Anchora Insurance Services, LLC v. Texas Green Star Holdings, LLC

Affirmed and Opinion Filed July 11, 2023

In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-22-00833-CV

ANCHORA INSURANCE SERVICES, LLC, Appellant
V.
TEXAS GREEN STAR HOLDINGS, LLC, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CC-21-04851-A

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Molberg, Pedersen, III, and Miskel
Opinion by Justice Pedersen, III
Appellant Anchora Insurance Services, LLC (Anchora) challenges the trial

court’s August 1, 2022 Order Denying Special Appearance. In three appellate issues,

Anchora argues that the trial court erroneously denied its special appearance because

the facts show that: Anchora does not have minimum contacts with the State of

Texas to support specific jurisdiction over it; Anchora does not have minimum

contacts with the State of Texas to support general jurisdiction over it; and exercising

personal jurisdiction over Anchora would violate due process. We affirm the trial

court’s order.
 Background

Anchora is a South Carolina company with its principal place of business in

Greenville, South Carolina. Anchora’s involvement with appellee Texas Green Star

Holdings, LLC (TGS) began when Aaron Smith, the owner and commercial lines

manager of Anchora, was contacted in December 2020 by a representative of Five

on Fifty Financial Services, LLC (Five on Fifty), another business operating in South

Carolina, looking for help in finding insurance coverage for its client, TGS.

TGS describes itself as a minority owned start-up company that purchased a

greenhouse property in March 2020 and began preparing its infra-structure for the

business of growing lettuce, spinach, kale, and other edible leafy greens for sale to

various retailers. Its growing operation is located in Sanger, Texas and occupies 322

acres of land with a multi-building nursery complex. TGS sought the insurance at

issue in this case to support its $15 million start-up loan and to protect its assets.

Anchora did not solicit the business of TGS in Texas and, before being

approached by Five on Fifty, it had no active license to sell insurance in Texas.

However, after being approached, Anchora agreed to try to find the general liability

and property insurance TGS was seeking, and it obtained a license to sell insurance

in Texas.1

1
Smith had previously held an individual license to sell insurance in Texas; when Anchora obtained
its license in 2020, Smith renewed his own license as well.
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 Anchora had a Retail Placement Agreement with Risk Placement Services,

Inc. (RPS), a wholesale insurance broker with branch offices that include Roswell,

Georgia and Dallas, Texas. Smith reached out to RPS because the markets that

Anchora had direct contracts with would not write the property insurance that TGS

required. Smith first emailed the DPS Georgia office; he was then referred to its

Dallas office (RPS-Dallas), which was managed by Ryan Pike. Smith asked Pike to

attempt to get quotes for property insurance for TGS.

Anchora received quotes from RPS-Dallas for the coverage TGS sought and

placed the “stacked” insurance coverage with three Texas insurance companies.

Anchora arranged financing of the premiums through IPFS Corporation, a

commercial insurance financing lender. Pursuant to that financing agreement, TGS

made its down payment on coverage by sending its check to Anchora; the check was

made out to Anchora Insurance Services, LLC in the amount of $52,706.35. Anchora

deposited the check in its bank account and then sent RPS its check for 90% of the

amount TGS paid.2

In February 2021, Texas was stricken by a five-day-long winter storm with

sustained freezing temperatures. The storm resulted in hundreds of deaths and left

millions of homes without power. TGS’s pleading alleges that its nursery operation

was “decimated” by the storm and that it incurred damage in excess of $9 million.

2
According to Anchora, RPS then retained its commission and sent the remaining funds to the
insurance companies.
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TGS made a claim on the policies it had obtained through Anchora the year before,

but coverage was denied.

TGS sued Anchora, alleging breach of contract and the duty of good faith and

fair dealing, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and violations of the Deceptive

Trade Practices Act and the Texas Insurance Code.3 Anchora filed a special

appearance, arguing that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over it. The

trial court denied the special appearance, and this interlocutory appeal followed.4

Discussion

Anchora raises three issues in this Court, contending the trial court

erroneously denied its special appearance.

Establishing Personal Jurisdiction

Texas courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant

if the Texas long-arm statute permits it and asserting jurisdiction is consistent with

federal due process guarantees. Luciano v. SprayFoamPolymers.com, LLC, 625

S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. 2021). The broad “doing business” language in Texas’s long-arm

statute allows the trial court’s jurisdiction to reach as far as the federal constitutional

requirements of due process will allow. Kelly v. Gen. Interior Const., Inc., 301

3
TGS also brought claims against the insurance companies, their insurance adjusting firm, RPS-Dallas,
and Pike.
4
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. ANN. § 51.014(a)(8).

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S.W.3d 653, 657 (Tex. 2010).5 Once the plaintiff has sufficiently invoked the long-

arm statute, the nonresident defendant has the burden of negating all bases of

jurisdiction alleged in the plaintiff’s petition. Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 574.

Personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant satisfies constitutional due

process guarantees when (1) the nonresident defendant has established minimum

contacts with the forum state and (2) exercising jurisdiction comports with

traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. See M & F Worldwide Corp.

v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 512 S.W.3d 878, 885 (Tex. 2017).

Personal jurisdiction may be specific or general in nature. Specific jurisdiction

exists when the plaintiff’s claims arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts

with the forum. Searcy v. Parex Res., Inc., 496 S.W.3d 58, 67 (Tex. 2016). The

proper focus of a specific jurisdiction analysis is the defendant’s relationship with

the forum; the defendant’s contacts must be “substantially connected to the alleged

operative facts of the case.” Id. at 67, 70. General jurisdiction is established when a

defendant’s contacts are sufficiently continuous and systematic that the defendant is

essentially “at home” in the forum State. M & F Worldwide Corp. v. Pepsi-Cola

Metro. Bottling Co., Inc., 512 S.W.3d 878, 885 (Tex. 2017) (citing Goodyear

5
Under the long-arm statute, Texas courts can exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant who “does business” in Texas. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 17.042. TGS’s petition alleged that
“Defendant Anchora Insurance Services, LLC (“Anchora”) is believed to be a foreign limited liability
company doing business in the State of Texas.” The plaintiff bears this initial burden of pleading sufficient
allegations to bring a nonresident defendant within the provisions of the Texas long-arm statute. Moki Mac
River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 574 (Tex. 2007).
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Dunlop Tires Operations, SA v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 131 (2011)). A court with

general jurisdiction may exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant based on

any claim, even if a claim is unrelated to that defendant’s contacts with the state. Id.

In this case, TGS contends that Anchora’s contacts with Texas satisfy both specific

and general jurisdiction requirements; Anchora denies that the trial court possessed

either.

Standard of Review

Whether a trial court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident

defendant is a question of law that we review de novo. Old Republic Nat’l Title Ins.

Co. v. Bell, 549 S.W.3d 550, 558 (Tex. 2018). When, as in this case, the trial court

does not issue findings of fact and conclusions of law with its special appearance

ruling, we imply all findings of fact necessary to support its ruling that are supported

by the evidence. BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex.

2002).

Minimum Contacts

The threshold inquiry for personal jurisdiction is whether the defendant

possesses minimum contacts with the forum state. Minimum contacts are established

when the nonresident defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of

conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking its laws, benefits, and

protections. Kelly v. Gen. Interior Constr., Inc., 301 S.W.3d 653, 657–58 (Tex.

2010). We analyze purposeful availment employing three guidelines: only the

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defendant’s contacts are relevant; the contacts must be purposeful, not random,

fortuitous, or attenuated; and the defendant must seek some advantage, benefit, or

profit by availing itself of the forum. See Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 575. In its first

appellate issue, Anchora argues that the trial court erred in denying its special

appearance because the facts show that it does not have minimum contacts with the

State of Texas that would support specific jurisdiction in this case.

Anchora concedes that it acted as a third-party insurance agent in order to find

general liability and property insurance coverage for TGS. It contends it fulfilled

that role without any purposeful contacts with the State of Texas. In its special

appearance, Anchora argued specifically that: it is not a resident of Texas; it has no

systematic and continuous contacts with the State of Texas: it in no manner invoked

the benefits and protections of the laws of Texas within the context of this lawsuit;

it does not own property, maintain a bank account, or pay taxes in the State of Texas;

it has not committed any tort, in whole or in part, within Texas; and it did not

purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities with the forum of

Texas. Thus, it contended, any contacts it did have with the State were random,

isolated, or fortuitous and could not support a conclusion of purposeful availment on

its part.

In response to Anchora’s special appearance, TGS argued that the following

actions by Anchora constituted purposeful contacts with the State of Texas: (1)

contracting with TGS directly, while being aware that TGS would be seeking

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insurance in Texas; (2) seeking the services of RPS-Dallas, another Texas resident,

in order to have RPS perform services in Texas to effectuate the contractual

agreement between Anchora and TGS; (3) receiving financial gain from TGS, when

TGS paid Anchora directly and Anchora received commissions; and (4) obtaining a

license to sell insurance in Texas. We look at these purported contacts in turn.

(1) Contracting with TGS, a Texas resident, to place insurance in Texas

It is undisputed that Anchora had no written contract with TGS. However, at

the special appearance hearing, counsel for Anchora conceded—as its representative

did in deposition—that the two had “an agreement orally that we would help them

procure insurance. And we did, in fact, do that.” Indeed, Anchora procured general

liability insurance for the Texas company and property insurance for its property that

was located in Texas. Thus, Anchora certainly agreed to do business with TGS.6

(2) Contracting with RPS-Dallas for Texas services

TGS also contends that Anchora contracted with RPS-Dallas for services that

would “effectuate the contractual agreement” between Anchora and TGS.

Documents in the record identify RPS as the “broker” in these insurance transactions

and identify Anchora as the “Retail Producer.” Anchora itself describes RPS as “the

6
The parties’ agreement could be characterized as a unilateral contract, which is created “when a
promisor promises a benefit if a promisee performs.” City of Houston v. Williams, 353 S.W.3d 128, 135–
36 (Tex. 2011). But whether we clothe the parties’ agreement with the title “contract” or not, the existence
of that agreement and its performance are significant to our minimum contacts analysis.

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conduit between Anchora and the insurance companies where [TGS] placed

coverage.” The record includes a June 19, 2021 email to TGS representatives from

Mr. Smith stating, “Please remember that you cannot bind or alter coverage without

speaking to an authorized agent of Anchora Insurance Services,

ILC/Mayfieid/Watson Insurance Group, LLC.” That “authorized representative”

was RPS-Dallas.

Anchora argues first that it “did not directly engage” RPS-Dallas for help in

obtaining insurance for TGS. Instead, it states, it was referred to the Dallas RPS

office after it initially contacted RPS offices in Georgia. But the fact that Anchora’s

reaching out to the Dallas office was not its original effort does not in any way make

its working relationship with the Dallas office less “direct.” The record establishes

that Anchora worked directly with Pike and RPS-Dallas in this process.

Similarly, Anchora challenges TGS’s charge that it (Anchora) contracted with

RPS-Dallas to perform services for Anchora in Texas. Instead, Anchora explains, it

has a Retail Producer Agreement “with RPS in Rolling Meadows, Illinois, not

Texas.” Again, the record establishes that Anchora’s first outreach went to RPS’s

office in Georgia; for the transactions at issue, the record establishes Anchora was

dealing with RPS’s office in Dallas. Anchora’s contract was with the multi-state

company and apparently allowed Anchora to work with any of that company’s

branch offices. What matters here is that Anchora’s contacts with RPS in Dallas did,

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as TGS contends, allow Anchora to “effectuate” its placement of insurance for TGS

in Texas. That fact is not undermined in any fashion by RPS’s contractual address.

(3) Financial gain from Texas activity

Anchora acknowledges that it “did accrue financial benefits—a

commission—as a result of the services it provided to [TGS].” But Anchora argues

that those benefits were not negotiated or paid directly by TGS. It is undisputed that

TGS wrote a check to Anchora, that Anchora deposited TGS’s check into its own

bank account, and that Anchora then sent 90% of those deposited funds to RPS,

keeping 10% as its commission. The multi-layered process by which this insurance

was identified, placed, and purchased may well mean that the various entities receive

compensation for their services in various ways. But there is no question, based on

the record before us, that Anchora received a financial benefit for its role in the

process and that its commission was paid by funds from TGS.

(4) Obtaining a license to sell insurance in Texas

Anchora also concedes the relevant facts for this contact. It states that:

Anchora obtained its license solely for the purpose of legally being able
to place insurance on [TGS’s] and another client’s behalf who was
moving from South Carolina to Texas. . . . Anchora only obtained its
Texas license so that it would be in compliance with Texas law as a
retail non-resident agent.

Anchora acknowledges that it intended to place insurance in Texas for Texas-

resident TGS, and that to do so, it was required to obtain a license to sell insurance

in this state. Stated differently, Anchora wanted to avail itself of the ability to place

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insurance in Texas, and so it submitted to the requirements of Texas law; it sought,

and received, permission to engage in the business of selling insurance in Texas.

And it did so, so that it could place the insurance that is at issue in this litigation.7

Anchora cites cases from two of our sister courts stating that “[t]he holding of

a license to sell services in Texas, without more, does not suffice to establish general

jurisdiction.” See Equity Trust Co. v. Hebert, No. 09-04-122 CV, 2004 WL 2474845,

*6 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2004, no pet.); see also Int’l Turbine Serv., Inc. v. Lovitt,

881 S.W.2d 805, 810 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1994, writ denied). Because Anchora

concedes that it obtained the license to place the insurance at issue in this case, we

are viewing its relevance to specific jurisdiction, rather than general jurisdiction.

While Hebert doesn’t specifically address the license in terms of specific

jurisdiction, Lovitt makes clear that, in that case, “the cause of action was not

connected with appellees’ Texas insurance license or business. “ Id. at 809.

Accordingly, these cases do not assist our analysis.

In Shelter Mutual Insurance Co. v. Dallas County Hospital District, 366

S.W.3d 858, 863 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, pet. denied), we addressed Shelter’s

status as a nonresident insurance company that “maintains a license to do business

in Texas and systematically conducts business in Texas with Texas insurance

companies.” Under the long-arm statute, Texas courts can exercise personal

7
The fact that Anchora had another client moving to Texas—and apparently wanted to be able to place
insurance for it as well—does not affect our analysis.
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jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who “does business” in Texas. CIV. PRAC.

& REM. § 17.042. We concluded in Shelter that “[r]egardless of the type of policies

it actually issues, by seeking and maintaining a license to issue insurance policies in

Texas and by actually issuing such policies to Texas companies, Shelter has

purposefully availed itself of the benefits of conducting business in Texas.” Id. As a

result, Shelter’s contacts were such that it could reasonably foresee being haled into

a Texas court. Id. Shelter also addressed maintenance of a license to do business as

evidence of general jurisdiction. But in this case, where Anchora’s principal testifies

that the very reason the license was obtained was to be able to place insurance for

TGS, we conclude that Anchora’s license is a significant contact supporting specific

jurisdiction.

Anchora relies on the Texas Supreme Court’s opinion in IRA Resources, Inc.

v. Greigo, 221 S.W.3d 592 (Tex. 2007), to argue that Anchora’s contacts with Texas

are insufficient to support personal jurisdiction. In that case, Mr. and Mrs. Greigo

purchased five Customer Owned Coin Operated Telephones through American

Telecommunications Company, Inc. (ATC), as an investment Id. at 594. The

Griegos’ investment agreement provided that ATC’s parent company would

maintain the phones and the Griegos would receive a guaranteed percentage of

revenues. Id. at 594–95. To fund the purchase of the telephones, Mr. Greigo rolled

an individual retirement account into a self-directed IRA administered by IRA

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Resources, a California corporation headquartered in San Diego. Id. 595. The

supreme court described the nature of that IRA:

IRA Resources acted as the third-party administrator of Griego’s self-
directed IRA, providing certain record-keeping services such as issuing
quarterly investment performance statements and reporting IRA
income to the Internal Revenue Service, but it followed its clients’
investment directives and provided no investment advice,
recommendations, or endorsements.

Id. The supreme court concluded that IRA Resources did not purposefully avail itself

of the privilege of conducting business in Texas and determined that the contacts it

had with the state were random, isolated, and fortuitous. Id. at 598–99. Thus the trial

court lacked specific jurisdiction in that case. Id. at 599. Anchora argues that its

contacts with Texas were similar to IRA Resources, because neither defendant

marketed or solicited business in Texas, neither had a Texas bank account or postal

box in Texas, and none of its employees traveled to Texas. However, we conclude

that Greigo is distinguishable in at least one significant respect: there the supreme

court concluded that “merely contracting with and accepting an account-initiation

fee from a Texas resident for services performed in California are insufficient to

satisfy the minimum contacts test.” Id. at 597 (emphasis added). In appellant’s case,

the services for which Anchora reached out to TGS and DPS-Dallas, for which it

received a commission, and for which it pursued and obtained a Texas license to sell

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insurance, were all services to be performed in Texas. We conclude that Greigo does

not support Anchora’s arguments here.8

Throughout its briefing, Anchora stresses that it performed all of its services

in Georgia, not in Texas. However, our supreme court has stated that “[t]he

defendant’s activities, whether they consist of direct acts within Texas or conduct

outside Texas, must justify a conclusion that the defendant could reasonably

anticipate being called into a Texas court.” M & F Worldwide Corp., 512 S.W.3d at

886 (quoting Retamco Operating, Inc. v. Republic Drilling Co., 278 S.W.3d 333,

338 (Tex. 2009)) (emphasis added). Although Anchora remained physically in

Georgia, we conclude that it reached out to a Texas resident and agreed to place

insurance for that resident, including insurance on the resident’s Texas property. In

the process, it worked with the Texas branch office of its broker to act as a conduit

between Anchora and companies that would insure the Texas business and property.

For its efforts, it received a commission that was paid from TGS’s funds. And all of

its activities were made possible because it obtained a license from the State of Texas

to sell insurance, i.e., to do business in Texas.

8
Anchora relies on a second case involving IRA Resources for its argument that “there can be no
specific jurisdiction when the defendant’s services find their way into the forum through a separate entity.”
It cites Meader v. IRA Resources, Inc., 178 S.W.3d 338, 347 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no
pet.) for that proposition, arguing that because Anchora was originally contacted by Five on Fifty,
jurisdiction in this case would be improper. The contacts on which our analysis is based are Anchora’s
contacts, not Five on Fifty’s. The fact that Anchora’s work for TGS was originally sought out by another
entity is irrelevant to Anchora’s contacts with TGS and Texas.
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 These contacts were Anchora’s. Each of them was part of Anchora’s

purposeful business venture into Texas to place specific insurance for a specific

client, i.e., TGS. Accordingly, the contacts cannot be described as random or isolated

or fortuitous. In addition, Anchora unquestionably profited from this business

venture. Accordingly, we conclude that Anchora purposefully availed itself of the

privilege of doing business in Texas. See Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 575. We

conclude Anchora had minimum contacts with the State of Texas sufficient to

support specific jurisdiction over it. We overrule Anchora’s first issue.9

Due Process

In its third issue, Anchora contends that the trial court erred by denying its

special appearance when the facts show that exercising personal jurisdiction over it

in this case would violate due process. Even if a nonresident has established

minimum contacts with a state, jurisdiction may only be exercised over the

nonresident if doing so comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial

justice. TV Azteca v. Ruiz, 490 S.W.3d 29, 55 (Tex. 2016). The Texas Supreme Court

has identified factors that may be relevant to this inquiry, including the burden on

the defendant, the interests of the forum in adjudicating the dispute, and the

plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief. Cornerstone

Healthcare Grp. Holding, Inc. v. Nautic Mgmt. VI, L.P., 493 S.W.3d 65, 74 (Tex.

9
Because we conclude that Anchora’s contacts support specific jurisdiction, we need not address its
second issue challenging general jurisdiction.
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2016). That court has also recognized that if “a nonresident has minimum contacts

with the forum, rarely will the exercise of jurisdiction over the nonresident not

comport with [such] notions.” Id. (quoting Moncrief Oil Intern. Inc. v. OAO

Gazprom, 414 S.W.3d 142, 154–55 (Tex. 2013)).

Subjecting Anchora to suit in Texas may impose some burden upon it, but the

same can be said of all nonresidents. “Distance alone cannot ordinarily defeat

jurisdiction.” Moncrief Oil, 414 S.W.3d at 155. Anchora does not identify any

burden peculiar to this case, or its circumstances, that speaks to any compelling

hardship beyond the distance between Georgia and Texas.

We are also persuaded that Texas has a compelling interest in adjudicating

this lawsuit, which will resolve claims of bad faith insurance practices that

purportedly resulted in millions of dollars in damages to a Texas resident and Texas

property. “The State of Texas has a special interest in regulating certain areas such

as insurance, and the Texas courts have implicitly recognized the role of that interest

for purposes of determining personal jurisdiction.” Guardian Royal Exch. Assur.,

Ltd. v. English China Clays, P.L.C., 815 S.W.2d 223, 229 (Tex. 1991). Moreover,

contrary to Anchora’s assertion in its brief, TGS is asserting that Anchora committed

torts in Texas. See Moncrief Oil, 414 S.W.3d at 155 (allegations that defendants

committed tort against resident in Texas “implicate a serious state interest in

adjudicating the dispute”).

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 Finally, while we do not question the ability of the South Carolina courts to

adjudicate TGS’s claims against Anchora, if TGS’s claims against all other

defendants are being pursued in a single case in Texas, efficiency argues for its

claims against Anchora being adjudicated as part of that single process.

We conclude that each of the Cornerstone Healthcare factors supports the

trial court’s exercising jurisdiction over Anchora. Accordingly, we conclude that

exercising that jurisdiction will comport with traditional notions of fair play and

substantial justice. See Ruiz, 490 S.W.3d at 55. We overrule Anchora’s third issue.

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s August 1, 2022 Order Denying Special

Appearance.

/Bill Pedersen, III//
220833f.p05 BILL PEDERSEN, III
JUSTICE

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 Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT

ANCHORA INSURANCE On Appeal from the County Court at
SERVICES, LLC, Appellant Law No. 1, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CC-21-04851-
No. 05-22-00833-CV V. A.
Opinion delivered by Justice
TEXAS GREEN STAR Pedersen, III. Justices Molberg and
HOLDINGS, LLC, Appellee Miskel participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s August 1,
2022 Order Denying Special Appearance is AFFIRMED.

It is ORDERED that appellee Texas Green Star Holdings, LLC recover its
costs of this appeal from appellant Anchora Insurance Services, LLC.

Judgment entered this 11th day of July, 2023.

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