People v. Thompson

2023 IL App (1st) 220429-U

THIRD DIVISION
June 21, 2023

No. 1-22-0429

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.
)
v. ) No. 07 CR 16031
)
TYSHON THOMPSON, ) Honorable
) Vincent Gaughan,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.
_____________________________________________________________________________

PRESIDING JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Reyes and D. B. Walker concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: (1) The State proved defendant guilty of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon
beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) defendant’s right to a speedy trial was not
violated; (3) the aggravated unlawful use of a weapon statute does not violate the
second amendment; and (4) no plain error occurred when the trial court
inadvertently failed to poll one juror because the evidence was not closely
balanced.

¶2 Following a jury trial, defendant Tyshon Thompson was convicted of aggravated

unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) and subsequently sentenced to 30 months in prison. On

appeal, defendant argues that: (1) the State failed to prove him guilty of AUUW beyond a

reasonable doubt; (2) defendant’s right to a speedy trial was violated; (3) the AUUW statute is
No. 1-22-0429

unconstitutional; and (4) defendant’s right to a unanimous verdict was violated when the trial

court polled only 11 of the 12 jurors.

¶3 Defendant was arrested on March 25, 2020, and subsequently charged by indictment with

two counts of aggravated discharge of a firearm and one count of AUUW. In July 2021,

defendant’s attorney filed a motion to withdraw. At the hearing on the motion, defendant

indicated to the trial court that he wished to represent himself. The court allowed counsel to

withdraw, but asked another attorney to talk to defendant about the “dangers of representing”

himself. Defendant agreed but continued to assert that he wanted to represent himself and

requested his discovery. The court informed defendant that he would receive discovery after the

court determined defendant was qualified to represent himself. The case was continued.

¶4 On August 20, 2021, the court asked defendant if he still wished to represent himself and

defendant responded that he did. Before the court would allow defendant to represent himself,

the court ordered a behavioral clinical examination (BCX) to determine whether defendant

understood the charges pending against him and whether he was capable of representing himself

at trial. The court observed that defendant did not “seem to comprehend things” and they were

having “difficulty communicating.” The court stated that he wanted to get “some resolution”

about defendant’s ability to represent himself. Defendant objected to the court continuing the

case to September 29, 2021.

¶5 The results of defendant’s BCX, prepared by the forensic clinical services, were filed on

September 28, 2021. Defendant was found both fit to stand trial and fit to stand trial pro se. The

report provided that defendant was “aware of his right to self-representation and [was] not

suffering from any mental illness which would impair his ability to stand trial [pro se].” At an

October 1, 2021 hearing, the trial court again questioned defendant about appearing pro se.

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Defendant again reiterated that he did not want a public defender to represent him and asserted

that he had the right to a speedy trial. The court continued the case until December 2, 2021, “by

agreement” to allow defendant time to think about his decision to represent himself and

defendant interjected that “This isn’t by agreement.”

¶6 On December 2, 2021, the court asked defendant if he still wanted to represent himself

and defendant responded that he did. The court then questioned defendant about his educational

history and his understanding of courtroom procedures. The court advised defendant that while

he has the right to an attorney, he does not have a right to a standby attorney. Defendant stated

that he would need assistance to prepare his defense, but maintained that he wanted to represent

himself. The court found that defendant could represent himself. Defendant informed the court

that he had mailed motions to the clerk of the court and wanted to have them heard. At the

conclusion of the hearing, the trial court continued the case by agreement to determine whether

to appoint standby counsel. However defendant objected that he did not agree to a continuance.

The court explained that if defendant wanted his motions to be heard, then he could not demand

trial.

¶7 On December 28, 2021, the trial court again discussed the pitfalls of defendant appearing

pro se but allowed defendant to represent himself. Defendant then asked for his motions to

modify bail and for a speedy trial to be considered. In his motion alleging a speedy trial

violation, defendant argued that he demanded trial between August 4, 2020, and February 3,

2021. The State responded that those continuances were all by agreement and that defendant had

been represented by private counsel until July 21, 2021. The trial court denied defendant’s

motion and noted that the supreme court suspended the statutory speedy trial term during the

pandemic. Defendant also filed a motion for discovery and requested standby counsel.

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¶8 On January 5, 2022, the trial court appointed standby counsel to assist defendant. The

State tendered approximately 300 pages of discovery to defendant. When the court continued the

case by agreement, defendant objected and stated that he was ready for trial. The court noted that

defendant demanded trial on the record and advised defendant that he needed to file a written

demand for trial. On January 7, 2022, the parties appeared in court, but the State informed the

court that it was not ready to proceed to a jury trial. The case was continued, and the court noted

that defendant demanded trial.

¶9 On February 4, 2022, defendant’s trial began with jury selection. The following evidence

was presented at trial.

¶ 10 Charice Rush testified that at approximately 10:30 p.m. on March 25, 2020, she was in a

vehicle with her niece and nephew near Forest Park, Illinois. Her nephew was driving, Rush was

in the front passenger seat, and her niece was seated behind her. They were driving home. As the

car was entering the Interstate 290 expressway, she noticed they were being chased. She saw a

man pull out a firearm and start shooting at them on the expressway. Her nephew had to swerve

out of the way, and they exited the expressway. Someone in the car called 911, but Rush could

not remember who called. However, she stated that she thought they were all calling at the same

time. She described the other car as a “darkish,” SUV or van that was “tall.” They were able to

get in contact with the Illinois State Police while they were near the Laramie Avenue exit. She

denied that she, her nephew, or her niece were armed with a firearm that day. Rush could not

recall what kind of car her nephew had at that time.

¶ 11 On cross-examination, Rush stated that prior to the shooting someone was trying to harm

her niece while her niece was at work at a gas station in Forest Park. Rush arrived at the gas

station after someone “jumped on” her niece. The Forest Park police would not let Rush exit the

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car and enter the gas station. Rush left the gas station with her niece and nephew. Another car

followed them onto the expressway entrance ramp and was chasing them. Rush was arguing with

the occupants of the other car and then someone in that car pulled out a firearm. The vehicle

Rush was in sped away to avoid harm. Rush did not see the driver of the other car and did not

know if defendant was the shooter. Rush testified that her niece was grazed by a bullet but she

did not seek medical treatment, and there were bullet holes in the car from the shooting.

¶ 12 Forest Park Police Officer Benito Marti testified that at approximately 10:30 p.m. on

March 25, 2020, he was on duty with Officer Jose Flores and Officer John Reilly when he

received a call for a shooting near Harlem on Interstate 290 with the vehicle description. The

officers then curbed a white Nissan Rogue off of Interstate 290 that matched the description. He

could not identify the driver of that car in court but testified that the last name of the driver was

Thompson. Officer Marti testified that the occupants of this vehicle were involved in a prior

incident at a Thornton’s gas station involving a battery. According to Officer Marti, a fight had

occurred at the gas station between 10 and 10:15 p.m. in which a female subject spat at three of

the clerks. After the shooting, the female involved in the battery was one of the occupants in the

Nissan Rogue.

¶ 13 The officers received a second call of a shooting near Harlem Avenue and Interstate 290

with this vehicle’s description. Officer Marti searched the vehicle and recovered a small silver

handgun in the glove compartment with blood on the trigger. The vehicle and the firearm were

subsequently turned over to the Illinois State Police as part of its investigation. The female

passenger was taken into custody for battery and a prior warrant. Officer Marti testified that the

Nissan Rogue was stopped twice, once outside the gas station, and later following the shooting.

When the driver stepped out of the vehicle, there was a blue rag with blood on it from a cut on

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his hand. The driver told the officer that he had been attempting to break up a fight between his

girlfriend and the gas station employees.

¶ 14 Forest Park Police Officer John Reilly testified that he was on duty alone at around 11

p.m. on March 25, 2020, but another officer was in front of him in a different car. He curbed a

vehicle near the 3600 block of West Chicago Avenue in Chicago. The occupants of this car had

previously been involved in an incident at a Thornton’s gas station. Officer Reilly had contact

with the driver of the car but did not see him in court. He described the car as a white Nissan

Rogue with plates “from like a rental car.” There were three occupants in the car, two males and

one female. The driver’s last name was Thompson. A silver handgun was located in the glove

compartment of the car and blood was on the trigger of the handgun.

¶ 15 Sergeant Daniel Garcia testified that he was employed as a crime scene investigator with

the Illinois State Police. He received a call to the crime scene at approximately 1 a.m. on March

26, 2020, on eastbound Interstate 290, near the Central Avenue exit. Sergeant Garcia

photographed the scene and then marked evidence he observed. During his search, he found two

fired shell casings. He packaged the evidence and then went to process the victim’s vehicle. At

that location, he took pictures of the car. He observed a “perforating defect on the passenger side

rear door,” which meant the bullet “went through the door.” Sergeant Garcia identified a photo

showing a “trajectory rod” placed in the hole to determine the path of the bullet. In his analysis

of the trajectory, he determined there was a “projectile” in the seat. Using a scalpel knife, the seat

was cut, and he recovered the projectile.

¶ 16 Sergeant Garcia assisted another team in processing the white Nissan Rogue. From that

search, a firearm was collected as well as cell phones and “red blood-like stains.” He did not

collect a blue rag, but he believed a blue rag which had blood on it was collected. He also

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collected swabs from the blood on the interior driver’s side door and for “touch DNA.” The

swabs were submitted to the lab.

¶ 17 Trooper Kenan Hasanbegovic testified that he was employed as a trooper with the Illinois

State Police and was assigned to the crime scene investigation unit. He was assigned with

Sergeant Garcia on March 26, 2020, when they were called to process a scene related to an

interstate shooting. After they processed the original scene and the victim’s car, they returned to

the 11th district police station. At the police station, he administered gunshot residue (GSR) tests

on three people in custody, including defendant. Trooper Hasanbegovic identified defendant in

court. For the GSR kit, he swabbed the forehand on both hands and sealed it to be submitted to

the lab. He then processed the white Nissan Rogue at the Illinois State Police headquarters in

Des Plaines. He recovered a firearm and a blue towel with blood like stains. He swabbed the

firearm for “touch DNA” and also a red blood-like stain on the trigger. The items were then

packed and sealed to be sent to the lab. Trooper Hasanbegovic also created a computer-aided

diagram of the scene depicting the eastbound lanes of Interstate 290.

¶ 18 Jennifer Belna testified as an expert in forensic DNA analysis. She was employed at the

Illinois Police Forensic Science Center as a forensic scientist in the “bio/DNA” section. She

receives evidence and conducts DNA analysis in “blood, semen, [and] saliva.” She received the

swabs from the firearm and a buccal standard from defendant and conducted a DNA analysis on

both items separately. First, Belna confirmed that the firearm swab was blood. She then

preserved that evidence and conducted a DNA analysis. After she conducted her analysis on the

blood and the buccal standard, she compared the results. She determined that defendant could not

be excluded as the major contributor from the swab on the trigger. This profile would occur in

approximately 1 in 13 octillion unrelated individuals.

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¶ 19 Marc Pomerance testified as an expert in firearms ballistics. He was employed at the

Illinois Police Forensic Science Center as an analyst in the firearms and tool marks section. He

received one firearm, two fired cartridge cases, and one fired bullet related to the March 25, 2020

shooting. He identified the firearm he examined in March 2020 as an AMT Model Backup .45-

caliber semiautomatic handgun as well as the magazine and two unfired .45-caliber cartridges. In

his analysis, he fired four test shots to confirm the firearm is working and the test fired bullets

and cartridge cases are used for comparison. He did not use the unfired bullets from the firearm

for the test shots. Based on his analysis, Pomerance concluded that the fired bullet and shell

casings were fired from the recovered .45-caliber firearm. His conclusion was based on his

observation of a “reproducing pattern of both class and individual characteristics between the test

shots and the two fired cartridge cases.”

¶ 20 Kevin Gillespie testified as an expert in trace microscopy and GSR residue. He was

employed at the Illinois Police Forensic Science Center as an analyst in the trace chemistry

section. He analyzed the GSR kits for defendant and the other occupants of the Nissan Rogue,

William Johnson and Nesa Green. The results of Green’s GSR test indicated that her left hand

was in the environment of a discharged firearm. Johnson’s GSR test indicated that his right hand

had been in the environment of a discharged firearm. Defendant’s GSR test indicated that both of

his hands had been in the environment of a discharged firearm. Gillespie testified that while all

three GSR kits were positive, the results could not determine which individual discharged a

firearm. He further stated that it was possible for GSR to be deposited on multiple people in a

close space, such as a sedan or SUV, if one person discharged the firearm.

¶ 21 Sergeant Lee Marks testified that he was assigned to the firearm services bureau with the

Illinois State Police and assists with the recordkeeping for Firearm Owner Identification Cards

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(FOID cards) and Concealed Carry Licenses (CCL). He explained that any adult over age 21 is

eligible for a FOID card absent anything on their record to prohibit their application. An

individual must have a valid FOID card to apply for a CCL. He conducted a search of the

database for defendant’s name and the results showed that defendant did not have a CCL in

March 2020 and he had never applied for a CCL. Sergeant Marks found that defendant had

applied for and received a FOID card, but it was no longer active due to the charges in this case.

He did not search to see if defendant purchased a firearm.

¶ 22 The State then rested its case. Defendant moved for “a judgment of acquittal,” which the

trial court denied. Defendant indicated that he intended to call Johnson to testify, but Johnson’s

attorney informed the court that Johnson would be invoking his fifth amendment right to remain

silent. Defendant then rested his case without presenting any additional evidence.

¶ 23 Following closing arguments and jury instructions, the jury began its deliberations.

During deliberations, the jury sent out four notes. The first note stated, “In the course of securing

the gun, were fingerprints taken by the [Illinois State Police] or Forest Park Police and were the

fingerprints identified as being either of the two other occupants besides [defendant]?” After

discussing the jurors’ questions with the parties, the court responded, “Dear Jury, you have heard

all of the evidence in this case. Please continue to deliberate.” The second note stated, “Was the

white Nissan Rogue rented by the defendant?” The court responded that the jury had “heard all

of the evidence that was presented at trial.” The third note stated, “We are in agreement on the

third count and we are hung on the other two counts, one and two.” Over defendant’s objection,

the court responded, “Dear Jury, you’re doing a fine job. Again, please continue to deliberate.”

The fourth and final note indicated that the jury had made a decision on one count, but could not

reach a decision on the other two counts. The court proposed calling the jury out and declare a

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mistrial on those two counts. The court would then consider the other count. The parties agreed

to this proposal.

¶ 24 The jury was called out into the courtroom and it found defendant guilty of AUUW, but

did not reach a verdict on the two counts of aggravated discharge of a firearm. Defendant

requested that the jurors be polled. The court polled 11 of the jurors and each confirmed the

verdict. The court stated that the jury had been polled. The court declared a mistrial on the

aggravated discharge of a firearm counts. Defendant asked for an attorney for posttrial motions

and sentencing and the court appointed the public defender.

¶ 25 Defendant, through counsel, filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and

a motion for a new trial, which were denied by the court. Following a sentencing hearing, the

trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 30 months in prison. The State moved to nolle pros

the two counts of aggravated discharge of a firearm, which the court allowed.

¶ 26 This appeal followed.

¶ 27 Defendant first argues that the State failed to prove him guilty of AUUW beyond a

reasonable doubt. Specifically, he contends that the State failed to show that defendant carried or

otherwise possessed the handgun recovered from the vehicle. The State responds that the jury

could have reasonably inferred from the evidence that defendant actually possessed the gun

based on his blood on the trigger and the GSR on both of his hands.

¶ 28 When this court considers a challenge to a criminal conviction based upon the sufficiency

of the evidence, it is not our function to retry the defendant. People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 329-

30 (2000). Rather, our inquiry is limited to “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis in original.) Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,

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319 (1979); accord People v. Cox, 195 Ill. 2d 378, 387 (2001). It is the responsibility of the trier

of fact to “fairly *** resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw

reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. “The trier of

fact is best equipped to judge the credibility of witnesses, and due consideration must be given to

the fact that it was the trial court and jury that saw and heard the witnesses.” People v. Wheeler,

226 Ill. 2d 92, 114-15 (2007). “Accordingly, a jury’s findings concerning credibility are entitled

to great weight.” Id. The reviewing court must carefully examine the record evidence while

bearing in mind that it was the fact finder who observed and heard the witnesses. People v.

Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2004). Testimony may be found insufficient under the

Jackson standard but only where the record evidence compels the conclusion that no reasonable

person could accept it beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. “A conviction will not be set aside on

appeal unless the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that there remains a

reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.” Wright, 2017 IL 119561, ¶ 70.

¶ 29 To sustain a conviction for AUUW as charged, the State was required to show that the

defendant knowingly carried a firearm on or about his or her person or in any vehicle; the

firearm possessed was uncased, loaded, and immediately accessible; and the defendant lacked a

CCL. See 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A-5) (West 2018). Defendant only challenges whether

the State proved that defendant carried or otherwise possessed the firearm recovered from the

glove compartment of the vehicle.

¶ 30 Defendant first contends that the State’s burden of proof to establish carrying a firearm is

higher than its burden to establish possession. However, he fails to cite any relevant authority

holding that such a difference exists. We are not persuaded by an out-of-context statement from a

dissenting opinion relied on by defendant. See People v. Wise, 2021 IL 125392, ¶ 65 (Michael J.

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Burke, J., dissenting) (in which the justice stated, “I believe there is a distinction between

carrying and knowingly possessing.”) (Emphasis in original.) In Wise, the defendant had been

convicted of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (UUWF) and argued that the State had failed to

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly possessed the firearm “on or about

his person.” Id. ¶ 22. Nothing in the majority opinion in Wise considered whether there is a

different burden of proof between carrying versus possessing a firearm. Rather, the dissent was

distinguishing the majority’s reliance on People v. Liss, 406 Ill. 419 (1950), in which the

defendant had been charged under a statute that provided, “ ‘No person shall carry concealed on

or about his person a pistol, revolver or other firearm.’ ” Id. at 421 (quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949,

ch. 38, ¶ 155). The Wise dissent was distinguishing the different statutory language at issue in

Liss and reasoned that it was not helpful or instructive because Liss did not involve constructive

possession of a firearm, which was at issue in that case. Wise, 2021 IL 125392, ¶ 62. Similarly,

defendant’s reliance on People v. Clodfelder, 172 Ill. App. 3d 1030 (1988), is also misplaced for

the same reason. In that case, the Fourth District also distinguished the applicability of Liss when

considering whether the evidence established that the defendant constructively possessed a gun

“on or about” his person. Id. at 1032-34. The court did not consider a difference between

carrying and possessing a firearm, but observed that the evidence in Liss could not support

constructive possession of a firearm “on or about” a person. Id. at 1033-34.

¶ 31 In his contention, defendant also conflates whether an individual carries or possesses a

firearm with the right to keep and bear arms under the second amendment, but fails to cite any

relevant authority connecting the second amendment with a different burden between carrying

and possessing a firearm. See People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116, ¶ 19 (quoting Moore v.

Madigan, 702 F.2d 933, 936 (7th Cir. 2012) (“ ‘The right to “bear” as distinct from the right to

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“keep” arms is unlikely to refer to the home. *** A right to bear arms thus implies a right to

carry a loaded gun outside the home.’ ”). Further, Berron v. Illinois Concealed Carry Licensing

Review Board, 825 F.3d 843 (7th Cir. 2016), also cited by defendant, does not support his

position. In that case, individuals sued in federal court over the denial of their CCL applications.

In rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that the CCL was redundant to the FOID card, the Seventh

Circuit reasoned that “the different degrees of danger posed by possessing a weapon at home (the

basic license) and carrying a loaded weapon in public (the concealed-carry license) justify

different systems.” Id. at 847. The court observed that the requirement that all CCL applicants

complete a firearms-training course was “tailored to situations that those who carry guns in

public may encounter” and was “just one of the differences between possessing guns at home

and carrying guns in public.” Id. The Berron court did not consider whether a difference existed

between carrying and possessing a firearm under the AUUW statute. Moreover, Berron suggests

that carrying a firearm, as would be permitted with a CCL, would be to possess the gun in public,

rather than possessing a firearm in the home. Accordingly, we reject defendant’s argument that

the State’s burden was higher to prove that he carried the firearm rather than he possessed it in a

vehicle. Although we conclude that the pertinent issue is whether the State proved that defendant

had possession of the firearm in the vehicle, we find that even if there was any distinction

between carried or possessed, a reasonable jury would have found defendant guilty of AUUW

under either theory.

¶ 32 Further, we observe that the legal definition of the term “carry” involves possession.

“Carry,” as defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, means: “To possess and convey (a firearm) in a

vehicle, including the locked glove compartment or trunk of a car.” Black’s Law Dictionary

(11th ed. 2019). Similarly, “possess” is defined as: “To have in one’s actual control; to have

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possession of.” Id. Thus, under these definitions, the terms “carry” and “possess” relate to the

same action when involving a firearm. And the language of the AUUW statute bears out the

same conclusion. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6 (West 2018).

¶ 33 We therefore begin with the element of possession. Possession of a firearm may be actual

or constructive. People v. Givens, 237 Ill. 2d 311, 335 (2010). “Actual possession is proved by

testimony that the defendant exercised some form of dominion over the firearm, such as that he

had it on his person, tried to conceal it, or was seen to discard it.” People v. Jones, 2019 IL App

(1st) 170478, ¶ 27. “[W]here possession has been shown, an inference of culpable knowledge

can be drawn from the surrounding facts and circumstances.” Givens, 237 Ill. 2d at 335.

“ ‘Whether there is knowledge and whether there is possession or control are questions of fact to

be determined by the trier of fact.’ ” People v. Balark, 2019 IL App (1st) 171626, ¶ 94 (quoting

People v. Schmalz, 194 Ill. 2d 75, 81 (2000)).

¶ 34 Viewing the trial evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational jury could

have found that defendant had carried or otherwise possessed the firearm. The evidence at trial

established that defendant was the driver of a white Nissan Rogue at approximately 10:30 p.m.

on March 20, 2020. Rush testified that she was a passenger in a vehicle on Interstate 290 when

someone from another vehicle fired multiple shots at their vehicle. After police were notified of

the shooting, the white Nissan Rogue driven by defendant was curbed by officers within minutes

heading east on Interstate 290. Both Officer Marti and Officer Reilly testified that the last name

of the Nissan Rogue’s driver was Thompson and trial evidence disclosed that defendant was the

only occupant with that last name. At the time of his arrest, defendant was bleeding from an

injury on a finger. Defendant elicited testimony from Officer Marti that defendant told the officer

he had cut his finger while attempting to break up the fight between his girlfriend and the gas

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station employees. Blood was found on the interior driver’s side of the car as well as on the

trigger of the firearm recovered from the glove compartment. This blood on the recovered

firearm was likely of recent origin as described in Officer Marti’s testimony. DNA analysis

established that defendant could not be excluded as the major contributor from the swab on the

trigger and this profile would occur in approximately 1 in 13 octillion unrelated individuals.

Defendant also tested positive for GSR on both hands, while the two other occupants only

showed the presence of GSR on one hand. The recovered shell casings and fired bullet matched

the firearm recovered from the Nissan Rogue. Based on this compelling evidence, the jury could

have easily concluded that defendant carried or had actual possession of the firearm.

¶ 35 We are not persuaded by defendant’s attempts to minimize his DNA on the gun and his

positive GSR. Defendant also focuses on the lack of fingerprint testing as a way to contend that

the evidence was not sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt that he physically touched the firearm.

The jury heard this evidence, and it was within its role as factfinder to assess this evidence.

Fingerprint evidence is not required to prove AUUW and its absence does not raise a reasonable

doubt. See People v. Loggins, 2019 IL App (1st) 160482, ¶ 68; People v. Hernandez, 229 Ill.

App. 3d 546, 551 (1992). As the supreme court has observed, “ ‘the trier of fact is not required to

disregard inferences which flow normally from the evidence and to search out all possible

explanations consistent with innocence and raise them to a level of reasonable doubt.’ ” People

v. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92, 117 (2007) (quoting Hall, 194 Ill. 2d at 332). Further, “ ‘the trier of

fact need not *** be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to each link in the chain of

circumstances.’ ” Id. (quoting Hall, 194 Ill. 2d at 330).

¶ 36 We also reject defendant’s assertion that the State and the trial court “recognized the

weakness of the State’s evidence” based on the State’s decision to nolle the aggravated discharge

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of a firearm counts. Unlike AUUW, to prove aggravated discharge of a firearm, the State had to

establish that defendant “knowingly discharged a firearm in the direction of a vehicle.” See 720

ILCS 5/24-1.2(a)(2) (West 2018). The prosecutor stated on the record that after reviewing the

trial testimony, “none of those witnesses were able to identify this defendant in possession of a

firearm at the time of the discharge.” As discussed above, possession for AUUW can be proven

by circumstantial evidence, i.e., DNA on the trigger of the firearm. Thus, the State’s decision on

the additional counts had no bearing on the evidence proving AUUW. Similarly, defendant’s

argument relating to the State’s failure to establish constructive possession of the firearm is

without merit because the State did not advance a theory of constructive possession.

Accordingly, defendant’s argument and his reliance on People v. Wise, 2021 IL 125392, ¶ 34 (in

which the supreme court considered whether the State had proven that the driver of a van had

constructive possession of a firearm recovered 5 to 10 feet away from him), is misplaced. Thus,

we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find defendant

guilty of AUUW beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm defendant’s conviction for AUUW.

¶ 37 Defendant next asserts that his statutory right to a speedy trial was violated when more

than 120 days of delay elapsed prior to trial. Specifically, defendant contends that the trial court

abused its discretion when it sua sponte ordered a BCX to determine whether defendant was fit

to represent himself at trial and none of the delays in the case were attributable to him.

¶ 38 The State initially responds that defendant has forfeited this claim by failing to raise it in

a posttrial motion. To preserve an issue for review, defendant must object both at trial and in a

written posttrial motion. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). However, defendant did

allege a speedy trial violation in one of his posttrial motions. Therefore, defendant preserved this

claim on appeal.

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¶ 39 “The right to a speedy trial is fundamental and guaranteed to a defendant under both the

sixth amendment and the due process clause of the federal constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VI,

XIV; Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967)), and by article I, section 8, of our state

constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8 (‘In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the

right *** to have a speedy public trial ***.’)).” People v. Mayfield, 2023 IL 128092, ¶ 18. The

legislature has conferred an additional speedy trial right in section 103-5 of the Code, which

specifies time periods within which an accused must be brought to trial. Id. ¶ 19; see 725 ILCS

5/103-5 (West 2020). Section 103-5(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 sets forth the

calculation for the speedy trial term for incarcerated individuals as follows:

“Every person in custody in this State for an alleged offense shall be tried

by the court having jurisdiction within 120 days from the date he or she was taken

into custody unless delay is occasioned by the defendant, by an examination for

fitness ordered pursuant to Section 104-13 of this Act ***. Delay shall be

considered to be agreed to by the defendant unless he or she objects to the delay

by making a written demand for trial or an oral demand for trial on the record.”

725 ILCS 103-5(a) (West 2020).

¶ 40 “The 120-day period in which a defendant must be tried runs during that time, but the

period is tolled during any time when the defendant causes, contributes to, or otherwise agrees to

a delay.” Mayfield, 2023 IL 128029, ¶ 20. “A pretrial delay caused or contributed to by the

defendant or otherwise agreed to by him is excluded from the computation of the 120-day period

in which a trial must commence under section 103-5(a).” Id.

¶ 41 Here, defendant was arrested on March 25, 2020, and remained in custody prior to trial.

While defendant was in custody, the Illinois Supreme Court entered administrative orders tolling

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the statutory time restrictions during the COVID-19 pandemic. Ill. S. Ct., M.R. 30370 (eff. Apr.

7, 2020). In June 2021, the Illinois Supreme Court amended M.R. 30370 to provide that the

statutory time restrictions in section 103-5 shall no longer be tolled beginning October 1, 2021.

Ill. S. Ct., M.R. 30370 (eff. June 30, 2021). The order provided that “[a]ll days on and following

October 1, 2021, shall be included in speedy trial calculations as contained in section 103-5 of

the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.” Id. Defendant does not challenge the time in which his

speedy-trial term was tolled by the supreme court order. Thus, defendant’s 120-day term began

to run on October 1, 2021.

¶ 42 Defendant focuses much of his speedy trial argument on the trial court’s decision to sua

sponte order the BCX and not allow him to represent himself. However, the court ordered the

BCX on August 20, 2021, and the results were filed with the court on September 28, 2021, both

dates that occurred while the speedy trial term was tolled. Even if the trial court erred in ordering

the BCX, which we do not find, the BCX report had no impact on the speedy-trial term and we

need not consider this argument in defendant’s speedy trial claim.

¶ 43 Instead, this court must review the time period from the beginning of defendant’s speedy-

trial term, October 1, 2021, until the day trial began, February 4, 2022. Since a total of 126 days

elapsed between those dates, we must determine whether any of the delays were attributable to

defendant. Defendant contends that because he objected to every continuance and demanded

trial, none of the days are attributable to him. The State maintains that some of the days are

chargeable to defendant because he filed motions and asked to have the motions considered.

¶ 44 Motions filed by a defendant before trial are ordinarily chargeable to the defendant.

People v. Jones, 104 Ill. 2d 268, 277 (1984). “Delay has included not only the filing of the

motion but also the time associated with processing the motion, including time for the State to

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respond and for the court to hear and resolve the issues.” People v. Cross, 2022 IL 127907, ¶ 21.

“[U]nder the plain language of the statute, a delay occasioned by a defendant need not cause or

contribute to the postponement of a date set for trial. Rather, any delay occasioned by a

defendant causes a postponement of the 120-day speedy-trial term.” Id. ¶ 23.

¶ 45 Turning to the time frame at issue here, defendant asserted his speedy trial rights at an

October 1, 2021 hearing while maintaining his intention to represent himself. The court

continued the case until December 2, 2021, “by agreement” to allow defendant time to think

about his decision to represent himself and defendant interjected that “This isn’t by agreement.”

¶ 46 At the December 2, 2021 hearing, the court asked defendant if he still wanted to represent

himself and defendant responded that he did, but wanted assistance. The court found that

defendant could represent himself. Defendant asked the court if the motions he had filed could be

heard. He informed the court that he had mailed the motions to the clerk of the court, but he did

not have file stamped copies of the motions. The judge stated that he would continue the case by

agreement to determine the standby counsel request and to have defendant’s motions heard, but

defendant objected that he did not agree. The court explained that if defendant wanted his

motions to be heard, then he could not demand trial. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court

continued the case “by order of court,” and defendant interjected that the continuance was “not

by agreement.”

¶ 47 On December 27, 2021, defendant filed motions with the court, including a motion for

discovery and a motion to dismiss based on a speedy trial violation. On December 28, 2021, the

trial court again discussed the pitfalls of defendant appearing pro se but allowed defendant to

represent himself. Defendant then asked for his motions to modify bail and for a speedy trial to

be considered. The trial court denied defendant’s motion and noted that the supreme court

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suspended the statutory speedy trial term during the pandemic. Defendant discussed his

discovery motion and stated that he needed the discovery to prepare his defense. Defendant again

requested standby counsel to assist him.

¶ 48 On January 5, 2022, the trial court appointed standby counsel to assist defendant. The

State tendered approximately 300 pages of discovery to defendant. When the court continued the

case by agreement, defendant objected and stated that he was ready for trial. The court noted that

defendant demanded trial on the record. On January 7, 2022, the parties appeared in court, but

the State informed the court that it was not ready to proceed to a jury trial. The case was

continued, and the court noted that defendant demanded trial. Defendant’s trial began on

February 4, 2022.

¶ 49 Even if we assume that the time from October 1, 2021, to December 1, 2021 is not

attributable to defendant, there are more than six days of the 126-day term chargeable to

defendant. The State contends that the time between December 1, 2021, and December 28, 2021,

as well as the time between December 28, 2021, and January 5, 2022, are chargeable to

defendant. We need not reach the time between December 1 and December 28 because we

conclude that the 8-day time period from December 28, 2021, to January 5, 2022 is attributable

to defendant.1 As detailed above, at the December 28 hearing, defendant asked the court to

1
Although we do not find defendant’s request for discovery was routine in light of the significant

amount of documents tendered by the State in response, we note that routine discovery requests

generally do not toll the speedy trial term. See People v. Stockett, 355 Ill. App. 3d 523, 526

(2005); People v. Cotledge, 2022 IL App (1st) 201209-U, ¶ 91. However, even if defendant’s

request was considered to be routine, we would still find the delay attributable to defendant

because of his request for standby counsel.

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appoint standby counsel and moved for discovery.

¶ 50 While defendant argues that none of these periods were attributable to him, he fails to

acknowledge that he filed a motion for discovery and requested the appointment of standby

counsel. As noted above, a delay includes not only the filing of the motion but also time for the

State to respond. Cross, 2022 IL 127907, ¶ 21. The State responded to defendant’s motion for

discovery in a timely manner on January 5, 2022, when it provided him with over 300 pages of

discovery. The court also appointed standby counsel on the same date. Because the time between

December 28, 2021, and January 5, 2022, concerned defendant’s request for discovery and

standby counsel, these days were attributable to him. This delay of eight days tolled his speedy

trial term and thus, his trial began within the 120-day period. We find no speedy trial violation

occurred.

¶ 51 Next, defendant contends that the AUUW statute is unconstitutional because it infringes

on an individual’s second amendment right to bear arms. Specifically, he asserts that under the

United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc.

v. Bruen, ____ U.S. ____, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022), the AUUW statute violates his right to open

carry a handgun. The State maintains that Bruen did not prohibit the State from criminalizing the

open carry of firearms without a CCL. We agree.

¶ 52 “ ‘Constitutional challenges carry the heavy burden of successfully rebutting the strong

judicial presumption that statutes are constitutional.’ ” People v. Rizzo, 2016 IL 118599, ¶ 23

(quoting People v. Patterson, 2014 IL 115102, ¶ 90). “That presumption applies with equal force

to legislative enactments that declare and define conduct constituting a crime and determine the

penalties imposed for such conduct.” Id. “ ‘To overcome this presumption, the party challenging

the statute must clearly establish that it violates the constitution.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Sharpe,

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216 Ill. 2d 481, 487 (2005)). “Courts have a duty to uphold the constitutionality of a statute

whenever reasonably possible, resolving any doubts in favor of the statute’s validity.” Id.

¶ 53 Defendant challenges the AUUW statute’s ban on the open carry of firearms as

unconstitutional on its face in violation of the second amendment. A facial constitutional

challenge requires a showing that the statute is unconstitutional under any set of facts, i.e., the

specific facts related to the challenging party are irrelevant. Rizzo, 2016 IL 118599, ¶ 24. A facial

challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is the most difficult challenge to mount. People v.

Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 25. A statute is facially unconstitutional only if there are no

circumstances in which the statute could be validly applied. Id. The fact that the statute could be

found unconstitutional under some set of circumstances does not establish the facial invalidity of

the statute. Id. Accordingly, a facial challenge must fail if any situation exists where the statute

could be validly applied. Id.

¶ 54 At issue in Bruen was New York’s requirement that a person seeking a pistol license to

carry a loaded weapon for self-defense outside of one’s home or business was required to show

“proper cause,” but the term “proper cause” was not defined in any statute. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at

2123. In reviewing this licensing statute, the Court recognized New York as part of a small

minority of states that allowed a licensing agency discretion to deny a “concealed-carry license”

application, such that they “may issue” a license. Id., 142 S. Ct. at 2123-24. In contrast, Illinois

falls in line with the majority of states as a “shall issue” jurisdiction, “where authorities must

issue concealed-carry licenses whenever applicants satisfy certain threshold requirements,

without granting licensing officials discretion to deny licenses based on a perceived lack of need

or suitability.” Id., 142 S. Ct. at 2123, n.1 (recognizing Illinois as a “shall issue” jurisdiction in a

footnote).

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No. 1-22-0429

¶ 55 The Supreme Court concluded that the “proper cause” requirement violated the second

and fourteenth amendments and re-affirmed that those amendments “protect an individual right

to keep and bear arms for self-defense.” Id., 142 S. Ct. at 2125 (citing District of Columbia v.

Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) and McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010)). Specifically, the

court held:

“when the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the

Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. To justify its regulation, the

government may not simply posit that the regulation promotes an important

interest. Rather, the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent

with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only if a firearm

regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition may a court

conclude that the individual’s conduct falls outside the Second Amendment’s

‘unqualified command.’ ” Id. at 2126 (quoting Konigsberg v. State Bar of

California, 366 U.S. 36, 50, n. 10 (1961)).

¶ 56 The Supreme Court reiterated that the second amendment does not grant an unrestricted

right to carry firearms by all people and at all times.

“The Second Amendment guaranteed to ‘all Americans’ the right to bear

commonly used arms in public subject to certain reasonable, well-defined

restrictions. Heller, 554 U.S. at 581. Those restrictions, for example, limited the

intent for which one could carry arms, the manner by which one carried arms, or

the exceptional circumstances under which one could not carry arms, such as

before justices of the peace and other government officials.” Id. at 2156.

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¶ 57 Further, in a concurring opinion, Justice Alito observed: “Our holding decides nothing

about who may lawfully possess a firearm or the requirements that must be met to buy a gun.

Nor does it decide anything about the kinds of weapons that people may possess. Nor have we

disturbed anything that we said in Heller or McDonald [], about restrictions that may be imposed

on the possession or carrying of guns.”

¶ 58 Turning back to the instant case, we find that defendant’s facial challenge of the

constitutionality of the AUUW statute is not supported by Bruen. The Bruen court explicitly held

that open carry without a license was not mandated under the second amendment.

“To be clear, nothing in our analysis should be interpreted to suggest the

unconstitutionality of the 43 States’ ‘shall-issue’ licensing regimes, under which

‘a general desire for self-defense is sufficient to obtain a [permit].’ Drake v. Filko,

724 F.3d 426, 442 (CA3 2013) (Hardiman, J., dissenting). Because these licensing

regimes do not require applicants to show an atypical need for armed self-defense,

they do not necessarily prevent ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens’ from

exercising their Second Amendment right to public carry. [Heller, 554 U.S. at

635.] Rather, it appears that these shall-issue regimes, which often require

applicants to undergo a background check or pass a firearms safety course, are

designed to ensure only that those bearing arms in the jurisdiction are, in fact,

‘law-abiding, responsible citizens.’ Ibid. And they likewise appear to contain only

‘narrow, objective, and definite standards’ guiding licensing officials,

Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 151 (1969), rather than requiring the

‘appraisal of facts, the exercise of judgment, and the formation of an opinion,’

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Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305 (1940)—features that typify proper-

cause standards like New York’s.” Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2138, n.9.

Thus, the Bruen court upheld Illinois’s laws providing for a CCL application. Nothing in Bruen

suggests that open carry is required under the second amendment.

¶ 59 We further find defendant’s assertion that Illinois is not a “shall issue” state lacks merit.

He contends that some of the requirements under the Firearm Concealed Carry Act (CCL Act)

(430 ILCS 66/1 et seq. (West 2016)), such as the completion of a firearm training course, are

discretionary in nature. However, defendant lacks standing to challenge the requirements under

the CCL Act. To establish standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute, defendant must

“submit to the challenged policy.” Jackson-Bey v. Hanslmaier, 115 F.3d 1091, 1096 (1997). In

other words, defendant must have attempted to comply with the Act. However, defendant has not

offered any evidence that he attempted to apply for the license and was subsequently denied one.

Thus, he does not have standing to challenge the CCL Act.

¶ 60 Since the Supreme Court found that Illinois is a “shall issue” state and the CCL Act

comports with the second and fourteenth amendments under Bruen, defendant’s facial challenge

fails. Accordingly, defendant’s AUUW conviction for possession of a firearm in a vehicle

without a CCL is not unconstitutional.

¶ 61 Finally, defendant argues that his fundamental right to a unanimous jury verdict was

violated when the trial court inadvertently failed to poll one juror. After the verdict had been

announced, defendant requested the court poll each of the jurors and the court then only polled

11 of the 12 jurors, each of whom confirmed the verdict. The State responds there was no

evidence that the jury’s verdict was not unanimous and the inadvertent error did not prejudice

defendant’s right to a unanimous jury.

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No. 1-22-0429

¶ 62 Defendant admits that he did not preserve this claim for our review. However, he asks

this court to review the issue under the plain error doctrine. As previously stated, to preserve an

issue for review, defendant must object both at trial and in a written posttrial motion. Enoch, 122

Ill. 2d at 186. Failure to do so operates as a forfeiture as to that issue on appeal. People v. Ward,

154 Ill. 2d 272, 293 (1992). Supreme Court Rule 615(a) states that “[a]ny error, defect,

irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Plain errors

or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the

attention of the trial court.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967). The plain error rule “allows a

reviewing court to consider unpreserved error when (1) a clear or obvious error occurred and the

evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against

the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or obvious error occurred

and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the

integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.” People v.

Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007) (citing Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 186-87). However, the plain

error rule “is not ‘a general saving clause preserving for review all errors affecting substantial

rights whether or not they have been brought to the attention of the trial court.’ ” Herron, 215 Ill.

2d at 177 (quoting People v. Precup, 73 Ill. 2d 7, 16 (1978)). Rather, “Illinois’s plain error rule is

a narrow exception to forfeiture principles.” People v. Jackson, 2022 IL 127256, ¶ 18.

¶ 63 Defendant carries the burden of persuasion under both prongs of the plain error rule.

People v. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d 32, 43 (2009). Defendant asserts that the evidence at trial was closely

balanced and this alleged error would qualify as plain error under the first prong. However,

“[t]he initial analytical step under either prong of the plain error doctrine is determining whether

there was a clear or obvious error at trial.” People v. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 49.

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¶ 64 Defendants have a right to have jurors polled. Jackson, 2022 IL 127256, ¶ 21. “ ‘[W]hen

a jury is polled, each juror should be questioned individually as to whether the announced verdict

is his own.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Kellogg, 77 Ill. 2d 524, 527-28 (1979)). Here, it is

undisputed that the trial court polled only 11 of the 12 jurors. Thus, the court committed a clear

or obvious error. See id. Since defendant has only alleged plain error under the first prong, we

next determine whether the evidence was closely balanced such that the error could have tipped

the scales.

¶ 65 “Under the first prong of the plain error rule, when the evidence of a defendant’s guilt is

closely balanced, there is the possibility that an innocent person may have been convicted

because of some error which is obvious in the record, but which was not properly preserved for

review.” (Citation omitted.) Jackson, 2022 IL 127256, ¶ 23. “[E]rrors reviewable under the first

prong of the plain error rule are the type of errors that are subject to harmless error analysis, and

a defendant must establish prejudice resulting from the error to excuse his forfeiture of such an

error.” Id. “That is, the defendant must show both that there was plain error and that the evidence

was so closely balanced that the error alone severely threatened to tip the scales of justice against

him. The State, of course, can respond by arguing that the evidence was not closely balanced, but

rather strongly weighted against the defendant.” People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 187 (2005).

¶ 66 In determining whether the evidence was closely balanced, a reviewing court evaluates

the totality of the evidence and conducts a qualitative, commonsense assessment of the evidence

within the context of the case. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 53. According to defendant, the

evidence was closely balanced based on the jury notes “inquiring about evidence pertaining to

who possessed and was in control of that weapon.” He also relies on the jury’s inability to reach

a verdict on the aggravated discharge of a firearm counts and contends again that the State

27
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conceded that it did not prove that defendant possessed the firearm at the time of the shooting.

We have already considered and rejected defendant’s argument relating to the aggravated

discharge of a firearm counts and need not reach this claim again.

¶ 67 During deliberations, the jury sent out four notes. The first two involved questions about

potential evidence: first asking if fingerprints were taken from the firearm and if the fingerprints

matched either of the two other occupants besides defendant, and later asking if the white Nissan

Rogue was rented by defendant. The final two notes reflected that the jury was deadlocked on

two counts but were in agreement on the third count. Lengthy deliberations and jury notes do not

require a finding that the evidence was closely balanced. People v. Nugen, 399 Ill. App. 3d 575,

584 (2010). We reject defendant’s argument that the jury’s notes alone indicated that the

evidence was closely balanced on the AUUW count. Instead, we find that the jury’s notes during

deliberations merely reflect that the jury took its job seriously and conscientiously worked to

come to a just decision. People v. Minniweather, 301 Ill. App. 3d 574, 580 (1998).

¶ 68 As thoroughly detailed above, the evidence at trial was not closely balanced. Defendant

was the driver of a white Nissan Rogue at approximately 10:30 p.m. on March 20, 2020.

Someone from the vehicle defendant was driving fired multiple shots at another car on Interstate

290. Multiple police officers curbed the Nissan Rogue driven by defendant within minutes of the

shooting. Two officers identified the driver of the Nissan Rogue by the last name Thompson and

trial evidence disclosed that defendant was the only occupant with that last name. Further,

defendant was bleeding from an injury on a finger when he was arrested. He subsequently

admitted to one of the officers that the blood was on his finger from the earlier altercation at the

gas station. Blood was found on the trigger of the recovered firearm and defendant could not be

excluded as the major contributor from the swab on the trigger. This profile would occur in

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approximately 1 in 13 octillion unrelated individuals. Defendant also tested positive for GSR on

both hands, while the two other occupants only showed the presence of GSR on one hand. The

recovered shell casings from the interstate and a fired bullet from the victim’s car matched the

firearm recovered from the Nissan Rogue. This evidence overwhelmingly supports the jury’s

guilty verdict for the AUUW count. Since the evidence was not closely balanced, the trial court’s

error in failing to poll one juror was not plain error and defendant’s claim fails. Because

defendant did not challenge this error under the second prong of the plain error doctrine, we need

not reach whether the record demonstrated a unanimous verdict.

¶ 69 Based on the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court of Cook

County.

¶ 70 Affirmed.

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