UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
DEBRA MIN, DOCKET NUMBER
Appellant, SF-1221-17-0119-W-1
v.
SOCIAL SECURITY DATE: July 6, 2023
ADMINISTRATION,
Agency.
THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1
Debra Min, Vancouver, Washington, pro se.
Gerald J. Hill, Esquire, and Jeffrey R. McClain, Esquire, Seattle,
Washington, for the agency.
BEFORE
Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
Raymond A. Limon, Member
FINAL ORDER
¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
denied her request for corrective action in her individual right of action (IRA)
appeal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following
circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact;
1
A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2
the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation
or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative
judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision
were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion,
and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material
evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully
considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to
clarify that, to establish that she made a protected disclosure, the appellant need
not prove that the matter disclosed actually established one of the types of
wrongdoing set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A), we AFFIRM the initial
decision.
BACKGROUND
¶2 The appellant serves as a Claims Representative in the agency’s Longview,
Washington, field office. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 5 at 84, Tab 55 at 4. On
October 30, 2015, she filed a complaint with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC)
alleging that, in retaliation for disclosing to her supervisors, the agency’s Office
of Inspector General (OIG), and two members of Congres s that her supervisor
authorized the issuance of a child’s Social Security card without sufficient
documentation, agency officials took actions against her that, among other things,
affected her performance evaluations and job duties and created a hostile work
environment. IAF, Tab 16 at 4-25. She also supplemented her OSC complaint
with additional claims of retaliatory personnel actions regarding, among other
things, her performance evaluations and changes in job duties on January 19,
3
2016, May 19, 2016, and August 29, 2016. 2 Id. at 165-83, 327-31, 516, 529-36.
By letter dated October 31, 2016, OSC informed the appellant that it was closing
its file regarding her complaint. IAF, Tab 1 at 26-27.
¶3 On November 24, 2016, the appellant filed an IRA appeal with the Board
and requested a hearing. IAF, Tab 1. In prehearing orders issued on
December 20, 2016, and February 21, 2017, the administrative judge found that
the appellant had shown that she had exhausted her administrative remedies
before OSC and that she made nonfrivolous allegations that she engaged in
protected activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C) by disclosing information to the
agency’s OIG and that the alleged protected activity was a contributing factor in
her 2015 performance rating and changes in her job duties and responsibilities.
IAF, Tab 7 at 2-3, Tab 65 at 2. The administrative judge also found that the
appellant had not shown that she exhausted her administrative remedies
concerning her claim that her statements to the OIG were a contributing factor in
her 2016 performance rating. IAF, Tab 65 at 2.
¶4 Following a hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision
denying the appellant’s request for corrective action. IAF, Tab 76, Initial
Decision (ID). In denying the request, the administrative judge first found that
the appellant asserted during the proceedings that the agency had purged her
informal personnel file in violation of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA)
covering the appellant, but she did not raise this allegation before OSC, and thus
she had not exhausted administrative remedies regarding this claim. ID at 2 n.2.
The administrative judge then found that the appellant had filed a grievance
regarding her 2015 performance rating prior to raising with OSC that her alleged
disclosures and activity were a contributing factor in the rating, and had made a
valid election to pursue her disagreement regarding her 2015 rating through the
2
On November 23, 2015, the appellant made a disclosure of information to OSC’s
disclosure unit, again setting forth her claim of an improperly issued Social Security
card. IAF, Tab 16 at 27-60.
4
negotiated grievance procedure; thus, the Board lacked jurisdiction over the
claim. ID at 5-7. Next, although the administrative judge found that the
appellant had exhausted administrative remedies regarding her 2015 and 2016
mid-year performance reviews, she concluded that the appellant did not make
nonfrivolous allegations that the reviews were covered personnel actions because
they did not contain ratings or any threat to lower the appellant’s rating , and she
reiterated her finding that the appellant failed to exhaust administrative remedies
regarding her 2016 performance rating. ID at 7 n.6, 10. She found that the
appellant showed that she exhausted administrative remedies before OSC as to the
remaining alleged personnel actions: a requirement that she vet monthly meeting
topics, the temporary reassignment of her workload in iAppeal, a 1-hour
reduction in weekly adjudication duties, a meeting with her second -level
supervisor regarding her equal employment opportunity complaint, and an
instruction to report to duty 30 minutes later than her previous report time. ID
at 10.
¶5 The administrative judge further determined that the appe llant did not show
by preponderant evidence that she had a reasonable belief that her supervisor’s
authorization of the issuance of a child’s Social Security card was a violation of a
law, rule, or regulation, gross mismanagement, or an abuse of authority; thus,
none of her disclosures were protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). ID at 10-15.
However, she found that the appellant engaged in activity protected under
5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C) when she disclosed this information to the agency’s
OIG. ID at 15. According to the administrative judge, all but one supervisor
implicated in the appellant’s allegations had knowledge of her statements to the
OIG within close proximity to the alleged personnel actions ; thus, the appellant
established that her protected activity was a contributing factor in the alleged
5
personnel actions. 3 ID at 16-18. Finally, the administrative judge considered all
of the alleged personnel actions for which the appellant had exhausted her
administrative remedies, including her 2015 and 2016 mid-year performance
reviews and her encounter with her former first-level supervisor regarding the
OIG complaint. The administrative judge concluded, however, that the appellant
had not proven that any of these actions, alone or collectively, constituted a
significant change in duties, responsibilities, or working conditions or a hostile
work environment that could be considered a significant change in working
conditions. ID at 18-30. Thus, she found that the appellant did not show that she
was subjected to a personnel action and was not entitled to corrective action. ID
at 30.
¶6 The appellant has timely filed a petition for review, to which the agency has
filed an opposition. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 3. The appellant has
filed a reply to the agency’s opposition. PFR File, Tab 4. On review, the
appellant argues that her appeal should be remanded to OSC, the administrative
judge applied an incorrect standard in finding that she did not s how that she was
subjected to a significant change in working conditions, the agency did not show
by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken a personnel action in
the absence of whistleblowing, and the administrative judge did not consider all
3
The administrative judge did not explicitly find that the alleged personnel actions took
place within a period of time such that a reasonable person could conclude that the
protected activity was a contributing factor in the actions. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 1221(e)(1)(B). However, the administrative judge found that all but one of the
appellant’s supervisors were aware of the appellant’s OIG complaint at the time of their
involvement in the alleged personnel actions, and each of the actions complained of
occurred less than 2 years after the OIG complaint; thus, each supervisor would have
been aware of the disclosure within a period of time such that a reasonable person could
conclude that the protected activity was a contributing factor in the alleged personnel
actions. ID at 3, 10, 17-18; see Dorney v. Department of the Army, 117 M.S.P.R.
480, ¶ 16 (2012) (noting that the Board has found that a personnel action taken within
1 to 2 years of a disclosure meets the knowledge/timing test).
6
of the evidence. PFR File, Tab 1. As set forth below, we find that the appellant’s
arguments are without merit.
DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
The Board lacks the authority to take any action regarding the appellant’s claim
that the agency purged her informal personnel file.
¶7 On review, the appellant does not challenge the administrative judge’s
dismissal of certain claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies or the
election of the negotiated grievance procedure, as discussed above. ID at 2-7.
She also does not dispute the administrative judge’s finding that she did not make
a protected disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or that her 2015 and 2016
mid-year performance reviews, her interactions with supervisors, and an
instruction to report to duty 30 minutes later did not constitute a significant
change in working conditions. ID at 7-15, 23-29. These well-reasoned findings
are supported by the record, and we discern no reason to disturb them. See
Clay v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 245, ¶ 6 (2016) (finding no reason
to disturb the administrative judge’s findings when she considered the evidence
as a whole, drew appropriate inferences, and made reasoned conclusions on the
issue of credibility); Broughton v. Department of Health and Human Services,
33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987) (same).
¶8 Although the appellant does not challenge the administrative judge’s
finding that she did not exhaust administrative remedies as to her claim that the
agency purged her informal personnel file in violation of the CBA, she requests
that the claim be remanded to OSC for an investigation and that the case be
remanded as a whole to OSC because the agency took a “materially adverse
action” against her. PFR File, Tab 1 at 9-10, 13; ID at 2 n.2. The Board does not
have jurisdiction over a whistleblower reprisal claim involving an action that is
not otherwise appealable to the Board for which the appellant has not exhausted
administrative remedies before OSC. Thus, we lack the authority to take any
7
further action regarding the appellant’s claim about her informal personnel file. 4
5 U.S.C. §§ 1214(a)(3), 1221(a); see Miller v. Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, 122 M.S.P.R. 3, ¶¶ 6-10 (2014) (finding that the Board lacked
jurisdiction to review claims in an IRA appeal that the appellant did not raise
before OSC), aff’d, 626 F. App’x 261 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Should the appellant wish
to further pursue this claim, she may seek redress from OSC pursuant to the
procedures set forth at 5 C.F.R. part 1800.
The administrative judge correctly found that the appellant failed to establish that
she was subjected to a significant change in duties, responsibilities, or working
conditions.
¶9 The appellant contests the administrative judge’s findings that the vetting of
monthly meeting topics, the temporary reassignment of her workload in iAppeal,
and the 1-hour reduction in weekly adjudication duties were not covered
personnel actions. PFR File, Tab 1 at 10-14; ID at 18-30. She contends that the
administrative judge should have applied the standard to evaluate whether she
suffered an actionable personnel action set forth in Burlington Northern & Santa
Fe Railroad Company v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006), asserting that this standard
places a lower burden on her to prove that an actionable personnel action
occurred. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-14. In White, the Supreme Court held that, to
prevail on a retaliation claim, a privately employed plaintiff need not show an
“adverse employment action”; rather, “a plaintiff must show that a reasonable
employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, ” meaning
that “[the action] might well have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or
supporting a charge of discrimination.” White, 548 U.S. at 60, 67-68 (citing
Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). However, White
4
The reason that an employee must exhaust her remedies before OSC before appealing
to the Board is to give OSC the opportunity to take corrective action before involving
the Board in the case. Ward v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 981 F.2d 521, 526
(Fed. Cir. 1992). For the exhaustion remedy to serve its intended purpose, the
employee must inform OSC of the precise ground of her charge of whistleblowing. Id.
8
addressed the extent to which activity constitutes actionable retaliation under the
anti-retaliation provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and is thus
inapplicable to the appellant’s IRA appeal. See generally id. at 59-70.
¶10 The appellant’s IRA appeal is brought pursuant to the Whistleblower
Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (WPEA), which provides its own statutory
definition of an actionable personnel action, codified at 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A).
Section 2302(a)(2)(A) defines a “personnel action” as any 1 of 11 enumerated
actions and “any other significant change in duties, responsibilities, or working
conditions[.]” 5 The appellant does not appear to dispute that the challenged
actions do not fall under an enumerated action and that the administrative judge
appropriately considered whether the actions constituted a significant change in
duties, responsibilities, or working conditions. ID at 18-20. We held in
Skarada v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 17, ¶ 23, that “only
agency actions that, individually or collectively, have practical and significant
effects on the overall nature and quality of an employee’s working conditions,
duties, or responsibilities, and are likely to have a chilling effect on
whistleblowing or otherwise undermine the merit system will be found to
constitute a covered personnel action under section 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii). ”
Although the administrative judge did not have the benefit of our decision in
Skarada when she issued the initial decision, she evaluated whether the appellant
showed such a significant change in a manner consistent with the standard set
forth in Skarada and concluded that none of the challenged actions rose to the
level of a significant change in duties, responsibilities, or work ing conditions. ID
at 19-23; see, e.g., White v. Social Security Administration, 76 M.S.P.R. 447,
461-62 (1997) (finding that the reassignment of cases within an office was not a
5
During the pendency of this appeal, the National Defense Authorizatio n Act for Fiscal
Year 2018 (NDAA), Pub. L. No. 115-91, 131 Stat. 1283, was signed into law on
December 12, 2017. Section 1097 of the NDAA amended various provisions of Title 5
of the United States Code. Our decision would be the same under both pre - and
post-NDAA law.
9
significant change in duties, responsibilities, or working conditions) , aff’d,
152 F.3d 948 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Table). 6
¶11 We similarly find that the administrative judge properly evaluate d whether
the challenged actions collectively constituted a hostile work environment but
concluded that they did not constitute severe, pervasive, or humiliating conduct
sufficient to establish a significant change in working conditions. ID at 23-30;
see, e.g., Skarada, 2022 MSPB 17, ¶¶ 26-29 (determining that the appellant’s
claims that certain agency officials told him to stop attending certain meetings,
excluded him from the hiring process for two new hires, avoided him, failed to
provide him with adequate guidance, excluded him from meetings, would not
support his request for a review of his position, yelled at him, and c onvened
investigations against him were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to
significantly impact the appellant’s working conditions). On review, the
appellant’s arguments to the contrary merely reiterate her arguments below and
do not establish a basis for review. PFR File, Tab 1 at 10-14.
The appellant’s additional arguments regarding the administrative judge’s
findings are unsupported by the record.
¶12 The appellant’s argument that the agency did not meet its burden by clear
and convincing evidence does not serve as a basis for review. PFR File, Tab 1
at 14-16, Tab 4 at 7-34. Because the appellant did not meet her burden to show
by preponderant evidence that her statements to the agency’s OIG were a
contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take a personnel action, the burden
did not shift to the agency to show by clear and convincing evidence that it would
have taken the same personnel action in the absence of the protected activity. See
6
The WPEA, which became effective on December 27, 2012, does not affect the
relevant holding in the cited authority, nor does it affect the relevant holdings in the
other authorities cited herein that were issued prior to the effective date of the WPEA.
See Pub. L. No. 112-199, 126 Stat. 1465 (2012).
10
5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1)-(2); Corthell v. Department of Homeland Security,
123 M.S.P.R. 417, ¶ 8 (2016).
¶13 The appellant’s reply to the agency’s opposition to her petition for review
contains arguments that appear to be outside the scope of the petition for review.
PFR File, Tab 4. Although we need not consider arguments outside the scope of
the petition, we have nevertheless reviewed the appellant’s additional arguments
and find them without merit. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(a)(4) (limiting a reply to a
response to a petition for review to the factual and legal issues raised by another
party in the response to the petition for review). Contrary to the appellant’s
assertions, there is no evidence that the administrative judge did not consider all
of the record evidence as a whole. PFR File, Tab 4 at 6. The administrative
judge made detailed credibility and factual findings supported by the record, and
we discern no reason to disturb these findings. See Clay, 123 M.S.P.R. 245, ¶ 6.
The initial decision is modified to clarify that, to establish that she made a
protected disclosure, the appellant need not prove that the matter disclosed
actually established one of the types of wrongdoing set forth in 5 U.S.C.
§ 2302(b)(8)(A).
¶14 In finding that the appellant did not show that her disclosures were
protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), the administrative judge found that “the
appellant has not proven by preponderant evidence that there was a violation of a
rule.” ID at 11. We modify the initial decision to clarify that, to establish that
she made a protected disclosure, the appellant need not prove that the matter
disclosed actually established one of the types of w rongdoing set forth at
5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A); rather, she must show that the matter disclosed was one
that a reasonable person in her position would have believed evidenced any of the
situations specified in section 2302(b)(8). Scoggins v. Department of the Army,
123 M.S.P.R. 592, ¶ 11 (2016). Despite the administrative judge’s finding, she
went on to analyze the remaining evidence regarding whether the disclosure was
protected and ultimately concluded that a reasonable person would not have
concluded that the matter disclosed evidenced a violation of a law, rule, or
11
regulation, gross mismanagement, or an abuse of authority. ID at 11-15.
Accordingly, we find that the administrative judge applied the correct standard to
find that the appellant’s disclosure was not protected, and the administrative
judge’s initial finding is of no consequence because it did not adve rsely affect the
appellant’s substantive rights. Cf. Karapinka v. Department of Energy,
6 M.S.P.R. 124, 127 (1981) (holding that the administrative judge’s procedural
error is of no legal consequence unless it is shown to have adversely affected a
party’s substantive rights). Accordingly, we affirm the initial decision as
modified herein.
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 7
The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation an d
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirement s. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
7
Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
12
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.
(1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439
Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of partic ular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
13
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, D.C. 20013
14
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
131 M Street, N.E.
Suite 5SW12G
Washington, D.C. 20507
(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or a ny court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 8 The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
8
The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
15
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439
Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
FOR THE BOARD: /s/ for
Jennifer Everling
Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.