In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
Nos. 21-2811 & 22-1003
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
KHALIL M. JACKSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.
No. 3:20-cr-00076-DRL-MGG-1—Damon R. Leichty, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED NOVEMBER 29, 2022 — DECIDED JUNE 16, 2023
____________________
Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and HAMILTON and BRENNAN,
Circuit Judges.
HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. A jury found defendant-appel-
lant Khalil Jackson guilty on charges of sex-trafficking a minor
(“Jane Doe”), child pornography, and cyberstalking. On ap-
peal Jackson seeks a new trial on two grounds. First, he con-
tends the district court erred by denying his motion to sup-
press incriminating statements he made to police in his first
interview with them. Second, he contends he was entitled to
2 Nos. 21-2811 & 22-1003
a jury instruction limiting the use of voicemails in which he
threatened Doe and her family. Finding no error, we affirm.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
A. Jackson’s Trafficking of Doe
Jane Doe’s story illustrates how human traffickers prey on
their victims. See generally United States v. Jackson, 535 F.
Supp. 3d 809 (N.D. Ind. 2021) (ruling on motions in limine,
including on government’s proposed expert on tactics and ef-
fects of human trafficking). After Doe’s father went to prison
for child molesting, she was raised by her mother and grand-
parents. Doe often felt alone. When she was seventeen years
old, her sister introduced her to Khalil Jackson, then twenty-
four years old. Knowing that Doe was a survivor of sexual as-
sault, Jackson assured Doe that she was “his best friend,” that
he was going to “protect” her, and that “he was never going
to let anybody touch” her again. Jackson pursued a relation-
ship with Doe and tried to undermine her relationship with
her family. He eventually helped her run away from home.
When Doe was still seventeen, Jackson coaxed her into
prostitution for his benefit, picking up customers at gas sta-
tions, truck stops, and driveways, then taking them to apart-
ments, houses, and hotel rooms as arranged by Jackson. Tak-
ing the trafficking to a new level, Jackson began advertising
Doe’s services online, using nude photos of her and a video
of Jackson himself having sex with her. Jackson eventually
transported Doe across a state line for multiple encounters in
Michigan for more prostitution.
B. Doe Eventually Escapes
Doe tried to run away, but wherever she went, Jackson al-
ways seemed to be watching. He prevented her from calling
Nos. 21-2811 & 22-1003 3
her mother, destroyed her cell phone, and beat her more times
than Doe could count. Eventually, though, Doe’s friends and
family intervened. A family friend posted on social media that
the FBI was investigating Jackson. When Jackson discovered
this, Doe later testified, he “started freaking out,” said he
feared “the cops are coming,” and took Doe to a different ho-
tel where “the cops weren’t looking.” Then, Jackson beat Doe
and dragged her from his car, by her hair, into the road. A
friend saw her and took her home. Doe’s mother called the
police and took her to the hospital. Doe was bruised, blood-
ied, and in a neck brace. Doe spoke with police while in the
hospital but was too afraid of Jackson to report the trafficking.
Jackson then made threatening phone calls to Doe’s family
home. After Doe’s family stopped picking up the phone, Jack-
son left threats on voicemails. Three were eventually played
for the jury. He threatened to make people pay, to shoot up
the place, and to burn down the house. Doe and her family
took the threats seriously. Doe herself, who was familiar with
Jackson’s prior threats and beatings, was frightened to tears.
Doe’s grandfather was so frightened, he testified, that he
feared Jackson would “torch the house” while the family was
sleeping and burn them all alive.
C. The Police Investigation and Conviction
Responding to a report about possible human trafficking,
Saint Joseph County Detective Phillip Williams interviewed
Doe and her family. Doe’s grandfather shared Jackson’s
threatening voicemails. Doe gave Detective Williams the
phone numbers related to advertisements on an escort web-
site and a web-based texting app. The police collected records
of advertisements connected to those phone numbers. The po-
lice also obtained text messages and user data connected to
4 Nos. 21-2811 & 22-1003
those phone numbers, as well as evidence from three hotels
where Doe was trafficked. The police collected 400 advertise-
ments of Doe for prostitution, including nude photos, many
text messages inviting customers to locations for sex, a user
email address related to Jackson, and records documenting
Jackson checking into three hotels, often with another person.
The police then obtained a search warrant for Jackson’s
apartment. The police seized one cell phone that revealed
over 200 queries to the same escort website already identified,
as well as confirmations that advertisements had been up-
loaded. Detective Williams also interviewed Jackson at his
dining room table. Portions of that interview were the subject
of Jackson’s motion to suppress, discussed below.
A federal grand jury indicted Jackson on five charges: one
count of child sex-trafficking, one count of producing child
pornography, one count of possessing child pornography,
one count of transporting child pornography, and one count
of cyberstalking. See 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (child sex-trafficking);
18 U.S.C. §§ 2251–52 (child pornography); 18 U.S.C. § 2261A
(cyberstalking). A jury convicted Jackson on all counts. The
district court sentenced him to forty years in prison and de-
nied his motion for a new trial.
II. The Motion to Suppress
Jackson argues on appeal that the district court should
have granted his motion to suppress statements he made dur-
ing his interview with Detective Williams when his apartment
was searched. Jackson sought to suppress evidence that he
had a phone number that did not match his seized phone, that
he confirmed that he knew the email address and social media
details used to prostitute Doe, and that he knew Doe’s actual
Nos. 21-2811 & 22-1003 5
age. Jackson moved to suppress this evidence on the theory
that its use would violate his right to counsel and associated
rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and Ed-
wards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1980). United States v. Jackson,
No. 3:20-CR-00076 DRL, 2020 WL 6537217, at *1 (N.D. Ind.
Nov. 6, 2020).
Jackson disclosed the key points from the interview—his
phone number, his email, his social media contact, and his
knowledge of Doe’s age—after he had been given Miranda
warnings. Earlier in the interview, however, Jackson had told
Detective Williams he would “rather have a lawyer.” Id. Jack-
son contends that his “rather have a lawyer” statement was
sufficient to invoke his right to counsel, so that the continued
questioning violated his rights.
A. A Suspect’s Miranda Rights
To protect a criminal suspect’s privilege against com-
pelled self-incrimination and right to counsel, the suspect
“must be informed of, and voluntarily waive, his right to
counsel before being subject to custodial interrogation.”
United States v. Robinson, 586 F.3d 540, 545 (7th Cir. 2009), cit-
ing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. Once a suspect informs the police
that he wants to consult with a lawyer, all interrogation must
cease “until counsel has been made available to him.” Ed-
wards, 451 U.S. at 484–85. If the suspect’s request for counsel
is ambiguous or equivocal, though, “officers have no obliga-
tion to stop questioning him.” Davis v. United States, 512 U.S.
452, 461–62 (1994). Davis advised that “it will often be good
police practice for the interviewing officers to clarify whether
or not [the suspect] actually wants an attorney,” but the Court
stopped short of holding that the Constitution requires offic-
ers to ask clarifying questions. Id.
6 Nos. 21-2811 & 22-1003
When a suspect has clearly requested counsel, Edwards
holds that police must stop the interrogation, but Edwards also
teaches that a suspect may open the door to further interroga-
tion if the suspect himself initiates further communications
with the police. 451 U.S. at 484–85. A suspect initiates further
communication if he makes a statement demonstrating “a
willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about
the investigation,” and “not merely a necessary inquiry aris-
ing out of the incidents of the custodial relationship.” Oregon
v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045–46 (1983). If a suspect initiates
conversation again, that fact by itself “does not necessarily
constitute a waiver of his right to counsel.” Robinson, 586 F.3d
at 545. Before police may engage in an interrogation, the sus-
pect’s waiver must also be “knowing and intelligent and
found to be so under the totality of the circumstances.” Ed-
wards, 451 U.S. at 486 n.9.
We review de novo whether the defendant invoked his
right to counsel. United States v. Peters, 435 F.3d 746, 751 (7th
Cir. 2006). We review for clear error the factual questions
whether “the accused, not the police, reopened the dialogue
with the authorities” and whether a Miranda waiver was
knowing and intelligent. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 486 n.9, cited in
Robinson, 586 F.3d at 544–45 (reinitiation was factual issue);
Perri v. Director, Dep’t of Corrections, 817 F.2d 448, 451 (7th Cir.
1987) (knowing and intelligent waiver was factual issue). We
review de novo whether such a reinitiation and a knowing
and intelligent waiver were voluntary “under the totality of
the circumstances.” Robinson, 586 F.3d at 545.
B. The Detective’s Interview with Jackson
The recording of Detective Williams’ interview with Jack-
son shows he arguably invoked his right to counsel, but even
Nos. 21-2811 & 22-1003 7
if he did, he then immediately opened the door for further in-
terrogation by reinitiating conversation. Early in the inter-
view, before reading Miranda warnings, the detective told
Jackson that he was going to explain his rights to him. The
detective also said he wanted to talk to Jackson. Jackson re-
sponded twice through crosstalk that he would “rather” talk
to a lawyer, including responding to a direct question about
whether he wanted to talk to the detective:
Detective: I’m gonna advise you of your
rights. I’m gonna explain to you
why we’re here, ok. I want to
talk to you. I’m gonna ask you
not to lie. We are federal offic-
ers. If you lie to us, that’s a
crime in itself, and it’s not like
on the state side where—
Jackson: I’d just rather have a lawyer—
Detective: Okay
Jackson: —cause you guys are taking me
to jail.
Detective: You don’t want to talk to me at
all?
Jackson: I just, I’d rather talk to a lawyer.
You guys are taking me to jail.
What is there more I can do to
help myself?
In denying Jackson’s motion to suppress, the district court
wrote that, standing alone, “I’d rather have a lawyer” would
“fall somewhere between the unambiguous request of ‘can I
8 Nos. 21-2811 & 22-1003
have a lawyer’ and the ambiguous statement ‘maybe I should
get a lawyer.’” Jackson, 2020 WL 6537217, at *2. The district
court went on to conclude that Jackson’s following question—
“What is there more I can do to help myself?”—made the “ra-
ther have a lawyer” statement ambiguous. Id. at *3. The dis-
trict court found in this phrasing the “passive ambiguity” of
Melville’s Bartleby the Scrivener and focused on the contrac-
tion “I’d” for “I would rather have a lawyer,” in the “second
conditional tense,” which the court understood as expressing
perhaps only a “conditional preference.” Id. at *2–3.
We are less confident than the district judge was that Jack-
son chose his verb tense to address an unrealistic or unlikely
scenario, as strict grammarians might use that tense. The de-
tective was interrogating Jackson right then and there. Jack-
son had to make an immediate decision about whether to ex-
ercise his Miranda rights. In past cases, we have treated nearly
identical expressions as sufficient to invoke the right to coun-
sel. See United States v. Martin, 664 F.3d 684, 687, 689–90 (7th
Cir. 2011) (defendant’s statement that “I’d rather talk to an at-
torney first” before providing written statement was unam-
biguous request for counsel but was limited to providing
written statement; request for counsel did not apply to an-
swering questions orally); White v. Finkbeiner, 611 F.2d 186,
190 (7th Cir. 1979) (“I’d rather see an attorney” held to be a
request for counsel), quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444–45 (“If
[the accused] indicates in any manner and at any stage of the
process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before
speaking there can be no questioning.”); see also United States
v. Hill, 575 F. Supp. 3d 185, 195–96 (D.D.C. 2021); United States
v. Espinal-Cardona, 635 F. Supp. 330, 333 (D.N.J. 1986); State v.
Nos. 21-2811 & 22-1003 9
Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 139 (Minn. 1999); Booker v. State, 851
P.2d 544, 547 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993). 1
Nevertheless, we recognize that the district court was try-
ing to parse a very fast exchange between Jackson and the de-
tective. In the critical moments, both were sometimes talking
at once. Jackson barely took a breath between saying he
would rather have a lawyer and then asking: “What is there
more I can do to help myself?” As we explain next, that ques-
tion had the legal effect under Miranda and Edwards of open-
ing the interrogation back up, so in the end, we can decide this
appeal without deciding whether “I’d rather have a lawyer”
was or was not ambiguous under all the circumstances.
C. Jackson’s Reinitiation
“What is there more I can do to help myself?” Jackson
characterizes this phrase as a statement. The detective under-
stood it as a question. It sounded like a question to the district
court, and it sounds like a question to us, too. Whether a state-
ment or a question, though, Jackson initiated “further com-
munication, exchanges, or conversations with the police,”
1 Our White opinion had a long subsequent history concerning White’s
later initiation of further questioning, but the later opinions did not ques-
tion treating “I’d rather see an attorney” as a sufficient request for counsel.
The cited opinion was vacated for reconsideration in light of Edwards v.
Arizona. White v. Finkbeiner, 451 U.S. 1013 (1981). Our decision on remand,
687 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1982), was also vacated, that time for further consid-
eration in light of Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 643 (1984), which held that
Edwards was not retroactive. Fairman v. White, 465 U.S. 1075 (1984). In the
White case’s fourth visit to this court, White v. Finkbeiner, 753 F.2d 540, 545
(7th Cir. 1985), we ultimately denied habeas relief for White but did not
question whether he had initially invoked his right to counsel sufficiently
by saying he would “rather see an attorney.”
10 Nos. 21-2811 & 22-1003
Robinson, 586 F.3d at 545, and the detective did not provoke
him to do so.
The detective was then free to seek clarity on whether this
was a knowing and voluntary waiver. Davis, 512 U.S. at 461.
The detective told Jackson there were “two sides to every
story.” Jackson said, “I know that,” and continued talking. He
complained that people were jumping to conclusions over the
social media post by Doe’s family friend. He wondered aloud
why he was only now learning he was being investigated.
And he argued with the detective about the battery case
against him (when his beatings had sent Doe to the hospital),
and why he was not being told why he was being arrested. At
several points in the next few minutes, the detective explained
to Jackson that he did not have to answer questions and could
speak with an attorney. Jackson said he understood. For ex-
ample:
Detective: I was getting ready to tell you
and explain all that to you and
you said you wanted an attor-
ney. Now, if you want an attor-
ney, that’s fine. If you want to
talk to me, you can talk to me.
And if we get to a question you
don’t want to answer, don’t an-
swer it.
Jackson: I understand that.
The detective later explained: “There’s always two sides to
every story. If you have information that can exonerate you,
give it to me. I’ll investigate it. It’s just as much my job to prove
that you’re innocent, if you’re saying you’re innocent, as that
Nos. 21-2811 & 22-1003 11
you’re guilty.” The detective said: “If you want to talk to me
and explain your side, fine. If you want an attorney, that’s fine
too.” Jackson continued to complain that he had go to jail
“without knowing” whether “you guys might find something
incriminating.” The detective tried to clarify: “Do you want
me to read your rights, or do you want to answer any ques-
tions at all, or would you prefer at this point to have a law-
yer?” This was met with no direct answer.
After these multiple attempts at clarification, the detective
tried to clarify once more whether Jackson was willing to talk.
Jackson agreed to keep talking:
Detective: Are you saying you’re willing to
talk to me? I need you to be clear
on that.
Jackson: I just wanna know what’s—of
course I’m willing to talk to you.
Jackson then complained that the only time he had been to jail
was when he had done something illegal. Moments later, the
detective read Jackson his full Miranda warnings, which Jack-
son said he understood.
After those warnings, Jackson made the incriminating ad-
missions he argues should have been suppressed: a phone
number that did not match his seized phone, as well as his
email address and his social media profiles. He also admitted
that he knew Doe had turned eighteen only recently. Thirty
minutes after the conversation started, Jackson finally said, “I
want a lawyer now.” Jackson made no further admissions.
We agree with the district court’s alternative holding that,
if Jackson’s “I’d rather talk to a lawyer” statement invoked his
12 Nos. 21-2811 & 22-1003
Miranda rights, then under the totality of the circumstances,
Jackson knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to coun-
sel during the interrogation by immediately initiating “fur-
ther communication, exchanges, or conversations with the
police.” Jackson, 2020 WL 6537217, at *3, citing Edwards, 451
U.S. at 484–85. Jackson continued asking the detective ques-
tions about the warrant and charges against him. Even after
the detective several times informed Jackson that he did not
have to talk to him, Jackson still said, “I understand that” and
“of course I’m willing to talk to you.” See Perri, 817 F.2d at 452
(defendant understanding the questions “sufficient to find
valid waiver”). Jackson initiated further conversation and
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to
counsel.
Jackson argues that the detective provoked him into dis-
closing his cell phone number, email address, and social me-
dia profiles, citing, for example, United States v. Wysinger, 683
F.3d 784, 801 (7th Cir. 2012), where we held that officers im-
properly continued a custodial interrogation after the suspect
had invoked his right to counsel. Unlike the circumstances in
Wysinger, though, Jackson’s admissions were not provoked.
Jackson was the person who kept the conversation going after
saying he would rather talk to an attorney. The district court
did not err by denying Jackson’s motion to suppress his ad-
missions about his email address, his phone number and so-
cial media profiles, or his knowledge that Doe had been a mi-
nor when he was trafficking her. 2
2 After Jackson said, “I want a lawyer now,” the detective tried to pro-
voke him into continuing to answer questions. Jackson said nothing
Nos. 21-2811 & 22-1003 13
D. Harmless Error
Even if we assume Jackson unambiguously asserted his
right to counsel with his statement that he would rather have
a lawyer, and even if he had not reinitiated the interrogation,
we are also satisfied that any constitutional error would have
been harmless. The interrogation did not produce a confes-
sion to the crimes. It produced admissions of three pieces of
information: that Jackson used another phone number that
did not match his seized phone, that he knew the email ad-
dress and social media details used to prostitute Doe, and that
he knew Doe’s actual age. This evidence was helpful to the
prosecution, but it was not decisive in the trial. Without those
details, the rest of the evidence against Jackson was still
simply overwhelming: hundreds of visits to the escort web-
site, hundreds of advertisements of Doe for prostitution, in-
cluding nude photos and the video of Jackson himself having
sex with Doe, many text messages inviting customers to loca-
tions for sex, direct documentation of hotel check-ins, and di-
rect testimony from Doe herself describing Jackson’s traffick-
ing, beatings, and pornography, from gas stations to drive-
ways to apartments, from hotels to cars to truck stops, and
from Indiana to Michigan to the internet. We are convinced
that any arguable constitutional error in denying the motion
to suppress was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
III. The Limiting Instruction Issue
At trial the court admitted into evidence three voicemail
recordings of Jackson’s threats to Doe’s family. These
voicemails were properly admitted to prove the cyberstalking
further of any substance, and no responses to those provocations were ad-
mitted against Jackson at trial.
14 Nos. 21-2811 & 22-1003
charge. Jackson asked the court for a limiting instruction tell-
ing the jury to consider the voicemails only on that charge.
The district court denied that request. We find no error.
On appeal, Jackson argues that, with respect to the hu-
man-trafficking and child-pornography charges, the threaten-
ing voicemails were “other acts,” inadmissible under Federal
Rule of Evidence 404. That rule governs character evidence
and evidence of a person’s other acts not directly at issue in
the trial. Rule 404(b)(1) provides: “Evidence of any other
crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove a person’s
character in order to show that on a particular occasion the
person acted in accordance with the character.” If character is
not the only purpose of other-acts evidence, Rule 404(b)(2) al-
lows some use of evidence of other bad acts for specific pur-
poses in criminal cases. The Rule mentions motive, oppor-
tunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence
of mistake, and lack of accident. If the evidence of other acts
is admitted for one of those purposes, a defendant who re-
quests a limiting instruction is entitled to one. United States v.
Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 860 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
When evidence is admissible for one purpose but not an-
other, “the court, on timely request, must restrict the evidence
to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.” Fed. R.
Evid. 105. The decisive question here is whether the district
court abused its discretion in treating the threatening
voicemails as relevant to the human-trafficking and child-por-
nography charges. See United States v. Mokol, 646 F.3d 479,
483–84 (7th Cir. 2011). 3
3
Jackson’s first request for a limiting instruction did not specifically
invoke Rule 404, and the prosecutor said the voicemails were “an example
Nos. 21-2811 & 22-1003 15
We find no abuse of discretion. Jackson’s threatening
voicemails were evidence of witness intimidation. They were
direct evidence to prove the human-trafficking and child-por-
nography charges, so Rule 404(b) does not apply here. “[C]on-
duct taken for the purpose of thwarting discovery of the crime
or postponing the investigation of the crime is part of the
charged crime.” United States v. Bowling, 952 F.3d 861, 869 (7th
Cir. 2020). This category of evidence includes attempts to
threaten witnesses, potential witnesses, or people cooperating
with a government investigation of the charged conduct. See
United States v. Miller, 276 F.3d 370, 373 (7th Cir. 2002); accord,
e.g., United States v. Carson, 870 F.3d 584, 599–601 (7th Cir.
2017) (defendant’s threats to victims of sex trafficking were
direct evidence of crime, not subject to Rule 404(b)); Mokol,
646 F.3d at 483–84 (threats to prosecution witness were direct
evidence, not subject to Rule 404(b)), quoting United States v.
DeAngelo, 13 F.3d 1228, 1232 (8th Cir. 1994); see also United
States v. Balzano, 916 F.2d 1273, 1280–82 (7th Cir. 1990) (de-
fendant’s threat to cooperating witness was direct evidence of
other charges, not subject to severance for separate trials).
Jackson left the voicemail messages only after Doe had
made her escape and after he committed his child-pornogra-
phy offenses. He contends this timing means the evidence of
his threats could be evidence of human trafficking and child
of his character.” Dkt. Entry 101 at 349 (emphasis added). The district judge
responded to that bobble by clarifying that the prosecutor intended to use
the voicemails “as reflective of his conduct in the past that was used to
coerce her on the other counts.” Given the prosecutor’s reference to char-
acter, which the rule prohibits, Jackson’s request was sufficiently clear to
preserve the issue for appellate review. See Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(1)(B) (ev-
idence objection may be preserved if ground “was apparent from the con-
text”); see also United States v. Holt, 460 F.3d 934, 936–37 (7th Cir. 2006).
16 Nos. 21-2811 & 22-1003
pornography only on a propensity or bad-character theory.
Similar timing arguments could have been made in Carson,
Mokol, and Balzano. A threat to a witness to a crime is admis-
sible as direct evidence of that crime, even if, or especially if,
the threat is made after the crime is committed.
Jackson also argues that the district court should have is-
sued a limiting instruction on the theory that, without such
instruction, the danger of unfair prejudice substantially out-
weighed the probative value of the evidence. Federal Rule of
Evidence 403 gives the trial judge discretion to exclude rele-
vant evidence “if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by a danger” of unfair prejudice. “Unfair prejudice”
includes “an undue tendency to suggest decision on an im-
proper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emo-
tional one.” Id. 1972 Advisory Committee Notes. We assume
for purposes of argument that the rationale of Rule 403 may
extend to a call for a limiting instruction where admissible ev-
idence may pose a high risk of unfair prejudice if used for a
particular purpose.
As a general proposition, we recognize that evidence of a
defendant’s threats to witnesses may pose a danger of unfair
prejudice. Threats are a “striking example of evidence that ap-
peals to the jury’s sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, pro-
vokes its instinct to punish, or otherwise may cause a jury to
base its decision on something other than the established
propositions in the case.” United States v. Thomas, 86 F.3d 647,
654 (7th Cir. 1996), quoting United States v. Guerrero, 803 F.2d
783, 785 (3d Cir. 1986). Nevertheless, reliable evidence of
threats can be probative of a defendant’s consciousness of
guilt, and we see nothing unfairly prejudicial in admitting
threats that defendant Jackson intentionally recorded to try to
Nos. 21-2811 & 22-1003 17
prevent his prosecution and conviction. Cf. United States v.
Calabrese, 572 F.3d 362, 368–69 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding no
abuse of discretion in admitting recording of defendant’s
warnings to cooperating witness, including sounds of beat-
ings).
Finally, the jury was also given standard instructions to
“consider each charge and the evidence concerning each
charge separately. Your decision on one charge, whether it is
guilty or not guilty, should not influence your decision on any
other charge.” The jury heard these instructions at the begin-
ning of the trial and at the end. As we said in Balzano, Mokol,
and Calabrese, we assume juries hear, understand, and follow
such instructions. Balzano, 916 F.2d at 1282; Mokol, 646 F.3d at
487; Calabrese, 572 F.3d at 368–69. The district judge did not
abuse his discretion in treating the threats as relevant to the
sex-trafficking and child-pornography charges, and thus in
denying Jackson’s request for a limiting instruction.
From start to finish, Judge Leichty did an excellent job
with this challenging case. It is telling that the appeal raises
only these two issues. The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.