Carter v. Carter

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 22-0355
Filed July 13, 2023

JASON CARTER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

BILLY DEAN CARTER, BILL G. CARTER, and the ESTATE OF SHIRLEY D.
CARTER, by and through BILL G. CARTER, Executor,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marion County, Jeffrey D. Farrell,

Judge.

Jason Carter appeals the order granting summary judgment and dismissing

an equitable action to vacate the final judgment entered in a separate action.

AFFIRMED.

Alison F. Kanne of Wandro & Associates, P.C., and Christine E. Branstad

and Nathan A. Olson of Brandstad & Olson, Des Moines, for appellant.

Mark E. Weinhardt and David N. Fautsch of The Weinhardt Law Firm, Des

Moines, for appellees.

Heard by Schumacher, P.J., and Chicchelly and Buller, JJ.
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CHICCHELLY, Judge.

Jason Carter filed this equitable action to vacate the judgment entered

against him in Carter v. Carter, 957 N.W.2d 623, 646 (Iowa 2021). The district

court granted summary judgment for the defendants and dismissed the action. On

appeal, Jason contends the district court abused its discretion in denying his

request for limited discovery on his claim of extrinsic fraud. He also contends the

court erred by finding he failed to show evidence of extrinsic fraud and his claim of

newly discovered evidence is barred by collateral estoppel. Because the district

court acted within its discretion in denying limited discovery and properly granted

summary judgment on both claims, we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Shirley Carter was alone in the home she shared with her husband, Bill,

when she was shot and killed during an apparent burglary in July 2015. Her son,

Jason, claimed he found his mother dead in the kitchen when he arrived at his

parents’ home just after 11:00 a.m. Jason first called his sister before calling 911

three minutes later. Bill returned home a short time later.

During the ensuing criminal investigation, it was determined that Shirley was

fatally shot twice. Fragments from recovered bullets showed Shirley was shot by

a high-powered rifle consistent with the .270 Remington that was discovered

missing from Bill’s gun safe. Jason’s fingerprints were found on the safe.1

1 Jason told law enforcement that before his mother’s murder, he was not aware
his parents owned a gun safe. Bill, however, thought that the gun safe was a gift
from Jason and his wife. Jason’s fingerprints were located on a part of the safe
that someone assembling it would touch.
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Six months after Shirley was killed, law enforcement had not made an

arrest. But Bill, his son, Billy, and Shirley’s estate sued Jason for wrongful death,

alleging that he shot and killed Shirley. The plaintiffs subpoenaed the entire file of

the investigation into Shirley’s homicide from the Iowa Department of Criminal

Investigation (DCI). Although the criminal investigation was ongoing, the DCI

agreed to share some of its file. The plaintiffs served DCI a second subpoena to

obtain the agreed-upon documents. Jason, who favored an “all or nothing”

approach to discovery, moved to quash the subpoena, which the court denied.

The wrongful-death action proceeded to a jury trial in December 2017. The

jury found Jason liable for Shirley’s death and awarded the plaintiffs $10,250,002

in damages.

Three days after the jury returned the civil verdict, the State charged Jason

with first-degree murder in connection with Shirley’s death. Discovery in the

criminal case began in February 2018. That same month, the court denied Jason’s

motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict in the civil case.

During the discovery process in the criminal case, the State produced

documents that Jason believed would have changed the outcome of trial in the

wrongful-death action. He petitioned to vacate the judgment based on newly

discovered evidence. The court dismissed the petition in January 2019.

In March 2019, a jury acquitted Jason of all criminal charges related to his

mother’s death. After his acquittal, Jason filed a second petition to vacate the civil

judgment based on newly discovered evidence. But because Jason’s petition was

filed more than one year after final judgment, the court denied it. Jason appealed.
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In March 2020, Jason filed this action to vacate the civil judgment under the

court’s equitable powers. He alleged the grounds for vacating judgment existed in

the year following the civil trial but could not have been discovered with reasonable

diligence. The defendants moved to dismiss the action, but the district court found

Jason had pled a valid cause of action and denied the motion.

The court stayed the proceedings in Jason’s action to vacate while the

wrongful-death action was on appeal. The supreme court affirmed that judgment

in March 2021. Carter, 957 N.W.2d at 646. Once the district court lifted the stay

in the equitable action, the defendants moved for summary judgment. They

argued that Jason’s petition failed to allege extrinsic fraud, which is required,

instead raising only a claim of newly discovered evidence. In the alternative, they

argued that the decision in Carter foreclosed Jason’s claim of newly discovered

evidence. Jason resisted the motion. At the same time, he amended his petition

to allege that the civil judgment was procured by extrinsic fraud and moved for

limited discovery to find more evidence supporting his extrinsic-fraud claim.

The district court held a hearing on the pending motions in November 2021.

In the ruling that followed, the court accepted Jason’s amended petition but denied

his request for limited discovery. It granted summary judgment, finding that Jason

presented no evidence of extrinsic fraud and the Carter ruling barred his claim of

newly discovered evidence. The court dismissed this action, and Jason appeals.

II. Scope of Review.

Our review of an independent action in equity to modify a decree is de novo.

In re Marriage of Hutchinson, 974 N.W.2d 466, 473 (Iowa 2022). On de novo
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review, we give weight to the district court’s factual findings although we are not

bound by them. Id.

III. Discussion.

Jason appeals both the grant of summary judgment and the denial of his

motion for limited discovery. Because the discovery ruling impacts the outcome of

summary judgment, we address it first.

A. Discovery.

On the same day he resisted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment,

Jason moved to amend his petition to add a claim of extrinsic fraud and asked for

a continuance to conduct limited discovery on the extrinsic-fraud claim. Although

the district court questioned “the credibility and sincerity of the new extrinsic fraud

claim, [which] was made only after the estate raised the issue as a bar to relief in

this proceeding,” it accepted the amended petition. But the court denied the

request for limited discovery, which Jason sought “to ascertain whether additional

evidence supporting allegations of extrinsic fraud exist.”

If a party opposing summary judgment “cannot present by affidavit facts

essential to justify the opposition, the court . . . may order a continuance to permit

affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may

make such other order as is just.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(6). We review the denial

of a continuance under rule 1.981(6) for an abuse of discretion. Good v. Tyson

Foods, Inc., 756 N.W.2d 42, 46 (Iowa Ct. App. 2008). “An abuse of discretion

consists of a ruling which rests upon clearly untenable or unreasonable grounds.”

Struve v. Struve, 930 N.W.2d 368, 377 (Iowa 2019) (citation omitted). We give the

district court wide discretion when reviewing discovery decisions. Id.; see also
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Moser v. Thorp Sales Corp., 312 N.W.2d 881, 891 (Iowa 1981) (“When a party

claims that he has not been given enough time to gather and submit affidavits in

resistance to a motion for summary judgment, it is within the discretion of the trial

court whether or not to wait for the affidavits to be furnished.”).

The court denied Jason’s request for limited discovery, citing the nature of

equitable actions to vacate judgment and public policy concerns:

An equitable action of this type should be an extremely rare event
justified only by evidence of extrinsic fraud. Jason did not even
allege an extrinsic fraud in his [original] forty-nine-page petition. In
light of the standards for filing an equitable action to vacate a
judgment, the filing party should have evidence of the extrinsic fraud
upfront. The party cannot file the action with the hope to reopen
discovery so that extrinsic fraud might be found. If that occurred, the
public policy preventing the reopening of judgments absent evidence
of extrinsic fraud would be breached. There would be no end to
litigation. That would be harmful to successful parties and the
efficiency of the court system.

The court also noted that “Jason had a fair opportunity to present his case at the

original civil trial” and “a full opportunity through a three-day hearing to present

evidence to vacate the civil judgment.” It concluded that “[a] party cannot file an

action that requires a showing of extrinsic fraud and hope to discover it during

discovery” because it “would be a disservice to the interests of justice” and “waste

the resources of the parties and the court.”

The denial of limited discovery was not clearly untenable or based on

unreasonable grounds. Although “generally a nonmoving party should have the

opportunity to make discovery prior to hearing and ruling on a motion for summary

judgment,” rule 1.1981 does not prevent summary judgment before all discovery

is completed. Bitner v. Ottumwa Cmty. Sch. Dist., 549 N.W.2d 295, 302 (Iowa

1996). Jason was allowed discovery in the wrongful-death action. That case was
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tried to a jury, resulting in the judgment he now seeks to vacate. The district court

did not abuse its discretion in denying him additional time for discovery. See id.

(finding no abuse of discretion in denying a request for a continuance of the

summary judgment ruling to conduct discovery when a party has “a full opportunity

to conduct discovery prior to the summary judgment hearing”).

Because the district court properly exercised its discretion in denying

Jason’s motion to conduct discovery, we affirm.

B. Summary Judgment.

Jason contends the district court erred by granting summary judgment on

his claims of extrinsic fraud and newly discovered evidence. We review the grant

of summary judgment for correction of errors at law. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v.

Drainage Dist. 67 Bd. of Trs., 974 N.W.2d 78, 82 (Iowa 2022). “Summary judgment

is proper when the undisputed material facts show the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Id. “A material fact is in dispute if reasonable minds

can differ on how to resolve the issue.” Id.

Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1012 sets out the grounds by which a court

can vacate a final judgment. The court can vacate a final judgment if it was

obtained by practice of fraud. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1012(2). It can also vacate a final

judgment based on newly discovered material evidence that “could not with

reasonable diligence have been discovered and produced at the trial, and was not

discovered within the time for moving for new trial.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1012(6).

A party attempting to vacate a final judgment in an action at law must do so

“within one year after the entry of the judgment.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1013(1). In the

wrongful-death action, Jason twice moved the court to vacate the judgment under
 8

rule 1.1012. The court denied the first motion, which was timely, on the merits.

Because Jason brought the second motion more than one year after the final

judgment was entered, the court denied it as untimely. See Hutchinson, 974

N.W.2d at 474 (noting that a party to a final judgment cannot pursue an action at

law to vacate the judgment after the deadline in rule 1.1013 passes).

Iowa courts recognize a procedure for challenging a final judgment after the

one-year deadline in rule 1.1013 expires. If more than one year has passed since

final judgment, a party can challenge that judgment under the common-law

exception to rule 1.1013 by initiating an independent equity action. Id. at 474–75.

So two years after final judgment in the wrongful-death action, Jason filed this

equitable action to vacate the judgment based on extrinsic fraud and newly

discovered evidence. The gist of his claims is that Bill conspired with members of

law enforcement to conceal evidence from him, which hindered his defense in the

wrongful-death action. He alleges this conspiracy to hide or misrepresent

evidence was extrinsic fraud. He claims the evidence they concealed is newly

discovered evidence. The district court granted summary judgment on both

claims, which we review in turn.

1. Extrinsic Fraud.

We begin with Jason’s claim that the judgment in the wrongful-death action

was procured by extrinsic fraud. The supreme court recently reflected on the high

bar a party must clear before a court in equity will vacate a final judgment in a

separate action:

The burden that a party bears in attempting in an equity suit to set
aside a judgment or decree and to obtain a new trial is a heavy one.
First, the alleged fraud must include extrinsic fraud rather than solely
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intrinsic fraud. Second, the party would not have been able to
discover the fraud within one year by using reasonable or due
diligence. Lastly, the party must show the traditional elements of
fraud.

Id. at 475. The question on summary judgment is whether reasonable minds could

disagree as to whether Jason cleared this bar.

In granting summary judgment on Jason’s claim of extrinsic fraud, the

district court first found Jason failed to show that any fraud could not be discovered

by reasonable diligence within one year of the judgment:

His claim of extrinsic fraud is based on the estate working [or]
collaborating with DCI, DCI hiding or losing evidence, and DCI and
the sheriff intimidating Jason’s family. He made these or similar
arguments during the civil case (as to the subpoena issue) and the
first petition to vacate. While he points to some evidence he learned
outside the one-year period, his claims of fraud were known to him
within one year after trial. Still, he made no claim of fraud until he
filed the amended petition on September 27, 2021.

The court also noted Jason’s claims of fraud centered on law enforcement

rather than the defendants:

Almost all of Jason’s claims are directed against DCI and the
sheriff’s office. DCI objected to sharing information from its
investigative report during the pendency of the civil case. DCI did
not give false assurances to either party. DCI received two
subpoenas during the course of the civil case. DCI filed a motion to
quash the first subpoena, and Jason filed a motion to quash the
second subpoena. Both motions were openly addressed by the
court. Neither party received the full investigative report, and Jason
lost his argument to prevent the more limited production requested
by the estate. Jason’s argument that the partial production
prejudiced him has already been addressed by the courts. See
Carter, 957 N.W.2d at 634.

Not only was law enforcement investigating Shirley’s death throughout the

wrongful-death proceedings, it had privilege to protect certain information learned
 10

in its investigation.2 See Iowa Code § 622.11 (“A public officer cannot be examined

as to communications made to the public officer in official confidence, when the

public interests would suffer by the disclosure.”); State ex rel. Shanahan v. Iowa

Dist. Ct. for Iowa Cnty., 356 N.W.2d 523, 528 (Iowa 1984) (holding that the district

court abused its discretion by ordering that the DCI give civil litigants in the

discovery phase of a wrongful-death action access to the DCI investigation file of

a double-homicide investigation).

The court found the biggest detriment to Jason’s claim is that it concerns

intrinsic fraud, not extrinsic fraud. The Iowa Supreme Court recently contrasted

the difference between the two:

Intrinsic fraud is that which inheres in the issues submitted to and
decided by the court. We have said intrinsic fraud occurs within the
framework of the actual conduct of the trial and pertains to and
affects the determination of the issue presented therein. . . .
Examples of intrinsic fraud include perjury, false or forged
instruments, and concealment or misrepresentation of evidence.
On the other hand, extrinsic fraud is some act or conduct of
the prevailing party which has prevented a fair submission of the
controversy. Extrinsic fraud has also been described as that fraud
which keeps a litigant from presenting the facts of his or her case and
prevents an adjudication on the merits. This includes lulling a party
into a false sense of security or preventing the party from making a
defense. Classic examples of extrinsic fraud include a bribed judge,
dishonest attorney representing the defrauded client, or a false
promise of compromise.

Hutchinson, 974 N.W.2d at 475–77 (cleaned up) (emphasis added).

2 We note that Jason invoked Iowa Code section 622.11 to quash the subpoena
of the DCI file during the wrongful-death action. Carter, 957 N.W.2d at 634 (holding
that a private citizen lacks standing to invoke the section 622.11 to prevent
disclosure of privileged information, yet the State can “voluntarily disclose
information that would be covered by the official information privilege”).
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We agree with the district court’s determination that Jason failed to prove

extrinsic fraud. As the court noted, this is not a classic case of extrinsic fraud in

which the defendants “made assurances or promises that lulled him into a false

sense of security or prevented him from presenting a defense.” Nor is it a case “in

which one party made assurances to the other to prevent them from making a

defense.” Jason’s claims are instead directed against law enforcement, which was

not a party to the civil action.3 Assuming Jason could prove his claims about

members of law enforcement, they concern intrinsic fraud.

2. Newly Discovered Evidence.

Jason also sought to vacate the civil judgment against him based on newly

discovered evidence that he claims shows he was not responsible for Shirley’s

death. To vacate a final judgment on this ground, a party must show:

(1) the evidence is newly discovered and could not, in the exercise
of due diligence, have been discovered prior to the conclusion of the
trial; (2) the evidence is material and not merely cumulative or
impeaching; and (3) the evidence will probably change the result if a
new trial is granted.

Carter, 957 N.W.2d at 637.

The district court granted summary judgment on this claim after determining

the issue was litigated and decided by the supreme court’s ruling in Carter v.

Carter, which estops the parties from relitigating it. See Lemartec Eng’g & Constr.

3 Jason filed a separate action against the State, alleging that a DCI agent “wrongly
inserted himself into the civil case and intentionally, but wrongly, targeted Carter
as his mother’s killer.” Carter v. State, No. 21-0909, 2023 WL 3397451, at *1 (Iowa
May 12, 2023). The supreme court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the
action. Id.
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v. Advance Conveying Techs., LLC, 940 N.W.2d 775, 779 (Iowa 2020). A party is

precluded from relitigating an issue when four criteria are met:

(1) the issue in the present case must be identical, (2) the issue must
have been raised and litigated in the prior action, (3) the issue must
have been material and relevant to the disposition of the prior case,
and (4) the determination of the issue in the prior action must have
been essential to the resulting judgment.

Id.

Jason cited newly discovered evidence in two petitions to vacate the

judgment in the wrongful-death action. The district court denied the first petition to

vacate on the merits. The supreme court affirmed that denial on appeal. Carter,

957 N.W.2d at 637. In doing so, it rejected Jason’s claim that the evidence he

cited in his first petition was newly discovered and could not have been discovered

with the exercise of due diligence. Id. at 638–39. The supreme court further found

that even if the evidence were material and admissible, it would not have changed

the result of trial. Id. at 639–43. The district court rejected Jason’s second petition

to vacate the judgment as untimely, but alternatively found that Jason’s claims of

newly discovered evidence would fail on the merits. The supreme court also

affirmed the denial of the second petition to vacate, agreeing the district court

lacked jurisdiction to consider it because Jason filed the second petition more than

one year after the judgment. Id. at 646. The court did not address the alternative

basis for the district court’s ruling.

Jason challenges the district court’s determination that he is precluded from

litigating his claim of newly discovered evidence. Although the supreme court held

that he failed to show newly discovered evidence in his first petition to vacate,

Jason argues his petition in this equity action relies on different evidence. The
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district court acknowledged that “Jason has presented some additional evidence

in this case that he did not yet have at the time the court heard evidence on his

first petition to vacate.” But even though the evidence Jason relies on in the equity

action is “new” in that it was not raised and considered on the merits previously,

the evidence supports the same theories Jason advanced in his first petition to

vacate. The supreme court addressed each of those theories and concluded the

evidence supporting them did not meet the criteria of “newly discovered” evidence.

See, e.g., id. at 639 (holding that Jason was aware of one theory before trial but

“did not make any attempts to obtain more information from law enforcement or

investigate leads for himself” and thus failed to exercise due diligence). The district

court found,

The supreme court decision thoroughly evaluated every aspect of
Jason’s newly discovered evidence claim. The court made broad
findings that his proposed evidence was known to him, that he did
not use due diligence to obtain the information before the civil trial,
that it was not material because it was inconsistent with his theory at
trial, and that most of the evidence was inadmissible hearsay. Those
findings govern the decision in this case because he makes the same
claims here.

We agree with the district court. Even if Jason is allowed to litigate his claim

of newly discovered evidence, it fails on the merits for the reasons the supreme

court articulated in Carter. Jason cannot show the evidence is newly discovered

evidence that could not have been discovered at the time of trial with due diligence,

is material and not cumulative or impeaching, and is likely to change the outcome

if presented in a new trial. We therefore affirm the grant of summary judgment.

AFFIRMED.