Christie Bailey v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

USCA11 Case: 22-11531 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 07/17/2023 Page: 1 of 7

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-11531
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________

CHRISTIE BAILEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, COMMISSIONER,

Respondent-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 4:20-cv-01664-NAD
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-11531

Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Christie Bailey appeals a magistrate judge’s order affirming
the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration’s (“Com-
missioner”) denial of her application for supplemental security in-
come (“SSI”). In this appeal, Bailey challenges only the Appeals
Council’s refusal to consider certain new evidence presented by
Bailey to the Appeals Council. First, she argues that the Appeals
Council erred in finding that a medical record from CED Mental
Health Center (“CED”) by Dr. Huma Khusro, dated February
2020, and a psychological evaluation by Dr. June Nichols, dated
May 2020, were not chronologically relevant. Second, she argues
that (1) a medical record from CED by Dr. Chardonney Johnson,
dated December 2019; (2) a medical record from Quality of Life,
dated January 2020; (3) a one-page mental health source statement
by Dr. Khusro, dated March 2020; and (4) a one-page mental health
source statement by Dr. Nichols, dated May 2020, were not mate-
rial. She adds, without citing to any authority, that, where a doc-
tor, especially a treating physician like Dr. Khusro, opines that a
claimant has disabling symptoms, the opinion is per se material.
In a social security case, we review the agency’s legal con-
clusions de novo, and its factual findings to determine whether they
are supported by substantial evidence. Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir. 2007). Whether evidence
meets the new, material, and chronologically relevant standard is a
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22-11531 Opinion of the Court 3

question of law subject to our de novo review. Washington v. Soc.
Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 806 F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th Cir. 2015). The Ap-
peals Council commits reversible error when it improperly refuses
to consider such evidence. Id. We will not address a new issue in
a social security appeal that was not raised in the district
court. Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1161 (11th Cir.
2004).
Generally, a claimant may present evidence at every stage of
the administrative process. Hargress v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 883
F.3d 1302, 1308 (11th Cir. 2018). If a claimant presents evidence
after the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision, the Appeals
Council must consider it if it is new, material, and chronologically
relevant.” Id. at 1309. Evidence is material if there is a reasonable
probability that the evidence would change the administrative re-
sult, and it is chronologically relevant if it relates to the period on
or before the date of the ALJ’s hearing decision. Id.; 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.970(a)(5), 416.1470(a)(5). The Appeals Council is not re-
quired to provide a detailed rationale for denying review. Mitchell
v. Soc. Sec. Admin, Comm’r, 771 F.3d 780, 784 (11th Cir. 2014).
Medical opinions based on treatment occurring after the
date of the ALJ’s decision may be chronologically relevant. Wash-
ington, 806 F.3d at 1322. In Washington, the claimant submitted to
the Appeals Council a psychologist’s evaluation and accompanying
opinion about the degree of the claimant’s mental limitations,
which were prepared seven months after the ALJ’s decision. Id. at
1319. We concluded that the psychologist’s materials were
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-11531

chronologically relevant because: (1) the claimant described his
mental symptoms during the relevant period to the psychologist,
(2) the psychologist had reviewed the claimant’s mental health
treatment records from that period, and (3) there was no evidence
of the claimant’s mental decline since the ALJ’s decision. Id. at
1322-23 (limiting our holding to “the specific circumstances of th[e]
case”).
In Hargress, the Appeals Council denied the appellant’s peti-
tion for review and refused to consider her newly submitted evi-
dence—which included medical records dated after the ALJ’s deci-
sion—stating that the new records were “about a later time” than
the ALJ’s decision, and, therefore, did not affect the ALJ’s decision
as to whether she was disabled prior to the date of that decision.
See Hargress, 883 F.3d at 1309. We stated that the Appeals Council
had declined to consider these new medical records because they
were not chronologically relevant. Id. We also held that the new
records were not chronologically relevant because nothing in them
indicated that the doctor, who did not treat the claimant during the
relevant period, had reviewed the appellant’s medical records, or
that the information in them related to the period at issue. Id.
at 1309-10.
In Harner v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner, we
explained that, for claims filed on or after March 27, 2017, the ALJ
does not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including
controlling weight, to any medical opinions or prior administrative
medical findings. 38 F.4th 892, 898 (11th Cir. 2022); 20 C.F.R. §
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22-11531 Opinion of the Court 5

404.1520c(a). Instead, the ALJ considers the persuasiveness of med-
ical opinions or prior administrative findings and will articulate the
persuasiveness of the medical opinions in its finding. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520c(a), (b). The ALJ considers several factors when as-
sessing medical opinions, including supportability and consistency,
which are the most important factors in conducting this assess-
ment. Id. § 404.1520c(a), (b)(2), (c)(1)-(5).
Here, the Appeals Council did not err in denying review af-
ter Bailey submitted new, post-decision evidence consisting of: (1)
Dr. Nichols’s 2020 psychological evaluation, (2) the February 2020
CED medical record, (3) the January 2020 Quality of Life medical
record, (4) the December 2019 CED medical record, (5) the March
2020 mental health source statement from Dr. Khusro, and (6) the
May 2020 mental health source statement from Dr. Nichols. Re-
garding Dr. Nichols’s May 2020 psychological evaluation and the
February 2020 CED medical record, the Appeals Council did not
err in determining that this evidence was chronologically irrele-
vant. Like in Hargress, here both records were “about a later time”
than the ALJ’s decision issued on January 28, 2020. See Hargress,
883 F.3d at 1309-10. And nothing indicates that the doctors here
relied on Bailey’s earlier medical records or that the information in
them related to the period at issue, which also distinguishes this
case from Washington. See id.; Washington, 806 F.3d at 1322-23. Alt-
hough Dr. Nichols’s evaluation had summarized Bailey’s prior
medical records, the evaluation expressly noted that the opinion
was based on the examination conducted on that date and Dr.
Khusro’s March 2020 mental health source statement. (Doc. 9-3 at
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-11531

27-28, 31). Thus, the discussed evidence did not relate to the rele-
vant period on or before the ALJ’s decision on January 28, 2022,
and the Appeals Council was not required to consider it. Id.
As to the December 2019 CED medical record, the January
2020 Quality of Life medical record, and the March 2020 and May
2020 mental health source statements from Dr. Khusro and Dr.
Nichols, the AC did not err in failing to consider this evidence. Re-
garding the December 2019 CED medical record, consistent with
the ALJ’s findings, that record showed that Bailey had moderate
mental health symptoms and diagnoses and continued to receive
treatment with prescription medications. And the ALJ had specifi-
cally accounted for these moderate symptoms with additional lim-
itations in Bailey’s RFC. Although Bailey did complain at that time
that her medications were not working, Dr. Khusro prescribed her
alternative medication and continued therapy, and nothing in that
record otherwise contradicts the ALJ’s finding that there was no
continuous evidence of marked or extreme mental health issues.
As such, that record was unlikely to change the outcome of the
ALJ’s decision. Hargress, 883 F.3d at 1309. As to the January 2020
Quality of Life medical record, Bailey has waived any argument in
this regard by failing to raise it before the district court. See Craw-
ford, 363 F.3d at 1161.
Regarding the source statements from Dr. Khusro and Dr.
Nichols, these opinions were also unlikely to change the outcome
of the decision because they were not supported by and/or con-
sistent with the medical evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a), (b)(2).
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22-11531 Opinion of the Court 7

Both statements were one-page forms that did not provide substan-
tive explanation or evidence as to the limitations described. Dr.
Khusro opined that she would expect Bailey to be off-task 50% or
more of an 8-hour day and that, in a 30-day period, she would ex-
pect Bailey to miss work 15 days or more. Dr. Nichols opined that
she would expect Bailey to be off-task 40 to 50% in an 8-hour day
and that, in a 30-day period, and she would expect Bailey to miss
work 10 to 15 days or more. Neither provided any explanation as
to the extreme limitations described—other than broadly describ-
ing Bailey as having a longstanding history of mental illness. More-
over, neither attempted to reconcile their opinions with other rec-
ord evidence showing periods where Bailey was reporting reduced
symptoms or no symptoms at all and with Bailey’s unchanged
treatment plan for the relevant period. And, contrary to Bailey’s
unsupported assertion, the Appeals Council was not required to
defer or give any specific weight to Dr. Khusro’s opinion because
she was a treating physician or Dr. Nichols’s opinion because she
was a doctor. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a); Harner, 38 F.4th at 987.
As such, the source statements were unlikely to change the out-
come of the ALJ’s decision, and the AC was not required to con-
sider them. Hargress, 883 F.3d at 1309.
Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.