RENDERED: JUNE 30, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2022-CA-1299-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE MITCH PERRY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 18-CR-003578
QUARTEZ WILSON APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CETRULO, DIXON, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.
CETRULO, JUDGE: Appellant Commonwealth of Kentucky (the
“Commonwealth”) appeals the Jefferson Circuit Court order granting Appellee
Quartez Wilson’s (“Wilson”) motion to exclude bullet casing evidence allegedly
found in his vehicle.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2018, Wilson was indicted for attempted murder, first-degree
burglary, four counts of first-degree wanton endangerment, fourth-degree assault,
third-degree terroristic threatening, harassment, being a convicted felon in
possession of a firearm, and being a second-degree persistent felony offender. The
charges arose from encounters between Wilson, his mother, and her husband over
the course of two days.
On October 15, 2018, Wilson allegedly got in a verbal argument with
his mother, struck her multiple times, and threw her to the ground. Additionally,
according to the Commonwealth’s bill of particulars, his mother claimed Wilson
said he was going to get a gun and shoot her. Two days later, in the early morning
of October 17, 2018, Wilson allegedly kicked in the door to the home his mother
and her husband shared and fired six rounds from a high-powered rifle in the
direction of the husband. The mother, as well as her two children, were also in the
home; however, the husband was the only individual who allegedly saw Wilson.
Later that day, approximately eight hours after the shooting, the police
arrested Wilson and allegedly found a shell casing in the vehicle he had been
driving. The casing was the same caliber and manufacturer as the casings
recovered at the scene of the shooting; however, a ballistics expert had compared
the casings and could not conclude that the casings had been fired from the same
weapon. Further, the ballistics expert stated that the casing from the vehicle and
those found at the scene of the crime did not have similar characteristics.
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In October 2022, shortly before the trial was set to begin, Wilson filed
a motion to exclude the shell casing allegedly found in his vehicle, claiming that
discovery indicated the shell casing had not been fired by the same gun used in the
shooting. A few days later, the trial court conducted a hearing on the motion but
held it in abeyance because the ballistics expert was expected to testify at trial, and
further information would be developed during that testimony. The trial court
noted, however, that an indiscriminate shell casing, unless it was matched to the
weapon that was supposed to be involved in the crime, seemed too remote and
unnecessary in regard to the indicted charges.
A few days later, when court reconvened to begin voir dire, the trial
court again addressed the motion. The Commonwealth argued that the motion was
“significant,” so the Commonwealth asked the trial court to resolve the issue
before starting trial. The trial court explained, in pertinent part,1 that Wilson
moved to exclude the evidence because the shell casing was not relevant evidence
to the indicted charges. The Commonwealth argued, however, that the shell casing
showed that Wilson had access to the same type of ammunition and presumably
1
Additionally, Wilson had moved for a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-
56, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 2676, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1978) (holding that a defendant is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing when he or she makes a “substantial preliminary showing” that the affiant
made a false statement in the affidavit). However, the trial court focused on the relevance issue
and found the Franks hearing was not a “big issue” because Wilson would be required to
convince the trial court that someone lied in the affidavit, and the trial court did not find evidence
that any misstatement would have been intentional. As such, the Commonwealth did not appeal
that issue, and it is not before this Court.
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the same type of gun used in the shooting because there was only one type of gun
that could have fired that type of bullet. Further, the Commonwealth argued that
whether the bullets could have been fired from the same gun used in the shooting
went toward the weight of the evidence, not the admissibility. As such, the
Commonwealth claimed the evidence was probative and material, and it did not
believe the evidence would be prejudicial.
Wilson countered that the ballistics report stated the casing allegedly
found in Wilson’s vehicle could neither be identified nor eliminated as having been
fired by the same firearm. Further, Wilson noted that the report stated the ballistics
expert did not observe “a significant agreement of individual characteristics.”
Therefore, Wilson claimed any attempt to connect the casings would be pure
speculation.
The trial court noted that the weapon used at the scene of the crime
had not been found; therefore, the Commonwealth had used the shell casings found
at the scene of the crime to determine the type of weapon used. The trial court
emphasized that the Commonwealth was then attempting to submit a separate
casing found in a different place and time, which was speculative. Further, the trial
court noted that the Commonwealth wanted to “offer a single cartridge with a
known caliber that had no specific criteria tying it to a weapon that we don’t have.”
The trial court said that the shell casing was “simply too remote and speculative,”
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and it was not going to allow the evidence in, although it would listen to the
evidence and perhaps revisit the issue. The Commonwealth then moved for a
continuance, arguing the casing was a significant part of its case, and further asked
for a written order excluding the casing. The trial court entered the order
prohibiting introduction of the shell casing, and the Commonwealth appealed. A
motion panel of this Court granted the Commonwealth’s stay of the trial and the
motion for intermediate relief from the evidentiary ruling.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“The standard of review of an evidentiary ruling is abuse of
discretion.” Ward v. Commonwealth, 587 S.W.3d 312, 332 (Ky. 2019) (citing
Anderson v. Commonwealth, 231 S.W.3d 117, 119 (Ky. 2007)). “The test for
abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary,
unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Id. (citing
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Ky. 2000)).
“Absent such abuse, this Court will not disturb a trial court’s decision to admit
evidence.” Harris v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 117, 122 (Ky. 2012) (citation
omitted).
ANALYSIS
The Commonwealth argues that the trial court abused its discretion
when it excluded the shell casing, because the casing was relevant evidence and
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therefore admissible regardless of other available evidence.2 The Commonwealth
explains that relevant evidence is “evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence” – Hudson v.
Commonwealth, 385 S.W.3d 411, 419 (Ky. 2012) (citing KRE 401) – and it is
generally admissible. Id. (citing KRE 402). Specifically, the Commonwealth
explains that the evidence was relevant because it was probative and material:
probative because it made the identity of the shooter more likely, and material
because it helped the Commonwealth “prove that it was [Wilson] who broke into
[his mother and her husband’s] home” to commit the crime.
Further, the Commonwealth argues that the shell casing was necessary
because Wilson claimed he did not commit the crime and that his mother’s
husband had a motive to lie regarding the identification of Wilson. Therefore, the
Commonwealth claims the shell casing makes it more likely that Wilson was the
perpetrator and supports the Commonwealth’s case for the perpetrator’s identity.
Additionally, the Commonwealth states that the shell casing “helps prove that
[Wilson] had the means to commit the shooting – ammunition for an assault rifle.”
2
Additionally, the Commonwealth argues the evidence was not too prejudicial, confusing,
misleading, or speculative under Kentucky Rule of Evidence (“KRE”) 403; however, the trial
court found the evidence was not relevant, so it did not conduct a KRE 403 analysis. As such,
we need not address the Commonwealth’s KRE 403 argument.
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However, the Kentucky Supreme Court has found that evidence with
no known connection to the crime is generally not admissible. See Harris, 384
S.W.3d at 123 (citing Major v. Commonwealth, 177 S.W.3d 700 (Ky. 2005)). See
also Barth v. Commonwealth, 80 S.W.3d 390, 402 (Ky. 2001) (quoting Higgins v.
Commonwealth, 142 Ky. 647, 134 S.W. 1135, 1138 (1911) (“The proof need not
positively show the connection; but there must be proof rendering the inference
reasonable or probable from its nearness in time and place or other
circumstances.”).
In Harris, the Kentucky Supreme Court found that weapons that were
not used in the crime were not admissible evidence. Harris, 384 S.W.3d at 122.
There, the defendant owned two guns that were the same caliber as the murder
weapon, and the trial court admitted those weapons into evidence. Id. Testing had
shown, however, that those weapons were not used during the murder. Id. Our
Supreme Court – relying on Major, along with some out-of-state cases –
determined that the trial court had abused its discretion when it admitted the two
guns into evidence because they did not have a connection to the crime and
therefore were not relevant. Id. at 123-24.
Likewise, in Major, the Kentucky Supreme Court found that the
proposed evidence was not relevant because it had not been connected to the
crime. See id. There, the defendant had “killed his wife with a pistol but the pistol
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was never recovered.” Id. at 123. The trial court had permitted the
Commonwealth to introduce three other guns that the defendant owned but had not
been used in the crime. Id. Our Supreme Court reversed the trial court and held
that the guns were not admissible “absent evidence that any of the firearms were
involved in the murder.” Id. (quoting Major, 177 S.W.3d at 710).
Although here, the Commonwealth sought to admit shell casings – not
other guns – we find the underlying analysis applicable. Similar to Harris and
Major, here, the Commonwealth attempted to submit evidence that was similar to
that found at the scene of the crime but that had no known connection to the crime.
The Commonwealth argues the casings were the same caliber and manufacturer;
however, the ballistics expert had analyzed the shell casings and could not
conclude that the casing from Wilson’s vehicle came from the same gun as the
casings found at the scene of the crime. Further, the ballistics expert had found no
similar characteristics between the casing found in Wilson’s vehicle and those
found at the scene of the crime. As such, the Commonwealth failed to connect the
casing allegedly found in Wilson’s vehicle with those found at the scene of the
crime, rendering the shell casing irrelevant.
Based on those facts, the trial court concluded there was no evidence
that the casing from Wilson’s vehicle was tied to the weapon used at the scene of
the crime; therefore, it was not admissible. The trial court’s determination was not
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arbitrary, unfair, nor counter to sound legal principles and was not an abuse of
discretion. See Ward, 587 S.W.3d at 333 (citation omitted).
CONCLUSION
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted Wilson’s
motion to exclude the shell casing allegedly found in his vehicle. As such, the
Jefferson Circuit Court is AFFIRMED.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEE.
Daniel Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky
Jeanne Anderson
Special Assistant Attorney General
Louisville, Kentucky
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