In re Columbia Pipeline Group, Merger Litigation

IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

IN RE COLUMBIA PIPELINE GROUP, ) CONSOLIDATED
MERGER LITIGATION ) C.A. No. 2018-0484-JTL

POST-TRIAL OPINION ADDRESSING
LIABILITY FOR AIDING AND ABETTING

Date Submitted: November 22, 2022
Date Decided: June 30, 2023

Ned Weinberger, Derrick Farrell, Brendan W. Sullivan, LABATON SUCHAROW LLP,
Wilmington, Delaware; Gregory V. Varallo, BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER &
GROSSMANN LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Stephen E. Jenkins, Marie M. Degnan,
ASHBY & GEDDES, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware; Jeroen van Kwawegen, Lauren A.
Ormsbee, Thomas G. James, Margaret Sanborn-Lowing, BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ
BERGER & GROSSMANN LLP, New York, New York; Counsel for co-lead plaintiffs.

Martin S. Lessner, James M. Yoch, Jr., Kevin P. Rickert, YOUNG CONAWAY
STARGATT & TAYLOR, LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Brian J. Massengill, Michael
Olsen, Matthew C. Sostrin, Linda X. Shi, MAYER BROWN LLP, Chicago, Illinois;
Counsel for defendant TC Energy Corporation.

LASTER, V.C.
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND ................................................................................... 11

A. Columbia ........................................................................................................... 13

B. The Spinoff ....................................................................................................... 14

1. Spectra And Dominion Contact Skaggs. .................................................. 17

2. TransCanada Approaches Smith. ............................................................. 18

3. The Two-Track Strategy ........................................................................... 20

4. The Launch Of The November Sale Process ........................................... 21

5. The Management Team Favors Berkshire And TransCanada. ................ 23

6. The End Of The November Sale Process ................................................. 25

C. Poirier’s November 25 Call With Smith........................................................... 27

D. Girling’s December 2 Call To Skaggs .............................................................. 29

E. Fornell’s Interactions With Skaggs And Smith ................................................ 31

F. Poirier’s December 17 Call To Smith............................................................... 32

G. Skaggs Primes The Directors For A Deal. ........................................................ 33

H. The Lead-Up To The January 7 Meeting.......................................................... 34

I. The January 7 Meeting...................................................................................... 36

J. TransCanada Begins Due Diligence. ................................................................ 41

K. The Debate Over A Request To Make A Proposal ........................................... 43

L. The January 25 Proposal ................................................................................... 48

M. The End-Of-January Board Meeting ................................................................ 49

N. The Deal Process Moves Forward. ................................................................... 51
 1. The February 9 Meeting ........................................................................... 53

2. TransCanada Slows Down The Process. .................................................. 54

3. TransCanada Lays The Groundwork For Dropping Its Price. ................. 56

4. Columbia Extends Exclusivity. ................................................................ 58

5. TransCanada Drops Its Price. ................................................................... 60

6. The Board Rejects TransCanada’s Offer. ................................................. 62

O. The Process Resumes. ....................................................................................... 62

1. The Wall Street Journal Leak ................................................................... 64

2. The $26 Deal ............................................................................................ 66

3. The Board Is “Freaking Out” And Wants A Deal “Whatever It Takes.” . 68

4. The Renewed Exclusivity Agreement ...................................................... 70

5. Columbia Declines To Engage With Spectra. .......................................... 73

6. TransCanada Signs Off On The Script. .................................................... 74

7. The $25.50 Offer ...................................................................................... 77

8. Columbia Accepts The $25.50 Offer. ....................................................... 81

P. The Merger Agreement ..................................................................................... 84

Q. The Proxy Statement ......................................................................................... 86

R. The Deal-Related Litigation ............................................................................. 92

1. The Appraisal Proceeding ........................................................................ 92

2. This Lawsuit ............................................................................................. 93

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS ................................................................................................. 94

A. The Sale Process Claim .................................................................................... 94
 1. The Fiduciary Relationship For The Sale Process Claim ......................... 96

2. The Breaches Of Duty In The Sale Process ........................................... 112

3. Knowing Participation In The Sale Process Breaches ........................... 132

4. Damages For The Sale Process Claim.................................................... 153

B. The Disclosure Claim ..................................................................................... 156

1. The Fiduciary Relationship For The Disclosure Claim .......................... 157

2. The Breaches Of The Duty Of Disclosure ............................................. 161

3. Knowing Participation In The Disclosure Violations ............................ 165

4. Damages For The Disclosure Claim....................................................... 169

5. A Remedy For The Disclosure Claim .................................................... 178

C. Are The Remedies Concurrent Or Cumulative? ............................................. 188

III. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................... 191
 In June 2016, TC Energy Corp. (“TransCanada”) paid $25.50 per share in cash to

acquire Columbia Pipeline Group, Inc. (“Columbia” or “CPG”). Columbia was a newly

minted public company, spun off one year earlier.

During the sale process, Robert Skaggs, Jr. served as Columbia’s Chief Executive

Officer and chair of its board of directors (the “Board”). Stephen Smith served as

Columbia’s Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer. Both men held the same

roles at Columbia’s parent company before the spinoff. Both wanted to retire early. Both

thought 2016 was the ideal year to retire, and both wanted to cash out through a merger

that would trigger their change-in-control benefits. Both supported the spinoff and joined

Columbia expecting to get it sold.

Immediately after the spinoff, buyers came calling. Skaggs led a haphazard sale

process, during which each bidder entered into a non-disclosure agreement (“NDA”)

containing a don’t-ask-don’t-waive standstill. That type of provision both serves the

traditional standstill’s role of prohibiting a bidder from seeking to acquire the target without

the target board’s permission and provides the additional protection of barring the bidder

from asking the target to waive the standstill or otherwise grant permission. It puts the

target board in the driver’s seat, because a bidder can only make an approach if the target

board invites it.

TransCanada was one of the bidders. Francois Poirier, TransCanada’s Senior Vice

President for Strategy and Corporate Development, led TransCanada’s deal team. Poirier

is a savvy former investment banker and repeat player in the M&A game. He fully

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understood the implications of the standstill, both from his work as an M&A professional

and from a briefing by TransCanada’s in-house counsel.

During an earlier stage in his career, Poirier had spent a decade as a relationship

manager for J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., and he visited Smith regularly in that role. Poirier

made Smith his principal point of contact for the sale process, and that tactical decision

proved pivotal. Smith was an experienced CFO, but he had never been on the front lines

of an M&A negotiation. Plus Smith is trusting, team-oriented, and transparent—all virtues

for a public company CFO, but vulnerabilities for a neophyte dealmaker on his first and

only assignment. Smith shared information freely. He has no poker face. For Poirier, Smith

was a compliant informant.

At the end of November 2015, the Board shut down the sale process so that

Columbia could shore up its balance sheet with an equity offering. Under the standstill,

TransCanada could not contact Columbia without an invitation. Poirier immediately made

a backchannel call to Smith. Through that call, Poirier learned that management still

wanted to sell and planned to resume the effort in a couple months.

During December 2015, Poirier and his colleagues engaged in further

communications with Smith and Skaggs. Most notably, Poirier told Smith on December 19

that TransCanada remained interested in a deal and could pay up to $28 per share. He asked

Smith to meet during the first week of January 2016. With Skaggs’s signoff, Smith agreed.

On January 7, 2016, Poirier and Smith had a face-to-face meeting. Smith was an

open book. He told Poirier that management wanted to sell and that TransCanada would

not face any competition from other bidders. After the meeting, Skaggs and Smith created

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a data room so that TransCanada could start conducting due diligence. During the last week

of January, TransCanada’s CEO called Skaggs and provided an oral expression of interest

in a deal at $25 to $28 per share.

Those interactions breached the standstill, but Skaggs and Smith made no effort to

enforce it. Instead, Columbia’s in-house counsel told his TransCanada counterpart that

nothing TransCanada was doing implicated the standstill. The TransCanada lawyer knew

better and questioned that interpretation, but went along. Skaggs and Smith opened the

gates, invited TransCanada in, and demonstrated their eagerness to sell.

After TransCanada’s CEO provided his oral expression of interest, Skaggs finally

went to the Board and obtained permission to engage in exclusive negotiations with

TransCanada. As Poirier and his team pressed forward, Skaggs and Smith undercut

Columbia’s bargaining leverage through solicitous responses and a lack of pushback.

Poirier grew so confident about management’s desire to sell that TransCanada’s first offer

came in at $24 per share, one dollar below its indicative range. Skaggs and Smith were

offended. TransCanada immediately upped its price to $25.25 per share, just inside its

indicative range. That made matters worse, because it showed Skaggs and Smith that

TransCanada had been trying to take advantage of them. Skaggs and Smith recommended

that the Board reject the offer, which the Board did.

For twenty-four hours, the deal was dead. Through its banker, TransCanada

reengaged and asked for a counter. Skaggs and Smith proposed $26 per share in cash.

TransCanada agreed to $26 but offered 90% in cash and 10% in stock. Smith and Poirier

agreed in principle. Both sides believed they had a deal.

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 Then came a Wall Street Journal story about the negotiations. TransCanada’s

exclusivity had expired, so when a second bidder contacted Skaggs, Columbia could have

engaged. But Skaggs and Smith believed they had a deal and were on the verge of signing

a formal merger agreement, so they recommended that the Board renew exclusivity.

Skaggs prepared a script for incoming bidders which said that Columbia only would

respond to a serious written offer. That was more than TransCanada had ever provided,

even after receiving diligence. Skaggs sent the script to TransCanada, and when Poirier

asked Smith about it, Smith told him that management wanted to get a deal done with

TransCanada and the script would help them do that.

Confident that Skaggs and Smith were wedded to a sale, and believing that the leak

put pressure on the Board, Poirier reneged on the agreement in principle at $26 per share,

lowered TransCanada’s bid to $25.50 per share in cash, demanded an answer within three

days, and threatened to announce publicly that the negotiations were dead unless Columbia

accepted the reduced offer.

The standstill prohibited TransCanada from threatening to make the parties’

discussions public, but permitted TransCanada to make disclosures required by law. Had

TransCanada decided to break off negotiations if Columbia said no, then Poirier’s

statement about disclosure would not have been a threat. It would have been an accurate

description of the consequence of Columbia’s decision. But as Poirier admitted, the $25.50

offer was not best and final. If Columbia had said no, TransCanada would not have broken

off negotiations. Consequently, Poirier’s statement about public disclosure was a threat

that violated the standstill.

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 Skaggs and Smith considered countering at $25.75 per share, but they did not want

to lose a benefits-triggering deal. Rather than pushing back, they recommended that the

Board take what TransCanada offered. The Board did, resulting in TransCanada acquiring

Columbia for $25.50 per share in cash (the “Merger”).

The plaintiffs sued Skaggs, Smith, and TransCanada. They asserted that Skaggs and

Smith breached their duty of loyalty during the sale process. They also asserted that Skaggs

and Smith breached their duty of disclosure because the proxy statement issued in

connection with the Merger (the “Proxy Statement”) was false and misleading. The

plaintiffs asserted claims against TransCanada for aiding and abetting the actionable

breaches of duty by Skaggs and Smith, as well as exculpated breaches of the duty of care

by the Board. Skaggs and Smith settled. TransCanada fought the case through trial.

The plaintiffs proved that TransCanada aided and abetted breaches of fiduciary duty

during the sale process. They proved that Skaggs and Smith breached their duty of loyalty

because, when pursuing a sale of the Company, they were seeking a transaction that would

trigger their change-in-control benefits and enable them to retire in 2016, as they wanted

to do. That conflict of interest led them to take actions that fell outside the range of

reasonableness. The plaintiffs also proved that the Board breached its duty of care by

failing to provide active oversight over the sale process.

The plaintiffs proved that TransCanada knowingly participated in the breaches of

duty that took place during the sale process. Knowing participation requires both

knowledge that the fiduciary is breaching a duty and culpable participation by the aider

and abettor.

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 Knowledge can be actual or constructive. TransCanada recognized in real time that

Skaggs and Smith were behaving eccentrically, even bizarrely, for sell-side negotiators.

They showed little interest in using available sources of negotiating leverage, did not care

about the standstill, shared information freely, extended exclusivity even after a leak and

an approach from a second bidder, and seemed inordinately eager to get a deal done.

TransCanada knew that Skaggs and Smith stood to receive lucrative change-in-control

payments and that there would be no social issues in the deal, meaning that Skaggs and

Smith had no plans to stick around. TransCanada had reason to know that Skaggs and

Smith were pursuing their own interests in securing a deal and that the Board was not

providing sufficient oversight.

Participation is a closer call. For a third-party buyer to participate in a sell-side

breach of fiduciary duty requires that the buyer create, exacerbate, or exploit the breach. A

third-party buyer might create or exacerbate a breach by offering the sell-side fiduciary a

side deal or by seducing a sell-side fiduciary with visions of great wealth. A third party can

also exploit an existing conflict that the buyer did not create or exacerbate. One recognized

form of exploitation involves a buyer working in conjunction with a disloyal sell-side

fiduciary to obtain inside information and violate boundaries for the sale process that the

sell-side board established.

TransCanada did not create or exacerbate the conflict of interest that Skaggs and

Smith faced. TransCanada nevertheless culpably participated by exploiting their conflicts

of interest. The decisive moment came when Poirier reneged on the agreement in principle

at $26 per share, lowered TransCanada’s bid to $25.50 per share in cash, demanded an

6
answer within three days, and threatened to announce publicly that the negotiations were

dead unless Columbia accepted the reduced offer. The standstill prohibited TransCanada

from taking that step, and TransCanada only took it because Poirier was confident that

Skaggs and Smith were wedded to a deal. TransCanada and Columbia had a win-win

transaction at $26 per share, but Poirier wanted more for his side, and he knew he could

take it by exploiting Skaggs and Smith’s conflict.

Poirier was only able to deliver the coup de grâce because he had been exploiting

Skaggs and Smith for months. He and his colleagues had persistently and knowingly

breached the standstill and used their interactions with Skaggs and Smith to obtain inside

information. Poirier was particularly skillful at exploiting Smith. He gained Smith’s trust

by playing on their past professional friendship, then manipulated Smith into thinking that

they were working together behind the scenes, scripting the conversations between their

respective CEOs, and keeping everything on track. But Poirier was not working with

Smith. He was working over Smith.

The totality of the circumstances matters. Poirier and TransCanada did not engage

in an isolated breach of the standstill or have a single conversation in which Skaggs or

Smith let information slip. Poirier and TransCanada pushed on Skaggs and Smith for

months, inducing them to commit errors and give away points. Even still, TransCanada

would not be liable for aiding and abetting without the final act of reneging on the deal at

$26 per share, dropping the price to $25.50 per share, and making a coercive threat that the

standstill prohibited. That double cross caused the tower of actions that TransCanada had

taken over the preceding months to topple across the line of culpability.

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 By knowingly participating in the breaches of the duty of loyalty committed by

Skaggs and Smith, TransCanada caused Columbia’s stockholders to lose the benefit of an

agreement in principle at $26 per share, comprised 90% in cash and 10% in stock.

TransCanada’s stock price increased between signing and closing, such that Columbia’s

stockholders would have received value of $26.50 per share. The appropriate remedy for

the sale process claim is damages of $1.00 per share based on the lost value of the

alternative transaction.

The plaintiffs also proved that TransCanada is liable for aiding and abetting

breaches of the duty of disclosure. The plaintiffs proved that Skaggs, Smith, and the

directors breached their fiduciary duties by failing to disclose all material information to

Columbia’s stockholders in connection with the vote on the Merger. Most significantly,

the Proxy Statement failed to disclose several of Skaggs and Smith’s interactions with

TransCanada and did not explain that those interactions violated the standstill. Through

selective disclosure, the Proxy Statement painted a misleading picture of arm’s-length

negotiations. The actual timing, tenor, and frequency of those interactions were different.

TransCanada had the right under the merger agreement to review the Proxy

Statement and an obligation to inform Columbia of any material omissions.

Knowledgeable TransCanada personnel reviewed the Proxy Statement, including Poirier

and other individuals who were involved in the omitted communications. TransCanada had

an easy means of fulfilling its contractual obligation and avoiding a claim for aiding and

abetting: send comments on the draft flagging the problems and proposing accurate

language. Columbia might have rejected TransCanada’s comments, and the Proxy

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Statement might have been misleading in any event, but TransCanada would have had a

powerful response to any charge of culpable participation. Rather than calling for a fair

description, TransCanada wrote off the Proxy Statement as Columbia’s document. By

knowingly permitting the sell-side fiduciaries to issue the Proxy Statement, TransCanada

aided and abetted their breaches of the duty of disclosure.

The question of remedy for the disclosure claim is difficult. The case was litigated

on the premise that the plaintiffs needed to prove reliance, causation, and damages to

recover compensatory or rescissory damages for a disclosure violation. The plaintiffs

sought rescissory damages of $3.032 billion with no alternative damages theory.

The plaintiffs did not introduce any evidence of reliance. The defendants say that

failure is fatal. If so, then virtually every effort to recover disclosure-based damages on

behalf of a class of stockholders in a publicly traded company is doomed. Yet Delaware

authorities clearly view an award of post-closing monetary damages as an available remedy

for a breach of the duty of disclosure in a public company setting.

Building on recent precedent, this decision recognizes the following rebuttable

presumption: If corporate fiduciaries distribute a proxy statement to public stockholders

and ask them to vote, and if the proxy statement contains a material misstatement or

omission, then there is a presumption that the stockholders relied on the proxy statement

such that individualized proof of reliance is not required. The presumption is rebuttable.

Under the Delaware Rules of Evidence, an evidentiary presumption causes the opposing

party to bear the burden of proving that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more

probable than the existence of the presumed fact. The defendants would bear that burden.

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 This decision cannot apply the presumption. To reiterate, this case was litigated on

the premise that the plaintiffs bore the burden of proving reliance. It would be unfair to

TransCanada to introduce the presumption after trial, when TransCanada no longer had the

opportunity to prove the nonexistence of presumed facts.

The plaintiffs therefore cannot recover rescissory damages. But that is not the end

of the line, because equity will not suffer a wrong without a remedy. A court of equity has

broad discretion when fashioning relief and is not limited to picking an option provided by

the parties.

Precedent teaches that when disclosure violations have deprived stockholders of

their ability to cast an informed vote on a matter affecting their economic interests, then a

court can award damages equal to a relatively small percentage of the equity value of each

share. Traditionally, this type of award has been called nominal damages, but not in the

sense of a nominal award of $1 for a breach where the plaintiff cannot prove any other

damages. “Nominal” in this sense just means small.

Precedent supports awards of $1.00 to $2.00 per share, or 2.5% to 4.7% of equity

value. Most recently, Chancellor McCormick awarded damages of $1.00 per share, which

equated to 2.7% of equity value. See In re Mindbody, Inc., S’holder Litig., 2023 WL

2518149, at *3, *47 (Del. Ch. Mar. 15, 2023).

This decision awards damages of $0.50 per share for the breaches of the duty of

disclosure, which equates to 1.96% of equity value. Whether judged in absolute or

percentage terms, that figure is reasonable compared to precedent. The evidence that prior

cases have deemed sufficient is both present in this case and justifies that figure. As a cross-

10
check, this decision looks to various methodologies that scholars have used to value voting

rights, because at a minimum, the breaches of the duty of disclosure prevented the

stockholders from freely exercising their right to vote on the Merger. The percentage that

this decision awards falls at the low end of the values that scholars have derived.

The sale process damages and the disclosure damages are not additive. The sale

process damages are economic damages, which Delaware law prioritizes. The disclosure

damages establish a remedial floor. Because the sale process damages exceed the

disclosure damages, the stockholders are entitled to the former.

This decision does not calculate a specific damages award or request a final order,

because there is still work to do. TransCanada has flagged issues like contribution, and the

plaintiffs will want a fee award. The parties will discuss next steps and report to the court.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The factual record is substantial. Trial lasted five days. Fifteen fact witnesses and

four expert witnesses testified. The parties introduced 1,928 exhibits, including deposition

transcripts from twenty-nine individuals.

In the pre-trial order, the parties agreed to nearly 450 stipulations of fact.1 The court

thanks litigation counsel for preparing those stipulations as officers of the court. This

decision relies on them when applicable.

1
Citations in the form “PTO ¶ —” refer to stipulated facts in the pre-trial order. See
Dkt. 434. Citations in the form “[Name] Tr.” refer to witness testimony from the trial
transcript. Citations in the form “[Name] Dep.” refer to witness testimony from a
deposition transcript. Citations in the form “JTX — at —” refer to a trial exhibit, with the

11
 For TransCanada, some facts were established before trial, because this is the

second time that TransCanada has litigated the events surrounding the Merger to a final

judgment. After the Merger, hedge funds pursued an appraisal (the “Appraisal

Proceeding”). As the acquirer, TransCanada was the real party in interest. In a post-trial

decision, the court made findings of fact and held that the fair value of Columbia as a

standalone entity at the time of the Merger was equal to the deal price of $25.50 per share.

In re Appraisal of Columbia Pipeline Gp., Inc. (Appraisal Decision), 2019 WL 3778370,

at *1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 12, 2019). Because TransCanada litigated the Appraisal Proceeding

to judgment, TransCanada is bound by the factual findings in the Appraisal Decision. The

appraisal petitioners are also bound. The named plaintiffs and the rest of the stockholder

class are not bound.

Discovery in this case unfolded differently than in the Appraisal Proceeding. The

different discovery record resulted in a different trial record. The different trial record has

led to some different factual findings, some of which favor the plaintiffs and others which

favor TransCanada. This decision also addresses some matters that were not raised during

the Appraisal Proceeding.

The plaintiffs bore the burden of proving their case by a preponderance of the

evidence. The following facts were proven under that standard.

page designated by the internal page number. If a trial exhibit used numbered paragraphs
or sections, then references are by paragraph or section. Witnesses in this case have testified
in related litigation, so to avoid confusion, citations to previous depositions or trial
testimony appear in the form “JTX — at —.”

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A. Columbia

Before the Merger, Columbia was a publicly traded Delaware corporation that

developed, owned, and operated natural gas pipelines, storage facilities, and other

midstream assets. As a midstream company, Columbia’s success depended on its contracts

with oil and gas producers, known as counterparty agreements.

For many years, Columbia was a wholly owned subsidiary of NiSource Inc., a

publicly traded utility. Skaggs served as CEO of NiSource and chair of its board of

directors. Smith served as CFO. A third executive, Glenn Kettering, was Executive Vice

President and Group Chief Executive Officer of the Columbia business unit.

Skaggs, Smith, and Kettering had been friends and colleagues for decades. All three

were aging executives who were planning for retirement. All three had selected 2016 as

their target year for retirement. All three saw a spinoff of the Columbia business unit as a

means to achieve that goal.

Skaggs had served as CEO since 2005, and he believed that a CEO had a shelf-life

of about ten years. Skaggs would turn sixty in 2016, and he saw himself only staying on

through July 2016 at the latest. His financial advisor used March 31, 2016, as his target

retirement date and told him that “the single greatest risk” to his retirement plan was his

“single company stock position in NiSource.” Appraisal Decision, 2019 WL 3778370, at

*2. As CEO, Skaggs could not easily sell his shares in the market without suggesting that

he lacked confidence in the company. In a cash sale of the company, however, Skaggs

could gain immediate liquidity.

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 Smith had been thinking about retirement all his life. Smith Tr. 1134–35. He viewed

fifty-five as the “magical age” to retire and his “retirement wish date.” See JTX 32 at 2;

JTX 1527 at 4. He would turn fifty-five in March 2016. As CFO, Smith faced the same

dilemma about monetizing his equity holdings.

Kettering also used 2016 as a target year for retirement. Like Skaggs, Kettering

would turn sixty in 2016. But Kettering was more open to working beyond 2016, and in

two retirement planning documents, he used mid-2017 as a target date. He wanted to retire,

but not with the same yearning as Skaggs and Smith.

All three executives had lucrative change-in-control agreements with NiSource

under which a sale of the company would cause their unvested equity to vest. Skaggs would

receive three times his base salary and target annual bonus if terminated after a change of

control. Smith and Kettering had a two-times multiplier.

Because of NiSource’s size, a sale of Columbia would not qualify as a change of

control. But if NiSource spun off Columbia, and if Skaggs, Smith, and Kettering went with

the new entity, then a sale would trigger their benefits. Skaggs and his management team

recommended a spinoff to the NiSource board of directors (the “Spinoff”).

B. The Spinoff

In September 2014, NiSource announced that it would pursue the Spinoff. NiSource

also announced a plan to form Columbia Pipeline Partners LP (“CPPL”), a master limited

partnership, to serve as Columbia’s primary vehicle for raising capital. Post-Spinoff, CPPL

14
would issue equity periodically, each time using the proceeds to purchase assets from

Columbia through drop-down transactions.2

In December 2014, the NiSource board of directors approved Skaggs, Smith, and

Kettering’s request to join Columbia. Each received a comparable change-in-control

agreement from Columbia. Skaggs lobbied successfully for Smith and Kettering to receive

a three-times multiplier.3

The change-in-control agreements gave Skaggs, Smith, and Kettering personal

reasons to secure a deal when disinterested stockholders might prefer a standalone option.

Their agreements expired in 2018, which meant that it was safer to sell sooner rather than

later. For Skaggs and Smith, the expiration date was a secondary factor. Both wanted to

sell and retire in 2016.

Skaggs, Smith, and Kettering expected Columbia to become an acquisition target,

so they engaged Goldman, Sachs & Co. (“Goldman”) and Lazard Frères & Co. (“Lazard”)

to prepare. After meeting with Smith, the lead Goldman banker told his colleagues that

Skaggs and Smith “‘don’t want to work forever.’” JTX 56. Goldman believed that Skaggs

and Smith were eyeing “a sale in the near term.” Appraisal Decision, 2019 WL 3778370,

at *3. In a memorandum from the same time frame, Skaggs’s personal financial advisor

2
See PTO ¶¶ 86, 142; JTX 18; JTX 21; JTX 27; JTX 30; JTX 39; JTX 40; JTX 42;
JTX 43.
3
Viewed in isolation, the increased multiple is an insignificant point. Viewed as
part of the larger story, it fits with the pattern of three long-standing colleagues planning
to exit through a sale.

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wrote that Columbia “could be purchased as early as Q3/Q4 of 2015.” JTX 114 at 1. He

added, “I think they are already working on getting themselves sold before they even split.

This was the intention all along. [Skaggs] sees himself only staying on through July of

2016.” Id.

Lazard identified a group of possible buyers that included TransCanada, Dominion

Energy Inc. (“Dominion”), Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“Berkshire”), Spectra Energy

Corp. (“Spectra”), Enbridge Inc., and NextEra Energy Inc. (“NextEra”). In May 2015,

Lazard contacted TransCanada and conveyed that Columbia “may be put into play” after

the Spinoff and “that social issues may not be a significant consideration.” JTX 109. In

other words, Skaggs, Smith, and Kettering were not interested in sticking around. All of

TransCanada’s proposals assumed that Skaggs, Smith, and Kettering would leave with

their change-in-control benefits.

On July 1, 2015, NiSource completed the Spinoff, and Columbia became an

independent, publicly traded company. The Board comprised seven members: Skaggs,

Sigmund Cornelius, Lester P. Silverman, Marty R. Kittrell, W. Lee Nutter, Deborah S.

Parker, and Theresa A. Taylor. Other than Skaggs, none were members of management.

Except for Silverman, all were also directors of NiSource.

Cornelius served as the lead outside director. He was the President and Chief

Operating Officer of a liquefied natural gas terminal, and he previously had a thirty-year

career at ConocoPhillips Co., a Fortune 100 integrated energy company. Skaggs consulted

regularly with Cornelius and relied on his advice, often treating Cornelius as a proxy for

the full Board.

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 Contemporaneous with the Spinoff, oil and gas prices declined sharply, which put

downward pressure on the stock prices of midstream companies. Immediately after the

Spinoff, Columbia’s stock traded over $30 per share. By August 2015, Columbia’s stock

was trading below $25 per share. In September, Columbia’s stock closed below $20 per

share. It stayed in that range until March 10, 2016, when news of the Merger leaked.

1. Spectra And Dominion Contact Skaggs.

Five days after the Spinoff, Spectra’s CEO left a voicemail for Skaggs about

opportunities for their companies. They spoke the next day. Skaggs believed a bid from

Spectra would involve stock. With increasing uncertainty in the oil and gas markets,

Skaggs and Smith did not want a stock deal. They told Goldman that they did “[n]ot [have]

a lot of interest in engaging with Spectra.” JTX 1013 at 1.

Later that month, Dominion’s CEO called Skaggs about opportunities for their

companies. On July 14, 2015, Skaggs sent an email to Cornelius in which he asked to

confer about “two inbound CEO calls.” PTO ¶ 164. Although both CEOs had used virtually

the same opening line, Skaggs described Spectra as a “casual pass” and Dominion as

“notable/substantive.” Id. Skaggs is a savvy communicator who could shape his message

to advance his goals, and the description he gave to Cornelius was an early example.

Skaggs favored a deal with Dominion, and his description pointed in that direction.

On July 20, 2015, Skaggs met personally with Dominion’s CEO. During the

meeting, Dominion’s CEO expressed interest in buying Columbia for $32.50 to $35.50 per

share in cash. Skaggs did not meet with Spectra’s CEO.

17
 The Board discussed Dominion’s expression of interest during a regularly scheduled

meeting on August 3 and 4, 2015. On August 5, Skaggs told Dominion’s CEO that he

needed to raise his bid to the “upper-$30s.” Id. ¶ 167. Dominion’s CEO told Skaggs that

Dominion wanted to move forward.

On August 12, 2015, Columbia and Dominion executed an NDA. It contained a

don’t-ask-don’t-waive standstill.

After obtaining due diligence, Dominion’s CEO told Skaggs that Dominion was no

longer interested in a deal at the price they had discussed. They agreed to terminate

discussions, and Dominion destroyed the confidential information it had received.

2. TransCanada Approaches Smith.

In September 2015, TransCanada began its pursuit of Columbia. Poirier led the deal

team. Wells Fargo Securities, LLC was TransCanada’s investment banker. Eric Fornell led

the Wells Fargo team.

Spectra and Dominion had contacted Skaggs, but Poirier and Fornell targeted Smith.

The three had met in 1999 when Smith was the Treasurer of American Electric Power, Inc.,

and Fornell and Poirier were investment bankers with J.P. Morgan.4 From 1999 until 2007,

4
PTO ¶¶ 47, 49, 118. At that point in his career, Poirier was the junior member of
a team that reported to Fornell. See Poirier Dep. 34–35 (Poirier describing Fornell as “his
boss,” a “mentor,” and a “friend”). Fornell played a significant role in Poirier’s career.
Fornell joined J.P. Morgan in 1999 to head up its Power and Pipelines Group. Poirier had
recently moved to J.P. Morgan from Chase Manhattan Bank of Canada. He sought out
Fornell, and Fornell invited him to transfer to his new group. Poirier became Group Head
of Investment Banking Coverage, where he reported to Fornell from 1999 to 2007. After
Fornell moved to Wells Fargo, he recruited Poirier in 2013 to serve as founding president

18
Fornell and Poirier visited Smith approximately a dozen times per year and built a rapport.

Through their efforts, J.P. Morgan secured engagements from Smith.5

Fornell remained in touch with Smith when he went to NiSource. See, e.g., JTX 24.

After the Spinoff, Fornell continued the relationship. See, e.g., JTX 121.

On September 16, 2015, Fornell visited Smith and told him that Poirier was with

TransCanada. During a follow-up visit two weeks later, Fornell told Smith that

TransCanada was interested in Columbia. On October 8, Fornell met with Smith a third

time and again brought up Poirier. Smith said he was open to a call. Fornell immediately

sent Poirier an email with the subject line, “Steve Smith” and the statement: “He will be

happy to hear from you.” PTO ¶ 185.

The next day, Poirier called Smith and scheduled an in-person meeting. Afterward,

Poirier had his team update their analysis of a Columbia acquisition, first prepared two

months earlier. The analysis described Columbia as “[c]urrently for sale.” Id. ¶ 187. The

circumstantial evidence supports a finding that Smith was the source of that information.

The analysis noted that the management team consisted of the “individuals who were seen

as ‘ineffective’ at NiSource” and calculated how much Skaggs, Smith, Kettering, and two

other top executives would receive under their change-in-control agreements. JTX 245 at

8, 21. From those calculations, TransCanada knew that a sale would put millions of dollars

and Head of Investment Banking and Capital Markets for Wells Fargo Securities Canada,
Ltd. In that role, Poirier again reported to Fornell. See PTO ¶¶ 44–45, 51.
5
See PTO ¶¶ 49, 118; JTX 1270 at 2.

19
in their pockets. TransCanada never contemplated retaining the senior Columbia

executives. Poirier Tr. 178–79, 182.

3. The Two-Track Strategy

As the fall unfolded, energy markets continued to deteriorate. CPPL’s unit price

declined, undercutting Columbia’s ability to use CPPL to raise capital.

In mid-October 2015, Skaggs sent the Board a memorandum in which he explained

that Columbia needed either to raise capital or to find an acquirer with a strong balance

sheet. Skaggs recommended a two-track approach. Along one track, Columbia would

prepare for a stock offering. Along a second track, Columbia would “[e]xplore whether

Dominion or a select group of blue chip strategic players (e.g. MidAmerican (Buffet),

Sempra, Enbridge, TransCanada, and perhaps Spectra) would have a legitimate interest in

CPG—at a price that’s within CPG’s intrinsic value range.” PTO ¶ 195. During its next

regular meeting, the Board approved the plan.

As part of the Board-approved strategy, Skaggs contacted Dominion’s CEO on

October 26, 2015. He explained that Columbia soon would be pursuing an equity offering

and that if Dominion still had interest in a deal, then Dominion should move quickly. The

next day, Skaggs met with his personal financial advisor to discuss his possible retirement

by July 2016, if not sooner. Id. ¶ 205.

On the evening of October 26, 2015, Smith had dinner with Poirier. Smith has many

virtues. He is detail-oriented and a team player. He is fully transparent. He lacks guile or

artifice. Those traits are laudable in a CFO but undesirable for an M&A neophyte who

became TransCanada’s “primary contact” during the deal process. Id. ¶ 50.

20
 During dinner, Poirier described TransCanada’s interest in Columbia. After the

meeting, Smith informed Skaggs, Kettering, and Robert Smith, Columbia’s general

counsel, about TransCanada’s interest.

On October 29, 2015, the Board met telephonically. Skaggs reported on his

discussion with Dominion’s CEO, and Smith reported on TransCanada’s approach.

Management recommended engaging with Dominion on the theory that Dominion could

pay a higher price. The Board instructed management to engage with TransCanada if

Dominion did not make an attractive proposal. The Board decided Columbia would pursue

an equity offering unless a potential buyer offered at least $28 per share. Id. ¶ 206.

4. The Launch Of The November Sale Process

On November 2, 2015, Skaggs met with Dominion’s CEO and offered exclusivity

in return for a transaction at $28 per share. Dominion’s CEO countered by suggesting either

an equity investment or a three-way merger-of-equals that would include NextEra.

The following day, Goldman prepared a list of key considerations for a sale process.

Goldman sent them to Smith, who forwarded them to Skaggs. They included the following

considerations:

• “Difficult environment for acquirers in this space. Big bet in the valuation on
projects ‘to come’ when folks are having a hard time valuing hard assets with real
counterparties/contracts due to anxieties about volumes, terminal values, counter
party credit issues, etc etc etc.”

• “Any sale process that is public (whether leaked or announced) puts pressure on
board to ‘take’ best price at premium to market that is offered and absent
competition may lead to any given bidder trying to push deal at a lower price.”

• “Competition (real or perceived) is the best way to drive bidders to their point of
indifference.”

21
• “Maintaining sense of competition means maintaining speed towards the finish
line.”6

On November 6, 2015, Smith contacted Poirier and offered to enter into an NDA

and provide non-public information. On November 9, they executed an NDA that

contained a don’t-ask-don’t-waive standstill (the “Standstill”). The NDA designated Smith

as the representative for TransCanada to contact regarding the sale process. PTO ¶ 211.

Christine Johnston, TransCanada’s Vice President of Law and Corporate Secretary,

negotiated the NDA for TransCanada. She reduced the length of the Standstill from

eighteen months to twelve, demonstrating that TransCanada focused on the provision.

During a meeting on November 10, 2015, the TransCanada deal team discussed the

Standstill. Meeting notes state: “standstill → 12 months can’t make run at them.” JTX 314

at 1. Poirier understood that the Standstill precluded TransCanada from pursuing a

transaction with Columbia for twelve months absent prior written Board authorization.

Poirier Tr. 198.

Columbia also entered into an NDA with NextEra and agreed that Dominion and

NextEra could share information. Goldman contacted Berkshire, and Berkshire executed

an NDA. The standstills that bound NextEra, Dominion, and Berkshire lasted eighteen

6
JTX 290 at 1. Two of Goldman’s points proved particularly prescient. First, a sense
of competition would be key to extracting a bidder’s highest price. Second, a leak would
put pressure on the Board to take an offer at a premium to market. Through their solicitous
interactions with TransCanada, Skaggs and Smith would eliminate any sense of
competition and leave the Board vulnerable to pressure once the deal leaked.

22
months. During the same period, Spectra’s CEO contacted Skaggs about strategic

opportunities. Neither followed up. PTO ¶¶ 212–213.

TransCanada’s outside counsel, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, reviewed the NDA. No

one informed the Board about the standstills or their implications. The Board did not learn

about the standstills until March 4, 2016. Cornelius had never heard the term “don’t-ask-

don’t-waive” until this litigation. Cornelius Tr. 787–98.

5. The Management Team Favors Berkshire And TransCanada.

Over the following weeks, Columbia provided due diligence to Dominion, NextEra,

TransCanada, and Berkshire. Each bidder received a management presentation.

TransCanada had its meeting with management on November 13, 2015. Smith and

Kettering attended for Columbia. Poirier was joined by Alex Pourbaix, TransCanada’s

Chief Operating Officer, and Karl Johannson, TransCanada’s President.

After the initial meetings, Skaggs reported to the Board that management had

engaged in “‘interesting’ exploratory discussions with three of the four credible ‘inbound’

strategic players (Dominion, TransCanada, Spectra, and Berkshire Hathaway).” PTO ¶

226. He also recommended that Columbia prepare for an equity offering during the week

of November 30, 2015, assuming a sufficient bid had not been received by then.

On November 17, 2015, the Board met telephonically. Skaggs presented his

recommendation, and the Board endorsed it.

On November 19, 2015, Skaggs invited Berkshire to make a bid by November 24

so that the Board could consider it during a meeting on November 25. Skaggs explained

that if no one provided a satisfactory bid, then Columbia would move forward with an

23
equity offering. Skaggs and Smith gave a similar message to TransCanada. They also told

TransCanada to focus on three criteria: an all-cash transaction, closing certainty, and price.

See JTX 855. Skaggs and Smith did not contact NextEra, Dominion, or Spectra, so those

bidders did not know about the deadline.

During meetings on November 19 and 20, 2015, TransCanada’s board of directors

(the “TransCanada Board”) heard from Poirier about his interactions with Columbia

management. Poirier reported that “[Columbia] management appears to prefer a sale of the

company and have indicated to us that there will be no social issues.” JTX 337 at 5. The

TransCanada team had quantified the financial interest that Columbia management had in

a deal, concluding that for a bid at a 20% premium, Skaggs, Smith, and Kettering would

have “total value at risk” of $45,386,051, $13,128,063, and $6,767,111. JTX 350 at 22.

TransCanada recognized that those “large change of control provisions” resulted in the

executives being “motivated to sell.” JTX 306 at 1.

Two days later, Poirier told Johnston and Wells Fargo that the Columbia

management team had a “strong desire to conclude a transaction prior to late 2016 (to avoid

equity issuance).” JTX 375 at 2. He noted that working backwards from late 2016 and

using a six-month timetable for completing a deal meant that Columbia management

“cannot afford for a sale process to fail in the near term.” JTX 371 at 3–4.

On November 24, 2015, TransCanada’s President and CEO Russ Girling contacted

Skaggs to express interest in an all-cash acquisition at $25 to $26 per share. That same day,

Berkshire’s CEO expressed interest in an acquisition at $23.50 per share. Neither indicative

offer met the $28 per share minimum set by the Board.

24
 6. The End Of The November Sale Process

On November 25, 2015, the Board held a special telephonic meeting. Skaggs told

the Board about TransCanada and Berkshire’s proposals and said they had received no

additional word from Dominion, NextEra, or Spectra. That was technically true, but

misleading. Skaggs failed to mention that no one told Dominion, NextEra, or Spectra about

the November 24 deadline, so none of them had any reason to act by that date. Skaggs was

a good communicator, and the directors felt that he kept them well informed. But Skaggs

also knew how to take advantage of their confidence by selectively omitting information

or adding his own spin. This was another example.

During the meeting, the Board decided that the indications of interest were too low

to pursue. The Board also discussed the risk that the window for raising capital would

close. To avoid missing the window, the Board terminated the sale process and instructed

management to proceed with the equity offering.

After the meeting, Skaggs contacted Berkshire’s CEO, told him that the Board did

not support a transaction at Berkshire’s valuation, and said that Columbia would be moving

forward with its planned equity offering. Berkshire’s CEO had told Goldman the week

before that if Columbia completed an equity offering, it would “kill our conversation.”

PTO ¶ 254. He could have meant it, but it also could have been a bluff, because for

25
Columbia to sell 20% of its equity at less than $20 per share would reduce stockholders’

pricing expectations and result in a chunk of its investors having a lower basis.7

Skaggs called Girling and gave him the same message. Girling asked what would

happen if TransCanada closed the gap between $26 and $28 per share and got the deal done

by Christmas. After consulting with Cornelius, Skaggs told Girling that the Board did not

want to take the risk. See PTO ¶¶ 249, 253.

That same day, Columbia sent “pencils down” letters to Dominion, NextEra,

Berkshire, and TransCanada. Id. ¶ 250. The letter stated: “These and all other duties and

obligations existing under the Confidentiality Agreement remain in full force and effect

notwithstanding the return and/or destruction of the Evaluation Material in accordance with

the terms of the Confidentiality Agreement.” Id. ¶ 251. In other words, the standstills were

in effect.

No one had told Dominion or NextEra about the November 24, 2015 deadline, and

they were surprised by the notice. NextEra responded, “This was news to us—we were

working on it.” Id. ¶ 252.

7
That is how TransCanada later analyzed the effect of the offering. The value of the
underlying business did not change. The offering simply reallocated that value among a
larger number of equity holders and enabled Columbia to reduce debt. With the value
spread across more shares, a pre-issuance offer of $28 per share equated to a post-issuance
offer of $25.75 per share. See JTX 530; JTX 531. Skaggs claimed that he viewed the equity
issuance as a “poison pill” that would stop anyone from bidding. Skaggs Tr. 1083. That
testimony was a litigation construct that made no financial sense.

26
C. Poirier’s November 25 Call With Smith

After Skaggs’ call with Girling on November 25, 2015, Poirier called Smith for

additional color. Because Skaggs had told Girling that Columbia had terminated the sale

process, the Standstill was operative. That provision made clear that after Columbia had

terminated discussions, TransCanada could not reinitiate them. The standstill component

stated that TransCanada could not “seek . . . to influence . . . the management [or] board of

directors . . . or affairs of the other Party, including by means of . . . contacting any person

relating to any of the matters set forth in this Agreement.” JTX 307 § 3(B). The don’t-ask-

don’t-waive component meant that TransCanada was prohibited from “making a request

to amend or waive this provision.” Id.

Poirier’s call to Smith breached the Standstill. But Smith did not object. He was

happy to backchannel with Poirier.

Smith told Poirier that management “probably” would want to pick up merger talks

again “in a few months.”8 The Board did not authorize Smith to convey that message to

TransCanada, and Smith did not provide any other bidders with that information.

Smith also told Poirier that he presumed TransCanada did not want Columbia to

raise additional capital through a drop-down transaction before TransCanada could buy it.

Smith told Poirier that Columbia’s “planned window for the next drop-down would be in

8
JTX 392; see JTX 403 (“There is some expectation internally that [Columbia] may
return to [TransCanada] in the new year for another kick at this.”); JTX 395 (email with
subject line: “Pencils down for now on [Columbia]”) (“[T]here is some possibility that
discussions could pick up again in the new year”).

27
the March to June timeframe.” JTX 409 at 2. The Board did not authorize Smith to suggest

that time frame, and Smith did not share the information with anyone else.

Poirier reported to the TransCanada deal team that “Capricorn management would

be supportive of a sale.” Id. at 1. Poirier also reported that “[b]ased on the decision they

made, I believe the board is not as wed to that path at the moment.” Id. In other words, he

“doubted whether Columbia’s directors shared management’s enthusiasm for a deal.”

Appraisal Decision, 2019 WL 3778370, at *8.

Poirier recommended that TransCanada plan on “reengaging in January, with an eye

to concluding an agreement by March.” JTX 411 at 3. He proposed to check in with Smith

after the equity offering and that Girling follow up with Skaggs “just before the holidays.”

Id. In the meantime, TransCanada would continue working on deal scenarios. Id.

The Proxy Statement did not mention the call between Poirier and Smith on

November 25, 2015. That call was one of many occasions when Poirier would extract

information from Smith and attempt to draw inferences from his words and body language.

Smith’s demeanor on the stand suggested that he does not have much of a poker face.

Whether communicating consciously or subconsciously, Smith gave Poirier lots of signals.

Poirier did not always read them correctly, but through Smith, Poirier had exclusive source

of insight into the sale process.

Thanks to Poirier’s conversation with Smith, TransCanada possessed unique

information about Columbia’s continuing interest in a deal and the timeline for further

negotiations. But TransCanada did not know for sure that it was receiving special

28
treatment. They suspected that other potential bidders could have engaged, and it was

possible that Smith or other representatives had given similar messages to other bidders.

D. Girling’s December 2 Call To Skaggs

On November 29, 2015, Poirier and Fornell exchanged a series of emails about how

to pursue a transaction with Columbia. Poirier emphasized the need “to create some time

pressure . . . to get [Columbia] to reengage in the near-term.” Id. Fornell wanted to reengage

but wondered about the Standstill. Id. at 1; see Fornell Tr. 26–27. He asked Poirier, “Have

your legal guys talked to Capricorn’s legal guys to see if they are OK with my calling Steve

[Smith]?” JTX 418.

Poirier already knew that the Standstill prohibited any approaches to Columbia.

Both he and Johnston had advised the TransCanada deal team that for twelve months,

TransCanada “can’t make a run at them [i.e., Columbia].” JTX 314 at 1; see JTX 311. But

Poirier was willing to push the limits.

As Poirier had recommended, TransCanada used Columbia’s equity offering as an

excuse for outreach. After the market closed on December 1, 2015, Columbia announced

an underwritten public equity offering at $17.50 per share. The offering was

oversubscribed and raised net proceeds of $1.4 billion. The underwriters exercised their

greenshoe and purchased an additional 10.725 million shares. The high demand suggested

that market participants saw Columbia’s stock as undervalued. Skaggs told investors that

the “successful” completion of the equity offering “eliminates the need for additional

equity capital until 2017 and gives us the financial flexibility to be opportunistic in raising

equity as we go forward and execute our business plan.” PTO ¶ 264.

29
 On the same day that the equity offering closed, Johnston emailed a summary of the

Standstill to Poirier:

For 12 months from November 9, 2015, TransCanada and its directors,
officers and representatives cannot, unless Capricorn’s board specifically
requests in writing in advance:

1) Acquire, offer or agree to acquire ownership of equity securities or
material assets

2) Seek to influence, advise, change or control its management or the board
(including by soliciting proxies), or request amendment to the standstill
provisions

3) Make any public disclosure or take actions that requires Capricorn to
make public disclosure with respect to matters that are the subject of this
agreement.

JTX 424. Poirier agreed with Johnston’s summary. Poirier Tr. 197–98. He forwarded

Johnston’s email to Girling stating: “See below. We basically must get Capricorn’s

acquiescence to pursue this transaction, or even to seek to influence them. Under item 2,

this extends to reaching out to board members without Bob’s knowledge or consent. . . .

This is a standard provision in my experience.” JTX 424.

Despite knowing what the Standstill prohibited, Girling called Skaggs on December

2, 2015. That same day, Fornell called Smith twice. PTO ¶¶ 271–272. Fornell reported to

his team that “CEOs had a good call this morning” and that there was “[n]othing to do at

the moment.” JTX 439. Later that day, Fornell provided Poirier with a proposed

engagement letter for Wells Fargo to act as a financial advisor to TransCanada in its

potential acquisition of Columbia. PTO ¶ 273.

30
 The circumstances indicate that the calls at least touched on a potential transaction.

Fornell’s calls to Skaggs and Smith therefore breached the Standstill. Neither objected. The

Proxy Statement did not mention those calls.

While Fornell was making those calls, TransCanada’s management team was

briefing the TransCanada Board on their interactions with Skaggs and Smith. The team

reported that Columbia management “relayed its view that its board may wish to re-engage

with TransCanada in 2016.” JTX 450 at 12. TransCanada management described the

Standstill, and the TransCanada Board instructed management “to review potential

litigation exposure.” Id. TransCanada plainly understood what the Standstill prohibited.

E. Fornell’s Interactions With Skaggs And Smith

Five days later, on December 7, 2015, Poirier emailed Fornell about Columbia and

asked, “What are merits of re-engaging now vs. waiting till [sic] January?” JTX 468 at 2.

Still concerned about the Standstill, Fornell asked, “Is it a question for counsel?” Id. Poirier

replied: “First, what are the tactical merits. If we think it makes sense, second step would

be to talk to counsel.” Id. Poirier already knew that TransCanada could not reengage

without violating the Standstill.

On December 8, 2015, Skaggs and Smith attended an energy conference organized

by Wells Fargo. During the conference, Wells Fargo was scheduled to have a meeting with

Skaggs, Smith, and Kettering.

Fornell used the meeting as an opportunity to follow up with the Columbia

management team. Before the meeting, Fornell sent Poirier an email suggesting that the

meeting was “[t]imely.” PTO ¶ 275. After the meeting, Fornell emailed Poirier with the

31
subject line: “Are you reachable?” and the message “I had a nice talk with Steve Smith at

the Energy Conference.” Id. ¶ 277. Poirier responded, “Yes now is good.” Id. After the

call, Poirier texted Girling: “Hi Russ, more intel on Capricorn and KMI please call at your

convenience.” Id. ¶ 278. Fornell agreed that he was working on TransCanada’s behalf.

Fornell Tr. 30.

The circumstantial evidence indicates that the December 8, 2015, meeting touched

on a potential transaction. That interaction breached the Standstill. The Proxy Statement

did not mention the meeting.

F. Poirier’s December 17 Call To Smith

On December 17, 2015, Poirier called Smith to reiterate TransCanada’s interest in

a deal. See JTX 273 at 2. Poirier indicated that TransCanada would be willing to pay around

$28 per share. See PTO ¶ 282. During the call, Poirier proposed that they meet during the

first week of January. See id. ¶ 279. When Poirier made the call, he knew that he needed

Columbia’s consent before approaching Columbia about a transaction. JTX 1661 at 56.

Smith told Skaggs about Poirier’s outreach, and Skaggs shared the information with

Matt Gibson, the lead banker for Goldman. See PTO ¶ 282. The next day, Gibson reported

to his team that TransCanada remained quite interested in a deal, that Smith would meet

with TransCanada during the first week of January at TransCanada’s request, and that

TransCanada had indicated that they could pay $28 per share. Id. Gibson also reported that

Skaggs had started “a series of 1x1 meetings with Directors” and that the “message is ‘even

though we raised equity, our plan still has a significant amount of execution risk (both

32
financial and operational). Need to continue to consider strategic alternatives[.]’” Id.

(alteration in original).

Poirier’s mid-December 2015 call to Smith breached the Standstill. No one

informed the Board about the call or that Smith had agreed to a January meeting. Cornelius

Tr. 799–801; see Appraisal Decision, 2019 WL 3778370, at *8, *32. The Proxy Statement

did not mention the mid-December call.

G. Skaggs Primes The Directors For A Deal.

During the second half of December 2015, Columbia’s top officers and Goldman

began planning for a possible deal with TransCanada in early 2016. On December 17,

Skaggs circulated to Smith, Kettering, and Goldman a “rough cut” of a presentation that

he planned to give to the Board one month later, on January 28, 2016. JTX 492. Skaggs

anticipated a deal price of $28 per share—the same price Poirier had suggested to Smith—

and he outlined a “Deal Analytic Framework.” Id. at 4. A key slide showed “What You

Have To Believe” about Columbia’s prospects to reject a deal at $28 per share. Id.

Skaggs planned to recommend a deal. He asked Goldman for help preparing the

deck. See JTX 514.

During the second half of December and through early January, Skaggs scheduled

separate one-on-one meetings with individual Board members. There can be good reasons

for a CEO to engage in one-on-one conversations with directors, but the practice invariably

enhances the CEO’s ability to curate the information each director receives and guide each

director toward the CEO’s preferred result. During one-on-one conversations, directors

cannot benefit from hearing the questions that other directors ask, nor can they deliberate

33
and share ideas. While not invariably problematic, individual meetings are a sign of a CEO

seeking to control a process.

Skaggs used his one-on-one meetings to prime the directors to support a sale.

Appraisal Decision, 2019 WL 3778370, at *33. Goldman would later describe the meetings

in exactly those terms. See JTX 575 (“Bob has spent the past week flying around meeting

with his Directors 1x1 . . . he’s priming them for a [TransCanada] bid.”).

Skaggs also used the one-on-one meetings to remind the directors that he hoped to

retire on July 1, 2016—just eight months away. See JTX 484. Without a sale, the Board

would need to find a new CEO, and a CEO transition is a significant undertaking that

always carries risk. Compared to finding, hiring, and working with a brand-new CEO—

against the backdrop of a business plan that Skaggs was saying incorporated significant

amounts of execution risk—a sale of Columbia would seem like an attractive option. That

was precisely the reaction that Skaggs wanted the directors to have.

H. The Lead-Up To The January 7 Meeting

On January 4, 2016, Poirier called and texted with Smith in anticipation of an in-

person meeting on January 7 (the “January 7 Meeting”). Poirier asked Smith to send him a

package of confidential information so he could prepare for the January 7 Meeting. JTX

273 at 2–3. TransCanada had destroyed the confidential information it received in

November 2015, and Poirier wanted an updated set.

Poirier noted that TransCanada would want access to an electronic data room as

soon as possible. Smith, Robert Smith, and Sullivan & Cromwell began setting one up. See

JTX 522; JTX 523, JTX 541; JTX 542.

34
 Poirier’s texts with and call to Smith on January 4, 2016, breached the Standstill.

The Proxy Statement disclosed Poirier’s contact with Smith but presented it in a misleading

manner. According to the Proxy Statement, “In early January 2016, Mr. Poirier called Mr.

S. Smith to request a meeting.” JTX 1291 at 46. Poirier did not call to request a meeting.

Smith and Poirier had already planned the January 7 Meeting by mid-December 2015. PTO

¶ 279. Poirier called to ask for an updated version of the package of information that

Columbia had provided to the bidders in November 2015.

Poirier also wanted comfort on the Standstill. Johnston and Robert Smith discussed

the issue, and the attorneys reasoned themselves into concluding that the January 7 Meeting

could go forward, even though TransCanada was clearly seeking to acquire Columbia.

On January 5, 2016, Smith emailed 190 pages of confidential information to Poirier.

See JTX 528 (the “January 5 Information”). The materials were largely a copy of what

bidders had received in November 2015, but with updated financial projections. The

January 5 Information included a sample counterparty agreement. TransCanada was

particularly focused on Columbia’s counterparty risk. See JTX 540. Smith did not obtain

Board approval before sending this information to Poirier.

In preparation for the January 7 Meeting, Goldman drafted a one-page list of talking

points for Smith to use. JTX 521. Skaggs approved them. Id. Skaggs was simultaneously

sending emails to key directors updating them on topics for the upcoming meeting on

January 28 and 29, 2016. He did not mention the January 7 Meeting. E.g., JTX 538.

One of the talking points stated, “If your interest is real, I’d suggest that you have

Russ meet with Bob and make a proposal well in advance of our Board meeting on January

35
28th.” JTX 521 at 1. Recall that Skaggs began planning in mid-December 2015 to sell the

Board on a transaction at the January 28 meeting. Smith’s suggestion that Girling call

Skaggs was part of management’s effort to sell the company.

Another talking point stressed that the two principal factors would be “1) price; and

2) certainty.” Id. On price, Smith was supposed to say:

• “I recall that [TransCanada] was at $26.00 and CPG was at $30.00, and you or Russ
indicated you could be at $28.00 before our equity offering.” Id.

• “I suggest that you lean in on price as much as possible (‘don’t get penny wise and
pound foolish’) as every dollar matters a lot to our Board.” Id.

• “This is particularly true if you hope to avoid an auction process. Board needs to
see price as ‘pre-emptive.’” Id.

I. The January 7 Meeting

The January 7 Meeting took place as planned. The following day, Poirier briefed

his team, and contemporaneous notes provide a persuasive account of what took place. See

JTX 545 at 1–2; JTX 599 at 11. Their contents match up well with a set of notes from

Robert Smith’s files about a report he received on the meeting. See JTX 546 at 1.

Like Smith, Poirier brought talking points to the meeting, and he started by going

through them. He explained that TransCanada wanted a U.S.-based asset but had many

other targets. JTX 599 at 11. As a skilled negotiator, Poirier was suggesting that there

would be competition for TransCanada’s attention. Cf. JTX 162 at 2 (Lazard report on

Dominion representative making same assertion).

Having set the stage, Poirier informed Smith that TransCanada nevertheless

remained interested in acquiring Columbia and contemplated a cash offer that would be

36
fully financed with no outs. JTX 546 at 1; JTX 599 at 11. Poirier said that TransCanada’s

view of Columbia’s fundamental value had not changed, implying that TransCanada still

envisioned a deal price of around $28 per share. Poirier explained that TransCanada wanted

to conduct due diligence for thirty to forty-five days in order to formulate a firm proposal.

JTX 546 at 1; JTX 599 at 11. Poirier stressed the need for due diligence on Columbia’s

contracts with its shippers and counterparty risk. See JTX 545 at 2; JTX 546 at 1.

Then it was Smith’s turn. He started going through his talking points, but after

reading a few, he literally pushed the page across the table and gave it to Poirier. See Poirier

Tr. 118. That is uncharacteristic behavior for an M&A negotiator, and so out of the ordinary

that TransCanada’s expert could not cite any precedent for it. Subramanian Tr. 1341–43.

The best that TransCanada’s expert could do was refer to his own practice when teaching

of giving his students his slides after a lecture. JTX 1662 ¶ 46. That is obviously a very

different context: A professor is not bargaining at arm’s length with his students in a high-

stakes negotiation where every step matters and is carefully choreographed. Poirier had not

given his talking points to Smith. Poirier Tr. 177.

TransCanada has argued that there was nothing wrong with Smith handing over the

talking points because nothing in them was problematic. Dkt. 429 at 50–51. The

significance of handing over the talking points lay in the act itself. Patterns carry

information, and departures from patterns provide signals. When an M&A negotiator does

something that M&A negotiators do not do, the departure from the norm sends a signal.

Whether intentionally or not, Smith signaled that he trusted Poirier and was open to a deal.

37
 TransCanada’s expert has argued that Smith could have decided to hand over the

talking points to establish credibility and induce TransCanada to bid. Subramanian Tr.

1341–42. In theory, yes. But that was not why Smith did it. He testified plainly that he felt

silly reading off the talking points and thought it was easier if he just handed them over.

Smith Tr. 1176. Negotiators in M&A settings do not typically do that, so the act

emphasized that Smith was a neophyte negotiator who was open to a deal.

During the conversation, Smith shared information freely. Poirier asked Smith if

there was a gap between the Board and management about selling, as TransCanada

suspected. Smith responded that there was not a unanimous view on a sale, but there was

a consensus on selling at the right price.

Smith confirmed that Skaggs wanted a proposal from Girling before January 27,

2016, so that he would have something to take to the Board during their meeting on January

28 and 29. Smith proposed a call on January 22. Smith reported that Skaggs was meeting

one on one with his directors in advance. Poirier proposed a call on January 25.

Poirier said that TransCanada would want thirty to forty-five days of exclusivity and

would seek to sign a definitive agreement around March 1, 2016. Smith responded that

TransCanada was unlikely to face competition. Smith Tr. 1141–42. He ticked through six

major competitors and explained why each was “distracted.” Poirier Tr. 207–08. In

substance, Smith told Poirier that “Columbia had eliminated the competition.” Appraisal

Decision, 2019 WL 3778370, at *8. Although TransCanada has quibbled over whether

Smith used those words, that was how Poirier understood it. JTX 545 at 2 (handwritten

notes from Poirier’s report on January 7 Meeting citing observation that each potential

38
competitor had its “own distractions”); JTX 599 at 11 (same; citing comment from Smith

that competition for a deal had been “eliminated”).

TransCanada has argued that Smith’s statement about a lack of competition was

immaterial because TransCanada already knew that other players in the industry were

distracted. Dkt. 457 at 59. TransCanada had plainly discounted some bidders. See JTX 377.

In the Appraisal Decision, this court found that TransCanada already knew about each of

the company-specific problems that other bidders faced. 2019 WL 3778370, at *8–9.

Once again, the significance of Smith’s statement lay not in its informational

content, but what it said about the management team’s desire for a deal. Poirier had opened

the discussion by downplaying TransCanada’s interest and stating that TransCanada had a

range of possible targets. An experienced negotiator for Columbia would have discounted

that assertion based on TransCanada’s persistent approaches, but saying that was part of

the code. When Poirier requested exclusivity, the standard choreography called for Smith

to resist. An experienced negotiator for Columbia might have said any number of things,

but reassuring Poirier that Columbia wanted to sell and that TransCanada would not face

competition would not have made the list.9 To the contrary, Goldman had advised Smith

9
See JTX 119 at 4 (Goldman Sachs presentation identifying “Responses to Avoid”
and noting “Do not say you / CPG / the Board are ‘open’ to a transaction / suggested
alternative”); JTX 128 at 2 (identifying possible responses to approaches); see also JTX
283 at 2 (Lazard script for meeting with Dominion CEO in which Skaggs would say,
“Lastly, we are aware that other parties are interested in engaging with us. My Board needs
to consider our alternatives in that regard.”); JTX 168 (Goldman draft of talking points for
response to approach by Dominion); JTX 161 (Lazard draft of talking points for response
to approach by Dominion).

39
that “[c]ompetition (real or perceived) is the best way to drive bidders to their point of

indifference.” JTX 290 at 1. By telling TransCanada “in substance that Columbia had

‘eliminated’ the competition, Smith contraven[ed] Goldman’s advice.” Appraisal

Decision, 2019 WL 3778370, at *8–9. He undercut Columbia’s negotiating leverage from

the start.

TransCanada and its expert have argued that Smith’s behavior benefited Columbia

because it reassured TransCanada that it had a path to success and was not being used as a

stalking horse. Had TransCanada been standoffish, then perhaps that could have been a

reasonable strategy. Here, TransCanada was the persistent pursuer. By this point,

TransCanada had violated the Standstill by reaching out to Columbia about a deal on eight

separate occasions: Poirier’s November 25 call to Smith; Girling’s December 2 call to

Skaggs; Fornell’s December 2 call to Smith; Fornell’s December 8 meeting with Smith;

Poirier’s mid-December call to Smith; Poirier’s January 4 call to Smith; Johnston’s January

4 call to Robert Smith; and the January 7 Meeting itself. As Skaggs would report to

Cornelius and two other directors on January 11, 2016, TransCanada “certainly has keen

interest in CPG.” JTX 564 at 1. No one needed to encourage TransCanada to bid. Smith’s

reassurances sent a different message—that management wanted a deal and would not be

seeking to drive up the price.

Poirier and Smith discussed valuation. The talking points that Smith handed over

indicated that TransCanada had been at $26 per share and that Columbia wanted $30, but

that Girling had suggested to Skaggs that TransCanada could get to $28. JTX 521 at 1.

40
Poirier understood from his meeting with Smith that Columbia would be pushing to get to

a price of $28 per share. JTX 545 at 1.

The January 7 Meeting breached the Standstill. Appraisal Decision, 2019 WL

3778370, at *32. The Proxy Statement provided a misleading description of the January 7

Meeting. It portrayed the meeting as the first step in TransCanada’s reengagement (it was

not), and it portrayed the meeting as involving a balanced exchange of high-level

information (it did not).

After the January 7 Meeting, TransCanada had free and regular access to

information from Smith. Poirier and Smith scheduled a daily call, and between January 7

and January 13, 2016, they spoke almost every day. The Proxy Statement did not mention

that fact.

J. TransCanada Begins Due Diligence.

One day after the January 7 Meeting, Poirier sent a due diligence list to Smith. Smith

was the most eager to sell, and he forwarded it to his colleagues with the note, “Doesn’t

appear too horrible.” JTX 548. Skaggs was also eager to sell. He weighed in with “[t]edious

. . . [b]ut, seems within fairway.” Id. Robert Smith was more measured. He described it as

“comprehensive to be sure” and indicated that there would be items that Columbia could

not provide. Id. (“We’ll try to be as accommodating as we can but will note what we can

and can’t do at this stage.”). After consulting with Sullivan & Cromwell, Robert Smith

advised Skaggs and Smith to reject many of the requests. JTX 555.

TransCanada identified twenty-nine people from its team who would need access to

the data room. JTX 547. On January 9, 2016, two days after the January 7 Meeting,

41
Columbia gave the TransCanada personnel access, and TransCanada’s team began

conducting due diligence. PTO ¶ 293. Columbia management did not obtain approval from

the Board before granting TransCanada access to the data room.

On January 11, 2016, Skaggs sent emails to Cornelius and two other directors with

whom he had already met in one-on-one sessions. See JTX 565. His email purported to

update them on management’s engagement with TransCanada, and Skaggs stated that he

would share the same information verbally with the other three directors when he had one-

on-one conversations with them later that week. PTO ¶ 297.

Skaggs’s email was misleading. He stated:

Since our recent discussions, TransCanada (TRP) sent a data request to Steve
on Friday evening (1/08)—in contemplation of “developing a preliminary
proposal” that apparently, TRP’s CEO would communicate to me “early in
the week of 1/25”. [sic] The TRP request is a follow-up to its November ’15
review of CPG’s business plan, and we consider the request as more-or-less
“routine” and “not overly burdensome”. [sic] (FYI . . . Although we formally
terminated discussions with TRP in early December, our NDA remains in
effect.) TRP also wants to speak again with Glen to follow-up on CPG’s
commercial and construction activities; that conversation will likely occur
later this week. (FYI . . . We continue to limit involvement/interactions to the
CPG “Core Team”. [sic]).

Id.

Skaggs did not mention the multiple interactions with Poirier, Girling, and Fornell.

He did not mention the January 7 Meeting or describe the candid information that Smith

had provided. He characterized TransCanada’s request for due diligence as a “data request”

that was “routine” and merely “a follow-up to its November [2015] review of [Columbia’s]

business plan.” Id. It was actually a direct result of the January 7 Meeting. He also implied

that TransCanada had set the timetable for a proposal, stating that “apparently, TRP’s CEO

42
would communicate to me ‘early in the week of 1/25.’” Id. Skaggs had given Girling that

timeline by asking him to make a proposal that Skaggs could present to the Board at its

meeting on January 28, 2016. Skaggs also referred to the NDA remaining in effect, while

failing to mention the Standstill, TransCanada’s repeated violations of that provision, or

management’s failure to report those violations to the Board and seek the Board’s approval

to proceed.

Skaggs’s email was another example of his skill at manipulating the flow of

information. This time Skaggs flatly misrepresented what he and Smith had been doing to

engineer a sale.

During due diligence, TransCanada focused on the size of the change-in-control

payments that management would receive. After calculating the total, a Wells Fargo banker

wrote, “112MM? yikes.” JTX 600; see JTX 608 (noting the $112 million “Change in

Control Executive Compensation”). Another banker responded, “Nice little retirement

plan.” Id.

K. The Debate Over A Request To Make A Proposal

Based on his repeated interactions with Skaggs and Smith, Poirier knew that Skaggs

wanted an expression of interest before the Board’s meeting on January 28 and 29, 2016.

Smith and Poirier planned for the CEOs to speak on January 25.

The Standstill clearly prohibited an expression of interest without prior Board

approval. It stated:

Standstill. In consideration for being furnished with Evaluation Material by
the other Party, each Party (each such Party in such context, the “Standstill
Party”) agrees that until the date that is twelve months after the date of this

43
 Agreement, unless the other Party’s board of directors otherwise so
specifically requests in writing in advance, the Standstill Party shall not, and
shall cause its Representatives not to . . . directly or indirectly,

(A) acquire or offer to acquire, or seek, propose or agree to acquire, by means
of a purchase, tender or exchange offer, business combination or in any
other manner, beneficial ownership . . . or constructive economic
ownership . . . of the other Party . . .

(B) seek or propose to influence, advise, change or control the management,
board of directors, governing instruments or policies or affairs of the
other Party, including by means of . . . contacting any person relating to
any of the matters set forth in this Agreement . . . or making a request to
amend or waive this provision or any other provision of this Section 3 or
of Section 1 or Section 2 or

(C) make any public disclosure, or take any action that could require the
other Party to make any public disclosure, with respect to any of the
matters that are the subject of this Agreement.

JTX 307 § 3.

An expression of interest fell within Section 3(A), under which TransCanada agreed

not to “directly or indirectly” either “seek . . . to acquire” or “propose . . . to acquire”

Columbia. Id. § 3(A). It also fell within Section 3(B), under which TransCanada agreed

not to “directly or indirectly” either “seek or propose to influence . . . the management,

board of directors . . . or policies or affairs” of Columbia, including by means of . . .

contacting any person relating to any of the matters set forth in this Agreement.” Id. § 3(B).

During TransCanada’s repeated interactions with Columbia management, the

Standstill had been raised only briefly, just before the January 7 Meeting. Columbia’s in-

house counsel quickly brushed the issue aside. No one asked whether Girling could make

a proposal that included a price range until January 25, 2016, the day of the call, and it was

TransCanada who flagged the point. See JTX 617. That morning, Johnston emailed Robert

44
Smith to seek confirmation that TransCanada would not breach the standstill “in the event

a verbal or written offer or proposal is made by Taurus to the Capricorn CEO.” JTX 620 at

1. She noted “specifically that the Capricorn board of directors is to ‘specifically request

in writing in advance’ any of the matters covered in Section 3.” Id.

Johnston’s email was itself a breach of the Standstill. Appraisal Decision, 2019 WL

3778370, at *32 n.32. For her to seek assurance that an “offer or proposal” would not

breach the Standstill was itself “a request to amend or waive” the Standstill, and the plain

language of the Standstill prohibited TransCanada from “making a request to amend or

waive this provision or any other provision of [the Standstill].” JTX 307 at 5.

Robert Smith forwarded Johnston’s request to the lead Sullivan & Cromwell

attorney advising Columbia. Smith wrote that he would “call [Johnston] back shortly

acknowledging that an offer is not in contravention with the standstill agreement.” JTX

620 at 1. Given the language of the Standstill, that was a bizarre statement to make. Absent

prior written Board authorization, an “offer” obviously was “in contravention [of] the

standstill agreement.” Two minutes after receiving Robert Smith’s email, the Sullivan &

Cromwell partner emailed back one word: “Agree.” Id.

Robert Smith replied to Johnston: “I confirm by this email that receipt of an offer to

purchase our securities in this context would not violate or be in contravention with the

terms of the NDA, including the standstill provision.” JTX 623 at 1. He did not obtain

Board approval, as required by the Standstill, before granting a waiver in response to a

request that itself breached the Standstill.

45
 Johnston knew that an offer to acquire Columbia would violate the Standstill

without a written Board invitation and that an email from the general counsel was not

enough. She wrote back: “[I]f we were to move forward, the words in the standstill that we

agreed would appear to require more explicit Board direction for an offer (even if

conditioned).” Id. That was a diplomatic way of telling Robert Smith that there was no

possible way that “an offer to purchase” Columbia’s securities “would not violate or be in

contravention” of the Standstill.

Robert Smith again reached out to Sullivan & Cromwell. The lead partner replied:

“I think a formal proposal they are right [sic], but what we’re doing now is fine. Just

emphasize that what we approve them doing is making a private, non-public indication for

discussion of a negotiated transaction and discussion of whether aboard [sic] wants to

initiate negotiations.” JTX 621.

That response had no basis in the language of the Standstill. Its terms do not

distinguish among “formal,” “informal,” or “binding” proposals and does not carve out

“private, non-public indication[s]” of interest. At trial, the Sullivan & Cromwell partner

agreed that submitting an expression of interest with a price range was “probably a breach”

of the Standstill. Frumkin Tr. 689. He nevertheless argued that “some approaches are

welcome and, therefore, not a breach” while “other approaches might be unwelcome and,

therefore, a breach.” Id. at 683–84.

Under the plain language of the Standstill, that is obviously wrong. The Standstill

does not distinguish between “welcome” and “unwelcome” approaches. Any approach is

a breach, just as any request to make an approach is a breach. At trial, the partner argued

46
that the plain language of the Standstill would make it “very difficult for anybody to . . .

ever reach out to a company and make a proposal.” Id. at 719–20. Exactly. That is the point

of don’t-ask-don’t-waive language. If directors want anybody to be able to reach out and

make a proposal, then counsel should not include don’t-ask-don’t-waive language in the

company’s standstills.

The partner’s argument that some approaches may be welcome while others are not,

makes an important distinction, but not one that operates at the level of breach. Whether

an approach is welcome affects whether the target decides to waive the breach or otherwise

not assert a claim. Any uninvited approach, including a welcome approach, is a breach, but

Columbia might decide to waive the breach or not assert the breach. That, however, was

not a call for management or the Sullivan & Cromwell partner to make. Only the Board

could decide to waive the breach or otherwise not assert the claim.

Neither Columbia management nor Sullivan & Cromwell brought the December

2015 conversations, the January 7 Meeting, Johnston’s inquiry about the Standstill, or

management’s desire to waive the Standstill to the attention of the Board. JTX 1642 at 70.

Instead, Sullivan & Cromwell prepared a memorandum to provide to the Board during its

meeting on January 28 and 29, 2016, that devoted eight of its ten pages to the directors’

fiduciary duties when selling the company. See JTX 587 at 3–10. And Sullivan &

Cromwell prepared a short slide deck to talk through a process of exploring strategic

alternatives. See JTX 627. It is hard to square that conduct with the trial testimony that

TransCanada’s anticipated expression of interest—with a price term—was a non-event for

purposes of the Standstill.

47
 Johnston’s request for confirmation that TransCanada’s proposal would not breach

the Standstill was itself a breach of the Standstill. The Proxy Statement did not mention it.

L. The January 25 Proposal

On January 25, 2016, Poirier called Smith and had a discussion about the valuation

that Girling would offer Skaggs during a call later that day, so “there were no surprises.”

Poirier Tr. 125–26. Girling then contacted Skaggs and expressed interest in an all-cash

acquisition in the range of $25 to $28 per share, subject to further due diligence. PTO ¶

301. Girling started the call by stating that to avoid a violation of the Standstill, the proposal

should not be viewed as an offer. See JTX 622 at 1. Under the Standstill, that did not make

any difference, because the provision went well beyond a formal offer.

Girling reported that due diligence had gone well and had not revealed any issues.

He stated that their view of Columbia’s fundamental value remained in the range of $25 to

$28 per share in cash, but that Columbia’s trading price meant that the premium would

seem excessive. See JTX 622 at 1; see also JTX 578 at 2 (Wells Fargo noting that “[t]he

nearly 60% premium implied by the range discussed by the CEOs makes [TransCanada]

look like it is overpaying”). Girling asked for another forty-five days of exclusivity for

more due diligence, to let the market respond to TransCanada’s earnings announcement in

February 2016, and to engage with the rating agencies. See JTX 622 at 1. Girling said that

TransCanada would not be willing to move forward without exclusivity. PTO ¶ 302.

Skaggs responded that Columbia would consider the proposal and that the Board

would push for the top of the range. See JTX 622 at 1.

48
 The next day, January 26, 2016, Skaggs emailed the directors and told them that

TransCanada’s CEO had called him with “a proposition to acquire CPG.” JTX 628. Skaggs

did not mention the Standstill, the backchanneling since November 30, 2015, the January

7 Meeting, or the due diligence that TransCanada had been conducting since January 9,

2016.

M. The End-Of-January Board Meeting

Since the middle of December 2015, Skaggs had planned to pitch the Board on a

sale to TransCanada during its regular meeting scheduled on January 28 and 29, 2016. PTO

¶ 304. On December 17, 2015, Skaggs sent Goldman a handwritten outline of slides he

wanted to use at the meeting. See JTX 492. That outline expressed “Management’s POV”

that a sale to an acquirer with scale and a strong balance sheet was the best path forward.

Id. at 3. From Poirier’s call with Smith, Skaggs expected a sale to TransCanada at $28 per

share. He later sent Goldman a draft of his proposed slide titled “What You Have To

Believe” to reject a deal at $28 per share. His points included:

• “Near-perfect execution.”

• “Customers Stay the Course (Won’t Flake)”

• “Balance Sheet Strength + Flexibility Are Overlooked”

• “Size and Scale Aren’t An Imperative.”

JTX 513 at 4. He also asked Goldman to prepare a slide showing the share prices and

standalone valuations in future years that would equate to $28 per share today. Id. at 5.

Using Skaggs’ outline, Goldman prepared a formal presentation for the meeting.

JTX 590. The presentation included a slide with matrices of EBITDA multiples and

49
resulting share prices. Id. at 1. Skaggs circulated the presentation to Smith and Kettering

and gave his opinion that “the slides make a statement.” JTX 594 at 1.

During the two-day meeting, Skaggs gave a presentation that was designed to depict

a deal with TransCanada as the obvious choice. Skaggs provided only a partial version of

Goldman’s metrics. He included the calculation that standalone would be more valuable if

the stock price reached $30.11 per share by the end of 2017. JTX 641 at 6. He omitted the

calculation that remaining independent would be more valuable if the stock price reached

$27.95 per share by the end of 2016.

After Skaggs’s report, the Board discussed contacting other parties. PTO ¶ 304(e).

No one reported on the Standstill, TransCanada’s breach, or the fact that more scrupulous

counterparties might respect their contractual commitments.

The Columbia management team advised the Board that Girling’s expression of

interest in a range of $25 to $28 per share was sufficiently “firm” to grant TransCanada

exclusivity. R. Smith Tr. 412. Inexplicably, Robert Smith testified at trial that

TransCanada’s offer was nonetheless insufficiently “firm” to violate the Standstill. Id. at

412–13. Such are the virtues of motivated reasoning.

The Board considered the risk of TransCanada terminating discussions without

exclusivity. PTO ¶ 304(g). TransCanada had been pursuing Columbia since October and

had repeatedly blown through the Standstill, providing a strong indication that

TransCanada would not walk without exclusivity, but no one discussed those points. The

Board authorized exclusivity through March 2, 2016. Id. ¶ 309.

50
 During an executive session, Skaggs led a discussion of succession planning. The

implicit message remained that a deal would avoid the challenges and risks associated with

finding, hiring, transitioning, and working with a new CEO. Cf. JX 884 at 1 (Lazard noting

internally that “the best succession planning will be a deal”).

N. The Deal Process Moves Forward.

After the Board meeting, Skaggs contacted Girling and told him that the Board had

agreed to exclusivity. At Sullivan & Cromwell’s suggestion, Skaggs proposed an informal,

unwritten exclusivity agreement. See JTX 646; JTX 652; JTX 659 at 2. The lead partner

on the deal was “not a fan of exclusivity” because “it creates a thread for plaintiffs’ lawyers

to pull on.” Frumkin Tr. 698–99, 748–49. He therefore recommended a “gentleman’s

agreement” regarding exclusivity with the intention of keeping it out of the Proxy

Statement. See JTX 647. TransCanada rejected the idea and insisted on a written

exclusivity agreement. Johnston Tr. 612.

On January 28, 2016, Columbia sent TransCanada a draft exclusivity agreement.

TransCanada’s competing first draft required TransCanada’s consent before Columbia

could “release any person from, or waive any provision of, any confidentiality or standstill

agreement to which it is a party.” JTX 643 at 3. That provision would have given

TransCanada control over whether any potential competing bidder was released from a

standstill. See Johnston Tr. 611–12. It showed that TransCanada was fully aware of how

the Standstill worked.

Later that same day, Columbia and TransCanada executed an addendum to the NDA

that permitted specified TransCanada personnel to review highly confidential information,

51
including 176 contracts between Columbia and its customer-producer counterparties. The

counterparty agreements were critical to a bidder understanding how well Columbia could

weather the commodities downturn. PTO ¶¶ 306–307; see JX 667; JX 672; JX 674 at 1.

On February 1, 2016, Columbia and TransCanada executed the exclusivity

agreement, which provided for exclusivity until 5:00 p.m., Central Time, on March 2. PTO

¶ 309. TransCanada committed to notify Columbia if it was no longer interested in pursuing

a transaction valued at $25 to $28 per share, at which point exclusivity would cease. Id.

The addendum provided that while exclusivity was in effect, Columbia could not accept or

facilitate an acquisition proposal from anyone but TransCanada,

provided that in response to a bona fide written unsolicited Transaction
Proposal that did not result from a breach of this letter agreement (an
“Unsolicited Proposal”) [Columbia] may, after providing notice to
[TransCanada] as required by this letter agreement, (i) enter into or
participate in any discussions, conversations, negotiations or other
communications with the person making the Unsolicited Proposal regarding
such Unsolicited Proposal, (2) furnish to the person making the Unsolicited
Proposal any information in furtherance of such Unsolicited Proposal . . . or
(3) approve, recommend, declare advisable or accept, or propose to approve,
recommend, declare advisable or accept, or enter into an agreement with
respect to, an Unsolicited Proposal or any subsequent Transaction Proposal
made by such person as a result of the discussions, conversations and
negotiations or other communications described in clause (1), if the Board of
Directors of [Columbia] determines in good faith, after consultation with its
outside legal counsel, that the failure to do so would reasonably be expected
to be a breach of fiduciary duties under applicable law.

JTX 676 at 2–3 (the “Exclusivity Fiduciary Out”). Columbia committed to notify

TransCanada “promptly (and in any case within 24 hours) if any Unsolicited Proposal or

any substitute inquiry or contact with any person with respect thereto is made” and to

52
“indicate the material terms and conditions of such Unsolicited Proposal, inquiry, or

contact.” Id.

During this period, Skaggs and his management team were “very focused on getting

[TransCanada].” JTX 659 at 3. In particular, Skaggs and Smith were “super focused on

getting [TransCanada] done fast.” JTX 678.

On February 3, 2016, the two management teams held a conference call to discuss

preliminary considerations around structuring a merger. The management teams agreed to

target a February 29 announcement date. On February 4, Columbia sent TransCanada a

draft merger agreement.

On February 5, 2016, the Board held a telephonic meeting during which Skaggs

gave an update on the process, including a summary of the draft merger agreement. Skaggs

told the directors that the parties were targeting an announcement of the transaction on

February 29. JTX 191 at 6.

1. The February 9 Meeting

On February 9, 2016, a meeting took place among Skaggs, Smith, and Fornell. It is

undisputed that they discussed the potential acquisition. PTO ¶ 317. At trial, none of the

meeting participants could recall the meeting. Skaggs Tr. 1049; Smith Tr. 1170; Fornell

Tr. 41–42.

Smith contacted Fornell and asked for the meeting. See JTX 691. The purpose was

for Skaggs and Smith to confirm that TransCanada could finance its bid. See JTX 707.

Smith and Skaggs hoped to close as quickly as possible and wanted TransCanada to use a

tender offer to shorten the path to closing. See JTX 698; JTX 693 at 3–4.

53
 After hearing about the meeting request, Poirier asked Fornell and his colleague

Hugh Babowal why Skaggs and Smith were behaving so strangely. Poirier relayed that

“Steve [Smith] keeps telling me that despite their stock price, this is not a wasted effort

[of] due diligence.” JTX 708. Poirier had been “thinking hard about why he is saying that”

and whether it signaled that “if we do not hit the bottom end of the range, they will run a

competitive process, and that is the reason for his comments?” Id. Fornell had a different

take. He thought Smith was “signaling that they would do a deal below their range.” Id.

Babowal agreed. He thought that Skaggs and Smith were acting as if “management and the

board want an exit regardless of price and will reset expectations to a lower level if the

market doesn’t recover.” JTX 709.

During the meeting, Skaggs probed about execution risk and whether TransCanada

could finance its bid. Fornell responded that TransCanada had “lots of levers to pull,” and

Smith “backed him up.” JTX 707. Smith thus supported TransCanada’s position. Fornell

came away thinking that Skaggs and Smith were very supportive of the deal. See id.

2. TransCanada Slows Down The Process.

After Fornell’s meeting with Skaggs and Smith, TransCanada slowed down the

process. Recall that Goldman had told Skaggs and Smith that “[m]aintaining sense of

competition means maintaining speed towards the finish line.” JTX 290 at 1. During

February 2016, the process began to stall. The reason given was TransCanada’s need for

reassurance from the credit rating agencies. See PTO ¶ 318.

On February 10, 2016, Smith and Poirier spoke in advance of a scheduled call

between Skaggs and Girling on February 12. See JTX 715 at 23. Smith’s talking points

54
called for him to reiterate that Columbia was seeking a price between $25 and $28 per

share. He was also supposed to stress that “[i]mportantly, and unusually for this industry,

this opportunity is being presented to [TransCanada] in a way that is unburdened by the

‘typical’ social issues.” Id. In other words, he was to emphasize that Columbia’s senior

management were happy to leave.

On February 12, 2016, Girling spoke to Skaggs. See JTX 724; JTX 726. Girling

explained that while TransCanada’s assessment of Columbia’s value had not changed, it

was difficult to justify the premium over Columbia’s market price implied by that

valuation. See JTX 722 at 2.

Skaggs reported on these developments during a Board meeting on February 12,

2016. JTX 191 at 6–7. When the directors met in an executive session, they raised for the

first time whether management might have a financial interest in seeing a deal happen. The

directors asked Sullivan & Cromwell to calculate how much the management team would

receive at various price points.

Sullivan & Cromwell presented its analysis one week later. The following table

summarizes the results.

Executive Deal at $28 + No deal but stock Gain From A Deal
Termination on trades at $28 per
6/1/2016 share + Retirement
on 6/1/2016
Skaggs $30,890,856 $8,366,961 $22,523,895
Smith $12,504,537 $3,133,731 $9,370,806
Kettering $9,685,479 $2,135,593 $7,549,886
Robert Smith $3,130,987 $0 $3,130,987

55
After receiving this information, the directors did not take any steps to exercise closer

oversight over the management team.

The meeting on February 19, 2016, was the first time that the Board received

information about Goldman’s relationships with TransCanada and Lazard’s relationships

with TransCanada and Dominion. JTX 191 at 7. Both investment banks had been advising

Columbia since before the Spinoff, yet they had never revealed their prior work for

TransCanada.

3. TransCanada Lays The Groundwork For Dropping Its Price.

On February 19, 2016, the credit agencies informed TransCanada that under its

proposed structure for financing the Merger, TransCanada’s credit rating was likely to fall

from A– with a stable outlook to BBB– with a negative outlook, the lowest investment

grade rating. See PTO ¶ 323. Poirier told Smith that because of the rating assessment,

TransCanada could not proceed with its existing financing plan for the acquisition. Id.

On February 24, 2016, Poirier had another call with Smith, this time in advance of

a call Girling was scheduled to have with Skaggs later that day. During the call, Poirier

“raised the spectre [sic] of a lower price in a roundabout way multiple times with Steve

Smith and was met with ‘crickets.’”10 Smith’s silence caused Poirier to sense an

opportunity. He surmised that “management wants to get this done” and that if

10
JTX 782 at 1; see also JTX 578 at 3 (Wells Fargo discussing alternative deal
structures that included prices of $22 per share or $24 per share and recommending
“Discuss Options 2-4 with [Columbia] CFO and see how he reacts”).

56
TransCanada made an offer below its range, then “Skaggs and Smith will take a lower price

to the board and dare them to turn it down.” Id. Poirier and Wells Fargo also developed an

alternative if Skaggs said, “[L]et’s put our pencils down.” JTX 773 at 5. They planned to

bring in a large Canadian pension fund who would make an equity investment in the range

that TransCanada had provided and that Columbia had expected. Id.

When Girling called Skaggs, he reported that TransCanada had substantially

completed its due diligence, but needed more time to deal with the rating agencies and

develop a financing plan for a deal priced between $25 to $28 per share. PTO ¶ 331; JTX

773. Girling also warned Skaggs that a deal might not be achievable within Columbia’s

range. See JTX 773 at 5. TransCanada was already considering lowering its bid to $23 per

share. See JTX 782 at 1.

Skaggs did not terminate the discussions. He told Girling that the deal process was

“becoming a distraction” and said, “let’s get done with this in a week.” Id.; see also JTX

760 at 3.

After the meeting, Skaggs sent a short update to the Board that accentuated the

positive. He reported that TransCanada continued to see Columbia’s value and was

exploring alternative financing plans. He did not report that Girling had signaled that an

offer might end up below Columbia’s range. See JTX 775.

Two days later, Skaggs sent a more detailed update to the Board. JTX 783. This

time he acknowledged that TransCanada had begun to emphasize the premium over

market, suggesting that TransCanada might come in with an offer at or below the low end

of its prior range. Id. at 3.

57
 On February 28, 2016, Skaggs emailed Cornelius about TransCanada possibly

offering a mixed consideration deal with less than $25 per share in cash. Cornelius

responded that he did not have “much appetite for a cash component less than $25.” JTX

791. Skaggs responded that if the cash component was below $25 per share, he would be

“inclined not to even counter.” Id.

4. Columbia Extends Exclusivity.

TransCanada’s exclusivity agreement was scheduled to expire on March 1, 2016.

On that date, Smith, Kettering, and Robert Smith met in person with the TransCanada team

to wrap up the deal points. JTX 797. During the meeting, TransCanada worked hard to give

the Columbia team the impression that they were planning to make a bid within Columbia’s

range. Id. Against that backdrop, TransCanada asked Columbia to extend the exclusivity

agreement through March 14. See JTX 1732 at 3. Rather than using the expiration of

exclusivity as an opportunity to reach out to other bidders (or threaten to do so), Columbia

management recommended extending the exclusivity agreement through March 8. The

Board approved the extension. PTO ¶ 338.

On March 2, 2016, Skaggs emailed the Board saying that he expected a proposal

from Girling on March 5. Id. ¶ 339. Skaggs was so confident that he was about to strike a

deal that he told the Board that there would be an in-person meeting on March 7 to consider

the transaction, and he arranged for private jets to fly the directors to Houston. JTX 821.

On March 3, 2016, Robert Smith emailed Johnston about TransCanada’s anticipated

offer and asked if TransCanada still had any concerns about the Standstill. JTX 816 at 1.

At trial, Johnston testified implausibly that an offer containing a price term would not

58
implicate the Standstill. Johnston Tr. 564. In real time, Johnston asked her outside counsel

at Mayer Brown for advice about whether there was “anything we should do to ensure that

we are not offside[?]” JTX 813 at 1. On Mayer Brown’s advice, Johnston sent Robert Smith

an email “asking him to confirm that the Board consents to the discussion.” JTX 816.

Asking for the Board’s consent was itself a breach of the Standstill, although by this point,

TransCanada could be confident that Columbia management was not concerned about it.

The Board met on March 4, 2016, to grant TransCanada permission to bid. That was

the first time that the directors heard about the Standstill. See JTX 191 at 9. According to

the minutes, a “representative from Sullivan & Cromwell explained that as a result of the

‘standstill’ provision in [its NDA], TransCanada was prohibited from making a proposal

absent an invitation to do so from the Board.” Id.

In reality, TransCanada was prohibited from making any effort, directly or

indirectly, to “seek . . . to acquire” Columbia or “seek or propose to influence the

management, board of directors . . . or . . . affairs” of Columbia, “including by means of .

. . contacting any person relating to any of the matters set forth in this Agreement.” JTX

307 § 3. TransCanada had never stopped seeking to acquire Columbia, and all of Girling,

Poirier, and Fornell’s contacts with Skaggs and Smith in December 2015, January 2016,

and February 2016 had been part of an effort to “seek . . . to acquire” Columbia and to

“seek . . . to influence the management [and] board of directors” of Columbia. No one had

ever sought the Board’s approval for any of those interactions.

To ensure that TransCanada’s written proposal did not breach the Standstill, the

Board formally authorized management to send a written request to TransCanada asking

59
for a merger proposal from TransCanada. PTO ¶ 346. Robert Smith sent out the written

request by email that day. Id. ¶ 348.

The Board instructed Skaggs and Smith to waive the standstills in the NDAs with

the other potential bidders as soon as exclusivity with TransCanada expired, before any

merger agreement was signed. Id. ¶ 347. With exclusivity set to expire on March 8, 2016,

that meant that the waivers for other potential bidders should go out on the morning of

March 9. R. Smith Tr. 418.

5. TransCanada Drops Its Price.

The TransCanada Board met on March 5, 2016, to authorize a formal bid. See JTX

829 at 2. Management and Wells Fargo gave their reports. See JTX 869 at 2–3. Poirier and

Fornell had previously remarked that Skaggs and Smith seemed so eager for a deal that

they would support a price below Columbia’s range. The minutes refer to “sensitivities

around price with the credit rating advisory services.” Id. at 4.

After discussion, the TransCanada Board “agreed that negotiations should

commence at US$24 with a high range of approximately US$25.25.” Id. TransCanada’s

formal offer was thus one dollar below its previous range of $25 to $28, and management’s

authority topped out just twenty-five cents above the bottom of its previous range.

The plan was for Girling to call Skaggs later that afternoon, with Poirier calling

Smith before the call to preview what Girling would say. During his call with Smith, Poirier

“floated the idea of an offer coming in at $24 a share.” Poirier Tr. 133. According to Poirier,

Smith “used colorful language” and accused Poirier of wasting his time. Id. at 133–34.

60
Smith was offended. He had interpreted TransCanada’s expressions of interest as more

serious and had not expected that his friend Poirier would backtrack.

After the call, Smith told Skaggs, “I think they’re considering 24.” Skaggs Tr. 1053.

Girling then called Skaggs and formally offered to buy Columbia for $24 per share. PTO

¶ 350. The pre-trial order states that Skaggs “expressed disappointment in the offer.” Id.

Skaggs testified at trial that he “absolutely lost it” and called the offer “counterproductive.”

Skaggs Tr. 1053.

Later that day, Smith called Poirier and advised TransCanada to increase its offer

before the Board met that evening. PTO ¶ 350. Smith told Poirier that TransCanada would

need to get to the midpoint of Columbia’s range—$26.50 per share—to get the Board’s

attention. Poirier Tr. 134. The Board did not authorize Smith to make what was effectively

a counteroffer.

Girling subsequently called Skaggs and raised TransCanada’s offer to $25.25 per

share. That figure split the difference between TransCanada’s opening bid of $24 and

Smith’s counter of $26.50. It was also the upper limit of the authority that Girling had

asked for and received from the TransCanada Board. Girling characterized the offer as

“best and final,” which it wasn’t. PTO ¶ 350. The TransCanada Board had never said it

would not authorize a higher figure. Skaggs told Girling that he would take TransCanada’s

offer to the Board, but that management could not support it. Id.

After Girling’s call with Skaggs, Poirier called Smith. Poirier told Smith that

TransCanada did not have the ability to increase its offer. Id. ¶ 353. That was not true.

61
 6. The Board Rejects TransCanada’s Offer.

The Board held a special meeting on the evening of March 5, 2016. Skaggs reported

on Poirier floating the $24 per share offer and Smith’s disappointment, followed by Girling

making the $24 per share offer and Skaggs’s disappointment. According to the minutes,

Smith stated that “he had conveyed to his counterpart at TransCanada that . . . management

viewed $26.50 as a more acceptable price and one management would feel comfortable

recommending.” JTX 191 at 10. After that exchange, Girling had raised TransCanada’s

offer to $25.25 per share and characterized its offer as “best and final.” Id.

Skaggs recommended against accepting the offer. As the court found in the

Appraisal Decision, Skaggs and Smith wanted to sell, and their desire to sell had undercut

Columbia’s negotiating position, but they were not willing to sell at just any price. They

would not take a terrible deal, but they also would not push “for the final nickel or quarter.”

Appraisal Decision, 2019 WL 3778370, at *28.

The Board directed management to reject TransCanada’s offer. PTO ¶ 351. After

the meeting, Skaggs contacted Girling and delivered that message. Girling responded, “I

guess that’s it.” JTX 863. After the call between Skaggs and Girling, Poirier called Smith

to try to convince him that TransCanada could not increase its offer. PTO ¶ 353.

Skaggs emailed the Board about these developments. He reported that management

had stopped work on the deal. Id. ¶ 354.

O. The Process Resumes.

The negotiations were not really over. On March 6, 2016, Wells Fargo contacted

Goldman. Fornell said that if Columbia’s management could support a price below $26.50

62
per share, then TransCanada might increase its price above $25.25 per share. Fornell told

Goldman that without a counter, the deal was dead. See JTX 877; JX 895; JX 900.

After hearing from Goldman, Skaggs gathered with Smith and Kettering, and they

agreed to support a deal at $26 per share. PTO ¶ 358. Skaggs spoke with Cornelius. Based

on the call with Cornelius, Skaggs, Smith, and Kettering instructed Goldman to tell Wells

Fargo that (i) “management had reached out to Board—and it was important they

understand this answer is the Board’s answer,” and (ii) “[b]ottom line, they’ll do 26. Not a

penny less. Straight from Board.” JTX 885.

Smith separately called Poirier. PTO ¶ 359. Muddying the waters, Smith asked

Poirier to consider making a bid of $26 per share, noting that the Board had not approved

that price. Id. That was honest, but it conflicted with Goldman’s message to Wells Fargo.

Later that day, Girling told Skaggs that TransCanada’s management would consider

whether it could support a bid of $26 per share. Id. ¶ 360.

Still later on March 6, 2016, Skaggs reported to the Board. See JTX 887. Some of

the directors were willing to support a deal at $26 per share. Others thought it was too low.

See PTO ¶ 361; JTX 889.

On March 7, 2016, Poirier called Smith and asked him a series of questions to feel

out how committed Columbia was to $26 per share. He told Smith that the TransCanada

Board could not meet until March 9, 2016, at the earliest. JTX 909.

63
 1. The Wall Street Journal Leak

On March 8, 2016, Smith heard from two investment banks that “credible rumors

were ‘on the street’ that [TransCanada] was in advanced discussions with Columbia.” JTX

908. One of the bankers reported that the Wall Street Journal was preparing a story. Id.

The record does not disclose the source of the leak. Columbia was one possibility,

because a leak can help a seller by opening the door to potential interlopers. TransCanada

was a more likely source, because the news of a bid can cause arbitrageurs to enter the

target company’s stock, which puts pressure on the target board to take a deal. Goldman

had advised Skaggs and Smith about that risk early in the process, warning that “[a]ny sale

process that is public (whether leaked or announced) puts pressure on board to ‘take’ best

price at premium to market that is offered and absent competition may lead to any given

bidder trying to push deal at a lower price.” JTX 290 at 1. Skaggs and Smith had not done

anything to develop competition or to make TransCanada think it faced competition.

The first news of the leak came from bankers. Poirier was a former investment

banker, and he had played an aggressive game throughout the deal process. He spoke with

Smith on March 7, 2016, and was scheduled to meet with the TransCanada Board on March

9. The leak happened on March 8. That was auspicious timing for Poirier, and it might not

have been a coincidence. Poirier could have made a few well-placed calls or suggested that

64
Wells Fargo do so. Poirier regularly breached other aspects of the NDA, so engineering a

leak would not have been out of the question.11

On March 9, 2016, the TransCanada Board met to consider how to respond to

Columbia’s request for $26 per share. Johnston’s contemporaneous notes reflect strong

support for the transaction. JTX 913 at 3. The TransCanada Board considered financing an

all-cash bid at $26 per share by selling a TransCanada asset, which TransCanada’s current

CFO testified was achievable. Hunter Tr. 1130; see JTX 925. Wells Fargo’s valuation

presentation put a $26 per share bid in the lower half of a discounted cash flow valuation

range. JTX 915 at 6. Wells Fargo confirmed that it could render a fairness opinion at $26

per share. JTX 913 at 1. Wells Fargo had prepared another discounted cash flow valuation

pegging the midpoint value of Columbia at $27 per share in its “growth” case and $26.76

per share in its “base” case, exclusive of synergies. JTX 962 at 3–4. The TransCanada

Board discussed that exclusivity had “expired yesterday” but that “[i]nterloper risk is low.”

Id. at 3. The TransCanada Board also discussed that a “potential media leak” was coming

that could impact each party’s share price. Id.

At the conclusion of the meeting, the TransCanada Board authorized an offer at $26

per share, consisting of 90% cash and 10% TransCanada stock. JTX 944 at 2.

TransCanada’s directors unanimously supported the bid. Id.

11
In addition to repeatedly breaching the Standstill, Poirier violated the NDA by
speaking privately about the Columbia deal with the head of a major Canadian pension
fund. See JTX 982.

65
 2. The $26 Deal

After the TransCanada Board meeting adjourned, Poirier called Smith and relayed

TransCanada’s $26 per share offer, with 90% of the consideration in cash and 10% in

TransCanada stock (the “$26 Offer”). He told Smith that there were three things that could

jeopardize it. One was if the rating agencies did not view the transaction favorably. The

second was if TransCanada’s stock fell below $49 per share Canadian. The third was if

TransCanada’s underwriters supported a “bought deal” on the equity issuance. JTX 953.

After hearing from TransCanada, Skaggs gathered the management team, joined by

Goldman and Sullivan & Cromwell. They decided they needed to know how the exchange

ratio would be set. PTO ¶ 372.

Smith called Poirier to ask about the exchange ratio. Poirier told him that

TransCanada needed to fix the exchange ratio before the announcement. Id. Smith tried

several times to get Poirier to agree that the exchange ratio would be fixed at closing, but

Poirier firmly disagreed. See JTX 943; JTX 953.

Although TransCanada vigorously denied it, a preponderance of the evidence

supports a finding that at the conclusion of his call with Poirier, Smith orally accepted the

$26 Offer. From that point on, both sides acted as if they had an agreement in principle

(the “$26 Deal”).

At least three strands of circumstantial evidence point to the existence of the $26

Deal. First, that was what Wells Fargo understood. In an internal email sent on March 10,

2016, Babowal told the Wells Fargo team that “they accepted $26 with 10% stock but are

trying to negotiate down the break fee.” JTX 956 at 1. When the Wells Fargo Fairness

66
Opinion Committee later convened to provide a fairness opinion for the final deal, their

materials stated on the first page that “[t]he Taurus Board . . . approved the submission of

a verbal offer of $26.00 per share, consisting of 90% cash and 10% stock,” and “[t]he

Capricorn board accepted this preliminary offer on the morning of March 10, 2016.” JTX

1120 at 1. A bullet point under the heading “Background Information” said the same

thing: “Taurus submitted a revised verbal offer of $26.00 per share (90% cash, 10% stock)

on 3/9/16, which Capricorn accepted.” Id. at 6. And the “Transaction Timeline” stated that

on March 9 and 10, 2016, “Taurus submitted a revised verbal offer of $26.00 per share

(90% cash, 10% stock) to Capricorn, which Capricorn accepted.” Id. at 8.

Second, two senior TransCanada executives exchanged texts on March 9 and 10,

2016, in which they described TransCanada as having a “done deal.” JTX 1779. Along

similar lines, Skaggs sent the Columbia deal team a note that treated the price term as

settled, identified the only remaining major issues as “negotiation of the break fee and fixed

share conversion ratio,” and contemplated a “MA signing/deal announcement” of “March

29th or 30th.” JTX 947. For the Columbia management team to have accepted the $26

Offer was not surprising, because they had already decided to support an offer at $26 per

share and they had prepared the Board for that price. See PTO ¶ 359.

Third, TransCanada’s exclusivity expired at midnight on March 8, 2016. The Board

had instructed management to release the other bidders from their standstills as soon as

exclusivity expired, which meant on March 9. Yet on March 9, management did not waive

them. Why? Because they thought they had a deal.

67
 3. The Board Is “Freaking Out” And Wants A Deal “Whatever It Takes.”

After management verbally agreed to the $26 Deal, Skaggs scheduled a meeting of

the Board for the morning of March 10, 2016. In advance of the Board meeting, Skaggs

circulated an agenda. He reported that TransCanada was trying to meet Columbia’s primary

deal requirements: “(a) $26.00/share of value; (b) predominantly a cash transaction; and

(c) certainty of close.” Id. ¶ 376.

Before the Board could meet, the Wall Street Journal broke the story on discussions

between TransCanada and Columbia. The New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) halted

trading in Columbia’s common stock, and both the NYSE and the Toronto Stock Exchange

halted trading in TransCanada’s common stock. Later that day, TransCanada announced

that it was in discussions regarding a potential transaction with a third party but did not

identify the company. Id. ¶ 375.

During the Board meeting, Skaggs described the $26 Offer and recommended that

the Board accept it. Id. ¶ 377. He explained that the offer equated to $23.40 in cash plus

shares of TransCanada stock with a value of $2.60. JTX 191 at 13

Skaggs noted that the exclusivity period had expired just before midnight on March

8, 2016, and that TransCanada had not asked for an extension. PTO ¶¶ 376, 378. The Board

previously had instructed the management team to waive the other bidders’ standstills as

soon as exclusivity expired, but because the management team thought they had a deal with

TransCanada, they had not yet done so.

After the Board meeting, Smith called Poirier. During the call, Poirier asked that

Columbia give TransCanada two weeks of exclusivity. Id. ¶ 380. Smith told him that

68
because of the leak,”[t]he [Columbia] board is freaking out and told the management team

to get a deal done with [TransCanada] ‘whatever it takes.’” JTX 952 at 1.

Cornelius testified credibly that the Board was not “freaking out.” Cornelius Tr.

807. He testified credibly that the Board had not given an instruction to the management

team to get a deal done “whatever it takes,” and that the Board had not authorized Smith

to convey that information to TransCanada. Id. at 808.

Smith’s statement struck Fornell as bizarre. After hearing about Smith’s statement,

Fornell wrote to his team: “Oddly, the Capricorn team has relayed this info to Taurus.”

JTX 952 at 1. One of the team members responded, “Turmoil provides opportunity. Taurus

would appear to be well positioned.” Id. Fornell emailed back: “Yes.” Id.

TransCanada has contended that Smith never made the statement that Poirier and

Fornell attributed to him. After taking into account Smith’s candor and his belief that he

and Poirier were working together to get a deal done, I credit that when Poirier asked for

an extension of the exclusivity agreement, Smith responded that it would not be a problem

because “[t]he [Columbia] board is freaking out” and had told the management team “to

get a deal done.” Id. The directors and Skaggs had shown some frustration with the pace

that TransCanada was moving, and there undoubtedly had been more frustration about

TransCanada’s rejected offer of $25.25 per share. It is easy to imagine that after hearing

about the $26 Offer, someone on the Board said, in substance, “Let’s get this done.” For

his own part, Smith wanted to get a deal done so he could retire with his change-in-control

benefits, and he likely was freaking out because he had been cast in the part of front-line

69
negotiator for a deal that would affect him personally in a material way. Regardless of the

actual words that Smith used, he conveyed the message that Poirier heard.

For TransCanada, Smith’s message and the news leak created an opening to lower

its price. Pourbaix, TransCanada’s Chief Operating Officer, and Johannson,

TransCanada’s President, had the following text exchange on March 10, 2016:

Johannson: “Are you in today? How is Russ doing with the offer.”

Pourbaix: “Just landing in Toronto. We had a deal as offered but now it is
all [expletive] with the leak that we are in discussions. What a
cluster[expletive].”

Johannson: “It is. What a disappointment.”

Pourbaix: “Russ just got off the phone with the CEO. They really want to
do the deal still which makes sense. This is more their problem than our
problem.”

Pourbaix: “He [Russ] actually had come full circle to wanting to do it. We
need to see where this shakes out. On the good side it may be an
opp[ortunity] to go back to [Columbia] with a lower price.”

Johannson: “I agree. Maybe we will benefit through this. It is nice to see
Russ was on board. I was getting worried.”

JTX 1779 (emphasis added). The next day, one of TransCanada’s directors texted Girling:

“I think the leak may be the best development for us.” JTX 1782. That was true, as

TransCanada used the leak as an opening to re-trade the $26 Deal.

4. The Renewed Exclusivity Agreement

On March 11, 2016, Spectra emailed Skaggs to start merger talks. Spectra’s CEO

wrote that, “[g]iven the news of recent days . . . , I wanted to be sure that you knew that we

believe we could offer your shareholders a premium to [Columbia]’s recent trading value

70
and, by offering [Spectra] shares in exchange, the resulting dividend could be

approximately double what your shareholders currently receive.” PTO ¶ 383. Spectra’s

CEO asked Skaggs to let him know “as soon as possible when we may speak or get our

teams together to determine how best to realize these potential opportunities for our

shareholders.” Id. Spectra also contacted Goldman. See JTX 1014.

Skaggs had scheduled a Board meeting for later that day to discuss TransCanada’s

request for two weeks of exclusivity. Before the Board meeting, Poirier called Smith again

and reiterated TransCanada’s desire for exclusivity. JTX 981. Poirier also sent Smith a

timeline that contemplated extending exclusivity through March 28, 2016. JTX 984.

During the Board meeting, Skaggs recommended granting TransCanada’s request,

conditioned on “a tight Critical Path to [merger agreement] signing.” PTO ¶ 382. Skaggs

proposed releasing the other bidders from their standstills before the new exclusivity

agreement was signed.

Skaggs also reported on Spectra’s inquiry. The Columbia management team had

never been interested in a deal with Spectra and had little interest in engaging. See JTX

1013. They told Goldman to handle any interactions. See JTX 1014. When speaking to the

directors, Skaggs downplayed the seriousness of Spectra’s approach. PTO ¶ 385.

The Board approved one additional week of exclusivity, not two. Id. ¶ 387. The

Board had already instructed Columbia management to release the other bidders from their

standstills, and that action should have been taken on the morning of March 9, 2016.

Instead, the letters went out to the other bidders on the evening of March 11. Id. ¶ 388.

71
 Skaggs’s next steps confirm his belief that he had a handshake deal with

TransCanada based on the $26 Offer and was on a “tight critical path” to a signed merger

agreement. Before the renewed exclusivity agreement was executed, rather than reaching

out to other bidders, Skaggs worked with his advisors to develop a script to use with Spectra

and in response to any other inbound overtures. In full, the script stated: “We will not

comment on market speculation or rumors. With respect to indications of interest in

pursuing a transaction, we will not respond to anything other than serious written

proposals.” JTX 1025 at 1.

By insisting on a “serious written proposal,” the script imposed a requirement that

a third-party bidder could not meet. TransCanada itself had yet to make a serious written

proposal, and TransCanada had received extensive due diligence, including the opportunity

to review highly sensitive counterparty agreements. See Smith Tr. 1146. TransCanada had

made the rejected $25.25 offer orally, and TransCanada had made the accepted $26 Offer

orally. Skaggs and Smith thus knew that it was highly unlikely that any other bidder could

make a “serious written proposal” without receiving due diligence, and a competing bidder

would not be able to receive due diligence once a new exclusivity agreement was signed.

When the script was prepared, Columbia was not bound by an exclusivity

agreement, had received an inbound inquiry from Spectra, and could reasonably expect

other inbound inquiries after the leak. The plaintiffs argue that by agreeing to the script

under those circumstances, Columbia management demonstrated their favoritism toward

TransCanada. That is true. But the reason that Columbia’s management team supported the

script was because they believed they had an agreement in principle based on the $26 Offer,

72
and they acted in the spirit of that agreement. They also had approval from the Board to

enter into a new agreement with TransCanada providing for one week of exclusivity. The

script anticipated the Exclusivity Fiduciary Out that would appear in the renewed

agreement. Columbia management thought the script would “minimize[] claims that

[Columbia] has committed [or will commit] a ‘solicitation foot fault.’” JTX 971. The script

simply said what they thought the renewed exclusivity agreement would require. See JTX

990.

5. Columbia Declines To Engage With Spectra.

Skaggs and Smith told Goldman to use the script with Spectra. The banker who took

Spectra’s call had found Spectra’s assurance regarding a bid to be credible, but Skaggs and

Smith were not interested. Appraisal Decision, 2019 WL 3778370, at *13. They wanted

Goldman on the front lines so that Spectra could not talk with them directly. PTO ¶¶ 390,

394. On March 12, 2016, Spectra’s CFO and head of M&A called Goldman, and Goldman

read the script. Id. ¶ 395. Spectra’s CFO responded that Spectra had run the numbers, but

that public information was limited and that Spectra could not be more specific without

due diligence. Id. Spectra specifically noted that it needed “a solid understanding of the

contracts, customers and timelines for projects” and could “not get a good feel for this with

public data.” JTX 1117 at 5. That was precisely the information that TransCanada had

insisted on reviewing.

The script, however, did not contemplate access to due diligence. One Goldman

banker asked internally, “Does [Spectra] ‘get it’ that they aren’t going to get diligence

73
without a written proposal?” PTO ¶ 400. And that was the Catch-22: No one, including

TransCanada, would submit a written proposal without diligence.

Goldman informed Skaggs and Smith that Spectra’s Chief Development Officer had

become involved, which meant that Spectra was “get[ting] serious.” Id. ¶ 401. Goldman

advised Skaggs and Smith that Spectra’s contact “can be interpreted as a sign that they are

doing real work over there.” Id. On March 12, 2016, Spectra’s CFO made a follow-up call

and told Goldman to “expect something formal, absent a ‘major bust’ in the ‘next few

days.’” Id. Evidencing its seriousness, Spectra engaged Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC as its

financial advisor. Id. ¶¶ 395, 402; JTX 1119 at 2.

The Board met on March 12, 2016, to consider whether to engage with Spectra.

Skaggs reported that Goldman had responded to Spectra using the script. Skaggs

recommended against engaging with Spectra on the theory that (i) Spectra was unlikely to

be able to pay more than TransCanada and (ii) management’s resources should be devoted

to buttoning down the $26 Deal. The directors formally approved the script, both

retroactively and going forward. PTO ¶¶ 396–398.

6. TransCanada Signs Off On The Script.

After the Board meeting, Robert Smith sent an email to Johnston to explain that

Columbia would agree to one week of exclusivity and wanted to use the script to respond

to incoming calls. See JTX 1025. Expecting to sign a new exclusivity agreement

comparable to the expired one, he asked for TransCanada’s agreement “that this scripted

response would not violate the terms of the EA (both in terms of the inbound received in

the EA’s gap period and going forward until signing, which unfortunately, given the leak,

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there is a potential that we will receive additional such inquiries).” JTX 1025. The

possibility of inbound inquiries was only unfortunate for a management team that wanted

a deal with TransCanada. It would not have been unfortunate for a management team that

wanted the best transaction reasonably available.

After receiving the script, Poirier forwarded it to Wells Fargo See JTX 1029.

Babowal questioned the phrase “serious written proposal” because “‘serious’ is in the eye

of the beholder.” Id. at 1. Picking two unreasonable extremes, he asked, “Does that mean

a financed bud [sic] subject only to confirmatory DD? Or can someone write a per share

price on a cocktail napkin.” Id. He then wrote, “If they are giving us a moral commitment

that it is the former I would be ok with this. Think we need to talk with them.” Id.

To find out what Columbia meant and “sniff out any issues,” Poirier called Smith.

JTX 1778 at 7. After the call, Smith texted Skaggs with a real-time report:

I think we are done. [Poirier] wanted to know the rationale – I explained it
and pointed out how important the Fiduciary protections were for our Board.
Told him we wanted to get this deal done with them and this would help us
achieve that goal. They were circling the wagons one last time and [Poirier]
said he would have Chris [Johnston] reach out to Bob [Skaggs] to get it
signed up once their meeting was concluded.

Id. at 8. TransCanada has argued that Smith never offered them a “moral commitment,”

but regardless of the words he used, Smith gave Poirier the assurance he wanted. In his

own words, Smith “[t]old him we wanted to get this deal done with them and this would

help us achieve that goal.” Id. The reference to “this deal” did not mean some general,

undefined deal with TransCanada. It meant the $26 Deal. Poirier understood that Smith

had made a “commitment to do a deal with TransCanada.” Poirier Tr. 257; see Fornell Tr.

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74–75. After his call with Smith, he instructed TransCanada’s counsel to sign off on the

script.12

Smith was so convinced that everything was “done” that he went on vacation with

his family. He left Kettering as the new point man with TransCanada. See JTX 1777 at 2.

The combination of Columbia’s decision to extend exclusivity combined with

management’s commitment to a deal with TransCanada stunned Wells Fargo. After

hearing about the extension of exclusivity, one of the Wells Fargo bankers wrote to a

colleague, “Sounds like we are back in the game.” JTX 1065. His colleague responded:

“Sounds like it. I’m just not sure that the other side is playing the same one! Can’t for the

12
PTO ¶ 405; JTX 1053. The evidence of Smith’s consistent candor with Poirier
reinforces the likelihood that he gave Poirier a high level of reassurance. Before his
deposition in the Appraisal Proceeding, no one had coached Smith on what a “serious
written proposal” meant, and during his deposition, Smith gave his untutored
understanding: “A bona fide proposal that says I will pay you X for your company. Hard
and fast. No outs. No anything. . . . You’re going to pay whatever you’re going to pay per
share and we’re going to sign that agreement and we’re done.” Smith Tr. 1155–57. Smith
was not an experienced M&A negotiator, and he likely had the same understanding when
he spoke with Poirier. That response would have resembled what Poirier said during the
January 7 Meeting, when he told Smith that TransCanada wanted to do a “deal in US
dollars” with a “fully locked in financing package without outs.” JTX 546 at 1. Smith could
easily have thought that a “serious proposal” meant a fully financed, committed deal.

At trial, a parade of Columbia’s witnesses (including a now-educated Smith) lined
up to say that “serious written proposal” did not mean what Smith had described in his
deposition. That well-prepared and coordinated trial testimony is unpersuasive. The
evidence supports a finding that Smith telegraphed to Poirier that Columbia management
was committed to the $26 Offer that they had orally accepted, wanted to get that transaction
done, and would not be drumming up competition.

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life of me figure out why they would keep us exclusive . . . .” Id. The reason is that Skaggs,

Smith, and Kettering wanted a deal.

On March 13, 2016, a large stockholder responded to the leak by suggesting that

Columbia test the market to create competition. PTO ¶ 407. The stockholder wrote:

We feel strongly that given the bid from TransCanada you should start a
strategic review and test the market. We are on the same page that the
company is worth more than the current stock price but at a minimum we
should see if the long-term value of the firm can be realized more rapidly.
Further given the likely rebound in the market we are not averse to owning
stock in [TransCanada], [Enbridge], [Spectra], [NextEra], etc. We are large
shareholders of those firms as a group already.

Id. Kettering emailed Skaggs and Smith and suggested that “[a]t some point, we may want

to let [Poirier] know a large holder is suggesting a process.” Id. ¶ 408. Doing so might have

put some competitive pressure on TransCanada, but no one passed the message along. That

was because Columbia management believed they had agreed to the $26 Deal.

7. The $25.50 Offer

The next day—March 14, 2016—was eventful. The TransCanada Board met that

morning. The first question they addressed was whether TransCanada’s underwriters

would support the $26 Deal. The underwriters “stood by their commitment to execute on

the underwritten offering in light of their comfort with the contemplated acquisition.” JTX

1092 at 2; see Poirier Tr. 264, 296; Johnston Tr. 648–49. The management team advised

the Board that “the market appeared to view the acquisition positively” and would support

the underwritten offering. JTX 1092 at 2

Despite the underwriters’ commitment and positive market reaction, Poirier and his

colleagues saw an opportunity to lower TransCanada’s bid. Girling told the directors that

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he “would engage in discussions with [Columbia]’s management regarding an all-cash

offer at US$25.50 per common share.” Id. (the “$25.50 Offer”).

After the meeting, Poirier texted Smith to ask if he could “do a call around 12-

12:30pm MT today?” JTX 1777 at 2. When Smith asked what it was about, Poirier said

cryptically, “We want to give you a thorough update of where we are.” Id. Smith was on

vacation and scheduled to be on the golf course. See JTX 1685 at 1. Expecting that the call

would be a non-event, he lateraled the call to Kettering. Id.

Poirier was joined on the call by Pourbaix, who viewed Columbia’s reaction to the

leak as an “opp[ortunity] to go back to [Columbia] with a lower price.” Poirier Tr. 246.

Poirier and Pourbaix proceeded to do just that.

First, Poirier told Kettering that TransCanada’s underwriters “thought including

stock as consideration was going to make the transaction challenging.” JTX 1493 at 419.

That was not true. TransCanada’s underwriters had remained committed to and

comfortable with the transaction. JTX 1902 at 2.

Next, Poirier cited TransCanada’s trading price, which he claimed had dropped

below the $49 Canadian price point that TransCanada had identified. That at least was

temporarily true, because on Friday, March 11, 2016, TransCanada’s share price had

dipped below $49 Canadian to $47 Canadian, and on Monday, March 14, the stock traded

around $47 Canadian. The stock would begin recovering the next day, and it crested $49

Canadian on March 16. In fairness, no one knew that on March 14.

After identifying those issues, Poirier sprung the $25.50 Offer on Kettering. See

Kettering Tr. 858–60; Poirier Tr. 267. Poirier pointedly did not tell Kettering that the

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$25.50 Offer was best and final, nor that the $26 Deal was off the table. Poirier Tr. 274.

During the trial in the Appraisal Proceeding, Poirier acknowledged that he and Pourbaix

“did not formally say no” to the $26 Deal. JTX 1493 at 420. He also acknowledged that if

Columbia “had said no to 25.50 all cash, we would have reconsidered being prepared to

take the risk of issuing stock as consideration along with the cash component of the

transaction.” Id. at 421. But, as a skilled negotiator, Poirier did not say so. Id. at 422.

Poirier put a seventy-hour fuse on the $25.50 Offer. He told Kettering: “[I]f

Columbia were not to accept the [$25.50] offer, TransCanada planned to issue a press

release within the next few days indicating its acquisition discussions had been

terminated.” PTO ¶ 412. Poirier admitted that he referred to the issuance of the press release

to create a sense of urgency for Columbia to accept the $25.50 Offer. JTX 1493 at 426–27.

The parties have debated whether or not the statement about disclosing the

termination of negotiations was a threat or simply an accurate statement about

TransCanada’s obligations under Canada’s securities laws. The plaintiffs cast it as a threat,

because the NDA prohibited TransCanada from using a threat of disclosure to increase its

bargaining leverage in deal negotiations.13 TransCanada casts it as a description of

TransCanada’s disclosure obligations, because the NDA contained an exception that

permitted TransCanada to disclose “the fact that discussions or negotiations . . . are taking

13
Poirier Tr. 188–89; see Johnston Tr. 573. Mayer Brown had advised TransCanada
specifically against making threats, and Johnston relayed that advice to Poirier and the
TransCanada deal team. JTX 517 at 1; JTX 819 at 7.

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place or have taken place concerning a Transaction” if TransCanada “received the written

advice of its outside counsel that it [was] required to make such disclosure in order to avoid

violating applicable securities laws or stock exchange rules” and provided Columbia “with

the text of the intended disclosure at least 24 hours prior to making the disclosure[.]” JTX

304 at 4–5. Johnston had added the reference to “stock exchange rules” when negotiating

the NDA. JTX 299 at 1, 4. At trial, a series of TransCanada witnesses testified that the

Toronto Stock Exchange rules would require a disclosure regarding the termination of

negotiations.

Whatever the reason, a public announcement by TransCanada would not have been

a good thing for Columbia. It could suggest that TransCanada had uncovered problems,

turning Columbia into damaged goods and hurting the Board’s ability to secure an

alternative transaction. On November 3, 2016, at the beginning of the November sale

process, Goldman had warned Skaggs and Smith that “[a]ny sale process that is public

(whether leaked or announced) puts pressure on board to ‘take’ best price at premium to

market that is offered and absent competition may lead to any given bidder trying to push

deal at a lower price.” JTX 290 at 1. That was the pressure that Poirier sought to create.

Had the $25.50 Offer been a best-and-final offer such that TransCanada intended to

break off negotiations if Columbia rejected it, then Poirier’s statement would have been

accurate, and the exception would have applied. But as Poirier admitted, TransCanada had

not committed to break off negotiations if Columbia rejected the $25.50 Offer. Poirier

agreed that TransCanada would have considered other bids, including the $26 Offer. Under

the circumstances, Poirier’s statement was a threat intended to pressure Columbia into

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accepting the $25.50 Offer. It was another example of TransCanada disregarding its

contractual commitments.

In the interim, Columbia and TransCanada had executed the new exclusivity

agreement. The agreement provided that it would terminate automatically if TransCanada

made an offer less favorable than the $26 Offer. Once Poirier made the $25.50 Offer,

Columbia was free to contact other bidders.

8. Columbia Accepts The $25.50 Offer.

After Poirier’s bombshell, Skaggs, Smith, and Kettering caucused about what to do.

They focused on TransCanada’s stock price and discussed whether to counter at $25.75,

reflecting roughly another $100 million in merger consideration.14

The Board met on the evening of March 14, 2016, and Skaggs reported on the day’s

developments. According to the minutes, Skaggs told the Board that “TransCanada’s final

proposal was to acquire the Company at a price of $25.50 per share in cash.” JTX 191 at

16. In light of Poirier’s clear testimony about not saying that the $25.50 Offer was best and

final, either the minutes are wrong or Skaggs misinformed the Board.

The minutes for the meeting on March 14, 2016, note that TransCanada had cited

“concerns over execution risk on TransCanada’s proposed subscription receipts offering

and the deterioration of TransCanada’s stock price” as the reasons for the lowered offer.

Id. at 17. The minutes do not reflect any analysis of those reasons. The minutes do not

14
JTX 1685 at 2; JTX 1686; Kettering Tr. 863–67; Skaggs Tr. 974–76.

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reflect any discussion of the fact that exclusivity terminated when TransCanada lowered

its offer. The minutes do not reflect discussion of a possible counter at $25.75 per share.

The minutes do not reflect any effort by management to come clean about Smith’s

conversations with Poirier—such as his statement after the leak that the Board was

“freaking out” and wanted to get a deal done with TransCanada “whatever it takes,” his

oral agreement to the $26 Deal, or his call with Poirier about the script in which he

expressed management’s commitment to the $26 Deal. Because no one mentioned those

exchanges, no one discussed how they could have undercut Columbia’s negotiating

leverage and encouraged TransCanada to lower its bid. Skaggs, Smith, and Kettering kept

quiet on these points because they wanted to take the $25.50 Offer and retire. If Board had

known about that back-and-forth, then the directors might have both disabused

TransCanada about the Board’s eagerness to sell and made a counteroffer.

The minutes do reflect that the Board discussed Spectra’s statement on March 12,

2016, that it could “make a formal proposal to the Company in the next few days,” as well

as the risk that singing a merger agreement with TransCanada might preempt that offer. Id.

The minutes do not reflect discussion of the fact that TransCanada had given Columbia

seventy hours to respond and that with exclusivity having terminated, Columbia could

contact Spectra and explain the timetable. Instead, according to the lawyerly language of

the minutes, the Board decided that Spectra would be able to compete as long as the merger

agreement with TransCanada provided for “a sufficiently low termination fee, ideally not

greater than 3% of the equity value of the transaction.” Id.

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 The meeting concluded with the Board deciding to defer formally responding to

TransCanada until the directors could meet in person on March 16, 2016, and receive full

presentations and fairness opinions from their financial advisors. Until the meeting on

March 16, the Board “authorized management and the Company’s advisors to continue

working with TransCanada in the interim.” Id. In the language of an M&A negotiation,

that meant the Board was prepared to accept the deal. That was how Poirier interpreted it.

See JTX 1094.

After the meeting, Skaggs and Smith chartered NetJets flights to bring each director

to Houston for a meeting on March 16, 2016. Skaggs Tr. 976.

On March 15, 2016, Skaggs, Smith, and Kettering exchanged text messages about

the performance of TransCanada’s stock, which traded above $48 per share. Kettering

suggested raising the issue with Poirier and asking for another $0.25 per share. Skaggs

waved him off. Kettering also texted Smith about the stock price, and Smith texted Skaggs.

Id. Skaggs again dismissed the idea of pushing Poirier for a higher price. Of the three,

Kettering was the most willing to work beyond 2016. It makes sense that Skaggs and Smith,

both of whom wanted to complete a transaction and retire in 2016, were averse to pushing

back on Poirier and jeopardizing the deal. See JTX 1686.

Poirier and Fornell also noticed that TransCanada’s stock was performing well. On

March 16, 2016, Fornell emailed Poirier, stating: “Your stock is hanging in nicely.” Poirier

replied, “Agreed!” JX 1110. Kettering texted Skaggs and Smith again about the stock price

and used a pejorative epithet to describe Poirier and the TransCanada deal team. See JTX

1656 at 211; JTX 1654. Skaggs still did not push for a higher price.

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P. The Merger Agreement

The Board met on March 16, 2016, to consider the proposed merger agreement. JTX

1107. After receiving fairness opinions from Goldman and Lazard, the Board approved it.

PTO ¶ 425. Skaggs called Girling, then reported to Smith and Kettering that there was “an

agreement in principle.” JTX 1686.

On March 17, 2016, the TransCanada Board met to give its formal approval. Wells

Fargo presented a discounted cash flow analysis using Columbia management’s

projections, as adjusted by TransCanada, that valued Columbia’s standalone business at

$26.51 per share. PTO ¶ 427(c). Management projected $150 million in annual cost and

revenue synergies by 2018, which Wells Fargo valued at an additional $1.93 per share. Id.

¶ 427(b), (e). From TransCanada’s standpoint, they were buying an asset valued at $28.45

per share. With TransCanada management having secured a price of $25.50 per share, the

TransCanada Board had no trouble approving the deal.

The parties executed an agreement and plan of merger (the “Merger Agreement”)

later that day and issued a press release announcing the transaction. Smith received a

congratulatory email from his financial advisor. Still focused on retirement, Smith

responded, “Thanks Rick, do you think I can retire now?” JTX 1138.

With the signing of the Merger Agreement, the sale process entered its final phase.

That phase was uneventful.

The Merger Agreement contained a no-shop provision that prohibited contacting,

engaging with, or providing confidential diligence materials to a competing bidder except

in response to a “Superior Proposal.” JTX 1123 (“MA”) § 4.02. Before sharing confidential

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information in response to a Superior Proposal, the Board had to determine that failing to

engage with the bidder would be reasonably expected to breach its fiduciary duties. Id. The

Merger Agreement provided TransCanada with a four-day, unlimited right to match any

Superior Proposal. See id. §§ 4.02(c)–(d). If Columbia terminated the Merger Agreement,

then TransCanada was entitled to a termination fee of $309 million, plus expense

reimbursement of up to $40 million. Id. § 7.02(b)(iii). The termination fee amounted to

three percent of the Merger’s equity value, or seventy-seven cents per share. The expense

reimbursement added another 0.39% of equity value, or ten cents per share. TransCanada

had incurred over $130 million in transaction fees, so there would be no issue about

triggering the full expense reimbursement. See JTX 1244 at 256.

Because TransCanada could match any competing bidder, an overbid could succeed

only by driving the bidding beyond TransCanada’s reserve price. Otherwise, a bidder could

cause TransCanada to pay more, but would not have a path to success. Anticipating this

outcome and reasoning backward, a competing bidder that did not believe it could outbid

TransCanada would not engage. And because TransCanada had conducted extensive due

diligence, any competing bidder faced the threat that it would suffer the “winner’s curse”

and could prevail only by overpaying.

Despite strong deal protection measures in the Merger Agreement, TransCanada

prepared for an overbid. Taking into account the termination fee, TransCanada calculated

that an interloper would have to offer at least $26.27 per share to top the Merger

Agreement. PTO ¶ 430. With the expense reimbursement, the actual figure was $26.37.

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 On April 5, 2016, Poirier informed TransCanada’s management that he “received

credible information” indicating that Enbridge was considering a bid. JTX 1184 at 1.

Poirier wanted to put pressure on the banks who worked with TransCanada so that they

would not support the Enbridge bid, telling his team: “Those of you who deal with banks[]

should obviously be sending the message of long term repercussions to the relationship if

they support a competing bid in any way.” Id. He gave Fornell the same message. Id. After

hearing about this effort, Johnston qualified what the team could say, telling them “be

careful not to make overt threats but instead stress the importance of loyalty in the

relationship.” Id. She later cautioned that all of the discussions should be “verbal (not

written).” Id. Fornell considered the message a threat. Fornell Dep. 247–48.

At a two-day meeting of the TransCanada Board on April 28 and 29, 2016,

TransCanada management presented detailed interloper strategy. JTX 1244 at 242. The

presentation reported that there was a “positive market reaction to [the] acquisition” and

that “TransCanada can afford to increase its offer.” Id. at 243. TransCanada’s materials

analyzed financing strategies for paying up to $28 per share. Id. at 253. Ultimately, no other

bidders emerged to challenge TransCanada. PTO ¶ 441.

Q. The Proxy Statement

On May 17, 2016, Columbia issued the Proxy Statement and recommended that

stockholders approve the Merger. JTX 1291. Skaggs signed the Proxy Statement, attesting

to its accuracy. Skaggs received, reviewed, and commented on it at least ten times. JTX

1583 at 10. Smith received, reviewed, and commented on it at least fifteen times. JTX 1584

at 9–10.

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 Under the Merger Agreement, TransCanada had the right to participate in drafting

the Proxy Statement and review its contents before it was disseminated. TransCanada

committed to “furnish all information concerning themselves and their Affiliates that is

required to be included in the Proxy Statement.” MA § 5.01(a). TransCanada committed

that none of the information it supplied

for inclusion or incorporation by reference in the Proxy Statement will, at the
date of mailing to stockholders of the Company or at the time of the
Stockholders Meeting, contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit
to state any material fact required to be stated therein or necessary in order
to make the statements therein, in light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading.

Id. TransCanada also agreed to inform Columbia if there was any issue in the Proxy

Statement that needed to be addressed

so that the Proxy Statement or the other filings shall not contain an untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state any material fact required to be
stated therein or necessary in order to make the statements therein, in light of
the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading.

Id. § 5.01(b).

TransCanada management, including Poirier, Johnston, and Girling, had the

opportunity to review and comment on the Proxy before it was disseminated to Columbia

public stockholders. PTO ¶ 432; JTX 1172; JTX 1183; JTX 1189; JTX 1196; JTX 1202;

JTX 1214; JTX 1281. Poirier promised to read the background section “carefully.” JTX

1276 at 1. At Johnston’s request, Poirier and Girling focused specifically on the

“Background to the Merger” and the description of their interactions with Smith and

Skaggs. See JTX 1183; JTX 1185; JTX 1187. Attorneys from Mayer Brown also reviewed

and commented on the Proxy Statement. JTX 1585 at 16; JTX 1179; JTX 1207.

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 After reviewing the draft, Poirier provided Johnston with comments, including

about the communications that he and Girling had with Smith and Skaggs. See JTX 1204;

JTX 1205. Poirier and Johnston consulted with Girling, who was not concerned about the

language of the Proxy Statement. In his words, “I am not that worried about it, it is their

document.” JTX 1210.

The Proxy Statement disclosed that Columbia had entered into NDAs in November

2015 with three other bidders (Parties B, C, and D) but did not mention the don’t-ask-don’t

waive feature of the standstills. Instead, the Proxy Statement disclosed that “none of Party

A, Party B, Party C or Party D would be subject to standstill obligations that would prohibit

them from making an unsolicited proposal to the Board” after the announcement of the

Merger. JTX 1291 at 60. After reviewing that disclosure, a Mayer Brown attorney wanted

to know whether there were any standstill obligations that bound the bidders and proposed

calling Robert Smith to ask. See JTX 1201. That information was obviously significant to

him.

The failure to disclose the true nature of the other bidders’ standstill obligations was

materially false and misleading. Appraisal Decision, 2019 WL 3778370, at *36. The Proxy

Statement also disclosed misleadingly that “[u]nlike TransCanada, none of Party B, Party

C or Party D sought to re-engage in discussions with [Columbia] after discussions were

terminated in November 2015,” without providing the additional disclosure that all four

parties were subject to standstills, that TransCanada breached its standstill, and that

Columbia opted to ignore TransCanada’s breach. JTX 1291 at 46. The Proxy Statement

created the misleading impression that Parties B, C, and D did not bid because they were

88
not interested. A reasonable stockholder would have found it significant that TransCanada

and Parties B, C, and D were bound by standstills in fall 2015 and that TransCanada was

permitted to breach its standstill to pursue the Merger. Appraisal Decision, 2019 WL

3778370, at *36.

The Proxy Statement failed to disclose that Skaggs and Smith were planning to retire

in 2016. This was a material omission of fact. Id.

The Proxy Statement failed to disclose a series of interactions between Columbia

and TransCanada. It did not disclose Smith’s discussion with Poirier on November 25,

2015. It did not disclose Fornell’s calls to Smith on December 2. It did not disclose

Fornell’s discussions with Smith about a potential deal on December 8. It did not disclose

Poirier’s call to Smith on December 19, during which he expressed TransCanada’s ongoing

interest in a transaction and suggested a price. It did not provide a fair description of the

leadup to the January 7 Meeting or the discussions between Smith and Poirier during the

January 7 Meeting. It did not disclose that after that meeting, Poirier and Smith spoke

almost every day. It did not disclose Smith’s call to Poirier on March 10, 2016, when he

stated that the board was “freaking out” and had told the management team to get a deal

done “whatever it takes.” See JTX 952. It did not describe accurately the agreement in

principle on the $26 Deal. It did not disclose that on March 12, Smith told Poirier that

Columbia management “wanted to get this deal done with TransCanada” and that the

inbound script would help to “achieve that goal.” JTX 1761. It did not accurately disclose

TransCanada’s ability to proceed with the $26 Deal.

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 After preparing and filing the preliminary Proxy Statement, Robert Smith worked

with Sullivan & Cromwell to draft the minutes for the various board meetings that took

place during the sale process. See JTX 1237; JTX 1246; JTX 1265. The minutes were not

prepared contemporaneously. They were prepared retrospectively after the outcome of the

sale process was known. That fact undercuts their evidentiary value.

In advance of the meeting of stockholders, a handful of stockholder plaintiffs sought

additional disclosure. Columbia and TransCanada added language to the Proxy Statement

to moot their claims. See JTX 1271; JTX 1274. Poirier, Johnston, and the TransCanada

team reviewed and commented on the revised Proxy Statement. See JTX 1276; JTX 1278.

This time, Poirier did not have any comments. JTX 1285. Mayer Brown also reviewed and

commented on the revised Proxy Statement. See JTX 1284; JTX 1286; JTX 1287.

Columbia filed its definitive Proxy Statement on May 17, 2016. On June 22,

Columbia held a special meeting of stockholders to vote on the Merger Agreement. Holders

of 73.9% of the outstanding shares voted in favor of the deal.

The Merger closed on July 1, 2016. Skaggs, Smith, and Kettering retired days later.

Based on the deal price of $25.50 per share, Skaggs received retirement benefits of $26.84

million—$17.9 million more than he would have received without a transaction. Smith

received $10.89 million—$7.5 million more than he would have received otherwise.

Kettering received $8.38 million—$5.58 million more than otherwise.

TransCanada reaped its own windfall by acquiring Columbia “at a low point in the

cycle.” PTO ¶ 343. In May 2016, Smith texted Skaggs that Columbia’s “stock would be

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$28 by now if we weren’t capped with the merger.” JTX 1745. Between signing and

closing, TransCanada’s stock price increased by approximately 18%. JTX 1664 at Ex. 3.

Poirier viewed the deal as a “strong success” for TransCanada. Poirier Tr. 285. In

an after-action review of the deal process conducted in July 2019, TransCanada

management noted that “[t]he acquisition analysis and subsequent negotiations were

significantly enhanced by previous strong relationships between TransCanada and

Columbia management,” namely through Poirier’s relationship with Smith. JTX 1522 at 3;

see Poirier Tr. 286.

The same presentation recommended that TransCanada management cultivate

similar relationships that could be exploited in future transactions. JTX 1553 at 28

(“Develop [a] short list of targeted acquisitions and create relationships within those

entities to smooth [future] transaction[s.]”). TransCanada thus recognized internally how

Poirier took advantage of Smith.

The presentation cautioned, however, that in future deals, TransCanada’s

representatives should try not to create a similar paper trail documenting their tactics. Id.

at 28 The presentation advised that “to mitigate litigation risk. . . [c]are should be taken

with respect to various forms of communication across the organization.” Id. The

presentation recommended that deal participants “[m]inimize email conversations; note

taking should be limited to deliverables and action items.” Id. at 35. TransCanada planned

to use the same playbook again, but without generating the same amount of evidence.

From a financial standpoint, the review observed that “project executions came in

within expectations and generally on-time” and that the financing and cost synergies that

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TransCanada expected to achieve through the Merger were achieved on schedule. Id. at 3,

7. The growth in Columbia’s underlying business turned the transaction into a huge

success, making up for flat or moderate growth in other TransCanada business units. Stan

Chapman, the head of TransCanada’s U.S. Natural Gas Pipeline Operations, praised the

acquisition in an October 2017 email to Poirier, noting: “Our financial forecast would look

very different w/o CPG’s billion $EBITDA contribution over the next 2 years. I certainly

hope your forethought and execution in getting the deal done was properly rewarded. You

deserve a pot of gold, my friend!” JTX 1398 at 1. Poirier replied: “Would I be a good

negotiator if I ever said I was satisfied with my comp :)?” Id.

TransCanada valued the Columbia business unit at $26.616 billion as of September

30, 2021. JTX 1664 ¶ 214. The Merger valued Columbia’s business at just over $10 billion,

albeit as of March 16, 2016. See PTO ¶ 214. TransCanada enjoyed a compound annual

growth rate on its investment of 20%.

Poirier was rewarded. In November 2019, he applied to be CEO, and he took on that

role in January 2021.

R. The Deal-Related Litigation

The Merger gave rise to a procession of litigation, including the Appraisal

Proceeding. As that proceeding was moving toward trial, the current stockholder plaintiffs

brought this proceeding.

1. The Appraisal Proceeding

In September 2017, investors holding 963,478 shares, worth $203 million at the deal

price, petitioned for appraisal. The case proceeded to a five-day trial in October 2018. As

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the post-Merger owner of the Company, TransCanada was the real party in interest in the

Appraisal Proceeding.

On August 12, 2019, the court issued the Appraisal Decision, which found that the

fair value of Columbia’s stock at the time of the Merger was equal to the deal price of

$25.50 per share. 2019 WL 3778370, at *1. The Appraisal Decision found that “the Proxy

contained material misstatements and omissions.” Id. at *36.

2. This Lawsuit

While the Appraisal Proceeding was pending, one of the plaintiffs in this action filed

a complaint alleging that Skaggs, Smith, and all of the former members of the Board had

breached their fiduciary duties in connection with the Merger, including by disseminating

a Proxy Statement that they knew was false and misleading, and contending that

TransCanada was jointly and severally liable as an aider and abettor. Dkt. 1. The plaintiff

sought to consolidate its action with the Appraisal Proceeding for a single trial.

TransCanada opposed that motion, and the court denied it. Dkt. 16.

After that ruling, the fiduciary litigation largely remained dormant until after the

issuance of the Appraisal Decision. Once that proceeding concluded, this litigation

resumed. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint in which it dropped its claims against

the directors other than Skaggs. A second stockholder filed a lawsuit asserting

fundamentally the same claims, and the two cases were consolidated. Dkt. 36.

The remaining defendants—Skaggs, Smith, and TransCanada—moved to dismiss

the complaint for failing to state a claim on which relief could be granted. Dkt. 33. The

plaintiffs cross-moved for partial summary judgment. Dkt. 35. The court denied the

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defendants’ motion to dismiss. In re Columbia Pipeline Gp., Inc. (Dismissal Decision),

2021 WL 772562, at *59 (Del. Ch. Mar. 1, 2021). The court partially granted the motion

for partial summary judgment. Dkt. 59.

During discovery, the plaintiffs settled with Skaggs and Smith. Dkt. 323. Under the

terms of that settlement, Skaggs and Smith agreed to pay $79 million to resolve the claims

against them. The court approved the partial settlement on June 1, 2022. Dkt. 396. The case

proceeded to trial against TransCanada.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

The plaintiffs sought to hold TransCanada liable for aiding and abetting breaches of

fiduciary duty by Skaggs, Smith, and the outside directors on the Board. A claim for aiding

and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty has four elements: (i) the existence of a fiduciary

relationship giving rise to a duty to the plaintiff, (ii) a breach of that duty by the fiduciary,

(iii) knowing participation in the breach by the defendant, and (iv) damages proximately

caused by the breach. Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1097 (Del. 2001). The

plaintiffs asserted two distinct claims for aiding and abetting. The first is based on breaches

of duty during the sale process (the “Sale Process Claim”). The second is based on breaches

of the duty of disclosure (the “Disclosure Claim”).

A. The Sale Process Claim

The plaintiffs proved that Skaggs and Smith breached their fiduciary duties as

officers during the sale process because they pursued a transaction that would enable them

to retire in 2016 with their full change-in-control benefits and, under the influence of that

conflict of interest, took actions that fell outside the range of reasonableness. The plaintiffs

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proved that the outside directors on the Board breached their duty of care by failing to

exercise sufficient oversight over Skaggs and Smith. Most importantly for an aiding and

abetting claim, the plaintiffs proved that TransCanada knowingly participated in the

breaches of duty. For purposes of the dimension of knowledge, they proved that

TransCanada had, at a minimum, constructive knowledge that Skaggs and Smith were

breaching their duty of loyalty and that the Board was not exercising sufficient oversight

over their activities. For purposes of the dimension of participation, they proved that

TransCanada exploited the sell-side breaches of duty when TransCanada reneged on the

$26 Deal, substituted the $25.50 Offer, and backed it up with a coercive threat that

TransCanada had committed not to make. TransCanada was only able to make that

exploitive move with confidence because Poirier had co-opted Smith, knew management

wanted to sell, had repeatedly taken actions that violated the Standstill while encountering

no resistance from Columbia management, and had concluded with Wells Fargo that

whatever game Skaggs and Smith might be playing, it was not one in which skilled M&A

professionals were maneuvering for the best price. It was rather one in which M&A

newbies were going to be happy as long as they got a deal done at a decent price that

triggered their change-in-control benefits and allowed them to retire. By exploiting this

scenario, TransCanada was able to buy Columbia for $25.50 per share rather than

proceeding with the $26 Deal.

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 1. The Fiduciary Relationship For The Sale Process Claim

The first element of a claim for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty is “the

existence of a fiduciary relationship.” Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1096 (internal quotation

marks omitted). That element is easily satisfied.

For over two centuries, American courts have treated corporate directors as

fiduciaries.15 Today, the proposition is axiomatic.16 Skaggs and the other members of the

Board were fiduciaries as directors.

15
The seminal American decision is Attorney General v. Utica Insurance Co., 2
Johns Ch. 371 (N.Y. Ch. 1818), an opinion by Chancellor James Kent, the renowned
Chancellor of New York and author of Commentaries on American Law (1826). The first
Delaware decisions appear some seventy years later. See Walker’s Adm’x v. Farmers’
Bank, 14 A. 819, 831 (Del. 1888); Diamond State Iron Co. v. Todd, 14 A. 27, 30 (Del. Ch.
1888), aff’d, 13 Del. (8 Houst.) 372 (Del. Jan. 16, 1889). Chancellor Charles M. Curtis,
who served from 1909 to 1921, provided Delaware’s first meaningful consideration of the
duties of corporate fiduciaries in decisions like Martin v. D.B. Martin, 88 A. 612 (Del. Ch.
1913), and Cahall v. Lofland, 114 A. 224 (Del. Ch. 1921), aff’d, 118 A. 1 (Del. 1922). His
successor, Chancellor Josiah O. Wolcott, served from 1921 until 1938 and was one of
Delaware’s great jurists. Among Chancellor Wolcott’s contributions are several decisions
addressing the role of directors as fiduciaries for the stockholders. See, e.g., Harden v. E.
States Pub. Serv. Co., 122 A. 705 (Del. Ch. 1923); Roberts v. Kennedy, 116 A. 253 (Del.
Ch. 1922). Both Chancellors presided during the period after New Jersey adopted the Seven
Sisters Acts, which opened the door for an envious upstart (as Delaware then was) to
compete for the chartering business. See Charles M. Yablon, The Historical Race
Competition for Corporate Charters and the Rise and Decline of New Jersey: 1880-1910,
32 J. Corp. L. 323, 359–67 (2007) (discussing the so-called charter-mongering states that
sought to emulate New Jersey and garner out-of-state incorporations, including Delaware,
Maine, West Virginia, and South Dakota); Joel Seligman, A Brief History of Delaware’s
General Corporation Law of 1899, 1 Del. J. Corp. L. 249, 270 (1976) (discussing the Seven
Sisters Acts). Both Chancellors played major—and today underappreciated—roles in
establishing this court’s reputation as a venue for corporate cases.
16
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) (“The existence and exercise of
[the board’s authority under Section 141(a)] carries with it certain fundamental fiduciary

96
 For just as long, American courts have treated corporate officers as fiduciaries.17

Today, that proposition is axiomatic as well. Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708–09

(Del. 2009). Skaggs and Smith were fiduciaries as officers.

Although pointing to a fiduciary relationship is technically sufficient to satisfy the

first element of an aiding and abetting claim, it does little to advance the analysis. As Justice

Felix Frankfurter famously observed:

To say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives direction to
further inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What obligations does he owe as
a fiduciary? In what respect has he failed to discharge these obligations? And
what are the consequences of his deviation from duty?

Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85–86 (1943). For a claim for aiding

and abetting, the fourth question is not pertinent, but the first three are.

The answers to Justice Frankfurter’s questions depend on the facts of each case.

Fiduciary duties under Delaware law are “unremitting,” meaning that they are always

obligations to the corporation and its shareholders.”). In Brehm v Eisner, the Delaware
Supreme Court overruled seven decisions, including Aronson, to the extent those
precedents reviewed a Rule 23.1 decision by the Court of Chancery under an abuse of
discretion standard or otherwise suggested deferential appellate review. 746 A.2d 244, 253
n.13 (Del. 2000). The Brehm Court held that going forward, appellate review of a Rule
23.1 determination would be de novo and plenary. Id. at 254. More recently, the Delaware
Supreme Court overruled Aronson’s test for demand futility and incorporated it into a new,
unified test. United Food & Com. Workers Union & Participating Food Indus. Empls. Tri-
State Pension Fund v. Zuckerberg, 262 A.3d 1034, 1059 (Del. 2021). Despite Aronson’s
fraught subsequent history, which this case omits, the case stands for other propositions
that remain foundational to Delaware law.
17
See Diamond State, 14 A. at 30; accord Dawson v. Nat’l Life Ins. Co. of U.S., 157
N.W. 929, 931 (Iowa 1916); O’Neile v. Ternes, 73 P. 692, 696–97 (Wash. 1903); Deadrick
v. Wilson, 67 Tenn. 108, 114–15 (Tenn. 1874).

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operative, but their application is context-dependent, meaning that “the exact course of

conduct that must be charted to properly discharge that responsibility will change in the

specific context of the action the [fiduciary] is taking . . . .” Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d

5, 10 (Del. 1998). That means that the framework of fiduciary duties can respond to new

challenges and changing circumstances, but directors and officers are not without guidance.

The Delaware courts have sought to provide officers and directors “with clear signal

beacons and brightly lined-channel markers as they navigate with due care, good faith, and

loyalty on behalf of a Delaware corporation and its shareholders.” Id.

When determining whether corporate fiduciaries have breached their duties when

pursuing a transaction, Delaware law distinguishes between the standard of conduct and

the standard of review. Although Delaware traditionally did not acknowledge that

distinction,18 Delaware jurists now do so openly to explain the divergence between the

normative framing of what fiduciary duties require and their practical application to the

facts of a case.19

18
See David Kershaw, The Foundations of Anglo-American Corporate Fiduciary
Law 185, 221–22 (2018). Despite the lack of open acknowledgement, the divergence could
be seen in earlier cases, such as decisions distinguishing between the articulated duty of
directors to exercise reasonable care and the liability standard of gross negligence. See,
e.g., Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812; In re Walt Disney Deriv. Litig. (Disney I), 907 A.2d 693,
749–50 (Del. Ch 2005), aff’d 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). Professor Kershaw notes that New
York cases maintained a similar distinction from the late nineteenth century until the
codification of the fiduciary standard of care in 1961. See Kershaw, supra, at 185–86.
19
See, e.g., Manti Hldgs., LLC v. Carlyle Gp. Inc., 2022 WL 1815759, at *7 (Del.
Ch. June 3, 2022) (Glasscock, V.C.); Totta v. CCSB Fin. Corp., 2022 WL 1751741, at *15
(Del. Ch. May 31, 2022) (McCormick, C.); In re MultiPlan Corp. S’holders Litig., 268

98
 With the distinction acknowledged, the standard of conduct describes what

corporate fiduciaries are expected to do and is defined by the content of the duties of loyalty

and care. In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig. (Trados II), 73 A.3d 17, 36 (Del. Ch. 2013). The

standard of conduct thus answers Justice Frankfurter’s first two questions: To whom does

the fiduciary owe obligations, and what obligations are owed? See Chenery, 318 U.S. at

85–86. The standard of review is the test that a court applies to the facts of the case to

determine whether the directors have met the standard of conduct. Trados II, 73 A.3d at

35–36. It answers Justice Frankfurter’s third question: How has the fiduciary failed to

discharge these obligations? Chenery, 318 U.S. at 85–86.

a. The Standard Of Conduct During The Sale Process

Corporate directors and officers owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the

corporation and its stockholders. Gantler, 965 A.2d at 708–09. To act loyally, a director or

officer must act in good faith. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).

A.3d 784, 809 (Del. Ch. 2022) (Will, V.C.); In re Pattern Energy Gp. Inc. S’holders Litig.,
2021 WL 1812674, at *30 (Del. Ch. May 6, 2021) (Zurn, V.C.); Cumming v. Edens, 2018
WL 992877, at *18 (Del. Ch. Feb. 20, 2018) (Slights, V.C.); In re Ebix, Inc. S’holder Litig.,
2014 WL 3696655, at *27 n.202 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2014) (Noble, V.C.); Reis v. Hazelett
Strip-Casting Corp., 28 A.3d 442, 457–59 (Del. Ch. 2011) (Laster, V.C.); Cargill, Inc. v.
JWH Special Circumstance LLC, 959 A.2d 1096, 1112 (2008) (Parsons, V.C.); see also
Ramsey v. Ga. S. Univ. Advanced Dev. Ctr., 189 A.3d 1255, 1275 n.102 (Del. 2018) (Strine,
C.J.).

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 For corporate fiduciaries, to act loyally means “to promote the value of the

corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.”20 As a practical matter, that means to

promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of the common stockholders in the

aggregate. See Frederick Hsu Living Tr. v. ODN Hldg. Corp., 2017 WL 1437308, at *21

(Del. Ch. Apr. 14, 2017) (collecting authorities). That simplification holds because when

stockholders enjoy special rights, powers, or preferences, those rights are contractual, and

corporate fiduciaries do not have a fiduciary duty to maximize the value of contract rights.21

20
eBay Domestic Hldgs., Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010); accord
N. Am. Cath. Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101 (“The
directors of Delaware corporations have the legal responsibility to manage the business of
a corporation for the benefit of its shareholder owners.” (cleaned up)); Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Hldgs., Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (“A board may have
regard for various constituencies in discharging its responsibilities, provided there are
rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders.”); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum
Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (“[O]ur analysis begins with the basic principle that
corporate directors have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the corporation’s
stockholders.”); see also Leo E. Strine Jr., The Soviet Constitution Problem in Comparative
Corporate Law: Testing the Proposition that European Corporate Law is More
Stockholder Focused than U.S. Corporate Law, 89 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1239, 1249 (2016);
(“[U]nder Delaware law . . . directors are required to focus on promoting stockholder
welfare.”); Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good
Faith in Corporation Law, 98 Geo. L.J. 629, 634 (2010) (“[I]t is essential that directors
take their responsibilities seriously by actually trying to manage the corporation in a
manner advantageous to the stockholders.”).
21
Id. (collecting authorities). Even when a subset of the stockholders enjoys special
rights, powers, and preferences, there will be decisions that do not implicate those
contractual rights. Id. at *21–22 (collecting authorities). In those cases, the directors must
seek to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of all of its stockholders. Id. at
*17. A more technically correct framing of the duty of loyalty is that the directors must
seek to maximize the value of the corporation for the ultimate benefit of “the
undifferentiated equity as a collective, without regard to any special rights.” Id.

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 When corporate fiduciaries are considering whether to sell the corporation, the

standard of conduct obligates them “to seek the transaction offering the best value

reasonably available to the stockholders.” Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network,

Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1993). “The best transaction reasonably available is not always

a sale; it may mean remaining independent and not engaging in a transaction at all.” In re

PLX Tech. Inc. S’holders Litig., 2018 WL 5018535, at *29 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 2018), aff’d,

211 A.3d 137 (Del. 2019) (TABLE). Consequently, when considering whether to pursue a

strategic alternative that would end the stockholders’ ongoing investment in the corporation

or fundamentally alter it, the fiduciary principle requires that directors and officers “seek

an alternative that would yield value exceeding what the corporation otherwise would

generate for stockholders over the long-term.” In re Rural Metro Corp. S’holder Litig.

(Rural Liability), 88 A.3d 54, 81 (Del. Ch. 2014) (cleaned up), aff’d sub nom. RBC Cap.

Mkts., LLC v. Jervis, 129 A.3d 816 (Del. 2015). The framing uses the verb “to seek”

intentionally: “Time-bound mortals cannot foresee the future.” In re Del Monte Foods Co.

S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 830 (Del. Ch. 2011). The test therefore cannot be whether,

in hindsight, the fiduciaries actually achieved the best price. Id. “Rather, the duty can only

be to try in good faith, in such a setting, to get the best available transaction for the

shareholders.” Citron v. Fairchild Camera and Instrument Corp., 1988 WL 53322, at *16

n.17 (Del. Ch. May 19, 1988) (Allen, C.).

Acting loyally requires acting in good faith, and acting in good faith requires that

the fiduciary subjectively believe that the course of action is in the best interests of the

corporation and its stockholders. See United Food & Com. Workers Union v. Zuckerberg,

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250 A.3d 862, 895 (Del. Ch. 2020), aff’d, 262 A.3d 1034 (Del. 2021). Stated conversely,

a corporate fiduciary acts in bad faith when the fiduciary “intentionally acts with a purpose

other than that of advancing the best interests of the corporation.” Stone, 911 A.2d at 369

(quoting In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig. (Disney II), 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006)). “It

makes no difference the reason why the director intentionally fails to pursue the best

interests of the corporation.” Disney I, 907 A.2d at 754. Bad faith can be the result of “any

emotion [that] may cause a director to [intentionally] place his own interests, preferences

or appetites before the welfare of the corporation,” including greed, “hatred, lust, envy,

revenge, . . . shame or pride.”22 A corporate fiduciary can be liable for action in bad faith

if “shown to have caused a transaction to be effectuated (even one in which he had no

financial interest) for a reason unrelated to a pursuit of the corporation’s best interests.”23

In an observation that remains as apt today as in the Victorian era, the nineteenth-

century English judge Charles Bowen remarked, “The state of a man’s mind is as much a

fact as the state of his digestion.” Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. D. 459, 483 (C.A.

22
In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. S’holders Litig., 1989 WL 7036, at *15 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31,
1989) (Allen, C.); see Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003) (Strine,
V.C.) (“The reason for the disloyalty (the faithlessness) is irrelevant, the underlying motive
(be it venal, familial, collegial, or nihilistic) for conscious action not in the corporation’s
best interest does not make it faithful, as opposed to faithless.”).
23
RJR Nabisco, 1989 WL 7036, at *15; see Nagy v. Bistricer, 770 A.2d 43, 48 n.2
(Del. Ch. 2000) (“[R]egardless of his motive, a director who consciously disregards his
duties to the corporation and its stockholders may suffer a personal judgment for monetary
damages for any harm he causes,” even if for a reason “other than personal pecuniary
interest.”).

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1885). Expressed less pithily, a mental state like bad faith is a question of fact. When

making a factual finding about mental state, a fact finder only has access to observable

indicia. “Despite their expertise, the members of the Court of Chancery cannot peer into

the hearts and souls of directors.” Allen v. Encore Energy P’rs, L.P., 72 A.3d 93, 106 (Del.

2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Without the ability to read minds, a trial judge

only can infer a party’s subjective intent from external indications. Objective facts remain

logically and legally relevant to the extent they permit an inference that a defendant lacked

the necessary subjective belief.” Allen v. El Paso Pipeline GP Co., L.L.C., 2014 WL

2819005, at *7 (Del. Ch. June 20, 2014).

Humans rarely act for only one purpose. Groups of humans, even less so. See Coster

v. UIP Cos., Inc., 2022 WL 1299127, at *10 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2022) (identifying multiple

purposes behind board action). One of a trial court’s most difficult jobs is to assess the

mental states of fiduciaries who act for multiple purposes. After carefully considering the

evidence, a trial judge may conclude that a fiduciary was sufficiently motivated by an

inequitable purpose to warrant a finding of bad faith, or a court may reach the opposite

conclusion. The answer depends on the facts and circumstances, credibility assessments,

and how the fact finder weighs the evidence.

b. The Standard Of Review For The Sale Process

When litigation arises, corporate fiduciaries are not judged by the standard of

conduct but rather using a standard of review. Trados II, 73 A.3d at 35–36. “In each

manifestation, the standard of review is more forgiving of directors and more onerous for

stockholder plaintiffs than the standard of conduct.” Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d

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648, 667 (Del. Ch. 2014). “Delaware has three tiers of review for evaluating director

decision-making: the business judgment rule, enhanced scrutiny, and entire fairness.” Reis

28 A.3d at 457.

“Enhanced scrutiny is Delaware’s intermediate standard of review.” Trados II, 73

A.3d at 43. Delaware courts deploy enhanced scrutiny in specific, recurring situations

marked by two features. First, there is an identifiable decision-making context where the

realities of the situation “can subtly undermine the decisions of even independent and

disinterested directors.” Id. “Inherent in these situations are subtle structural and situational

conflicts that do not rise to a level sufficient to trigger entire fairness review, but also do

not comfortably permit expansive judicial deference [under the business judgment rule].”

Rural Liability, 88 A.3d at 82. Second, the decision under review involves the fiduciary

intruding into a space where stockholders possess rights of their own. The fiduciary’s

exercise of corporate power therefore raises questions about the allocation of authority

within the entity and, from a theoretical perspective, implicates the principal-agent

problem.24 The resulting situation calls for an intermediate standard of review that

24
To be clear, directors and officers are not agents of the stockholders, nor are the
stockholders their principals. “A board of directors, in fulfilling its fiduciary duty, controls
the corporation, not vice versa. It would be an analytical anomaly, therefore, to treat
corporate directors as agents of the corporation when they are acting as fiduciaries of the
stockholders in managing the business and affairs of the corporation.” Arnold v. Soc’y for
Sav. Bancorp., Inc., 678 A.2d 533, 540 (Del. 1996) (footnote omitted); see also
Firefighters’ Pension Sys. of Kans. City, Mo. Tr. v. Presidio, Inc., 251 A.3d 212, 286 (Del.
Ch. 2021) (“Rather than treating directors as agents of the stockholders, Delaware law has
long treated directors as analogous to trustees for the stockholders.”). The principal-agent
problem uses the language of economic theory, not the language of legal relationships.

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examines “the reasonableness of the end that the directors chose to pursue, the path that

they took to get there, and the fit between the means and the end.” Obeid v. Hogan, 2016

WL 3356851, at *13 (Del. Ch. June 10, 2016).

Enhanced scrutiny integrates different judicial lineaments from the 1980s, when

distinct standards of review seemed to proliferate. The Delaware Supreme Court first

openly recognized an intermediate standard of review in Unocal. In response to an

unsolicited tender offer, the board implemented a discriminatory debt-for-equity exchange

offer. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956. The situational conflict was the “omnipresent specter” that

the directors could have been influenced by and have acted to further their own interests or

those of incumbent management, “rather than those of the corporation and its

shareholders.” Id. at 954. The encroachment on stockholder rights involved the

stockholders’ ability to tender their shares. The resulting intermediate standard of review

called for the directors to show that (i) they had acted in good faith to identify and respond

to “a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness” (i.e., they pursued a legitimate end),

and (ii) they had implemented a response that was “reasonable in relation to the threat

posed” (i.e., they selected a reasonable means). Id. at 955.

Next, in Revlon, the Delaware Supreme Court expressly stated that it was applying

the new Unocal standard of review to the sale of a corporation for cash. 506 A.2d at 182,

184 n.16. But the high court also stated that when the board of directors decided to sell the

corporation, the directors’ role changed “from defenders of the corporate bastion to

auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the

company.” Id. at 182. That powerful metaphor suggested a set of affirmative obligations

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(such as a duty to auction) that the Delaware courts would enforce. Thirty-six years later,

we understand that Revlon was an enhanced scrutiny case. A situational conflict arose

because “the potential sale of a corporation has enormous implications for corporate

managers and advisors, and a range of human motivations, including but by no means

limited to greed, can inspire fiduciaries and their advisors to be less than faithful.”25 The

encroachment on stockholder rights implicated the stockholders’ right to vote on (and

potentially reject) the board’s preferred transaction, free of unreasonable interference from

their fiduciaries, and the Revlon board had interfered with that right by agreeing to a crown-

jewel asset lockup and a no-shop provision. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182–84. As

25
In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 439 (Del. Ch. 2012); see Dollar
Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 597 (“The heightened scrutiny that applies in the Revlon (and Unocal)
contexts [is], in large measure, rooted in a concern that the board might harbor personal
motivations in the sale context that differ from what is best for the corporation and its
stockholders.”). Conflicts of interest are particularly powerful when a corporation is being
sold because a negotiated acquisition is a paradigmatic example of a final period problem.
See generally J. Travis Laster, Omnicare’s Silver Lining, 38 J. Corp. L. 795, 804–11 (2013)
(discussing final period problem and resulting situational conflicts as justification for the
Delaware Supreme Court’s otherwise difficult-to-rationalize and much maligned ruling in
Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003)); J. Travis Laster,
Revlon Is A Standard of Review: Why It’s True and What It Means, 19 Fordham J. Corp.
& Fin. L. 5, 8–18 (2013) (discussing final period problem and implications of situational
conflicts for Revlon as a standard of review). Delaware decisions have acknowledged that
“a final-stage transaction for all shareholders” is one that warrants application of enhanced
scrutiny. McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 918 (Del. 2000); see Lonergan v. EPE Hldgs.
LLC, 5 A.3d 1008, 1019 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“In a final stage transaction—be it a cash sale, a
break-up, or a transaction like a change of control that fundamentally alters ownership
rights—there are sufficient dangers to merit employing enhanced scrutiny . . . .”); Mendel
v. Carroll, 651 A.2d 297, 306 (Del. Ch. 1994) (Allen, C.) (“[I]f the board were to approve
a proposed cash-out merger, it would have to bear in mind that the transaction is a final-
stage transaction for the public shareholders. Thus, the time frame for analysis, insofar as
those shareholders are concerned, is immediate value maximization.”).

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subsequently clarified by the Delaware Supreme Court in QVC, the resulting intermediate

standard of review called for the directors to show that (i) they sought to obtain the best

transaction reasonably available, (i.e., they pursued a legitimate end), and (ii) they followed

a process that fell within a range of reasonableness (i.e., they selected a reasonable means).

See QVC, 637 A.2d at 45.

Chancellor Allen’s decision in Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651

(Del. Ch. 1988), likewise introduced what seemed like another new standard of review.

Chancellor Allen framed Blasius as if it differed from Unocal and Revlon by spotlighting

the question of the directors’ power to act and positing that such an issue could not be left

to the directors’ own judgment. Id. at 660. But the directors in Blasius possessed the

corporate power under the Delaware General Corporation Law and the corporation’s

constitutive documents to take the challenged actions. The case did not implicate the

directors’ technical legal authority but rather the dynamics of the principal-agent problem.

See id. at 658–59 (“The question thus posed is not one of intentional wrong (or even

negligence), but one of authority as between the fiduciary and the beneficiary (not simply

legal authority, i.e., as between the fiduciary and the world at large).”).

The Blasius case involved a consent solicitation by a 9% stockholder who wanted

to elect a new board majority that would implement a leveraged recapitalization. In the

face of the consent solicitation, the incumbent directors expanded the size of the board and

filled the resulting vacancies so that the insurgency could not elect a new board majority.

The situational conflict involved the incumbent directors’ ability to retain their positions

as directors and their concomitant control over the company. Id. at 661. The encroachment

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on stockholder rights involved the stockholders’ right to vote. Id. at 662–63. The standard

of review that Chancellor Allen articulated called for the directors to make to showings.

First, the directors had to show that their reason for interfering with the voting process was

the good faith pursuit of a legitimate end (Chancellor Allen found that they had because

the board sought “to protect its incumbency, not selfishly, but in order to thwart

implementation of the recapitalization that it feared, reasonably, would cause great injury

to the Company”). Id. at 658. Second, the directors had to show that they deployed a means

that had a sufficiently compelling justification (Chancellor Allen found that the means they

chose fell short because it precluded the stockholders from electing a new board majority).

Id. at 658, 662–63.

Like Unocal and Revlon, the Blasius test fundamentally asked whether the directors

(i) acted in good faith for the purpose of maintaining or enhancing the integrity of the

voting process (or in response to a reasonably perceived threat to that process), and

(ii) chose an appropriately calibrated response that was supported by a compelling

justification. The standard for measuring the means-ends fit thus shifted from the “range

of reasonableness” to the tighter metric of a “compelling justification” in recognition that

“[t]he shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of

directorial power rests.” Id. at 659. The justification for action that intruded into an election

of directors or touches on matters of corporate control had to not simply be reasonable but

rather compelling. MM Cos., Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1129–30 (Del.

2003); Pell v. Kill, 135 A.3d 764, 787 (Del. Ch. 2016). And there was one justification that

corporate fiduciaries could not use when the vote involved the election of directors:

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“[T]hey cannot argue that without their intervention, the stockholders would vote

erroneously out of ignorance or mistaken belief about what course of action is in their own

interests.” Pell, 135 A.3d at 788; accord In re Williams Cos. S’holder Litig., 2021 WL

754593, at *30 (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2021), aff’d sub nom. The Williams Cos., Inc. v. Wolosky,

264 A.3d 641 (Del. 2021) (TABLE).

The Blasius test was thus another form of enhanced scrutiny, albeit one that required

a tighter fit between means and ends and with one possible justification ruled out. Recently,

the Delaware Supreme Court said so explicitly, holding that Blasius review is just that: a

version of the enhanced judicial scrutiny first recognized in Unocal. Coster v. UIP Cos.,

Inc., --- A.3d ----, 2023 WL 4239581, at *8 (Del. June 28, 2023). The high court took the

additional step of retiring the compelling justification concept. Instead, in the context of a

corporate election or a stockholder vote involving corporate control, the board must

identify a legitimate threat and then “tailor its response to only what is necessary to counter

the threat.” Id. at *12. Moreover, the board’s response “cannot deprive the stockholders of

a vote or coerce the stockholder to vote a particular way.” Id. What results is enhanced

scrutiny applied with a special sensitivity to the stockholder franchise. Id. at *13.

Finally, even the test from Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981),

for judicial review of a decision by a special litigation committee can now be understood

as a nascent form of enhanced scrutiny.26 The situational conflict was the difficult dynamic

26
See In re EZCORP Inc. Consulting Agreement Deriv. Litig., 2016 WL 301245, at
*27 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2016) (describing Zapata as having adopted “a test which marked

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of directors deciding whether to cause the corporation to sue their fellow directors.27 The

encroachment on stockholder rights involved a stockholder plaintiff’s ability to pursue a

derivative claim when demand was excused. The resulting standard of review put the

burden on the special litigation committee to show (i) “the independence and good faith of

the committee and the bases supporting its conclusions,” (i.e., whether the members of the

special litigation committee acted in the good faith pursuit of a legitimate end), and (ii) a

second step in which the court “determine[s], applying its own independent business

the Delaware Supreme Court’s first deployment of something akin to the two-step standard
of review that later emerged as enhanced scrutiny”); La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v.
Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., 2011 WL 773316, at *7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 4, 2011) (“An SLC’s
decision to dismiss a post-demand-excusal derivative claim is reviewed under Zapata’s
two-step standard, which effectively amounts to reasonableness review and a context-
specific application of enhanced scrutiny.”); Julian Velasco, Structural Bias and the Need
for Substantive Review, 82 Wash. U. L.Q. 821, 849 (2004) (explaining that Zapata “is quite
similar to Unocal”); Gregory V. Varallo et al., From Kahn to Carlton: Recent
Developments in Special Committee Practice, 53 Bus. Law. 397, 423 n.121 (1998) (“The
[Zapata] standard is also reminiscent of the enhanced scrutiny courts use to examine the
actions of directors engaged in a sale of a corporation or other like transactions. . . . Perhaps
the similarity . . . is best explained by the fact that in all of these situations courts would
like to defer to the business judgment of a board, but because the scenarios in which these
cases arise create a potential conflict of interest for board members, the court is only willing
to do so if a board first demonstrates it is capable of making an independent business
judgment and the judgment seems at least to make some rational sense.”).
27
Zapata, 430 A.2d at 787 (“[N]otwithstanding our conviction that Delaware law
entrusts the corporate power to a properly authorized committee, we must be mindful that
directors are passing judgment on fellow directors in the same corporation and fellow
directors, in this instance, who designated them to serve both as directors and committee
members. The question naturally arises whether a ‘there but for the grace of God go I’
empathy might not play a role.”).

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judgment, whether the motion should be granted” (i.e., whether the members of the special

litigation committee selected a reasonable means of addressing the litigation). Id. at 788.

Enhanced scrutiny is thus an intermediate standard of review that calls for the

fiduciaries to establish that they (i) acted for a proper purpose and (ii) selected an

appropriate means of achieving that purpose. Returning to the M&A setting, enhanced

scrutiny first asks whether the fiduciaries acted for the proper purpose of seeking the best

transaction reasonably available. See QVC, 637 A.2d at 45. It then asks whether the

fiduciaries followed a process that fell within a range of reasonableness. Id. If the

fiduciaries “selected one of several reasonable alternatives, a court should not second-guess

that choice even though it might have decided otherwise or subsequent events may have

cast doubt” on the decision. Id.

When applying enhanced scrutiny, a court evaluates the sale process as a whole, not

just the final decision to sell or the decisions that the directors formally made. Officers

invariably play a large role in a sale process and take the actions that most directly shape

its outcome. Not surprisingly, “the paradigmatic context for a good Revlon claim . . . is

when a supine board under the sway of an overweening CEO bent on a certain direction[]

tilts the sales process for reasons inimical to the stockholders’ desire for the best price.” In

re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1002 (Del. Ch. 2005).

Here, the transactional context elevates the standard of review from the business

judgment rule to enhanced scrutiny. Skaggs and Smith negotiated, and the Board approved,

a sale of Columbia to TransCanada for $25.50 per share in cash. The Merger ended the

stockholders’ ongoing investment in Columbia, making it a final-stage transaction. Never

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again would the stockholders have an opportunity to obtain a return from their investment

in Columbia. Nor would there be any ongoing relationships among the directors, officers,

and stockholders. The period leading up to the Merger was a time when the hydraulic

pressures of the last period of play could and did cause the interests of the corporate

fiduciaries and their beneficiaries to diverge. Enhanced scrutiny therefore provides the

operative standard of review.28

2. The Breaches Of Duty In The Sale Process

The second element of a claim for aiding and abetting is “a breach of the fiduciary’s

duty.” Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1096 (internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiffs

proved that Skaggs and Smith breached their duty of loyalty as corporate officers because

(i) they were motivated by self-interest tied to their change-in-control agreements and their

desire to retire in 2016, and (ii) their conflict of interest led them to take steps that fell

outside the range of reasonableness. The plaintiffs proved that the Board breached its duty

of care by failing to provide sufficiently active and direct oversight of the sale process.

28
The Merger was a third-party sale, and the Company does not have a controlling
stockholder, so a fully informed, non-coerced vote could reduce the standard of review
from enhanced scrutiny to an irrebuttable version of the business judgment rule. Corwin v.
KKR Fin. Hldgs. LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 312–13 (Del. 2015). “[O]ne violation is sufficient to
prevent application of Corwin.” van der Fluit v. Yates, 2017 WL 5953514, at *8 n.115
(Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 2017). The Appraisal Decision held that the Proxy Statement contained
three materially misleading disclosures and omissions. See 2019 WL 3778370, at *35–36.
This decision identifies more. The Corwin doctrine is therefore inapplicable, and
TransCanada did not argue in its post-trial brief that Corwin reduced the standard of review.

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 a. Skaggs And Smith’s Bad Faith Motivation

The plaintiffs proved that Skaggs and Smith wanted to retire in 2016, with their full

change-in-control benefits. The plaintiffs proved that Skaggs and Smith pursued a deal

with TransCanada with that goal in mind.

The record shows plainly that Skaggs and Smith wanted to retire in 2016.

• Skaggs had served as CEO of NiSource since 2005, and he believed that a CEO had
a shelf-life of about ten years. Skaggs hit ten years of service in 2015.

• Skaggs’s personal financial advisor used March 31, 2016, as Skaggs’s anticipated
retirement date.

• Smith had been thinking about retirement all his life and had set fifty-five as his
magical age to retire. Smith would turn fifty-five in 2016.

The record also shows that Skaggs and Smith were motivated by their desire to trigger their

change-in-control benefits before retiring. As described in more detail in the Factual

Background, Skaggs’s personal financial advisor told him that the single greatest risk to

his retirement plan was his NiSource equity. As CEO, Skaggs could not liquidate his

NiSource stock without casting doubt on its prospects, and he continued to face that

problem as CEO of Columbia. As CFO, Smith confronted a similar dynamic. Writing as a

member of this court, Chief Justice Strine referred to this type of dilemma as a “fiduciary

quandary” that can incentivize an officer to seek a deal at a defensible price, even if the

deal was not the best transaction reasonably available. See In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig.,

926 A.2d 94, 116 (Del. Ch. 2007). In Mindbody, a similar conflict led to liability for a CEO

who was tired of selling small blocks of stock into the market under a Rule 10b5-1 plan

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and wanted to obtain near-term liquidity by selling the company as a whole. See 2023 WL

2518149, at *5.

While at NiSource, Skaggs and Smith pushed for the Spinoff, then asked to join

Columbia knowing that it would be an attractive takeover target and expecting it to be sold.

• In a June 2015 memorandum, Skaggs’s personal financial advisor wrote, “I think
they are already working on getting themselves sold before they even split. This was
the intention all along. [Skaggs] sees himself only staying on through July of 2016.”
JTX 114 at 1.

• In discussions with TransCanada in November 2015, Columbia management
signaled that they “prefer a sale of the company” and indicated “that there will be
no social issues.” JTX 337 at 5.

• In a call with Poirier on February 10, 2016, Smith’s talking points called for him to
reiterate again to TransCanada that there would be no social issues. JTX 715 at 23.

• Immediately after the deal was announced, Smith responded to a congratulatory
email from his financial advisor with “[t]hanks Rick, do you think I can retire now?”
JTX 1138.

• Immediately after the deal closed, Skaggs and Smith retired.

Skaggs and Smith had personally significant amounts of money riding on a deal that

would trigger their change-in-control benefits. TransCanada calculated in November 2015

that Skaggs and Smith would receive an incremental $45,386,051 and $13,128,063,

respectively, if Columbia was sold at a 20% premium over market.

In addition to this direct evidence of intent, Skaggs and Smith acted like executives

who were thirsty for a sale. They engaged with bidders immediately after the Spinoff and

sought to line up a transaction by the end of November 2015. When that failed and the

Board shut down the sale process, they continued to engage with TransCanada. They told

TransCanada that management wanted to sell, and they did not mention the Standstill. As

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the sale process unfolded, Skaggs and Smith acted so solicitously toward TransCanada that

Poirier and the Wells Fargo team wondered what message they were sending and what

game they might be playing.

Importantly, the plaintiffs did not argue simplistically that Skaggs and Smith were

so desperate for a sale that they would take any deal. Clearly, that was not the case. As the

Appraisal Decision found, “Skaggs and Smith also had countervailing incentives to pursue

the best deal possible,” and their change-in-control agreements “included significant equity

components that appreciated with a higher deal price.” 2019 WL 3778370, at *28. The

issue in the Appraisal Decision was whether Skaggs and Smith were so eager to sell that

they would accept a fire-sale bid below fair value, and the court rejected that argument:

“Although Skaggs and Smith wanted to retire, they were professionals who took pride in

their jobs and wanted to do the right thing. They were not going to arrange a fire sale for

below Columbia’s standalone value, and the Board would not have let them.” Id.

The different trial record presented in this case demonstrates that although Skaggs

and Smith wanted to do the right thing when selling the company, they also wanted to

trigger their change-in-control benefits and retire. Skaggs and Smith faced a conflict of

interest that pulled them from the path of propriety and undermined their ability to achieve

the best value reasonably available for the stockholders. In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. S’holders

Litig., No. CIV.A. 10389, 1989 WL 7036, at *15 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989) (“Greed is not

the only human emotion that can pull one from the path of propriety; so might hatred, lust,

envy, revenge, or, as is here alleged, shame or pride. Indeed any human emotion may cause

a director to place his own interests, preferences or appetites before the welfare of the

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corporation.”). Skaggs and Smith asserted that they only wanted to obtain the best price,

but the law, “sensitive to the ever-present inclination to rationalize as right that which is

merely beneficial, will accord scant weight to the subjective judgment of an interested

[fiduciary].” Merritt v. Colonial Foods, Inc., 505 A.2d 757, 765 (Del. Ch. 1986) (Allen,

C.).

The plaintiffs did not seek to prove that Skaggs and Smith were so conflicted that

they would sell at any price. The plaintiffs sought to prove and succeeded in proving that

because of their desire for a deal, Skaggs and Smith behaved in ways that undercut

Columbia’s negotiating leverage, led to lower offers from TransCanada, and resulted in

TransCanada reneging on the $26 Deal and ambushing the Columbia management team

with the $25.50 Offer. The plaintiffs also proved that Skaggs and Smith’s desire for a deal

caused them not to risk a deal at $25.50 by pushing TransCanada for another quarter. The

Appraisal Decision foreshadowed that possibility by noting that there was reason to think

that “different negotiators could have done better.” Id. at *29; see Dismissal Decision, 2021

WL 772562, at *43–49 (reviewing court’s findings and rulings in Appraisal Decision and

explaining possibility of a different outcome in a breach of fiduciary duty case).

TransCanada has argued that Skaggs and Smith could not have been affected by a

desire to trigger their change-in-control benefits and retire because they (i) rejected

TransCanada’s proposal to try to sign a deal in November 2015 and pursued the December

equity offering, and (ii) rejected TransCanada’s $24 per share proposal on March 4, 2016,

then recommended against TransCanada’s supposedly best-and-final proposal at $25.25

per share later that day.

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 The rejection of TransCanada’s proposal to sign a deal in lieu of an equity offering

does not suggest that Skaggs and Smith were unaffected by a conflict of interest.

TransCanada was setting a trap. If Columbia had agreed and then ran low on capital,

TransCanada would have had all the leverage. Yet even with that obvious risk, Skaggs was

tempted to the point where he took the concept to Cornelius. It was Cornelius who vetoed

the idea and insisted that Skaggs say no.

Skaggs and Smith’s reaction to TransCanada’s proposal of $24 per share and their

subsequent recommendation against a bid of $25.25 per share does not evidence their

loyalty either. It rather confirms that they were not willing to take just any deal, including

an offensive one. In a series of communications with TransCanada that breached the

Standstill, Skaggs and Smith had pushed for a transaction in the range of $26 to $28 per

share, and TransCanada had repeatedly indicated that it could pay up to $28 per share. As

a result of these interactions, Skaggs and Smith had anchored on a price of $28 per share,

expected not to have to go any lower than $26 per share, and relied on Girling and Poirier’s

indications that TransCanada was prepared to pay in that range.

When Girling offered $24 per share, Skaggs and Smith were offended. That figure

was a full dollar below the low end of the range that Girling had proposed to gain

exclusivity ($25 to $28 per share) and four dollars below the $28 per share figure that

Skaggs and Smith wanted. Even with their ambitions for a change-in-control-fueled

retirement, they could not stomach a low-ball offer like that, and they reacted emotionally.

TransCanada’s immediate raise to $25.25 per share came across as a second insult, because

it made clear that TransCanada could have bid within its proposed range in the first place.

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The immediate jump reinforced the impression that TransCanada was trying to take

advantage of Skaggs and Smith.

The conflict of interest that Skaggs and Smith faced did not mean that they would

accept an insulting price, and their rejection of the extreme did not mean that they fulfilled

their duties. It was their conflicted behavior that gave Girling and Poirier the confidence to

offer $24 per share in the first place, and later to renege on the $26 Deal. When Poirier

proposed the $25.50 Offer, Skaggs was unwilling to push for another quarter.29

Skaggs and Smith fell victim to a conflict of interest. They did not act in good faith

for the proper purpose of securing the best transaction for the benefit of the stockholders.

They acted for mixed reasons, including their personal interest in achieving a transaction

that would trigger their change-in-control benefits and facilitate their retirements in 2016.

29
In this respect, the conflict of interest that Skaggs and Smith faced is the same
conflict that confronts contingently compensated professions, like investment banks. “The
contingently compensated agent has a greater incentive to get the deal done rather than
push for the last quarter, particularly if pushing too hard might jeopardize the deal and if
the terms on offer are already defensible.” Rural Liability, 88 A.3d at 94. As TransCanada’s
expert explained, Skaggs and Smith were net sellers in any transaction, and so their
interests were generally aligned with those of the stockholders, but they had a greater
incentive to get a deal done to lock in their change-of-control benefits and enable them to
retire in 2016. There are interesting questions of economic theory about what Skaggs and
Smith’s point of indifference rationally should have been, and answering them would
require making assumptions about the relative utility that Skaggs or Smith attributed to
near-term retirement and the security of a bird in the hand compared to the benefits of a
higher price. Depending on those estimates, reasonable minds could debate how Skaggs
and Smith should have acted. In this case, ample contemporaneous evidence shows how
Skaggs and Smith actually acted. Whatever an economic model fueled by particular
assumptions might say, they actually wanted to secure a deal so they could trigger their
change-in-control benefits and retire in 2016.

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Their desire for a curtain call in 2016 sufficiently influenced their actions to result in this

court’s factual finding that they acted in bad faith.

b. Actions That Fell Outside The Range Of Reasonableness

Having a conflict of interest is not a strict liability offense. The conflict must have

a real-world effect. In a sale process, that means conduct that falls outside the range of

reasonableness. The plaintiffs proved that Skaggs and Smith acted outside the range.

Columbia’s sale process had three distinct phases. The first phase involved multiple

bidders, began shortly after the Spinoff, and ended on November 25, 2015, when the Board

instructed management to pursue the equity offering and send return-or-destroy letters to

the participants. The second phase only involved TransCanada. It began immediately after

the first phase ended and witnessed TransCanada’s persistent and unsolicited efforts,

notwithstanding the Standstill, to acquire Columbia. The second phase ended with the

signing of the Merger Agreement. The third phase began after signing and ended when the

Merger closed. The second phase was when the breaches of duty occurred.

During the first phase, Skaggs and Smith showed favoritism toward particular

bidders that foreshadowed how they would treat TransCanada during the second phase.

They demonstrated their wiliness to play favorites when Dominion and Spectra each

contacted Skaggs. The approaches were virtually identical, yet Skaggs and Smith preferred

Dominion, so they gave Spectra the cold shoulder. Later in the first phase, Skaggs and

Smith favored TransCanada and Berkshire by giving only them the bid deadline of

November 24, 2015. Not surprisingly, only they bid.

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 The first phase also marked the start of Smith’s indiscrete communications with

Poirier. In September and early October 2015, Fornell connected them. Immediately after

their first call on October 9, Poirier had his team prepare an updated analysis which noted

that Columbia was “[c]urrently for sale.” PTO ¶ 186. Later that month, on October 26,

Poirier had a private dinner with Smith. Then, on November 13, the TransCanada team

received a management presentation from Smith and Kettering. Poirier came away from

those interactions believing that Columbia management wanted to sell, that there would be

no social issues, and that Columbia management wanted to complete a transaction by mid-

2016. See JTX 337; JTX 371; JTX 375.

When neither TransCanada nor Berkshire hit the Board’s bogey of $28 per share,

the Board instructed management to terminate the sale process. With the sending of the

return-or-destroy letters, the first phase ended. TransCanada immediately started the

second phase, during which TransCanada persistently pursued Columbia.

Throughout the second phase, Skaggs and Smith showed extraordinary solicitude

toward TransCanada. That solicitude began immediately after the return-or-destroy letters

went out. Poirier promptly called Smith. Rather than declining the call because the Board

had terminated the sale process, Smith told Poirier that Columbia “probably” would want

to pick up merger talks again “in a few months.” See JTX 392; JTX 395; JTX 403. He also

reiterated that management wanted a deal by mid-2016. See JTX 409 at 2. The Board did

not authorize Smith to provide that information, and Smith did not give it to anyone else.

Poirier’s call on November 25, 2015, technically violated the Standstill because it

post-dated the termination of the November sale process, but it was a foot fault. What

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followed, however, was a series of contacts during December 2015 and early January 2016

that blatantly breached the Standstill. During this period, Skaggs and Smith never pushed

back and never mentioned the Standstill. They were happy to open the gates.

The limited discussions about the Standstill that took place show that the

management team was focused on a sale. Just before the January 7 Meeting, Poirier raised

the Standstill and suggested that in-house counsel confer. At the time, TransCanada was

obviously pursuing an acquisition of Columbia and seeking to influence management. The

Standstill prohibited both.

• On December 19, 2015, Poirier had told Smith that TransCanada remained
interested in acquiring Columbia and suggested that TransCanada could pay up to
$28 per share.

• The December 19, 2015 call prompted Skaggs and Goldman to start preparing
materials evaluating an offer at $28 per share for use at a Board meeting in January
2016.

• On January 4, 2016, Poirier called Smith, asked for an updated version of the
package of information that Columbia had provided to bidders during the November
2015 process, and told him that TransCanada would want prompt access to a data
room to start conducting due diligence.

• On January 5, 2016, Smith provided Poirier with an updated version of the package
of information that Columbia had provided to bidders.

Yet Columbia’s in-house counsel told his TransCanada counterpart that the January 7

Meeting did not implicate the Standstill.

During the January 7 Meeting, Smith was an open book. He literally handed over

his talking points to Poirier. He told Poirier that management wanted to sell, and that while

the Board was split, there was a consensus on selling for the right price. He told Poirier

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that Skaggs was meeting one-on-one with his directors. He said, in substance, that

TransCanada would not face any competition.

TransCanada has argued that the actions that Skaggs and Smith took in December

2015 and during the January 7 Meeting did not matter to the sale process. That is plainly

wrong. Skaggs and Smith provided TransCanada with critical information affecting the

rest of the sale process. After the January 7 Meeting, TransCanada knew all of the

following facts:

• Both Skaggs and Smith would engage freely with TransCanada.

• Columbia management did not care about the Standstill.

• Smith was a neophyte negotiator and a reliable source of information.

• Skaggs wanted a proposal to bring to the Board on January 28, 2016.

• Columbia management wanted an all-cash deal that closed by mid-2016.

• Columbia management inferably wanted a transaction signed by March 2016.

• There would be no social issues.

• Columbia management would receive multi-million-dollar change-in-control
payments.

• There was a Board-level consensus on selling at the right price.

• Columbia management did not expect TransCanada to face any meaningful
competition from other bidders.

The Board did not authorize Skaggs and Smith to provide this information to

TransCanada. One of the directors testified that the Board never would have authorized

Smith to tell a potential bidder that Columbia had eliminated the competition, which he

thought was counterintuitive. Appraisal Decision, 2019 WL 3778370, at *33, n.35. In fact,

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the Board had not authorized any communications with TransCanada, much less the

January 7 Meeting. Id. at *33. At best, the directors knew from Skaggs’s one-on-one

meetings that TransCanada remained interested in a deal. They did not know and had not

approved Skaggs and Smith’s active pursuit of a deal. They certainly had not authorized

Smith to portray Columbia as eager for a bid or to reassure TransCanada that it would not

face competition. Skaggs and Smith never gave the Board a candid report on the January

7 Meeting, and they never reported to the Board on what Smith said to Poirier. Cornelius

Dep. 141.

After the January 7 Meeting, the solicitude that Skaggs and Smith showed toward

TransCanada continued. Smith and Poirier scheduled a daily call, and TransCanada began

conducting due diligence. TransCanada’s initial list of due diligence was lengthy, but

Skaggs and Smith were prepared to sign off on it. After consulting with Sullivan &

Cromwell, Columbia’s in-house counsel advised Skaggs and Smith to reject many of the

requests. Demonstrating its seriousness, TransCanada obtained credentials for nearly thirty

people to access the electronic data room.

During the preparations for the call when Girling would provide Skaggs with an

expression of interest, Columbia management again put out the welcome mat for

TransCanada. Columbia’s in-house counsel bizarrely took the position that even “an offer

to purchase our securities” would not be a violation of the Standstill, JTX 623, even though

that was exactly what the Standstill prohibited. The Board was free to waive the restriction

or ratify a breach after the fact, but those are different issues than the question of breach

itself.

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 Skaggs and Smith’s ardor for a transaction was again on display in early February

2016. Smith’s behavior during that period seemed so accommodating that Poirier was

puzzled and found himself pondering what Smith might be trying to do. The Wells Fargo

bankers thought Smith and Skaggs were “signaling that they would do a deal below their

range,” JTX 708, and that they wanted “an exit regardless of price.” JTX 709. Smith’s

solicitous behavior continued during the meeting on February 9 with Fornell. When Skaggs

asked about the execution risk that TransCanada faced, Smith did not support Skaggs by

adding tough questions of his own. Instead, when Fornell responded that TransCanada had

many levers to pull, Smith backed up Fornell. JTX 707. Fornell came away believing that

Skaggs and Smith truly wanted to sell.

Those actions were not reasonable, and the eagerness that Skaggs and Smith showed

for a deal led Poirier and the TransCanada team to contemplate a bid below their original

range. During mid-February 2016, Poirier began fishing for signals from Smith about

whether Columbia management would react negatively to a bid below TransCanada’s

indicative range. Smith gave none, and Poirier later reported to Wells Fargo that he had

“raised the spectre [sic] of a lower price in a roundabout way multiple times with Steve

Smith and was met with ‘crickets.’” JTX 782 at 1. Smith’s silence caused Poirier to sense

opportunity.

In his next call with Skaggs, Girling foreshadowed that TransCanada might not bid

within Columbia’s indicative range. Internally, TransCanada was considering bids as low

as $23 per share. Skaggs got the message, but did not draw a line in the sand.

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 As discussed in the Factual Background, the discussions about a deal broke down

for twenty-four hours after TransCanada made a bid so low that Skaggs and Smith reacted

emotionally and rejected it. The next day, Wells Fargo reengaged by asking Goldman for

a counteroffer. Skaggs, Smith, and Kettering decided to counter at $26 per share. After

consulting with Cornelius, they instructed Goldman to tell Wells Fargo that (i)

“management had reached out to [the] Board—and it was important they understand this

answer is the Board’s answer,” and (ii) “[b]ottom line, they’ll do 26. Not a penny less.

Straight from [the] Board.” JTX 885. Making that counteroffer without the Board’s

involvement fell outside the range of reasonableness, and Smith then went further out of

bounds. In a back-channel call with Poirier, he asked Poirier to consider a bid of $26 per

share and cautioned that the Board had not approved that price. PTO ¶ 359. That softer

framing undercut Goldman’s message of “not a penny less,” and by disclaiming the

Board’s involvement, Smith made it seem like Goldman was bluffing.

TransCanada responded with the $26 Offer, which Columbia management

accepted. See Part I.O.2, supra. When Smith called Poirier and said yes to the $26 Offer,

Poirier asked for another two weeks of exclusivity. In another blunder, Smith told him that

extending exclusivity would not be a problem, because “[t]he [Columbia] board is freaking

out” and had told the management team to get a deal done, “whatever it takes.” JTX 952

at 1. Wells Fargo was stunned. After hearing about Smith’s statement, Fornell wrote to his

team: “Oddly, the [Columbia] team has relayed this info to [TransCanada].” JTX 952 at 1.

One of the team members responded, “Turmoil provides opportunity. [TransCanada]

would appear to be well positioned.” Id. Fornell emailed back: “Yes.” Id.

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 Skaggs then revealed his own commitment to the deal by providing TransCanada

with a script that Columbia used with inbound inquiries, before any agreement extending

exclusivity had been executed. When Poirier called Smith to ask about the script, Smith

gave the store away again. This time Smith told Poirier that the management team “wanted

to get this deal done with them and this would help us achieve that goal.” JTX 1778 at 8.

Again, Wells Fargo was stunned. When one banker noted that they were “back in the game”

on exclusivity, another noted: “I’m just not sure that the other side is playing the same one!

Can’t for the life of me figure out why they would keep us exclusive . . . .” JTX 1065.

TransCanada took advantage of the situation by reneging on the $26 Deal and

substituting the $25.50 Offer. This time, Skaggs, Smith, and Kettering caucused about

whether to counter at $25.75 per share, reflecting roughly another $100 million in merger

consideration. They recognized that TransCanada’s stock price had recovered from a short-

term dip, eliminating that justification for a lower price. But Skaggs decided not to risk the

deal in hand, and the management team recommended that the Board accept it. The Merger

Agreement memorialized the terms of the $25.50 Offer.

During the three-and-a-half months that ran from the termination of the first phase

of the sale process on November 25, 2015, through Columbia’s formal approval of the

Merger Agreement on March 16, 2016, Smith and Skaggs acted unreasonably. They

repeatedly showed a level of solicitude toward TransCanada that Poirier and Wells Fargo

found incomprehensible.

Maybe there could be a time when obtaining the best transaction reasonably

available requires telling the buyer you are eager to sell, reassuring the buyer that there is

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unlikely to be any competition, never mentioning a standstill, eagerly providing due

diligence, appearing receptive to a price below the range you had asked for, revealing to

the buyer that your side is “freaking out” and wants to get a deal done, extending

exclusivity after a public leak about the deal talks and an inbound inquiry from a second

bidder, and then not countering a last-minute price drop. This is not that case. Due to

Skaggs and Smith’s conflicted actions, the sale process in this case fell outside the range

of reasonableness.

c. The Board’s Inadvertent Breach Of Its Duty Of Care

During a sale process, directors must be particularly vigilant. “[A] board of directors

. . . may not avoid its active and direct duty of oversight in a matter as significant as the

sale of [a corporation.]” Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1281; accord Citron, 569 A.2d at 66. One

of the Delaware Supreme Court’s clearest teachings is that “directors cannot be passive

instrumentalities during merger proceedings.” Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d

345, 368 (Del. 1993). Directors must maintain “an active and direct role in the context of

a sale of a company from beginning to end.” Id. Providing active oversight includes

“identifying and responding to actual or potential conflicts of interest.” RBC, 129 A.3d at

855.

In the context of a sale, directors can breach their duty of care by failing to obtain

information that they should have obtained, even when the information was withheld by

others. See Rural Liability, 88 A.3d at 93–96. That principle recognizes that “the buck stops

with the Board.” Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 835. It also enables Delaware law to reach aiders

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and abettors that cause the directors to breach their duty of care. For several reasons, that

doctrinal approach does not expose the directors themselves to a risk of liability.

First, a Delaware corporation typically has an exculpatory provision in its certificate

of incorporation. See 8 Del. C. § 102(b)(7). Such a provision eliminates any monetary

liability for a breach of the duty of care. That is the case here, and the Board members other

than Skaggs could not be liable.

Second, a director is “fully protected” when relying “in good faith” on “such

information, opinions, reports or statements presented to the corporation by any of the

corporation’s officers or employees . . . or by any other person as to matters the [director]

reasonably believes are within such person’s professional or expert competence and who

has been selected with reasonable care.” 8 Del. C. § 141(e). That is also the case here, and

the directors would be fully protected from any consequences of breach.

Third, the Delaware Supreme Court has appended a separate standard of liability to

the analysis of the duty of care when a plaintiff sues outside directors. To reiterate,

Delaware law starts with the standard of conduct, which establishes the level of care that

corporate fiduciaries are expected to use. The standard of conduct contemplates the

exercise of reasonable care. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. To determine the outcome of

litigation, a court applying Delaware law uses a standard of review, which establishes the

level of carelessness that will result in a breach of duty. The level of care varies depending

on which standard of review applies.

• When the business judgment rule applies, the level of carelessness is gross
negligence. Id.

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• When enhanced scrutiny applies, the level of carelessness is action that falls outside
a range of reasonableness.30

• When entire fairness applies, the level of carelessness is action resulting in a
decisionmaking process that fails to satisfy the fair dealing dimension of the unitary
entire fairness test.31

Finally, assuming a court has found that the directors breached their duty of care and that

other defenses do not apply, the Delaware Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff must

satisfy a standard of liability: “When disinterested directors themselves face liability, the

law, for policy reasons, requires that they be deemed to have acted with gross negligence

in order to sustain a monetary judgment against them.” RBC, 129 A.3d at 857. That is true

30
E.g., QVC, 637 A.2d at 36 (rejecting sale process that “was not reasonable as to
process or result”); id. at 45 (identifying as a key feature of enhanced scrutiny “the
adequacy of the decisonmaking process employed by the directors, including the
information on which the directors based their decision”); id. (noting that the directors bore
“the burden of proving that they were reasonably informed”); Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949,
955, 958 (requiring a “reasonable investigation”)
31
E.g., Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213, 1244 (Del. 2012) (affirming
trial court’s finding that “the process by which the Merger was negotiated and approved
was not fair” and produced an unfair price); Disney II, 906 A.2d at 52 (explaining that the
business judgment rule can be rebutted by establishing that “the directors breached their
fiduciary duty of care” and that “[i]f that is shown, the burden then shifts to the director
defendants to demonstrate that the challenged act or transaction was entirely fair to the
corporation and its shareholders”); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del.
1983) (explaining that the fair dealing dimension of the entire fairness test includes “how
it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how the approvals of
the directors . . . were obtained”).

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“even if the transaction was a change-of-control transaction.”32 The directors in this case

acted unreasonably, but they were not grossly negligent.

In this case, the sale process fell outside the range of reasonableness. That happened

because the directors did not engage in sufficient monitoring of Skaggs and Smith. The

directors started falling short in December 2015, when Skaggs told three of the directors

during his one-on-one meetings that TransCanada remained interested in a transaction.

That disclosure should have caused each of the directors to perk up and ask questions. Had

any of the directors done so, they would have learned that Poirier called Smith on

December 19, during which, Poirier confirmed TransCanada’s continuing interest in a

transaction and implied that TransCanada was still interested in a deal at $28 per share. At

that point, warning lights should have flashed, and the directors should have called a

meeting and taken control of the process. Instead, they let Skaggs sweettalk them

individually, and the Board did not receive any meaningful information about what Skaggs

and Smith were doing until their next regularly scheduled meeting on January 28 and 29,

2016, when Skaggs reported Girling’s expression of interest in a transaction in the range

32
Singh v. Attenborough, 137 A.3d 151, 151 (Del. 2016) (ORDER) (“Absent a
stockholder vote and absent an exculpatory charter provision, the damages liability
standard for an independent director or other disinterested fiduciary for breach of the duty
of care is gross negligence, even if the transaction was a change-of-control transaction.”);
accord McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492, 505 n.56 (Del. Ch. 2000) (asserting
that whenever a plaintiff pursues a post-closing damages claim for breach of fiduciary duty,
“[i]n the absence of the exculpatory charter provision, the plaintiffs would still have been
required to plead facts supporting an inference of gross negligence in order to state a
damages claim”).

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of $25 to $28 per share. Even then, the directors only heard what the management team

wanted them to know.

After the end-of-January meeting, the Board should have engaged. The directors

should have asked about the origins of the offer, the early contacts with TransCanada, and

whether Skaggs and Smith faced conflicts of interest. Had they asked probing questions,

they would have learned about the series of communications in December 2015 and

uncovered the details of the January 7 Meeting. Skaggs was simultaneously talking with

the directors about CEO succession, and with more information, the directors could have

put two and two together on the conflict front. They would have realized that Skaggs and

Smith were not the right people to lead the sale process, and they could have shifted

Goldman or Lazard into that role. If nothing else, the directors could have stopped the free

flow of information from Smith to Poirier.

Had the directors dug into the details, they also would have uncovered the

connection to the terminated sale process from November 2015. They could have asked

why management was only engaging with one of the four bidders from November, which

would have led to an explanation of the don’t-ask-don’t-waive standstills. A standstill of

that type is a powerful tool that can skew a sale process, and the directors should have

known about those provisions from the get-go.

The directors did not ask these questions. Nor did the Company’s sophisticated

outside counsel help the directors identify those issues and navigate through them.

If the directors had engaged earlier and more thoroughly, then they might well have

waived the Standstill to enable TransCanada to approach. After doing so, they would have

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been in a position to take control of the sale process. Instead, Skaggs and Smith continued

to lead the charge, and the process suffered for it. The directors thus breached their duty of

care. But there is no circumstance in which any of the outside directors could be liable.

They would be entitled to exculpation, fully protected in relying in good faith on Skaggs,

Smith, and their advisors, and only guilty of a care breach under the enhanced scrutiny

standard of review. They did not act with gross negligence sufficient to support a finding

of liability. It is no wonder that the plaintiffs did not sue them.

3. Knowing Participation In The Sale Process Breaches

The most critical element for an aiding-and-abetting claim is the defendant’s

knowing participation in the breach. The element of knowing participation has two

dimensions: knowledge and culpable participation. The plaintiffs proved both.

a. The Standard For Knowing Participation

The Restatement (Second) of Torts explains that a defendant can be secondarily

liable for “harm resulting . . . from the tortious conduct of another” if the defendant

(a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a common
design with him, or

(b) knows that the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives
substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct
himself, or

(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result
and his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty
to the third person.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 (Am. L. Inst. 1979), Westlaw (database updated May

2023). To the same end, the Delaware Supreme Court has held that a defendant can be

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liable for aiding and abetting if the defendant has “participated in the board’s decisions,

conspired with [the] board, or otherwise caused the board to make the decisions at issue.”

Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1098. Liability thus requires that “the accessory actor’s conduct be

informed by knowledge of the primary duty or its breach and that [the accessory actor]

make a causally significant contribution to the wrong suffered by the party to whom the

primary actor owes a duty.” Deborah A. DeMott, Culpable participation in fiduciary

breach, in Research Handbook on Fiduciary Law 219 (D. Gordon Smith & Andrew S.

Gold, eds. 2018).

For the dimension of knowledge, the accessory actor must have had “actual or

constructive knowledge that their conduct was legally improper.” RBC, 129 A.3d at 862

(cleaned up). In other words, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the aider and abettor acted

“knowingly, intentionally, or with reckless indifference.” Id. (cleaned up). “[T]he question

of whether a defendant acted with scienter is a factual determination.” Id.

The dimension of participation is harder to pin down, because culpable participation

“may take many forms.” DeMott, supra, at 220. The accessory may engage in conduct

“that induces or instigates a breach of fiduciary duty” or may assist in the breach “through

agreement with the fiduciary.” Id. In either scenario, the accessory conduct “occurs prior

to—or almost simultaneously with—the fiduciary’s decision to breach the duty.” Id. In the

absence of a duty to act, some level of volitional conduct is always required; culpable

participation “cannot be premised on simple inaction.” Id. at 229. Where there is a duty to

act, culpable participation can result from a conscious refusal to fulfill that duty.

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 In M&A settings, Delaware decisions have examined claims for aiding and abetting

against different deal participants, ranging from affiliates involved in the transaction, to

sell-side advisors like investment banks or law firms, to buy-side counterparties. Proving

knowing participation can be easier or harder depending on the defendant’s role.

When the defendant is an affiliate involved in the transaction, the path to proving

knowing participation is relatively straightforward. By definition, the affiliate is already

participating in the transaction, and principles of imputation permit the knowledge of a

duty-breaching fiduciary to be attributed to the affiliate. Holding the accessory affiliate

jointly and severally liable with the primary duty-breaching fiduciary follows from the

fiduciary’s act.33

When the defendant is a sell-side deal advisor, the path requires proof that the

advisor consciously assisted the fiduciaries in committing a breach or caused the breach to

33
See, e.g., In re Dole Food Co., Inc. S’holder Litig., 2015 WL 5052214, at *39
(Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 2015) (holding after trial that affiliated entities that controller used to
effectuate an unfair transaction knowingly participated in the breach of duty and were
jointly and severally liable with controller for aiding and abetting the breach); In re
Emerging Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 2004 WL 1305745, at *38 (Del. Ch. May 3,
2004) (same); Carlton Invs. v. TLC Beatrice Int’l Hldgs., Inc., 1995 WL 694397, at *15–
16 (Del. Ch. Nov. 21, 1995) (Allen, C.) (denying a motion to dismiss aiding and abetting
claims against controlling stockholder and his affiliates where the complaint alleged
“overarching control” by the stockholder such that the court could “infer[ ] ‘knowing’
participation” by his affiliates); see also MultiPlan, 268 A.3d at 818 (inferring at pleading
stage that affiliate of interested controller who acted as financial advisor for transaction
aided and abetted breach of duty by controller); La. Mun. Police Empls.’ Ret. Sys. v. Fertita,
2009 WL 2263406, at *7 n.27 (Del. Ch. July 28, 2009) (inferring at pleading stage that
affiliated entities that controller used to effectuate an interested transaction knowingly
participated in the breach and were subject to viable claim for aiding and abetting). See
generally DeMott, supra, at 222–23.

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occur by manipulating the fiduciaries. A sell-side deal advisor typically works closely with

its fiduciary clients, provides them with information and analysis, and assists them in

making and carrying out their decisions. A third-party advisor thus may be involved

directly in the breach, or it can induce a fiduciary’s breach by providing misleading

information or “creating an informational vacuum.” RBC, 129 A.3d at 862.

By contrast, proving that an arm’s-length buyer knowingly participated in a sell-

side breach is a difficult task. As a general rule, “arm’s-length bargaining is privileged and

does not, absent actual collusion and facilitation of fiduciary wrongdoing, constitute aiding

and abetting.” Morgan v. Cash, 2010 WL 2803746, at *8 (Del. Ch. July 16, 2010). A third-

party bidder who negotiates at arm’s length therefore “rarely faces a viable claim for aiding

and abetting.” Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 837. A high burden for proving that a third-party

acquirer has aided and abetted a fiduciary breach “aids target stockholders by ensuring that

potential acquirors [sic] are not deterred from making bids by the potential for suffering

litigation costs and risks on top of the considerable risk that already accompanies [a

transaction].” Morgan, 2010 WL 2803746, at *8. “Under this standard, a bidder’s attempts

to reduce the sale price through arm’s-length negotiations cannot give rise to liability for

aiding and abetting.” Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1097.

The high burden for an aiding and abetting claim against a third-party buyer is not

insurmountable, and a potential acquirer’s right “to seek the lowest possible price through

arms’ length negotiations with the target board” is not unlimited. Del Monte, 25 A.3d at

837.

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 [A] bidder may be liable to the target’s stockholders if the bidder attempts to
create or exploit conflicts of interest in the board. Similarly, a bidder may be
liable to a target’s stockholders for aiding and abetting a fiduciary breach by
the target’s board where the bidder and the board conspire in or agree to the
fiduciary breach.

Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1097–98. The buyer “may not knowingly participate in the target

board’s breach of fiduciary duty by extracting terms which require the opposite party to

prefer its interests at the expense of its shareholders.” Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 490 A.2d

1050, 1058 (Del. Ch. 1984), aff’d, 575 A.2d 1131 (Del. 1990). “Creating or exploiting a

fiduciary breach . . . is an impermissible intrusion into the relationship between the

fiduciary and beneficiary.” Del Monte, A.3d at 837.

The cases in which plaintiffs have succeeded in pleading or proving a claim for

aiding and abetting against a third-party bidder have often involved a buyer who obtained

privileged access to a disloyal sell-side actor, then used the resulting relationship to ignore

guardrails or violate boundaries that the sell-side board established. The seminal Delaware

Supreme Court decisions are Revlon and Mills Acquisition. In each case, the Delaware

Supreme Court issued a targeted preliminary injunction that barred the buyer from

enforcing its contract rights under a merger agreement. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184; Mills Acq.

Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del. 1989). The Delaware Supreme Court

has made clear that this form of relief is only available against a bidder that has engaged in

aiding and abetting. See C & J Energy Servs., Inc. v. Mia. Gen. Empls.’ Ret. Tr., 107 A.3d

1049, 1072 (Del. 2014). The facts that supported the issuance of that type of relief in Revlon

and Mills Acquisition therefore provide insight into what is sufficient for that claim.

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 In Revlon, the directors of Revlon, Inc. initially responded to a hostile bid by Ronald

Perelman by offering to exchange 10 million Revlon shares for senior subordinated notes.

506 A.2d at 177. The offering was oversubscribed, and 10 million shares were purchased

on a pro rata basis. When Perelman continued to pursue the company, the directors

negotiated with Forstmann Little & Co. over a leveraged buyout. The directors eventually

agreed to sell the company to Forstmann for $57.25 per share plus a contractual

commitment to support the par value of the notes. The merger agreement contained a

crown-jewel asset lockup, a no-shop clause, and a termination fee. Id.

Perelman topped Forstmann’s bid and sought a preliminary injunction against the

deal protection devices. Ruling on the application, the Delaware Supreme Court found that

the directors “breached their primary duty of loyalty” by making “support of the Notes an

integral part of the company’s dealings with Forstmann, even though their primary

responsibility . . . was to the equity owners.” Id. at 182. The high court explained that the

noteholders’ rights were fixed by contract, that the directors had no obligation to protect

the noteholders, and that the directors engaged in “unreasonable” conduct by bargaining to

support the value of the notes. Id.at 183. Although the Delaware Supreme Court did not

expressly state that Forstmann was culpable for aiding and abetting, the high court noted

that Forstmann (i) received preferential treatment throughout the sale process in the form

of cooperation from management, access to private financial information, and an exclusive

opportunity to present merger proposals directly to the board, and (ii) ultimately committed

contractually to support the notes, which was the source of the board’s loyalty breach. Id.

at 184. As a remedy, the high court issued a preliminary injunction barring Forstmann from

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enforcing the crown-jewel asset lockup, the no-shop provision, and the termination fee,

indicating that Forstmann had engaged in aiding and abetting. See C&J Energy, 107 A.3d

at 1072. With the benefit of hindsight, Forstmann’s knowing participation appears to have

resulted from the preferential treatment he received and his agreement to the contractual

provision that most clearly resulted from the directors’ breach of duty.34

Similar albeit stronger indicia of knowing participation appear in Mills Acquisition.

There, a special committee of the board of directors of Macmillan, Inc. ran a sale process

in which the participants were whittled down to two bidders. See Mills Acq., 559 A.2d at

1272. KKR had joined with Macmillan’s chairman and CEO, Edward P. Evans, and its

president and COO, William F. Reilly, to propose a management buyout. Id. The

competing bidder, a firm controlled by Robert Maxwell, was a strategic buyer that did not

need management. Id. at 1273. Before the final round of bidding, Evans and Reilly tipped

KKR that Maxwell’s bid was “$89, all cash.” Id. at 1275. The special committee’s

investment banker, whom Evans and Reilly had originally hired as their own financial

34
The Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in QVC has similar features. The high
court affirmed the issuance of a preliminary injunction that barred an acquirer from
enforcing a stock option lockup, a no-shop provision, and a termination fee. See 637 A.2d
at 36–37. The bidder had received preferential treatment in the form of a single-bidder
negotiation and had worked hand-in-hand with the sell-side fiduciaries to incorporate
onerous defensive measures into the original merger agreement, which the parties declared
would make their agreement impregnable. After a topping bid emerged, the bidder again
worked hand-in-hand with the sell-side fiduciaries to make the defensive measures even
more onerous. See id. at 49–51. As in Revlon, the case involved both preferential treatment
and unreasonable contractual provisions. The more detailed factual account in the excellent
trial-level decision provides more of this flavor. See QVC Network, Inc. v. Paramount
Commc’ns Inc., 635 A.2d 1245 (Del. Ch. 1993), aff’d, 637 A.2d 828 (Del. 1993).

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advisor, then proceeded to deliver different messages to KKR and Maxwell. For KKR, the

banker read a “long script” that provided specific guidance about increasing its price. Id.

For Maxwell, the banker provided a short and ambiguous message which suggested that

Maxwell was already the high bidder. Id. KKR increased its bid, conditioned on a package

of deal protection measures that included a crown-jewel asset lockup. Maxwell stood pat.

The directors accepted the KKR offer. Id. at 1277–78.

Maxwell topped KKR’s bid and sought a preliminary injunction against the deal

protection devices. Ruling on Maxwell’s application, the Delaware Supreme Court found

that Evans and Reilly, had acted as “self-interested corporate fiduciaries” and breached

their duty of loyalty, while the Macmillan board had breached its duty of care by failing to

provide oversight. Id. at 1279. Although the Delaware Supreme Court did not expressly

state that KKR was culpable for aiding and abetting, the high court stressed that both the

Evans-Reilly tip and the long script constituted improper favoritism toward management’s

preferred bidder. Id. at 1283–84 n.33. As a remedy, the Delaware Supreme Court issued a

targeted preliminary injunction that barred KKR from enforcing a crown-jewel asset

lockup and a no-shop provision, indicating that KKR had engaged in aiding and abetting.

See C&J Energy, 107 A.3d at 1072. With the benefit of hindsight, KKR’s knowing

participation appears to have resulted from favorable treatment that violated the procedures

for conducting the sale process, together with the contractual provisions that resulted from

the breach.

In addition to the Delaware Supreme Court cases, Chancery decisions shed light on

when a bidder engages in knowing participation. In Del Monte, this court issued a targeted

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preliminary injunction blocking the enforcement of deal protection measures in a merger

agreement with KKR. 25 A.3d at 818. Barclays Capital, the longtime financial advisor to

Del Monte, had put the company in play by approaching private equity funds where

Barclays had strong relationships and pitching them on buying the company. Barclays

hoped to earn advisory fees from representing Del Monte, plus even larger financing fees

by leading the debt syndicate for the successful bidder. Id. at 820–21. To participate in the

sale process, KKR entered into an NDA that prevented KKR from teaming with any other

bidder without the Del Monte board’s consent. But with assistance from Barclays, KKR

secretly teamed up with another bidder. Id. at 823. Then, before price negotiations were

complete, KKR agreed that Barclays could be one of its lead banks for the financing. Id. at

826. The court found preliminarily that both Barclays and KKR had aided and abetted the

Del Monte directors in breaching their duties. The key facts on the issue of knowing

participation included KKR’s violation of the no-teaming provision, its efforts to keep the

club bid hidden from the board, and its agreement to include Barclays in its financing

syndicate. Id. at 837.

Most recently, in Mindbody, a private equity firm named Vista Equity Partners

served as the catalyst for a fiduciary breach by a sell-side founder and CEO. Vista invited

the CEO to its CXO Summit, an annual gathering of executives from Vista’s portfolio

companies. Vista choreographed the summit to show CEOs how they could generate great

wealth by selling to Vista, operating their companies under Vista’s umbrella, and taking a

second helping when Vista sold their companies to new owners. Mindbody, 2023 WL

2518149, at *13, *35–36. Vista had also honed its ability to move rapidly to an actionable

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bid. After seducing a CEO, Vista could make a blitzkrieg dash to the finish line, thereby

preventing a board from developing transactional alternatives. Id. at *38. Through the CXO

Summit and other interactions, the CEO became “uniquely smitten” with Vista and fixated

on a sale to Vista as “his solution.” Id. at *36. When the board commenced a sale process,

Vista communicated surreptitiously with the CEO, made its sprint, and ultimately extracted

a lower bid than what disinterested negotiators could have achieved. Id. at *37–39.

Chancellor McCormick did not expressly hold that Vista aided and abetted the sell-side

CEO’s breach of duty because the plaintiffs did not properly assert the claim, but the facts

illustrate how a third-party buyer can participate knowingly in a sell-side breach.

Decisions at the motion to dismiss phase include Presidio, where this court denied

a motion to dismiss an aiding and abetting claim against a private equity firm, BC Partners

Advisors, L.P (“BCP”), that had prevailed in a sale process for Presidio, Inc. See 251 A.3d

at 281. Presidio’s management team and its financial advisor, LionTree, initially reached

out to two private equity firms. BCP was a financial buyer that planned to retain existing

management to run the company. Clayton Dubilier & Rice LLC (“CD&R”) planned to

combine Presidio with a portfolio company in the same industry, which meant that CD&R

could pay a price supported by synergies but did not need to retain management. Acting on

LionTree’s advice, the Presidio board negotiated only with BCP and entered into a merger

agreement that included a go-shop. During the go-shop, CD&R topped BCP’s deal and

secured “Excluded Party” status, which meant that Presidio would owe BCP a lower

termination fee (which any topping bidder would effectively fund). CD&R also insisted on

the terms of its offer remaining confidential, except for the disclosure of its identity as a

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bidder, which the merger agreement mandated. Unbeknownst to Presidio’s board,

LionTree tipped BCP about CD&R’s price. BCP immediately made an exploding offer at

just $0.10 above CD&R’s bid and insisted on an increased termination fee, which deprived

CD&R of the principal benefit of Excluded Party status. Id. at 243–44 Oblivious to the tip,

the board capitulated, resulting in a deal price below what the board otherwise could have

achieved. Id. at 244–46. Citing LionTree’s tip, BCP’s eager response, and their joint efforts

to keep the tip secret until discovery in litigation, the court held that the plaintiff had stated

a claim against BCP for aiding and abetting. Id. at 281–82; see Chester Cnty. Empls.’ Ret.

Fund v. KCG Hldgs., Inc., 2019 WL 2564093, at *19 (Del. Ch. June 21, 2019) (sustaining

aiding and abetting claim against acquirer who obtained confidential information from a

sell-side financial advisor and exploited management’s conflict of interest).

In contrast to these decisions, there are numerous Delaware cases that have

dismissed aiding and abetting claims against bidders at the pleading stage. In those

decisions, the plaintiffs failed to allege any action by the sell-side fiduciaries that fell

outside the range of reasonableness (hence the lack of any underlying breach) or any action

by the bidder other than hard-nosed bargaining (hence the lack of knowing participation).35

35
E.g., Jacobs v. Meghji, 2020 WL 5951410, at *8 (Del. Ch. Oct. 8, 2020); In re
Xura, Inc. S’holder Litig., 2019 WL 3063599, at *3 (Del. Ch. July 12, 2019); In re Hansen
Med., Inc. S’holders Litig., 2018 WL 3025525, at *12 (Del. Ch. June 18, 2018)

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 b. Knowledge

The knowledge dimension of an aiding and abetting claim requires that the third-

party bidder either actually know that the sell-side fiduciaries were breaching their duties

or have constructive knowledge under a recklessness standard. RBC, 129 A.3d at 862. The

plaintiffs proved that TransCanada knew that Skaggs and Smith were engaging in a breach

of the duty of loyalty and that the Board was failing to provide meaningful oversight. At a

minimum, TransCanada had constructive knowledge of those breaches of duty.

At the time of the sale process, Poirier had nearly twenty years’ experience working

as an investment banker, plus two years working as TransCanada’s head of acquisitions.

PTO ¶¶ 44–45. He knew the moves that sellers usually make, understood their meaning,

and was on the lookout for departures from the standard patterns. Skaggs and Smith

broadcasted a series of signals that told Poirier they were focused on selling at a defensible

price and retiring with their change-in-control benefits, rather than seeking the best

transaction reasonably available.

The signals that Skaggs and Smith sent included:

• Their message that there would be no social issues in the deal.

• Their lack of interest in enforcing the Standstill when Girling, Poirier, and Fornell
made repeated approaches during December 2015.

• Smith’s behavior during the January 7 Meeting, including his statement that
TransCanada would not face competition.

• Smith’s daily calls with Poirier after the January 7 Meeting, including their
conversations before and after every communication between Skaggs and Girling.

• Smith’s encouragement of a bid during February 2016, which caused Poirier to
wonder about what message Smith was conveying.

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• Smith’s reassurance that the script for inbound calls was a product of the Columbia
management team’s desire to get a deal done with TransCanada.

• Smith’s representation after the Wall Street Journal leak and an inbound inquiry
that exclusivity would not be a problem because Columbia’s Board was “freaking
out” and had instructed management to get a deal done “whatever it takes.”

Poirier did not simply wonder about these messages on his own. He asked Wells Fargo

what message Skaggs and Smith might possibly be conveying, and Wells Fargo advised

that Skaggs and Smith were saying that they wanted to sell at any defensible price.

Poirier also knew that Skaggs and Smith had powerful financial motivations to sell.

They seemed to want an exit badly and kept committing unforced errors. Poirier and

TransCanada had constructive knowledge that Smith and Skaggs were breaching their duty

of loyalty by trying to lock in their change-in-control benefits and retire. At a minimum,

TransCanada knew that Skaggs and Smith were breaching their duty of care by acting like

a bunch of noobs who didn’t know how to play the game.

TransCanada also had constructive knowledge that the Board was breaching its duty

of care. Although TransCanada did not have direct interaction with any Board members

and was not inside the boardroom for any meetings, TransCanada saw the results.

TransCanada was like a driver who could not see inside the car ahead but witnessed it

weaving across the centerline, then onto the shoulder, then back across the centerline again.

Poirier closely analyzed everything that Columbia was doing. He and TransCanada had

constructive knowledge that the Board was breaching its duty of care by failing to take the

wheel from a conflicted management team that lacked M&A experience.

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 For the knowledge dimension of aiding and abetting, that is enough. Knowledge

alone, of course, is not sufficient to satisfy the element of knowing participation. The third

party must also culpably participate in the sell-side breach. If TransCanada had only known

about the sell-side breaches and allowed Skaggs, Smith, and the Board to make unforced

errors, then TransCanada could have taken advantage of their mistakes without opening

itself to liability. But as discussed in the next section, TransCanada went further.

c. Exploitation

The culpable participation dimension of an aiding and abetting claim requires that

the third-party bidder create, exacerbate, or exploit the sell-side breach. The plaintiffs

proved that TransCanada exploited—with gusto—the breaches of fiduciary duty by

Skaggs, Smith, and the Board.

TransCanada definitively crossed the line into exploitation when Poirier reneged on

the $26 Deal and ambushed Kettering with the $25.50 Offer. Poirier put a seventy-two-

hour fuse on the offer and threatened that if Columbia did not accept it, TransCanada would

publicly disclose that talks had ended. That threat breached the Standstill. TransCanada

knew that a threat of that type constituted a breach, not only from the terms of the Standstill,

but because TransCanada’s outside counsel had flagged the issue. JTX 517 at 7.

Delaware law distinguishes between a coercive threat and a factual statement about

natural consequences.36 If the $25.50 Offer had been TransCanada’s final offer, then

36
See In re Dell Techs. Inc. Class V S’holders Litig., 2020 WL 3096748, at *24
(Del. Ch. June 11, 2020) (discussing distinction); compare Eisenberg v. Chi. Milwaukee

145
Poirier’s statement about disclosure would have been an accurate statement about the

action that TransCanada was required to take under the rules of the Toronto Stock

Exchange. But Poirier admitted that the $25.50 Offer was not TransCanada’s best and final

offer, and he agreed that TransCanada would have reconsidered and tried to complete the

acquisition. Poirier also admitted that he referred to a public disclosure to put pressure on

Columbia. Poirier made a coercive threat that the NDA prohibited. Wedded to a sale and

worried about losing the deal, Skaggs and Smith did not push back.

Poirier and TransCanada only had the confidence to take the bold step of reneging

on the $26 Deal, substituting the $25.50 Offer, and backing it up with a coercive threat

because of the knowledge they had gained from exploiting Skaggs and Smith over the prior

four months. During that period, Poirier and TransCanada consistently and repeatedly

breached the Standstill, thereby violating a boundary that the Board had established to

protect the integrity of any sale process. The breaches of the Standstill were not close calls.

When Skaggs and Smith did not mention the Standstill, Poirier sensed he was being invited

in. When Columbia’s in-house counsel took the position that even an offer would not be a

violation, Poirier and TransCanada knew management was opening the gates.

Corp., 537 A.2d 1051, 1062 (Del. Ch. 1987) (holding that inaccurate disclosures about de-
listing rendered a self-tender offer coercive), with Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1383
(Del. 1996) (explaining that a fiduciary is obligated to give truthful disclosures about the
negative consequences of a particular course of action, even if they may dissuade
stockholders from adopting it), and Gradient OC Master, Ltd. v. NBC Universal, Inc., 930
A.2d 104, 120 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“Accurately disclosing circumstances or realities
surrounding a [transaction] . . . is not actionably coercive.”).

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 During the four-month period, Poirier also exploited Smith. First, Poirier skillfully

cultivated Smith by trading on their past professional friendship. Then, Poirier manipulated

Smith by creating the impression that the two of them were the Svengalis behind the scenes,

working together as partners to pull everyone’s strings, script their bosses’ conversations,

and generally make the deal happen. Co-opted by Poirier, Smith spoke freely, giving

Poirier the information he needed to take advantage of the situation.

TransCanada’s own self-assessment of the sale process evidences successful

exploitation. In 2019, TransCanada conducted an after-action review of the Columbia

acquisition which noted that the negotiations “were significantly enhanced by previous

strong relationships between TransCanada and Columbia management.” JTX 1522 at 3.

The presentation recommended that TransCanada management cultivate similar

relationships that could be exploited in future transactions. Id. at 28. Framed in the

understated language of a business assessment, TransCanada implicitly acknowledged that

it had taken advantage of Columbia’s fiduciaries and hoped to repeat the strategy, albeit

without creating a similar evidentiary record.

As in Revlon, Mills Acquisition, Del Monte, Presidio, and Mindbody, TransCanada

secured the cooperation of sell-side players. As in Mills Acquisition, Del Monte, Presidio,

and Mindbody, TransCanada violated the boundaries that the Board established. After

determining that the sell-side fiduciaries were breaching their duties, TransCanada

exploited them with the $25.50 Offer.

Because a bidder is entitled to negotiate aggressively, whether a bidder’s behavior

crosses the line will depend on the facts and circumstances. Without the final act of

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reneging on the $26 Deal, making the $25.50 Offer, and adding a coercive threat that

violated the NDA, TransCanada’s accumulated actions would not have toppled over the

line into liability. With that final act, the tower fell.

TransCanada’s expert provided a helpful analogy that illustrates the type of

negotiating behavior that falls on the acceptable side of the line:

To take a simple example, if I deliberately go to a car dealership on the last
day of the month, and I am aware that my salesman can achieve his monthly
bonus by getting me to buy a car, I am not aiding-and-abetting an injury to
the car dealership if I get a low price for my car. To the contrary, such tactics
would reflect what are universally considered to be negotiation best
practices.

Subramanian Report ¶ 72. In other words, if a buyer simply takes a sell-side fiduciary as

the buyer finds him, then the buyer can negotiate aggressively.

The problem with the expert’s simple hypothetical is that it is too simple to provide

an analogy for this case. TransCanada was not like a customer who simply walks into a

store on the last day of the month and negotiates with a salesman. TransCanada agreed to

the Standstill and repeatedly violated it, which is like the customer promising never to enter

the store without the owner’s consent, then coming in anyway. And Poirier worked over

Smith for months, which is like the customer wining and dining the salesman while

eliciting confidential information. And TransCanada agreed not to threaten to publicly

disclose the merger discussions, then did so anyway to put the pressure of a coercive threat

behind a lowered bid. It is hard to find a retail analogy for that final act.

TransCanada’s persistent and opportunistic violations of the Standstill should not

be brushed away as legitimate instances of aggressive bargaining. They need to be taken

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seriously to enable sell-side fiduciaries to fulfill their duties. If accountability for persistent

and opportunistic violations of a process boundary only falls on the sell-side fiduciary and

not on the bidder, then bidders will keep crossing boundaries. That puts the sell-side

fiduciaries in a bind, because they must decide whether to sue to enforce the boundary,

potentially putting a valuable deal at risk, or lose negotiating leverage by looking the other

way. The better approach is to take into account a bidder’s persistent and opportunistic

violations of process boundaries like standstill agreements, no-teaming agreements, or

prohibitions on unsupervised contacts with management. A bidder who breaks those rules

is not merely taking advantage of a sell-side fiduciary’s missteps. The bidder is forcing the

fiduciary to blunder. Taking those violations seriously gives bidders an incentive to respect

the boundaries that a board establishes, which in turn enables the board to manage the sale

process.37

37
At a conceptual level, treating persistent and opportunistic breaches of contract
as distinct from an isolated breach, finds support in Section 39 of the Restatement (Third)
of the Law of Restitution. Titled “Profit from Opportunistic Breach,” it states:

(1) If a deliberate breach of contract results in profit to the defaulting
promisor and the available damage remedy affords inadequate protection to
the promisee’s contractual entitlement, the promisee has a claim to restitution
of the profit realized by the promisor as a result of the breach. Restitution by
the rule of this section is an alternative to a remedy in damages.

(2) A case in which damages afford inadequate protection to the promisee’s
contractual entitlement is ordinarily one in which damages will not permit
the promisee to acquire a full equivalent to the promised performance in a
substitute transaction.

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 This framework provides a bidder like TransCanada with a clear path to avoiding

liability for aiding and abetting: Comply with contractual commitments and sale process

rules. The easiest way for TransCanada to have avoided aiding and abetting liability was

to stand by the $26 Deal, not make the $25.50 Offer, and not back it up with a coercive

threat that violated the NDA. TransCanada had secured a good deal that was a win-win for

both sides. But TransCanada saw weakness and wanted more.

TransCanada also could have undermined the case for aiding and abetting by not

persistently and opportunistically breaching the Standstill. Particularly when Poirier

wanted to set up the January 7 Meeting, TransCanada’s in-house counsel could have sent

a straightforward message to her counterpart: “We are interested in acquiring Columbia.

We cannot proceed without a written invitation from the Board. Unless we receive such an

invitation, no discussions can take place. Please advise how you would like to proceed.” If

(3) Breach of contract is profitable when it results in gains to the defendant
(net of potential liability in damages) greater than the defendant would have
realized from performance of the contract. Profits from breach include saved
expenditure and consequential gains that the defendant would not have
realized but for the breach, as measured by the rules that apply in other cases
of disgorgement (§ 51(5)).

Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 39 (Am. L. Inst. 2011),
Westlaw (database updated May 2023). The Restatement is obviously talking about a
remedy, not a basis for liability, but the doctrine recognizes the difference between a mere
contractual breach and an exploitive one. “Not by coincidence, the contractual entitlements
that are vulnerable in the manner just described are those for which the promisee would
most often be entitled to protection by injunction . . . .” Id. cmt. b. Similar policy interests
apply when a bidder engages in destabilizing acts of exploitation by breaching a contract,
like a standstill, that could support injunctive relief.

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the response was some variant of “don’t worry about it” (consistent with what actually

happened), then TransCanada could have insisted on a written invitation from the Board.

Such a message would have created some risk that the Board would invoke the Standstill,

but it would have forced Skaggs and Smith to go to the Board, and TransCanada would

have protected itself. TransCanada’s in-house counsel could have made a similarly frank

and uncompromising demand for a written invitation from the Board later in January 2016,

before Girling provided Skaggs with an expression of interest containing a price term.

Instead, TransCanada’s in-house counsel accepted an implausible assurance that the

Standstill did not apply, while expressing doubt about that reassurance by noting that “if

we were to move forward, the words in the standstill that we agreed would appear to require

more explicit Board direction for an offer (even if conditional).” JX 623. TransCanada

could have protected itself by insisting on the written Board-level invitation that the

Standstill required.

TransCanada’s behavior in this case does not mark the company as an incorrigible

wrongdoer that committed an unforgivable crime. To the good, TransCanada did not offer

Skaggs or Smith any inducements that led to their behavior. The conflict of interest that

undermined the sale process resulted from generous change-in-control arrangements and

their desire to retire early. TransCanada did not convince Skaggs and Smith that it was time

to hang up their spurs, and TransCanada had no role in the change-in-control benefits.

TransCanada is also not liable for aiding and abetting simply because it knew about

the sell-side breaches of duty or, at a minimum, had constructive knowledge. Nor is

TransCanada liable for aiding and abetting simply because it took advantage of its

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counterparty’s mistakes. TransCanada’s conduct reached the level of culpable participation

when it exploited the sell-side fiduciaries by reneging on the $26 Deal, making the $25.50

Offer, and backing it up with a coercive threat that violated the NDA. TransCanada took

that step because Poirier and his colleagues believed that they could exploit the conflicted

counterparties on the other side. And TransCanada was only emboldened to take that final

step because Poirier had been breaching the Standstill and exploiting Skaggs and Smith

throughout the prior months. An isolated breach of the Standstill would not have supported

a claim for aiding and abetting. See In re Comverge, Inc., 2014 WL 6686570, at *11–12

(Del. Ch. Nov. 25, 2014). The conduct in this case involved persistent and opportunistic

breaches over an extended period, culminating in the exploitative $25.50 Offer.

The morals of the marketplace prevail in many instances, but everything is not a

Hobbesian free for all. Just as a party must be careful that its solicitations of business do

not cross the line into tortious interference with a contract or business opportunity, and just

as a party must be careful that its pitches do not cross the line into falsehood and libel, so

too a party that engages with a fiduciary must be careful about the possibility that the

fiduciary may be engaging in breach. A party who identifies a breach and zestfully exploits

it engages in culpable participation.

That is what TransCanada did. TransCanada is therefore jointly and severally liable

for the consequences that flowed from sell-side fiduciaries’ breaches of duty that took place

during the sale process.

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 4. Damages For The Sale Process Claim

The final element of an aiding and abetting claim is proof of causally related

damages. Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1097. The plaintiffs proved their entitlement to an award

of damages based on the $26 Deal.

“[D]amages flowing from [a breach of fiduciary duties] are to be liberally

calculated.” Thorpe by Castleman v. CERBCO, Inc., 676 A.2d 436, 444 (Del. 1996).

“[M]athematical certainty is not required.” Bomarko, Inc. v. Int’l Telecharge, Inc., 794

A.2d 1161, 1184 (Del. Ch. 1999), aff’d, 766 A.2d 437 (Del. 2000). “[O]nce a breach of

[fiduciary] duty is established, uncertainties in awarding damages are generally resolved

against the wrongdoer.” Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc., 1993 WL 443406, at *12 (Del. Ch. Oct.

29, 1993), aff’d, 676 A.2d 436, 444 (Del. 1996). An aider and abettor is jointly and

severally liable for the damages that a fiduciary would owe, so the same principles apply.38

38
Gotham P’rs, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty P’rs, L.P., 817 A.2d 160, 172 (Del. 2002)
(“[T]he Court of Chancery properly held HGI, Gumbiner, and Guzzetti jointly and
severally liable with the General Partner for aiding and abetting the General Partner’s
breach of fiduciary duties created by the Partnership Agreement.”); Laventhol, Krekstein,
Horwath & Horwath v. Tuckman, 372 A.2d 168, 170 (Del. 1976) (“[P]ersons who
knowingly join a fiduciary in an enterprise which constitutes a breach of his fiduciary duty
of trust are jointly and severally liable for any injury which results.”); Beard Rsch., Inc. v.
Kates, 8 A.3d 573, 619 (Del. Ch. 2010) (imposing joint and several liability on defendants
for breaches of fiduciary duty and for aiding and abetting the breach), aff’d sub nom. ASDI,
Inc. v. Beard Rsch., Inc., 11 A.3d 749 (Del. 2010); Triton Const. Co., Inc. v. E. Shore Elec.
Servs., Inc., 2009 WL 1387115, at *28 (Del. Ch. May 18, 2009) (“Defendants Eastern and
Elliott aided and abetted Kirk’s breaches of fiduciary duty. Therefore, they are jointly and
severally liable for the damages imposed to remedy those breaches.”), aff’d, 988 A.2d 938
(Del.2010).

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 “If the plaintiffs prove that the defendants could have sold the corporation to the

same or to a different acquirer for a higher price, then the measure of damages should be

based on the lost transaction price.”39 The plaintiffs proved that but for the sell-side

fiduciaries’ breaches of duty, aided and abetted by TransCanada, the parties would have

executed a merger agreement based on the $26 Deal. Columbia and TransCanada had

reached an agreement in principle reflected in the $26 Deal. Although that deal had

conditions, the agreement was firm. Skaggs believed the parties were on “a tight Critical

Path to MA signing.” PTO ¶ 382. He was sufficiently confident that he had a deal that he

acted as if exclusivity had been renewed even before the agreement was signed. Smith

believed the deal was done and went on vacation. Other contemporaneous evidence

supports the existence of an agreement in principle, including statements by Wells Fargo

bankers and texts among TransCanada executives. See JTX 1120 at 1, 6, 8; JTX 779.

39
PLX, 2018 WL 5018535, at *51; see Dole, 2015 WL 5052214, at *46 (awarding
damages of $2.74 per share, which suggested that “Murdock and Carter’s pre-proposal
efforts to drive down the market price and their fraud during the negotiations reduced the
ultimate deal price by 16.9%”); HMG/Courtland Props. v. Gray, 749 A.2d 94, 117 (Del.
Ch. 1999) (finding that although price fell within lower range of fairness, “[t]he defendants
have failed to persuade me that HMG would not have gotten a materially higher value for
Wallingford and the Grossman’s Portfolio had Gray and Fieber come clean about Gray’s
interest. That is, they have not convinced me that their misconduct did not taint the price
to HMG’s disadvantage”); see also Bomarko, 794 A.2d at 1184–85 (holding that although
the “uncertainty [about] whether or not ITI could secure financing and restructure” lowered
the value of the plaintiffs’ shares, the plaintiffs were entitled to a damages award that
reflected the possibility that the company might have succeeded absent the fiduciary’s
disloyal acts), aff’d, 766 A.2d 437 (Del. 2000).

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 At trial, TransCanada sought to demonstrate that the conditions to the $26 Deal

failed such that it was no longer viable. TransCanada’s skilled litigation team assembled

some evidence to support their story, but it was not persuasive. The first condition was for

the TransCanada underwriters to support the $26 Deal, which they did by standing by their

commitments. The second condition was for the rating agencies to opine that

TransCanada’s rating would not fall below investment grade, which the ratings agencies

gave. The final condition was for TransCanada’s stock not to fall below $49 Canadian per

share. It did, but only briefly.

Notwithstanding TransCanada’s protestations, the record demonstrates that the $26

Deal was still real. Poirier admitted as much, testifying that TransCanada had not

committed to break off negotiations if Columbia rejected the $25.50 Offer and that if

Columbia had pushed back, TransCanada would have considered other bids, including the

$26 Deal. JTX 1902 at 2; see Poirier Tr. 264, 296; Johnston Tr. 648–49.

The plaintiffs’ expert proved at trial that the consideration contemplated by the $26

Deal was worth $26.50 per share at closing, because TransCanada’s stock price increased

during the interim. Poirier had insisted on using a fixed exchange ratio in which Columbia

stockholders would receive $23.40 in cash plus a number of TransCanada shares equal to

$2.60 in cash on the date of the announcement. JTX 953 at 1. Using TransCanada’s actual

stock price performance, the shares worth $2.60 on the date of the announcement were

worth $3.10 on the date of closing. See JTX 1664 ¶¶ 73–78; Meinhart Tr. 1197–202. Those

calculations are undisputed.

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 For purposes of the Sale Process Claim, TransCanada is liable to the class in the

amount of $1.00 per share. This award necessarily results in the plaintiffs in this case

receiving more than the fair value of their shares, which the Appraisal Decision determined

to be $25.50 per share. That is because an appraisal measures the value of the corporation

as a standalone entity, as if the merger giving rise to appraisal rights never happened. An

appraisal does not take into account other injuries, such as the possibility that sell-side

fiduciaries could breach their fiduciary duties by failing to obtain a higher-valued

transaction. See generally Dismissal Decision, 2021 WL 772562 at *56 (explaining why

the fair value determination did not foreclose fiduciary duty claims).

B. The Disclosure Claim

In addition to the Sale Process Claim, the plaintiffs advanced the Disclosure Claim.

The plaintiffs proved that Skaggs, Smith, and the Board breached their fiduciary duty of

disclosure by seeking stockholder action based on a proxy statement that contained

material misstatements and omissions. The plaintiffs proved that TransCanada knowingly

participated in the disclosure violations. TransCanada knew information that the Proxy

Statement failed to disclose, such as material interactions that Girling, Poirier, and Fornell

had with Skaggs and Smith. TransCanada had a contractual obligation to provide

information about the disclosures to Columbia. TransCanada chose to remain silent,

dismissing the Proxy Statement as Columbia’s document. By doing so, TransCanada

knowingly participated in a breach of fiduciary duty.

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 1. The Fiduciary Relationship For The Disclosure Claim

As with the Sale Process Claim, the first element of the claim for aiding and abetting

is easily satisfied. The Columbia directors, including Skaggs, were fiduciaries. So were

Skaggs and Smith in their capacity as officers. But Justice Frankfurter’s questions show

that fiduciary status is not enough. The more important questions are to whom the duty is

owed, the nature of the duty, and whether it was breached.

Pertinent to this case, directors of a Delaware corporation owe “a fiduciary duty to

disclose fully and fairly all material information within the board’s control when it seeks

shareholder action.” Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84 (Del. 1992). The Merger required a

stockholder vote to become effective. 8 Del. C. § 251(c). When the directors submitted the

Merger for a stockholder vote, they owed a duty to the stockholders to disclose fully and

fairly all material information within their control.

As officers, Skaggs and Smith owed a duty of disclosure that was “the same as those

of directors.” Gantler, 965 A.2d at 709. This court has sustained claims against officers for

failing to disclose material information in proxy statements for mergers. See, e.g., Warren

Gen. Empls.’ Ret. Sys. v. Roche, 2020 WL 7023896, at *19–23 (Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 2020);

In re Baker Hughes, Inc. Merger Litig., 2020 WL 6281427, at *15–16 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27,

2020). For Skaggs, that duty was particularly stark, as he signed the Proxy Statement.

The duty to disclose all material information does not stop with the knowledge that

corporate fiduciaries happen to have readily available in their minds. The duty

encompasses material information that the fiduciaries can reasonably obtain. See Delman

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v. GigAcquisitions3, LLC, 288 A.3d 692, 726–27 (Del. Ch. 2023). It therefore requires

good faith investigation to determine what material information needs to be disclosed.

Information is material if it “would have assumed actual significance in the

deliberations” of a reasonable stockholder deciding how to vote. Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil

Co., 493 A.2d 929, 944 (Del. 1985). A plaintiff need not prove that a reasonable

stockholder would have voted differently, nor even that there was a substantial likelihood

that a stockholder could vote differently. All that materiality requires is “a substantial

likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable

investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.”

Rosenblatt, 493 A.2d at 944 (cleaned up).

Fiduciaries also have a duty to speak completely. “[W]hen a board chooses to

disclose a course of events or to discuss a specific subject, . . . it cannot do so in a materially

misleading way, by disclosing only part of the story, and leaving the reader with a distorted

impression.” Appel v. Berkman, 180 A.3d 1055, 1064 (Del. 2018). “Partial disclosure, in

which some material facts are not disclosed or are presented in an ambiguous, incomplete,

or misleading manner, is not sufficient to meet a fiduciary’s disclosure obligations.” Id.

For the duty of disclosure, there is no separate standard of review. As Chancellor

Allen explained, “[T]he question whether shareholders’ have, under the circumstances,

been provided with appropriate information upon which an informed choice on a matter of

fundamental corporate importance may be made, is not a decision concerning the

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management of business and affairs of the enterprise.”40 Therefore, “the independence (or

good faith or due care) of a board is not directly relevant to a determination whether a

disclosure obligation has been satisfied (disclosure not being a question of business

judgment.)”41 The plaintiff must prove the elements of a claim that is tied to the standard

of conduct itself.

40
In re Anderson, Clayton S’holders Litig., 519 A.2d 669, 675 (1986) (Allen, C.)
(citation omitted); accord In re Tri–Star Pictures, Inc. Litig., 1990 WL 82734, at *8–9
(Del. Ch. June 14, 1990) (same); Lewis v. Leaseway Transp’n Corp., 1990 WL 67383, at
*
6 (Del. Ch. May 16, 1990) (same).
41
In re Mobil Comm. Corp. Consol. Litig., 1989 WL 997182, at *1 (Del. Ch. Apr.
3, 1989) (Allen, C.). There is a separate line of cases that could be read to suggest that the
business judgment rule protects a board’s decisions about what to disclose such that a
plaintiff must rebut one of its elements to prevail on a disclosure claim. In the 3Com
decision, when denying a plaintiffs’ motion seeking expedited discovery into disclosure
claims, this court remarked that “[s]o long as the proxy statement, viewed in its entirety,
sufficiently discloses and explains the matter to be voted on, the omission or inclusion of
a particular fact is generally left to management’s business judgment.” In re 3Com
S’holders Litig., 2009 WL 5173804, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2009). For that proposition,
the court cited Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 380 A.2d 556 (Del. Ch. 1977), a post-trial decision
which said something similar, id. at 565. The Kaplan decision in turn relied on Schiff v.
RKO Pictures Corp., 104 A.2d 267 (Del. Ch. 1954), which involved an application to
enjoin an interested sale of assets to a dominant stockholder and was issued after an
evidentiary hearing. One of the issues was whether the proxy statement should have
provided values for a film library and a share of the profits from a movie called “The Robe.”
Chancellor Seitz viewed those assets as particularly difficult to value, noting that “much of
the success of the movie industry is dependent upon the whims of a fickle public” and that
managers in the movie business “often succeeded only by the application of unorthodox
business methods.” Id. In that context, he declined to find that the omissions of valuations
for these assets constituted disclosure violations, observing that the omission or inclusion
of that type of valuation was “within an area of management judgment.” Id. at 280.
Chancellor Seitz’s observation was thus far more limited than how 3Com and Kaplan
portrayed it.

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 In a case involving stockholder action, a claim for breach of the duty of disclosure

requires proof of only two elements: (1) a request for stockholder action, and (2) a material

misrepresentation or omission. Whether a plaintiff must prove more turns on the remedy

that the plaintiff seeks. If the plaintiff seeks compensatory or rescissory damages based on

the harm that the breach of duty caused, then the record must establish the causal chain

necessary to support that remedy. The stockholder must have relied on the

misrepresentation or material omission in making a decision, the decision must have caused

A decade ago, only two decisions referenced the 3Com formulation. See Ehlen v.
Conceptus, Inc., 2013 WL 2285577, at *2 (Del. Ch. May 24, 2013); In re Micromet, Inc.
S’holders Litig., 2012 WL 681785, at *10 (Del. Ch. Feb. 29, 2012). Recently, the phrase
experienced a renaissance, and it has appeared in four decisions in the last two years. See
Teamsters Loc. 677 Health Servs. & Ins. Plan v. Martell, 2023 WL 1370852, at *10 (Del.
Ch. Jan. 31, 2023); In re Match Gp., Inc. Deriv. Litig., 2022 WL 3970159, at *27 (Del. Ch.
Sept. 1, 2022); City Pension Fund for Firefighters & Police Officers in City of Mia. v. The
Trade Desk, Inc., 2022 WL 3009959, at *16 (Del. Ch. July 29, 2022); Teamsters Loc. 237
Additional Sec. Benefit Fund v. Caruso, 2021 WL 3883932, at *29 (Del. Ch. Aug. 31,
2021).

None of the cases actually apply the business judgment rule to a disclosure issue. If
3Com simply means that a proxy statement should be read as a whole, then I am on board.
See In re GGP, Inc. S’holder Litig., 282 A.3d 37, 73 (Del. 2022) (Traynor, J., concurring
in part) (“‘When determining whether there has been a disclosure violation, a proxy
statement should be read as a whole.’” (quoting IRA Tr. FBO Bobbie Ahmed v. Crane,
2017 WL 7053964, at *18 (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 2017), and two other decisions, including
3Com and its reference to “management’s business judgment.”)). Corporate fiduciaries
should get the benefit of the doubt on a hard disclosure call made under factually
ambiguous circumstances. But 3Com should not be read to suggest that the business
judgment rule protects any rational decision that a fiduciary makes about what to disclose.
That interpretation would replace the duty to disclose material information with a duty to
disclose only what the fiduciary rationally believes constitutes material information.

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the damages, and the damages must be quantified. See Dohmen v. Goodman, 234 A.3d

1161, 1168 (Del. 2020). The court must also determine whether the disclosure violation

resulted from a breach of the duty of loyalty or care, and a plaintiff that seeks to recover

damages for a breach of the duty of disclosure must establish that the fiduciary acted with

“a culpable state of mind” or engaged in “non-exculpated gross negligence.” Wayport, 76

A.3d at 315. If a plaintiff seeks a remedy that is not tied to actual harm, then those

additional elements are superfluous. In that setting, “a beneficiary need not demonstrate

other elements of proof—reliance, causation, or damages.” Dohmen, 234 A.3d at 1168.

The first two elements of a claim for aiding and abetting a breach of the duty of

disclosure consider only the underlying fiduciary relationship and the existence of a breach.

A plaintiff can satisfy those elements by pointing to a request for stockholder action and

proving a material misstatement or omission. See Mindbody, 2023 WL 2518149, at *43.

2. The Breaches Of The Duty Of Disclosure

The plaintiffs proved that Columbia’s directors and officers breached their duty of

disclosure by failing to disclose material information about contacts between Columbia

and TransCanada during the sale process. For Skaggs and Smith, the breach of the duty of

disclosure sounded in loyalty, because they knew about their interactions and the resulting

violations of the Standstill. For the other directors, the breach of the duty of disclosure

sounded in care.

This court held in the Appraisal Decision that the Proxy Statement “contained

material misstatements and omissions.” 2019 WL 3778370, at *36. The Appraisal Decision

identified the three “most significant” disclosure omissions as (i) “Smith invited a bid and

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told Poirier that TransCanada did not face competition” at the January 7 Meeting; (ii)

Dominion, NextEra, Berkshire, and TransCanada were subject to Standstills, TransCanada

breached its standstill, and that Columbia ignored TransCanada’s breach; and (iii) Skaggs

and Smith were planning to retire in 2016. See id. at *35–36.

The plaintiffs proved additional material omissions at trial. First, the plaintiffs

proved that TransCanada and Columbia had other communications about a potential

transaction in December 2015 that the Proxy Statement did not disclose. In cases involving

publicly traded companies, sell-side fiduciaries must provide their stockholders with an

accurate, full, and fair description of significant meetings or other interactions between

target management and a bidder.42 “Although a fiduciary need not give a play-by-play

42
See, e.g., Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1280–82 (Del.
1994) (reversing a grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on disclosure claim
where proxy failed to disclose the existence of a bid because “once defendants traveled
down the road of partial disclosure of the history leading up to the Merger and used the
vague language described, they had an obligation to provide the stockholders with an
accurate, full, and fair characterization of those historic events,” including the existence of
the bid); Presidio, 251 A.3d at 261 (“It is reasonably conceivable that the existence of the
tip was material information that should have been disclosed to the stockholders. The Proxy
made no mention of LionTree’s tip to BCP.”); In re Xura, Inc. S’holder Litig., 2018 WL
6498677, at *13 (Del. Ch. Dec. 10, 2018) (holding that plaintiff adequately pled a claim
for breach of the duty of disclosure where stockholders appeared to lack information about
private communications between CEO and bidders); In re OM Gp., Inc. S’holders Litig.,
2016 WL 5929951, at *12 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2016) (“[O]ur Supreme Court recognized that
a partial and incomplete disclosure of arguably immaterial information regarding the
history of negotiations leading to a merger might result in a materially misleading
disclosure if not supplemented with information that would allow the stockholders to draw
the complete picture.”); Alessi v. Beracha, 849 A.2d 939, 946 (Del. Ch. 2004) (holding that
negotiations between buyer’s and target’s CEOs were material when the parties discussed
“significant terms” including “valuation”); see also PLX, 2018 WL 5018535, at *33–34
(finding after trial that recommendation statement omitted material information where it

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account, when fiduciaries choose to provide the history of a transaction, they have an

obligation to provide shareholders with an accurate, full, and fair characterization of those

historic events.” Mindbody, 2023 WL 2518149, at *39 (cleaned up).

The Proxy Statement omitted or misleadingly represented a series of interactions

between TransCanada and Columbia management that were sufficiently extensive to alter

the total mix of information:

• On November 25, 2015, immediately after the Board terminated the November sale
process, Smith told Poirier that Columbia “probably” would want to pick up merger
talks again “in a few months.” PTO ¶ 253. Based on that conversation, Poirier
understood that Columbia’s management team “would be supportive of a sale.” JX
413 at 3.

• On December 2, 2015, Skaggs and Girling had what Fornell described as a “good
call.” JX 439. That same day, Fornell called Smith twice, then provided Poirier with
a proposed engagement letter for Wells Fargo to act as a financial advisor to
TransCanada in its potential acquisition of Columbia. PTO ¶ 273.

• On December 8, 2015, Fornell met with Skaggs and Smith at an energy conference
and checked in about a potential transaction. See id. ¶¶ 275–278.

• On December 17, 2015, Poirier called Smith to reiterate TransCanada’s interest in
a deal with the Company. See JTX 273 at 2. During the call, Poirier indicated that
TransCanada would be willing to pay around $28 per share. See PTO ¶ 282.

• On January 4, 2016, Poirier called Smith in anticipation of the January 7 Meeting.
The Proxy Statement stated that the purpose of the call was to request a meeting.
JTX 1291 at 46. That was misleading because the January 7 Meeting had been
planned since mid-December 2015. Based on those calls, Smith sent Poirier the
package of information that Columbia had given to bidders in November 2015, plus
updated projections. He also agreed that TransCanada could have access to a data
room.

failed to disclose a communication between a director and a potential bidder about the
bidder’s interest in acquiring the company and the likely timeframe for a bid).

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• During the January 7 Meeting, Poirier indicated that TransCanada could be willing
to pay around $28 per share. See PTO ¶ 282.

• On February 9, 2016, Skaggs and Smith met with Fornell and discussed the potential
acquisition, including the state of TransCanada’s financing. Id. ¶ 317. The Proxy
Statement only included vague descriptions of “discussions” “[f]rom February 8,
through February 12, 2016” about the feasibility of a tender offer. JTX 1291 at 48.

By omitting or mischaracterizing these interactions, the Proxy Statement painted a

misleading picture of the nature and extent of the contacts between TransCanada and the

Columbia management team.

The Proxy Statement also failed to disclose that from November 25, 2015, through

March 4, 2016, TransCanada’s contacts with Columbia breached the Standstill, that

Columbia management chose not to enforce the Standstill, and that Columbia management

did not bring those breaches to the attention of the Board so that the Board could determine

how to proceed. Omitting those facts changed the total mix of information by preventing

stockholders from understanding how receptive Columbia management was to

TransCanada’s approaches. See Appraisal Decision, 2019 WL 3778370, at *35–36.

The plaintiffs also proved that Columbia’s fiduciaries breached their duty of

disclosure by omitting the fact that Columbia’s officers accepted the $26 Offer, resulting

in the $26 Deal. The Proxy Statement contained a partial and misleading description of the

$26 Offer. The Proxy Statement described it as an “an indicative offer.” JX 1291 at 53. The

$26 Offer was a real offer, although it came with three conditions attached. An offer with

conditions is still an offer. TransCanada made an offer, and Columbia accepted it.

The Proxy Statement also contained a material misleading description of

TransCanada’s reasons for lowering its bid. According to the Proxy Statement,

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TransCanada management told Columbia that it reneged on the agreement in principle

because

concerns over execution risk on TransCanada’s proposed subscription
receipts offering and the deterioration of TransCanada’s stock price
following the leak, indicated that TransCanada’s board of directors had
concluded it could not maintain the $26 per share mixed-consideration
proposal and that TransCanada’s final proposal was to acquire Columbia at
a price of $25.50 in cash per share of Columbia common stock.

Id. at 56. While it is true that Poirier said those things, the Proxy Statement implies that

they were accurate. In fact, the TransCanada Board had not concluded that TransCanada

could not maintain the $26 Offer, and TransCanada’s underwriters had remained confident

in their ability to execute the proposed subscription receipts offering. Poirier cited those

reasons as pretexts for reneging on the $26 Deal and substituting the $25.50 Offer. He

admitted that the $25.50 Offer was not a best-and-final bid, and that TransCanada would

have considered adding back a stock component if Columbia had said no.

3. Knowing Participation In The Disclosure Violations

The third element of an aiding and abetting claim requires proof of knowing

participation in the breach of duty. The plaintiffs carried their burden.

This court has held that an acquirer knowingly participates in a disclosure violation

when the acquirer has the opportunity to review a proxy statement, has an obligation to

identify material misstatements or omissions in the proxy statement, and fails to identify

those misstatements or omissions. See Mindbody, 2023 WL 2518149, at *43–44. That was

the case here. See MA § 5.01(a).

165
 TransCanada knew about the interactions that did not appear in the Proxy Statement

and what really took place during those interactions. TransCanada also knew that its pre-

March 2016 interactions violated the letter of the Standstill. Indeed, TransCanada was more

focused on the Standstill than Columbia. Poirier and Johnston both read and understood it.

They advised the TransCanada deal team about what it meant, and Poirier informed

Girling. TransCanada also knew that the $26 Offer had been a real (albeit conditional) offer

and that the reasons Poirier gave to Columbia for reneging on the $26 Deal were pretextual.

TransCanada reviewed the Proxy Statement in detail. At trial, Poirier testified that

“[t]here was exchange of drafts between both companies to verify its completeness and

accuracy.” Poirier Tr. 164. Poirier read the Proxy Statement and provided comments on

both the preliminary and definitive versions. Id. 289; JTX 1196: JTX 1281. Girling,

Johnson, Fornell, and Mayer Brown also reviewed it.

TransCanada chose not to correct the material misstatements or omissions in the

Proxy Statement. TransCanada did so because Girling viewed the Proxy Statement as

Columbia’s document and told his team not to worry about it.

TransCanada also knowingly participated in a breach of the duty of disclosure based

on the Proxy Statement’s failure to disclose Skaggs and Smith’s plans to retire.

TransCanada did not actually know of Skaggs and Smith’s plans, but TransCanada had

constructive knowledge. Both Lazard and Smith told TransCanada that there would be no

social issues in the deal, and Skaggs and Smith behaved like executives who wanted to call

it a day. In the face of that constructive knowledge, TransCanada ignored its contractual

obligation by failing to raise the issue.

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 TransCanada also had constructive knowledge of the Proxy Statement’s failure to

disclose that other bidders from the November 2015 process were bound by don’t-ask-

don’t waive standstills. TransCanada’s own NDA contained one, and while TransCanada

had negotiated to reduce the length of its Standstill from eighteen months to twelve,

TransCanada had not eliminated it. TransCanada had surmised in real time that its

competitors had agreed to similar standstills, and it sought in the exclusivity agreement to

have the right to control whether Columbia could “release any person from or waive any

provision of, any confidentiality or standstill agreement.” JTX 643 at 3. In the face of that

constructive knowledge, TransCanada again proceeded recklessly by ignoring its

contractual obligation and failing to raise the issue.

TransCanada had an easy way to fulfill its contractual obligation and eliminate any

risk of liability for aiding and abetting. For points in the sales process where TransCanada

knew what took place, TransCanada could have provided Columbia in writing with specific

disclosures about those meetings or communications. For points where TransCanada had

constructive knowledge, TransCanada could have asked Columbia in writing about those

areas and instructed Columbia to include all material information. For example:

• TransCanada could have sent a written communication stating: “TransCanada
believes the Proxy Statement needs to include the following disclosure: ‘On
December 19, 2015, Poirier called Smith, expressed TransCanada’s interest in an
acquisition, and indicated that TransCanada’s views regarding Columbia’s value
had not changed. Before making that call, TransCanada did not obtain permission
from the Board of the Company as required by the standstill.’ Under Section 5.01
of the Merger Agreement, we ask that you include this statement.”

• To address Skaggs and Smith’s interest in retirement, TransCanada could have sent
a letter or email stating: “We have reason to believe that members of the Columbia
management team, including Skaggs and Smith, intend to retire after this

167
 transaction. For example, we were told several times that there would be no social
issues in this deal. We are aware that in In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d
94 (Del. Ch. 2007), the Delaware Court of Chancery determined that a proxy
statement omitted a material fact by not describing the economic motivations of the
CEO and lead negotiator, including his desire to retire. Under Section 5.01 of the
Merger Agreement, we ask that you investigate this issue and advise us of the result
of the investigation so that we can consider appropriate disclosure.”

• To address the existence of other standstills, TransCanada could have sent a letter
or email stating: “We have reason to believe that other bidders who engaged with
the company in 2015 may have signed NDAs with don’t-ask-don’t-waive
standstills. TransCanada signed an NDA with a don’t-ask-don’t-waive standstill,
and we assume that you started with a standard agreement for all participants. We
are aware that the Delaware courts have regarded the existence of don’t-ask-don’t-
waive standstills as a material fact. See In Ancestry.com Inc. S’holder Litig., Consol.
C.A. No. 7988-CS, Dkt. 125 at 233–35 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2012) (TRANSCRIPT)
(finding material omission where proxy statement did not disclose the existence of
a don’t-ask-don’t-waive standstill); In re Complete Genomics, Inc. S’holder Litig.,
Consol. C.A. No. 7888-VCL, Dkt. 66 at 17–22 (Del. Ch. Dec. 27, 2012)
(TRANSCRIPT) (holding that a failure to disclose a don’t-ask-don’t-waive
standstill constituted a failure to “disclose material information”). Under Section
5.01 of the Merger Agreement, we ask that you investigate this issue and advise us
of the result of the investigation so that we can consider appropriate disclosure.”

Because TransCanada did not take steps of this kind, it is not possible to say with

certainty what the outcome would have been. The answer would turn on facts and

circumstances, including how clearly TransCanada asserted its position and the credibility

of Columbia’s response. But if Columbia ultimately refused to include a particular point of

disclosure, then TransCanada could have defended against charge of knowing participation

by arguing that even if it had actual or constructive knowledge about a disclosure breach,

it had not culpably participated.

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 4. Damages For The Disclosure Claim

The final element of an aiding and abetting claim is proof of causally related

damages. Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1097. The plaintiffs seek an award of rescissory damages

in the amount of $3.032 billion.

Because the fourth element of an aiding-and-abetting claim requires causally related

damages, it resurrects questions that this decision passed over when considering the

element of breach. For an aiding-and-abetting claim based on a breach of the duty of

disclosure, the issue of causally related damages resurrects the question of reliance,

because the absence of reliance breaks the chain of causation between the misstatement or

omission and the damages. See In re J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. S’holder Litig., 906 A.2d

766, 773 (Del. 2006).

The plaintiffs did not introduce any evidence on the issue of reliance. TransCanada

argues that the plaintiffs therefore cannot recover damages. The plaintiffs respond that for

stockholders in a publicly traded corporation, where there are millions of beneficial owners

and shares trading every millisecond, proving reliance on an individualized basis is

impossible. If a plaintiff must prove individualized reliance, then the Delaware fiduciary

duty of disclosure cannot support a class-wide claim to recover compensatory or rescissory

169
damages. Yet many decisions have recognized that compensatory43 and rescissory44

damages are available for breaches of the duty of disclosure.

As captured in Dohmen, the traditional formulation of a claim for breach of the duty

of disclosure places the burden of proving reliance, causation, and damages on the plaintiff

if the plaintiff intends to seek compensatory or rescissory damages. 234 A.3d at 1175

(“[A]n investor who proves a breach of the fiduciary duty of disclosure must prove reliance,

causation, and damages.”). Another important Delaware Supreme Court decision on

reliance and causation is Gaffin v. Teledyne, Inc., 611 A.2d 467 (Del. 1992). There, through

43
E.g., In re Orchard Enters., Inc. S’holder Litig., 88 A.3d 1, 42–53 (Del. Ch. 2014)
(collecting authorities acknowledging availability of compensatory damages measured by
quasi-appraisal as a remedy for a breach of the duty of disclosure). To similar effect, there
are decisions relying on exculpation to bar a class-wide damages remedy for a breach of
the duty of disclosure based on a breach of the duty of care. See, e.g., In re Transkaryotic
Therapies, Inc., 954 A.2d 346, 360 (Del. Ch. 2008) (“[W]here a breach of the disclosure
duty does not implicate bad faith or self-interest, both legal and equitable monetary
remedies (such as rescissory damages) are barred on account of the exculpatory provision
authorized by 8 Del. C. § 102(b)(7).”); In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Consol. S’holder Litig., 919
A.2d 563, 597–98 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“A decision violates only the duty of care when the
misstatement or omission was made as a result of a director’s erroneous judgment with
regard to the proper scope and content of disclosure, but was nevertheless made in good
faith. Conversely, where there is reason to believe that the board lacked good faith in
approving a disclosure, the violation implicates the duty of loyalty.” (footnote omitted)).
44
See Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp. (Vickers II), 429 A.2d 497, 501 (Del. 1981)
(explaining that when a breach of fiduciary duty has been alleged and proven against a self-
interested controlling stockholder, the stockholder plaintiffs are not limited to an out-of-
pocket measure, but rather can seek rescission or rescissory damages), overruled in part
on other grounds, Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714 (explaining that rescissory damages is not
the exclusive remedy under Vickers II); Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278, 280
(Del. 1977) (finding breaches of duty of disclosure and remanding for determination of
damages).

170
a series of self-tender offers executed over a period of years, the defendant corporation

(Teledyne) reduced its share count by two-thirds. Id. at 468. The plaintiffs challenged the

sixth self-tender, in which Teledyne offered to purchase shares at a price of $40 each. Four

months after the self-tender offer closed, Teledyne announced earnings, and the stock price

jumped to $70 per share. Id. at 470.

The offering circular contained little information beyond the term of the offer and

instructions for acceptance. Id. at 468–69. The plaintiff sued Teledyne for equitable fraud

on the theory that the offering circular contained material misstatements and omissions.

The plaintiffs also argued that Teledyne had delayed the mailing of its annual report, which

contained some of the information, until late in the tender offer period so that some

tendering stockholders were not able to consider it. The plaintiffs did not sue the Teledyne

directors for breach of the fiduciary duty of disclosure. Id. The claim for equitable fraud

required proof of reliance and causation. Id. at 472.

The Court of Chancery certified a class, rejecting Teledyne’s arguments that there

were two types of stockholders—sophisticated holders and other stockholders—and that

individual questions of reliance predominated. The court held that Teledyne engaged in a

course of conduct that affected all stockholders equally. The court acknowledged, however,

that if the trial record showed that different stockholders received different levels of

information, then it could be necessary to certify subclasses. Id. at 471. The court therefore

held that for purposes of trial, “a rebuttable presumption of class-wide shareholder reliance

was established by the facts that: a) each class member received the offering circular which

171
failed to contain material financial information; and b) each shareholder tendered shares

by signing off on the offering circular’s ‘Letter of Transmittal.’” Id. at 472.

At trial, Teledyne argued that all of the material facts were already available in the

total mix of information established by press releases and other public filings. Teledyne

also argued that because it released its annual report before the self-tender closed, the

information in the annual report cured any problems with the offering circular. The Court

of Chancery rejected those defenses and held that the evidence failed to rebut the

presumption of reliance. Id. at 472–73. In addition to the delayed mailing of its annual

report (EDGAR was not yet a thing), Teledyne had failed to disclose that it viewed the

repurchase of its stock as a “sound investment,” and Teledyne had mispresented that its

officers and directors could not participate in the tender offer, when in fact two senior

officers would decide whether Teledyne’s pension plan would participate, and they caused

the plan to tender 1.1 million shares. Id. at 473–74. The court awarded damages of $1 per

share on a class-wide basis. Id. at 467.

On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court vacated the class-wide award, holding that

“individual shareholder justifiable reliance was not proven on a class-wide basis” and that

the Court of Chancery therefore should have decertified the class. Id. at 474. The high court

found that the Court of Chancery’s own factual findings showed that the presumption of

class-wide reliance was rebutted. Id. The sophisticated stockholders could be expected to

know about Teledyne’s press releases regarding its financial results, and the Delaware

Supreme Court treated the hand delivery of the annual report to brokers and nominees for

distribution to beneficial owners as the equivalent of hand delivery to the sophisticated

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stockholders, meaning that the high court viewed the sophisticated stockholders as having

received the annual report nine days before the self-tender closed. Id. For other

stockholders, the high court found it reasonable to assume that at least some stockholders

could have received the annual report and read it. Id. For still other stockholders, the high

court found that “significant individual questions concerning the level of knowledge

possessed by each shareholder existed and, therefore, any presumption of justifiable

reliance as to ‘all other shareholders’ was rebutted as well.” Id. The Delaware Supreme

Court concluded that because the presumption of reliance was rebutted, the Court of

Chancery had erred by refusing to decertify the class. Id.

Notably, the Delaware Supreme Court did not reject the presumptions of reliance

that resulted from the stockholders receiving the offering circulars. The Delaware Supreme

Court held that Teledyne had successfully rebutted the presumption, not that the

presumption itself was erroneous.45

45
The Gaffin decision contains broader language stating that “[a] class action may
not be maintained in a purely common law or equitable fraud case since individual
questions of law or fact, particularly as to the element of justifiable reliance, will inevitably
predominate over common questions of law or fact.” Id. at 464. After citing authorities
supporting that proposition, the Delaware Supreme Court stated: “We agree with the
holdings of these cases and conclude that the trial court erred by failing to decertify the
class because of the inherently individual issue involving the element of justifiable reliance
in this purely common law equitable fraud case.” Id. The Delaware Supreme Court only
applied this rule and reversed the failure to decertify the class after holding that the
presumption of reliance had been rebutted. It follows that when a presumption of reliance
exists, that presumption can support class-wide relief until the defendant rebuts it. After
that, individual issues predominate.

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 The Gaffin decision supports the existence of a rebuttable presumption of reliance

that applies when a corporation sends a disclosure document to diffuse stockholders in

connection with a request for stockholder action. This court’s decisions suggest a similar

paradigm. For example, in the CBS case, Vice Chancellor Slights observed that when

directors request stockholder action and send them information on which to make a

decision, “it follows logically that when stockholders act following the disclosure, a

reasonable inference can be drawn that the stockholder relied upon the disclosure and that,

assuming it is ‘material,’ any harm flowing from the stockholder’s action proximately

resulted from such reliance.” In re CBS Corp. S’holder Class Action & Deriv. Litig., 2021

WL 268779, at *23 (Del. Ch. Jan. 27, 2021).

Most recently, in GigAcquisitions3, Vice Chancellor Will explained that when

fiduciaries have asked the stockholders of a publicly traded entity to take action based on

a common set of disclosures, the large number of stockholders gives rise to a collective

action problem that makes it “impractical, if not impossible, for each stockholder to ask

and have answered by the corporation its own set of questions regarding the decision

presented for consideration.” 288 A.3d at 712 (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). She held that in that setting, stockholders are presumed to rely on the disclosure

documents that their fiduciaries have provided and, if those documents contain material

misstatements or omissions, then any harm caused by the stockholder vote is presumed to

be the proximate result of their reliance. Id. Consequently, “[i]ndividual proof of reliance

is unnecessary.” Id.

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 Read together, Dohmen, Gaffin, GigAcquisitions3, and CBS support the following

rule of law: If corporate fiduciaries [1] distribute a disclosure document, [2] to diffuse

stockholders, [3] in connection with a request for stockholder action, and [4] the disclosure

document contains a material misstatement or omission, then there is a presumption that

the stockholders relied on the disclosures such that individualized proof of reliance is not

required. That presumption is rebuttable, and in a civil case, “the party against whom a

presumption is directed has the burden of proving that the nonexistence of the presumed

fact is more probable than the existence of the presumed fact.” D.R.E. 301(a). The

defendants thus bear the burden of proving that stockholders did not rely on the material

misstatement or omission.

This outcome has the benefit of being consistent with Corwin, which presumes both

reliance and causation by holding that when fiduciaries have satisfied their duty of

disclosure in connection with a transaction that requires stockholder approval, then the

effect of the vote is to lower the standard of review to an irrebuttable version of the business

judgment rule. See 125 A.3d at 308. Stockholder approval based on full disclosure only

warrants that legal effect if the stockholders have considered the disclosures, relied on

them, and made a judgment to approve the transaction based on those disclosures. If the

stockholders did not rely on the disclosures, or if the disclosures did not play any role in

inducing the stockholder to approve the transaction, then the vote would not reflect an

independent decision about the merits of the transaction, and it should not have any effect.

For Corwin to operate, both reliance and causation must be presumed.

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 This outcome is also consistent with federal precedent, at least when the disclosure

violation involves a misleading omission. In Affiliated Ute, the Supreme Court of the

United States held that when a defendant under a duty to disclose omits or withholds a

material fact, then both reliance and causation are presumed. See Affiliated Ute Citizens of

Utah v. U.S., 406 U.S. 128, 153–54 (1972). The Court first held that “[u]nder the

circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure to disclose, positive proof of

reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery.” Id. The Court next held that proof that a

defendant under a duty to disclose withheld a material fact satisfied the element of

causation. Id. at 154. Under this framework, all that the plaintiff must plead and prove is

that “the facts withheld [were] material in the sense that a reasonable investor might have

considered them important in the making of this decision.” Id. Other decisions have

explained that those presumptions exist because without them, it would be virtually

impossible for a plaintiff to prevail, and the claim would be a dead letter.46

As noted, the plaintiffs did not introduce any evidence on the issue of reliance. They

simply pointed to the disclosure violations in the Proxy Statement and the results of the

vote. The existence of a presumption is outcome-determinative.

46
See Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 173–
74 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Applying [Affiliated Ute], we have held that the proper approach to the
problem of reliance is to analyze the plaintiff’s allegations, in light of the likely proof at
trial, and determine the most reasonable placement of the burden of proof of reliance.”
(internal quotations omitted)); Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1162 (10th Cir. 2000)
(“[T]he Affiliated Ute presumption of reliance exists in the first place to aid plaintiffs when
reliance on a negative would be practically impossible to prove.”), abrogated on other
grounds by Cal. Pub. Empls.’ Ret. Sys. v. ANZ Sec., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2042 (2017).

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 The Merger required a stockholder vote. At the time that Columbia filed the Proxy,

it had 400,383,243 shares of common stock outstanding. JX 1291 at 1. Proof of

individualized reliance in this setting would be impossible. See GigAcquisitions3, 288 A.3d

at 712. The presumption discussed in this decision therefore warrants finding that

Columbia’s stockholders relied on the Proxy Statement.

In this case, however, the court cannot apply the presumption. At the pleading stage,

the court explained that to obtain rescissory damages, the plaintiff would have to prove

“quantifiable damages that are ‘logically and reasonably related to the harm or injury for

which compensation is being awarded.’” Dismissal Decision, 2021 WL 772562, at *57

(quoting J.P. Morgan, 906 A.2d at 773). That would mean damages resulting from reliance

on the Proxy Statement. When the court issued the Dismissal Decision, the Delaware

Supreme Court had stated in Dohmen that “to recover compensatory damages, an investor

who proves a breach of the fiduciary duty of disclosure must prove reliance, causation, and

damages.” 234 A.3d at 1175.

The only reasonable takeaway from the Dismissal Decision was that the plaintiffs

would have to prove reliance, causation, and quantifiable damages. TransCanada’s post-

trial argument called attention to the implications of such a rule—a practical impossibility

to recover class-wide compensatory damages for breaches of the duty of disclosure. The

GigAcquistion3 decision further highlighted the destabilizing implications of such an

approach. Before the post-trial phase, however, the plaintiffs had not sought a presumption

of reliance, and the court had not held that one would apply.

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 The parties therefore litigated the case with the expectation that the plaintiffs would

have to prove reliance, causation, and quantifiable damages. It would be unfair to

TransCanada to change the rules now by implementing a presumption. Having failed to

offer proof of reliance, the plaintiffs cannot recover the damages remedy they seek.

5. A Remedy For The Disclosure Claim

The plaintiffs have proved that Columbia’s fiduciaries breached their duty of

disclosure by issuing a Proxy Statement that contained material misstatements and

omissions and that TransCanada aided and abetted in the breach. The plaintiffs therefore

have proven a wrong. This court is a Court of Equity, and equity will not suffer a wrong

without a remedy.

The Court of Chancery “has broad latitude to exercise its equitable powers to craft

a remedy.”47 The court’s remedial powers “are complete to fashion any form of equitable

and monetary relief as may be appropriate” and “to grant such other relief as the facts of a

particular case may dictate.”48 The court is not limited to choosing among the specific

47
Hogg v. Walker, 622 A.2d 648, 654 (Del. 1993); accord Berger v. Pubco Corp.,
976 A.2d 132, 139 (Del. 2009) (“[T]he Court of Chancery has broad discretion to craft an
appropriate remedy . . . , the propriety of a court-ordered remedy is ordinarily reviewed for
abuse of discretion.”); Reserves Dev. LLC v. Severn Sav. Bank, FSB, 961 A.2d 521, 525
(Del. 2008) (“The Court of Chancery has broad discretion to fashion equitable relief.”).
48
Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714; accord Whittington v. Dragon Gp. L.L.C., 2011
WL 1457455, at *15 (Del. Ch. Apr. 15, 2011) (“This Court, as a court of equity, has broad
discretion to form an appropriate remedy for a particular wrong.”); Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P.
v. Cantor, 2011 WL 536911, at *3 (Del. Ch. May 11, 2001) (“[T]his ‘Court, fortunately,
has broad discretion to tailor remedies to suit the situation as it exists.’” (quoting Andresen
v. Bucalo, 1984 WL 8205, at *4 (Del. Ch. Mar. 14, 1984))); McGovern v. Gen. Hldg., Inc.,

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proposals advanced by the parties; instead, “this Court frequently has relied on its own

remedial discretion to fashion a different remedy than what the parties may have requested

when the circumstances so require.” PharmAthene, Inc. v. SIGA Techs., Inc., 2011 WL

6392906, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 2011). Put more poetically, the “protean power of equity”

allows a court to “fashion appropriate relief,” and a court “will, in shaping appropriate

relief, not be limited by the relief requested by plaintiff.” Tex. Instruments Inc. v. Tandy

Corp., 1992 WL 103772, at *6 (Del. Ch. May 12, 1992) (Allen, C.).

The Delaware Supreme Court has held that “where directors have breached their

disclosure duties in a corporate transaction that has in turn caused impairment to the

economic or voting rights of stockholders, there must at least be an award of nominal

damages.” Loudon v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 700 A.2d 135, 142 (Del. 1997). But

nominal damages in this setting is not the symbolic award of $1 that a court grants when

no greater damages were suffered or proven.49 It is a per-share award. The monetary

2006 WL 1468850, at *24 (Del. Ch. May 18, 2006) (“The Supreme Court has emphasized
the capacious remedial discretion of this court to address inequity.”). See generally Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (“Once a right and a violation
have been shown, the scope of a district court’s equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is
broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.”).
49
See, e.g., Macrophage Therapeutics, Inc. v. Goldberg, 2021 WL2582967, at *22
(Del. Ch. June 23, 2021) (“In the absence of sufficient proof of a specific injury, the court
will issue a declaration that the defendant breached his fiduciary duties and award nominal
damages . . . in the amount of $1.00.”); Ravenswood Inv. Co., L.P. v. Est. of Winmill, 2018
WL 1410860, at *25 (Del. Ch. Mar. 21, 2018) (“Since I have found a breach of the duty of
loyalty but am unable to award any other form of relief, I find that Plaintiff is entitled to .
. . nominal damages in the amount of $1.”); Penn Mart Supermarkets, Inc. v. New Castle
Shopping LLC, 2005 WL 3502054, at *16 (Del. Ch. Dec. 15, 2005) (“[I]n recognition of

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amount represents a relatively small (arguably nominal) percentage of the value of each

share, but when applied across a class of shares, the amount adds up. From a defendant’s

standpoint, the award is not nominal.

In Weinberger, Chancellor Brown established the initial precedent for such an

award by setting damages at $1 per share. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 1985 WL 11546

(Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 1985), aff’d, 497 A.2d 792 (Del. 1985). The Chancellor had originally

held that a controlling stockholder freeze-out in which the minority received $21 per share

was entirely fair, but on appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the transaction was

not entirely fair because of the controller’s failure to disclose material information when

seeking stockholder approval. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703. On remand, Chancellor

Brown saw no mathematical basis for awarding a precise figure based on the breach of the

duty of disclosure, and in a classic exercise of equitable discretion, he concluded that “$1

per share represents a fair measure of compensation for the wrong done to the members of

the minority.” Id. Chancellor Brown explained that the award was proportionate and

reasonable by noting that the acquirer was capable of paying at least $22 per share and that

the acquisition would have remained beneficial to the acquirer at that price, “both

economically and in other ways.” 1985 WL 11546, at *10. The damages figure represented

4.7% of the equity value of the shares measured by the deal price. Multiplied across a class

of 5,688,502 shares, the damages award totaled $5,688,502.

the breach of the Landlord’s protective covenant, the Court awards [Plaintiff] one dollar in
nominal damages.”).

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 Then-Vice Chancellor Hartnett issued a similar award in an action which challenged

the disclosures issued in connection with a tender offer and short-form merger that a

controlling stockholder used to eliminate minority stockholders at a price of $58 per share.

The court found that the disclosure documents were materially misleading because they

failed to disclose over $1 billion of gas and oil reserves. See Smith v. SPNV Hldgs., Inc.,

1990 WL 84218, at *17 (Del. Ch. June 19, 1990). In an exercise of equitable discretion,

Vice Chancellor Hartnett awarded damages of $2 per share, explaining that the award was

proportionate compared to the headline value of the undisclosed reserves, which equated

to approximately $3 per share. He also noted that there were “other minor disclosure

violations . . . which were indicative of a conscious decision by the defendant to be less

than candid.” Smith v. Shell Petroleum, Inc., 1990 WL 186446, at *5 (Del. Ch. Nov. 26,

1990) (cleaned up). The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the damages award as falling

within the trial court’s “broad discretion.” Shell Petroleum, Inc. v. Smith, 606 A.2d 112,

117 (Del. 1992). The damages figure represented 3.4% of the equity value of the shares

measured by the deal price. Multiplied across a class of approximately 17,182,880 shares,

the damages award totaled $34,365,760.

Then-Vice Chancellor Hartnett issued a similar equitable award in the Gaffin v.

Teledyne litigation, discussed above. The corporation acquired shares through a self-tender

offer at $40 per share, and the court found after trial that the disclosure documents

contained material misstatements and omissions. See Gaffin v. Teledyne, Inc., 1990 WL

195914, at *18 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 1990), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 611

A.2d 467 (Del. 1992). In an exercise of equitable discretion, the court awarded damages of

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$1 per share, representing 2.5% of the value of the equity at the self-tender price. Multiplied

across the plaintiff class of approximately 2.5 million shares, the damages award totaled

$2,500,000. The defendants did not challenge the damages calculation on appeal, and the

Delaware Supreme Court allowed it to stand, but the high court reversed the class-wide

dimension of the award. The high court also observed that in Weinberger, Chancellor

Brown had pointed to record evidence that supported the proportionality of an award of $1

per share. The high court implied that a similar explanation based on record evidence was

lacking in Gaffin.

Most recently, Chancellor McCormick awarded damages of $1 per share against the

sell-side fiduciary who breached his duty of disclosure and the private equity buyer who

aided and abetted the breach. Mindbody, 2023 WL 2518149, at *47. The deal price was

$36.50 per share. As in Weinberger, Chancellor McCormick explained that the award was

reasonable based on record evidence about the acquirer’s authority to bid up to $40 per

share and the fact that the deal remained profitable for the buyer at that price. Id. at *3,

*47. The resulting damages award reflected an increase of 2.7% over the deal price and

equated to around $36 million.

In this case, an equitable remedy for the disclosure violations that TransCanada

aided and abetted is an award of $0.50 per share. On an absolute basis, that award is less

than the $1 per share awarded in Weinberger, Gaffin, and Mindbody, and the $2 per share

awarded in Shell. On a percentage basis, the award represents 1.96% of the value of the

equity as measured by the deal price of $25.50. That figure is well below the percentage-

based awards in all of the precedents, including the 2.7% award in Mindbody.

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 Looking to the types of evidence that prior decisions have cited provides support

for this outcome. The precedents have looked to contemporaneous valuations of the target

company, and in the appraisal context, the Delaware Supreme Court has made clear that a

trial court should regard the acquirer’s assessment of the value of the target company as a

highly persuasive figure. Verition P’rs Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., 210 A.3d

128, 137 (Del. 2019). Describing an acquirer’s superior insight into the value of the target,

the high court posited that

[the buyer’s] access to nonpublic information . . . improved [its] ability to
estimate [the target’s] going-concern value over that of the market as a
whole. In particular, [the buyer] had better insight into [the target’s] future
prospects than the market because it was aware that [the target] expected its
quarterly results to exceed analysts’ expectations.

Id. at 139 (footnote omitted). These observations suggest that a buyer’s internal valuations

carry an extra imprimatur of reliability and are likely to provide more persuasive evidence

of value than the buyer’s actual bids, which are tempered by the buyer’s desire to acquire

the target for the lowest possible price. See In re Dunkin’ Donuts S’holders Litig., 1990

WL 189120, at *9 (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 1990) (“A bidder’s objective is to identify an

underpriced corporation and . . . acquire it at the lowest price possible.”). When the

TransCanada Board approved the Merger Agreement, Wells Fargo presented a discounted

cash flow analysis using Columbia management’s projections, as adjusted by

TransCanada, that valued Columbia’s standalone business at $26.51 per share, then added

another $1.93 per share in synergies for total value of $28.45 per share. The disclosure-

based damages award of $0.50 per share would bring the total consideration to $26 per

share, below the standalone value of $26.51 that TransCanada placed on the company.

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 Precedents also have looked to the back-and-forth of the negotiations between the

parties. Columbia consistently sought a price range of $26 to $28 per share, and Girling

and Poirier both indicated that TransCanada’s valuation of Columbia supported a price

within that range. TransCanada was unwilling to pay that price not because Columbia’s

value did not support it, but because the premium over Columbia’s beaten-down stock price

would look too big, TransCanada’s own stock price might suffer as a result, and the

judgment of the TransCanada management team might be questioned. TransCanada could

readily finance a purchase of Columbia in the range of $26 to $28 per share, and

TransCanada was prepared to do so if an interloper had surfaced. The disclosure damages

award of $0.50 per share would bring the total consideration to $26 per share, at the low

end of the range that Columbia sought and well below what TransCanada was willing to

pay.

Precedents also have considered whether the deal would remain profitable for the

acquirer after taking into account the additional damages award. In this case, the acquisition

of Columbia has been extremely profitable for TransCanada and made up for flat or

moderate growth in other business units. On October 12, 2017, TransCanada’s head of U.S.

Natural Gas Pipeline Operations emailed Poirier to congratulate him on a job well done.

JTX 1399. He explained:

Until now, I didn’t realize the true impact of the [Columbia] acquisition on
the company. I obviously knew the magnitude of [Columbia’s] EBITDA
growth, but didn’t realize how flat or moderate the growth was in the other
BU’s. Our financial forecast would look very different w/o [Columbia’s]
billion $ EBITDA contribution over the next 2 years. I certainly hope your
forethought and execution in getting the deal done was properly rewarded.
You deserve a pot of gold, my friend!

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Id. In a subsequent review of the transaction conducted in 2019, TransCanada management

reported that the “Columbia acquisition should be deemed a strong success.” JTX 1522 at

3. Among other things, the presentation noted that the transaction had generated

“shareholder returns above similar transactions.” Id.

These sources of evidence suggest that the court could award disclosure-based

damages of up to $2.50 per share. Using the methodologies suggested by the precedents,

the most persuasive figure is $0.50 per share. That price level corresponds roughly to where

a deal might have ended up had stockholders voted down the transaction at $25.50 per

share. Unlike the damages for the Sale Process Claim, this estimate of damages does not

use the value of the $26 Deal at closing as an alternative transaction, which results in

damages of $1 per share due to the increase in TransCanada’s stock price. It rather

envisions a negative vote after which TransCanada would have increased its bid to provide

value of $26 per share using an exchange ratio that delivered $26 in value.

Studies in which scholars have valued voting rights provide a cross-check for the

1.96% award. The amounts awarded in Weinberger, Shell, Gaffin, and Mindbody addressed

breaches of the duty of disclosure in a context where fiduciaries requested stockholder

action. At least part of the injury in those cases flowed from the loss of the right to make

an informed decision. In other words, at least part of the injury flowed from a loss of the

opportunity to make an informed vote. Because the harm affected voting rights, estimates

of the value of voting rights provide a useful proxy for a reasonable damages award. That

framing of the injury also explains the per-share nature of the award. Because each share

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carries the right to vote, each share suffers the decisional harm, resulting in a per-share

outcome.

Some scholars have valued voting rights by comparing the trading prices of high-

vote shares to low-vote shares. Studies based on United States firms imply values of 2%,50

3.6%,51 5.4%,52 and 10.4%53 of total equity value. An award of 1.96% of equity value

measured by the deal price is a conservative measure when checked against those values.

Other scholars have valued voting rights by examining the prices at which large

blocks of stock trade relative to the prices at which individual shares trade. Studies based

on United States firms imply values of 1%,54 2.4%,55 4.3%,56 and in a subset of banks

50
Tatiana Nenova, The Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control: A Cross-
Country Analysis, 68 J. Fin. Econ. 325 (2003).
51
Paul Docherty, Steve Easton, & Sean Pinder, Flights-to-Control: Time Variation
In The Value Of A Vote, 66 J. Corp. Fin. 101790 (2021)
52
Ronald C. Lease, John J. McConnell, & Wayne H. Mikkelson, The Market Value
of Control in Publicly-Traded Corporations, 11 J. Fin. Econ. 439 (1983)
53
Luigi Zingales, What Determines the Value of Corporate Votes?, 110 Q. J. Econ.
1047 (1995).
54
Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, Private Benefits of Control: An International
Comparison, 59 J. Fin. 537 (2004).
55
See Saeyoung Chang & David Mayers, Who Benefits in an Insider Negotiated
Block Trade?, 41 Fin. Mgmt. 703 (2012).
56
Michael J. Barclay & Clifford G. Holderness, Private Benefits from Control of
Public Companies, 25 J. Fin. Econ. 371 (1989).

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between 1964 and 1979, 26%57 of total equity value. An award of 1.96% of equity value

measured by the deal price is again a conservative measure.

Perhaps the most interesting method of valuing voting rights compares the market

price of a share of common stock with the implied market price of a synthetic share of non-

voting stock constructed using matching put and call options.58 The main advantage of that

method is that it enables a value to be estimated for the voting rights of a particular issuer

at a particular time. As expected, the implied value of a voting right fluctuates depending

on whether a vote is in order, with the right to vote generally having no value but spiking

upwards during times proximate to exercise. Scholars using this method find valuations

consistent with the low end of prior studies59 and an average value for votes equal to

approximately 1.58% of the stock price.60 An award of 1.96% of equity value is reasonable

compared to those results.

In a prior decision, the court reviewed this literature when assessing the value of a

settlement that imposed restrictions on the voting rights associated with high vote stock.

57
Larry G. Meeker & O. Maurice Joy, Price Premiums for Controlling Shares of
Closely Held Bank Stock, 53 J. Bus. 297 (1980).
58
Avner Kalay, Oǧuzhan Karakaş, & Shagun Pant, The Market Value of Corporate
Votes: Theory and Evidence from Option Prices, 69 J. Fin. 1235 (2013).
59
Edward Fox, Is There A Delaware Effect for Controlled Firms?, 23 U. Pa. J. Bus.
L. 1, 21 (2020).
60
Morgan White-Smith, Revisiting Revlon: Should Judicial Scrutiny of Mergers
Depend on the Method of Payment?, 79 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1177, 1191 (2012) (discussing
earlier, unpublished version of Kalay, Karakaş, and Pant’s analysis).

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The court found that valuing the restrictions at 3.5% of equity value was conservative. In

re The Mosaic Co, S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 6228-VCL, Dkt. 117 at 48–50 (Del. Ch. Sept.

15, 2011) (TRANSCRIPT). An award of 1.96% of equity value is moderate in comparison.

This decision has used these studies only as a cross-check. They support the

reasonableness of the precedent-based award.

This court awards damages of $0.50 per share for the Disclosure Claim. That

amount is distinct from and less than the $1 per share awarded for the Sale Process Claim.

C. Are The Remedies Concurrent Or Cumulative?

This decision has awarded damages of $1 per share for the Sale Process Claim and

$0.50 per share for the Disclosure Claim. But are the remedies cumulative, such that the

damages aggregate to $1.50 per share? Or do they overlap, such that the damages equate

to $1 per share? The answer is that they overlap, with the disclosure damages providing a

floor.

Delaware courts have generally calculated damages for breach of the duty of

disclosure using the value of the underlying economic rights harmed by the breach. Thus,

a standard measure of compensatory damages for a breach of the duty of disclosure in a

merger is quasi-appraisal, which awards the fair value of the equity interest that the

stockholder otherwise could have retained (if the transaction had been voted down) or

secured through an appraisal (if the stockholder had elected that remedy). See Orchard, 88

A.3d at 42–53 (collecting authorities). An alternative measure of compensatory damages

for a breach of the duty of disclosure looks to the deal price that unconflicted negotiators

could have obtained after a negative vote, or which the acquirer would have had to pay to

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secure an affirmative vote. See PLX, 2018 WL 5018535, at *51 (collecting authorities). In

both scenarios, the damages for breach of the duty of disclosure are measured by the lost

economic opportunity. The same is true for rescissory damages. That restitution-based

remedy restores to the plaintiff the economic value that the plaintiff would have possessed

at the time of judgment, had the wrongdoer not wrongfully deprived the plaintiff of its

property. The value of the remedy is again measured by the value of the underlying

property.

In theory, there could be an award of damages for the loss of voting rights that is

separate from and additive to the economic loss. The Loudon decision, for example, states

that damages will be available when a disclosure violation results in “deprivation of

stockholders’ economic or voting rights.” 700 A.2d at 142; accord id. at 147. The “or”

suggests that the two could be separate.

An example illustrates the point. Envision a case in which we have divine

knowledge that the value of the common stock at the time of a merger was precisely $10

per share, but the deal in fact paid $9 per share. Imagine that the defendant fiduciaries also

committed disclosure violations that deprived the stockholders of their right to make an

informed decision on the merger. In theory, each stockholder could be entitled to $1 per

share of economic damages plus some additional dollop of disclosure damages. But

Delaware decisions have never calculated damages that way. Delaware courts have only

awarded damages based on the economic harm. In a disclosure case warranting a quasi-

appraisal remedy, the plaintiff receives only its pro rata share of the value of the company

as if it had remained a standalone entity. The plaintiff does not receive that value plus an

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additional measure of damages tied to the lost voting right. Likewise, cases that have found

a sale-process injury and a disclosure-based injury have only awarded a singular recovery

tied to the economic harm. E.g., Mindbody, 2023 WL 2518149, at *48 (awarding singular

recovery based on lost deal value for both sale process claim and disclosure claim); Rural

Liability, 88 A.3d 107–09 (awarding singular recovery based on standalone value for both

sale process claim and disclosure claim).

That tradition indicates that Delaware law views voting rights as an instrumental

protection for economic rights such that when a damages award compensates a stockholder

for its lost economic rights, no additional remedy is warranted for the conceptually separate

harm to voting rights. The remedy for the economic loss is sufficient. The awards in

Weinberger, Shell, and Gaffin occurred where there was an adjudicated disclosure violation

that deprived stockholders of their voting rights, but the economic harm was difficult to

measure. That in turn suggests that damages for a disclosure violation establish a floor. If

economic damages exceed disclosure damages, then the plaintiff receives economic

damages. Otherwise, the plaintiff receives disclosure damages. The plaintiff does not

receive both. In Mindbody, the Chancellor awarded the same $1 per share for both

economic damages and disclosure damages. She did not add them together.

The plaintiffs are entitled to damages of $1 per share for the Sale Process Claim.

That amount exceeds the $0.50 per share for the Disclosure Claim, so it is all that the

plaintiffs can recover. If some or all of the class members were not able to recover the $1

in damages for the Sale Process Claim, then those class members could potentially recover

the $0.50 per share for the Disclosure Claim as a fallback.

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 This decision does not calculate the damages that TransCanada owes. TransCanada

has indicated that it will seek a credit against any damages award based on the settlement

that Skaggs and Smith reached. The parties have not briefed that issue, but a settlement

credit appears warranted. See In re Rural/Metro Corp. S’holders Litig., 102 A.3d 205 (Del.

Ch. 2014) (analyzing settlement credit under Delaware Uniform Contribution Against

Tortfeasors Act). TransCanada has also suggested that the appraisal claimants may be

bound by prior factual findings from the Appraisal Decision such that their recovery could

be limited. The parties have not briefed that issue either, and while conceivable before the

issuance of this decision, that possibility now seems strained. In any event, there are hurdles

to overcome before a damages award can be quantified.

III. CONCLUSION

TransCanada is liable for aiding and abetting the sell-side fiduciaries’ breaches of

duty during the sale process. The plaintiffs are awarded economic damages of $1 per share

based on the $26 Deal, which provides persuasive evidence of the value that the plaintiffs

would have received but for the sell-side breaches of duty and TransCanada’s culpable

participation.

TransCanada is liable for aiding and abetting the sell-side fiduciaries’ breaches of

the duty of disclosure. The plaintiffs are awarded disclosure damages of $0.50 per share,

representing a discretionary amount designed to remedy the harm to the stockholders’

decisional and economic rights in a setting where fiduciaries requested stockholder action,

yet failed to provide the stockholders with the information necessary to make an informed

decision.

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 The awards overlap. They are not cumulative. The maximum amount of damages is

$1 per share.

During earlier phases of the case, the parties have pointed to issues that still need to

be addressed before a final order can be entered. Within thirty days, the parties will submit

a joint letter that identifies the unresolved issues and proposes a schedule for bringing this

case to a conclusion at the trial level.

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