was “so great
as to make it highly probable that harm would follow.”

Martinez, 986 N.W.2d at 124 (alterations in original) (internal citation omitted). This

is a difficult standard to meet, id. at 125, as shown by the two cases the district

court relied on in entering summary judgment against Penny—Bell and Fritz.6

Bell involved the question of whether an ambulance driver acted recklessly

when transporting a patient to a medical center. See 579 N.W.2d at 331. On his

way to the center, the driver radioed dispatch “and requested the traffic lights on

Roosevelt Avenue be changed from the normal traffic cycle to flashing red in all

directions.” Id. at 322. Dispatch complied with the request, and the driver

proceeded south on Roosevelt Avenue at about forty miles per hour. Id. At the

same time, the plaintiff was traveling west on Kirkwood Street, with “her windows

rolled up and her radio on.” Id. “As she approached the flashing red lights at the

intersection of Kirkwood and Roosevelt, traffic was heavy.” Id. The plaintiff

6 These appear to be the only cases under section 321.231 on the issue of
recklessness in an emergency response. There are other cases implicating the
statute that involve high-speed chases but, because of the factual differences
between that type of situation versus emergency responses, they provide little
guidance on the question presented here. See Martinez, 986 N.W.2d at 122–23;
Morris v. Leaf, 534 N.W.2d 388, 388–91 (Iowa 1995); Dooley v. City of Cedar
Rapids, No. 09-1926, 2011 WL 1135794, at *1–6 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2011).
McClennan v. Orlando Ramirez is an emergency response case, but the
section 321.231 protections did not apply there because the officer was not using
his lights or siren. See No. 18-1974, 2019 WL 2375244, at *3–4 (Iowa Ct. App.
June 5, 2019). Hoffert is an emergency response case as well, but it only clarified
that recklessness is the applicable standard of care, without applying that
standard. See 578 N.W.2d at 685. Because Hoffert overruled the negligence
standard that had been applied in past cases, the emergency response cases
predating Hoffert are also not that helpful. See id. (overruling Rush v. Sioux City,
240 N.W.2d 431 (Iowa 1976), City of Cedar Rapids v. Moses, 223 N.W.2d 263
(Iowa 1974), and Wetz v. Thorpe, 215 N.W.2d 350 (Iowa 1974)).
 10

stopped at the intersection and checked for traffic in both directions but, due to

traffic, neither she nor the ambulance driver could see each other. Id. The plaintiff

proceeded into the intersection and was hit by the ambulance. Id.

The plaintiff filed suit and successfully obtained a verdict in her favor, with

a jury finding that the ambulance driver’s conduct was reckless. See id. However,

the district court granted the defendants’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the

verdict, finding there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict. Id. at 333.

In its ruling, the court noted the evidence showed it was daytime and sunny, traffic

was heavy, the ambulance slowed down while approaching the intersection, red

lights were flashing at the intersection, the ambulance driver checked traffic in both

directions before proceeding, “other vehicles were able to either hear or see the

ambulance as it approached,” and the ambulance driver “had a clear view of the

intersection and all traffic was stopped as he approached it.” Id. at 334–35. On

these facts, the court reasoned the driver did not create “a situation in which the

risk of harm to others was probable.” Id. at 337. The supreme court agreed in

summary fashion, concluding: “The evidence in this case cannot be said to

constitute substantial evidence of recklessness” to support the jury’s verdict. Id.

at 338.

Fritz also involved an emergency response at an intersection where the

plaintiff was subject to a traffic control device. 2020 WL 6845944, at *2. In that

case, a police officer was responding to a fight in progress. Id. The officer entered

a two-lane highway, Highway 150, traveling north and “accelerated quickly with his

lights and siren activated.” Id. At least two vehicles, one traveling north and one

traveling south, pulled off to the side of the roadway as the officer traversed the
 11

highway. Id. The intersection of Highways 150 and 18 is a busy four-way stop.

Id. The officer “claim[ed] he slowed slightly as he approached the intersection,

which was clear, and made eye contact with [the plaintiff] who was stopped on the

east side of the intersection before continuing through it.” Id. Thinking that the

plaintiff would yield to him, the officer “accelerated through the intersection,

reaching speeds as high as 60 mph, and collided with [the plaintiff] approximately

272 feet north of it.” Id.

Leading up to the accident, [the plaintiff] was waiting at the
stop sign of a business turnoff on the west side of Highway 150. He
waited for over 15 seconds to let three vehicles pass, one
northbound and two southbound. As the second southbound vehicle
was passing, [the plaintiff] began driving straight across Highway 150
toward a gas station on the opposite side. A little more than four
seconds later, [the plaintiff’s] truck was broadsided by [the officer’s]
police SUV while crossing the northbound lane of Highway 150.

Id. at *3 (internal citations and footnote omitted).

The defendants in Fritz moved for summary judgment, arguing the claim of

recklessness failed as a matter of law. Id. at *3. Though some of the evidence

was disputed, like whether the officer’s view was obstructed, the federal district

court concluded “no reasonable jury could find [the officer] knew, or should have

known, that his driving was so obviously dangerous that it was likely to cause an

accident.” Id. at *6. The court observed his “lane was clear as he approached and

accelerated through the intersection”; “[h]e did not know, nor was it reasonably

foreseeable, that a vehicle was likely to pull into his path”; “nearby vehicles were

obligated to yield and it was reasonable for [the officer] to believe that they would

do so.” Id. The Eighth Circuit agreed with this reasoning on appeal, finding “the

circumstances are almost identical” to Bell, since both involved an emergency
 12

vehicle traversing a straight and clear lane while nearby motorists could hear a

siren or see flashing lights. Fritz, 19 F.4th at 1070. If Bell did not involve

recklessness, the court reasoned, then neither could Fritz. Id.

The district court likewise concluded that if neither Bell nor Fritz involved

recklessness, then this case does not either. The court reasoned: “Similar to Fritz,

while the officer’s failure to see Mr. Penny’s approach into the intersection may

constitute negligence, he did not have reason to believe that any vehicle nearby

was unlikely to yield to his emergency lights and siren, thus resulting in harm to

another.” But, unlike the plaintiffs in Bell and Fritz, Penny was not subject to a

traffic control device and he was traveling at a high rate of speed on the highway

that Dekker was attempting to cross. This is a key factual distinction from those

cases on the question of recklessness.

With cross-traffic already stopped and the emergency vehicles using lights

and sirens, it was safe for the emergency drivers in Bell and Fritz to assume that

the clear lanes ahead of them would remain that way. As a result, they cannot be

said to have unreasonably acted in disregard of a known risk “so great as to make

it highly probable that harm would follow.” See Martinez, 986 N.W.2d at 124

(citation omitted). The risk was created by the civilian drivers—who had been

stationary—unforeseeably pulling out in front of the emergency vehicles, despite

being subject to a traffic control device with the added duty to yield to the

emergency vehicle under Iowa Code section 321.324.

Here, however, it was not safe for Dekker to assume the path in front of him

was clear or would be clear because of motorists’ duty to yield to him. Dekker

claimed that he looked to his right before proceeding through the stop sign at the
 13

intersection but did not see Penny approaching. He recalled seeing only one

stationary light, which he thought was a farmhouse some distance away from the

intersection. Yet opinions from Penny’s experts state that Penny was fully visible

from Dekker’s vantage point and that Dekker should have seen him. See Feld v.

Borkowski, 790 N.W.2d 72, 80–81 (Iowa 2010) (finding an expert’s affidavit gave

rise to a reasonable inference of recklessness in summary judgment proceedings).

Penny testified to the same at his deposition, pointing out that Dekker was coming

down a hill, from which he would have had an “eagle eye” view of the highway and

Penny’s approaching headlights, which were visible on video from the crash. The

defendants offered no evidence to dispute these facts, aside from Dekker’s

conclusory statement that he “determined that nobody was there,” even though

Penny was. And it was undisputed that Penny was traveling around the speed

limit of fifty-five miles per hour—a speed at which he would have trouble yielding

to an emergency vehicle unexpectedly entering the highway from his left.

Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Penny, a reasonable

jury could find that Penny was visible to Dekker and that Dekker did not sufficiently

scan the intersection—if at all—before accelerating through the stop sign without

braking. While Penny had a statutory duty to yield to Dekker under

section 321.324(3), his failure to do so does not relieve Dekker “from the duty to

drive with due regard for the safety of all persons using the highway.” Iowa Code

§ 321.324(4). Emergency drivers can only run stop signs “after slowing down as

may be necessary for safe operation,” see id. § 321.231(3)(a), which could include

coming to a full stop if the circumstances demand it, like where a vehicle that is not

subject to a traffic control device is traveling at a high rate of speed on a highway
 14

the emergency driver is trying to cross. If Dekker went through the intersection

without sufficiently assessing it, which is a legitimate inference from evidence

showing that Penny was visible from Dekker’s vantage point and traveling at a non-

yielding speed, then doing so could be considered an intentional act in disregard

of a risk so obvious that Dekker must be taken to have been aware of it, and so

great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow. Martinez, 986 N.W.2d

at 124.

Overall, we find a genuine issue of material fact remains on whether Dekker

sufficiently scanned the intersection before proceeding through the stop sign

consistent with his “duty to drive . . . with due regard for the safety of all persons,”

or whether his failure to do so amounted to “reckless disregard for the safety of

others.” Iowa Code § 321.231(5). Because reasonable minds could differ on

whether Dekker acted recklessly, this is a triable issue for the jury to decide. See

Siesseger v. Puth, 248 N.W. 352, 357 (Iowa 1933) (“Recklessness is an inference

of fact to be drawn from the evidence offered, and is a matter for the determination

of the jury.”); cf. Oddo v. City of Buffalo, 72 N.Y.S.3d 706, 708 (N.Y. App. Div.

2018) (finding issue of whether officer sufficiently slowed down before intersection

“presents an issue of fact whether he acted with reckless disregard for the safety

of others”(citation omitted)); Corallo v. Martino, 873 N.Y.S.2d 102, 103 (N.Y. App.

Div. 2009) (affirming denial of summary judgment where issues of fact remained

on whether officer, against a red light, “checked for oncoming traffic before entering

the intersection”); Glenn v. Columbus, 72 N.E.3d 124, 132 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016)

(affirming denial of summary judgment because reasonable jury could conclude

that emergency vehicle entering intersection against a red light “despite an
 15

observable vehicle continuing to move toward the intersection, constituted

reckless conduct”); Zapata v. City of Gonzales, No. 13-18-00065-CV, 2020 WL

486489, at *5 (Tex. App. Jan. 30, 2020) (“Under this version of events, Officer

Tunis drove through the intersection on a red light without slowing his vehicle or

waiting for the cross-traffic to yield. This evidence raises a fact issue as to whether

Officer Tunis’s conduct was reckless.”).

IV. Conclusion

We reverse the entry of summary judgment and remand for further

proceedings, concluding genuine issues of material fact remain that preclude the

defendants’ entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Chicchelly, J., concurs; Greer, P.J., dissents.
 16

GREER, Judge (dissenting).

I dissent from the majority opinion and would affirm the grant of summary

judgment given the application of these facts to the legal issues presented. Drilling

down to the core issue, the city of Winterset and its police officer Christian Dekker

argued there was no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find Dekker was

reckless. The district court agreed. On appeal, James “Judd” Penny argues the

district court referenced the correct standard of review but failed to apply it when it

did not consider the facts in the light most favorable to Penny. With due

consideration of that argument, the facts do not support a finding of recklessness

on the part of the driver, Officer Dekker, and so summary judgment as a matter of

law was appropriate.

To start, there is strong evidence that Officer Dekker’s conduct was

negligent in the operation of his police vehicle on the night of the accident with

Penny. But that concession does not answer the question presented here. The

key to this decision is the application of Iowa Code section 321.231, which gives

Dekker, as the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle, certain privileges. See

Iowa Code § 321.231(1) (2020). The driver of a police vehicle may (a) “[p]roceed

past a . . . stop sign, but only after slowing down as may be necessary for safe

operation” and (b) “[e]xceed the maximum speed limits so long as the driver does

not endanger life or property.” Id. § 321.231(3)(a), (b). Yet, the emergency vehicle

driver must drive “with due regard for the safety of all persons,” and the statute

does not “protect the driver . . . from the consequences of the driver’s . . . reckless

disregard for the safety of others.” Id. § 321.231(5) (emphasis added). While I

recognize that this statute comes with “limitations that balance public safety
 17

interests,” the standard of care for claims under this section is “recklessness.” See

Martinez v. State, 986 N.W.2d 121, 123–24 (Iowa 2023).

With the standard at hand, we focus on Dekker’s behavior to see if he

willfully or wantonly disregarded the safety of others and whether the danger was

so obvious from the facts that Dekker should have known or reasonably foreseen

that harm would flow from his actions. See Bell v. Cmty. Ambulance Serv. Agency

for N. Des Moines Cnty., 579 N.W.2d 330, 335 (Iowa 1998). To set out examples

of recklessness, Bell described two scenarios. In one case, a driver operated a

vehicle with actual knowledge the brakes were virtually useless although earlier

warned not to drive it. Id. at 335 (referencing State v. Cox, 500 N.W.2d 23, 26

(Iowa 1993)). Similarly, in the other case, a driver operated a vehicle knowing

about its deteriorated brakes that caused him to run through a stoplight and into a

school zone crosswalk, hitting a child. Id. (referencing State v. Conyers, 506

N.W.2d 442 (Iowa 1993)). As these cases highlight, the recklessness standard

requires that we look to find if the actor “has intentionally done an act of an

unreasonable character in disregard of a risk known to or so obvious that he must

be taken to have been aware of it, and so great as to make it highly probable that

harm would follow.” Thompson v. Bohlken, 312 N.W.2d 501, 504–05 (Iowa 1981)

(emphasis added) (quoting William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 34

(4th ed.1971)). Requiring more than negligence or want of ordinary care, finding

reckless behavior requires “evidence of defendant’s knowledge, actual or

chargeable, of danger and proceeding without any heed of or concern for

consequences.” Bell, 579 N.W.2d at 336. To support a fact question over

recklessness, the majority lists cases involving intersection crashes in jurisdictions
 18

where a recklessness standard applies and where summary judgment was denied.

I find those distinguishable to this case because they involve congested

intersections where an intent to enter with less than full vision of possible traffic

involved a potentially reckless choice by the emergency vehicle operator.

Here, traffic was almost non-existent, it was dark out, and Officer Dekker

was driving with flashing overhead lights and his siren on. He looked both ways

before entering the intersection of North 10th Avenue and Highway 92 and spotted

a light that he believed came from a farmhouse on the north side of Highway 92.

Given that assessment, he believed no traffic to be coming from that direction that

would impede his free travel through the intersection. From the other view, he

recognized an approaching vehicle but assessed it as too far away to be a concern.

It is unrefuted in the record that he believed the intersection was clear of any

potential danger before entering. To me, these facts support Dekker’s negligence,

just as Penny was negligent for failing to see Dekker and pull over, and the lack of

care on each of their parts did not involve intentionality as they both believed the

intersection was clear.

This would be a far different case if the officer saw the car coming and

wanted to beat it, went through a busy intersection without checking for vehicles

that could not be seen, or assumed that a car would stop just because of the

activated emergency lights and sirens—all behavior that might be considered

reckless. “[R]ecklessness is a difficult standard to meet in Iowa.” Martinez, 986

N.W.2d at 125 (citation omitted). It has not been met here.

Finally, I address Penny’s argument that the facts in the light most favorable

to him preclude summary judgment because he has two experts that support a
 19

recklessness finding, thus there is a factual dispute to resolve at a trial. In a motor

vehicle collision case, opinions should help establish facts in dispute and not

answer a legal question. “[Q]uestions such as whether a defendant was negligent

or not negligent are improper because ‘[e]xperts are not to state opinions as to

legal standards.’” Haskenhoff v. Homeland Energy Sols., LLC, 897 N.W.2d 553,

600 (Iowa 2017) (citation omitted) (second alteration in original). To that point, the

reckless standard is a legal question—not to be decided by expert. Yet, as the

majority notes, an expert may provide a basis for a “reasonable inference of

recklessness” for summary judgment purposes. See Feld v. Borkowski, 790

N.W.2d 72, 80–81 (Iowa 2010) (noting the expert’s attempt to replicate the

occurrence involving the thrown baseball bat causing injury led him to a conclusion

that the batter “must have deliberately released the bat in a very abnormal,

contorted act of recklessness” (emphasis added)).

So, we review what facts we know in the light most favorable to Penny.

Along with expert opinions that Penny brought to the table, a formal investigation

confirmed Dekker’s speeds. Iowa State Trooper David Wonders investigated and

authored a technical collision investigation report. He could only do a speed

determination for Dekker’s vehicle and noted:

SPEED DETERMINATION: On April 16th, 2018, the ACM and
PCM[7] were downloaded from Officer Dekker’s vehicle. PCM
information shows that approximately 5 seconds before the crash,
Officer Dekker was traveling at 44 mph and was applying the brake.
Approximately 2 seconds before the crash, Officer Dekker was
traveling 30 mph with no brake applied. At the time of the collision,
Officer Dekker was traveling approximately 25 mph with no brake
applied.

7The only reference to explain these codes in the record is that they go to the
vehicle’s “black box information.”
 20

Penny certified in answers to interrogatories that he was traveling “possibly”

twenty-five miles per hour when he entered the intersection. Later in his

deposition, he changed that answer to assert his speed upon entry to the

intersection was more likely forty-five to fifty-five miles per hour. His expert’s report

had him traveling between fifty to fifty-five miles per hour. Neither Penny nor

Dekker saw the other. Penny’s experts—Daniel Billington, a forensic expert, and

Todd Hall, a technical accident investigator—offer facts Penny asserts raise a fact

question over the recklessness claim. First, Hall opined “there is no evidence

Officer Dekker was unable to see Judd Penny in the several seconds leading up

to the collision—that he had enough time to stop because Penny was able to be

seen.” Again, Officer Dekker did not exercise due care when he failed to see

Penny, but this failure does not lead to a recklessness finding, so Hall’s report

offers no evidence of recklessness. Next, Penny attached what appears to be a

speed calculation graph (Crash Data Retrieval) but offered no report or affidavit

that interprets the data or explains the findings. Again, all evidence confirmed that

Officer Dekker was traveling in excess of the speed limit on an emergency call, but

his speed is not reckless behavior under the circumstances without more.

Assuming the intersection was clear of all traffic, as he and Penny believed, no

one would label Dekker’s speed alone as reckless.

Finally, most of the forensic expert Billington’s opinions discussed Dekker’s

speed and that he failed to react appropriately to the Penny vehicle before reaching

the intersection because he did not see Penny—noting Dekker was required to

“expect the unexpected.” The opinions that Dekker should have seen Penny are
 21

those that support negligence and so while Penny’s experts point out potentially

negligent actions of Officer Dekker, they do not present a factual pattern that

resembles reckless behavior as a matter of law. While it is clear both Dekker’s

and Penny’s actions raise questions of negligence for failing to see each other,

that negligent behavior cannot be elevated to recklessness without the intent

requirement expressed in our case law. See Dooley v. City of Cedar Rapids,

No. 09-1926, 2011 WL 1135794, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2011)

(“[S]ection 321.231 requires a level of culpability beyond mere negligence to

support liability.”). In the end, all parties concede that Dekker was responding to

an emergency call involving a non-responsive person, had emergency lights and

sirens in operation, both parties failed to see the other before colliding, and Dekker

was traveling in excess of the speed limit but slowed as he approached the

intersection controlled by a stop sign impacting Dekker’s travel. In the worst case,

Dekker’s actions were negligent, but there is no showing that elevates that

behavior to recklessness.