Filed 7/19/23 P. v. Vasquez CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Mono)
----
THE PEOPLE, C095599
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No.
MFE20000775)
v.
JOSUE ADALBERTO COREA VASQUEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Josue Adalberto Corea Vasquez drove to Jose Omar Hernandez
Sanchez’s house in the middle of the night and waited for him to leave for work.
Defendant brought an AK-47 assault rifle that he bought specifically for the purpose of
murdering Sanchez. The two men were coworkers, and defendant felt disrespected by
Sanchez during a brief period of time in which Sanchez was defendant’s supervisor.
About an hour and a half after defendant parked near Sanchez’s house, Sanchez walked
outside, started his car to warm it up, and returned to the house. Defendant took this
opportunity to leave his car and position himself between a grouping of trees closer to the
house. When Sanchez came back outside to leave for work, defendant took aim and said
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something like, “You’re not so fucking invincible now, are you?” Before Sanchez could
respond, defendant pulled the trigger, emptying the 30-round magazine and ending
Sanchez’s life.
A jury convicted defendant of first degree murder, found that the murder was
committed by means of lying in wait, and also found that defendant personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm causing Sanchez’s death. The trial court sentenced
defendant to state prison for life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) plus a
consecutive term of 25 years to life.
On appeal, defendant challenges the lying-in-wait special circumstance as
unconstitutional because it fails to genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the
death penalty or LWOP and it does not reasonably justify a more severe sentence than
other premeditated murders. Because our Supreme Court has “repeatedly rejected” this
argument (People v. Casares (2016) 62 Cal.4th 808, 849, disapproved on another point in
People v. Dalton (2019) 7 Cal.5th 166, 214; see also People v. Carasi (2008) 44 Cal.4th
1263, 1310; People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1148), we must do the same.
(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.) Defendant also
asks this court to review the sealed transcript of in camera proceedings conducted by the
trial court in connection with his Pitchess motion.1 Having done so, we conclude the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in determining the personnel files it reviewed contained
no discoverable material. We therefore affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
Due to the nature of defendant’s appellate contentions, we need not provide a
detailed recitation of the evidence adduced against him at trial. And because defendant
1 While Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess) has been
superseded by statute, motions for discovery of law enforcement officer personnel files
are still referred to as Pitchess motions. (People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1225.)
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confessed to murdering Sanchez, both to a coworker, Francisco Ramirez, and also during
a recorded interview with district attorney investigator Chris Callinan, our summary of
the murder is taken largely from defendant’s own statements.
Sanchez was murdered outside his home during the early morning hours of
October 9, 2016. The events giving rise to the murder began more than two months
earlier, when Sanchez was defendant’s supervisor at a Vons grocery store. Defendant
hated Sanchez. This hatred appears to have stemmed primarily from the manner in which
Sanchez exercised managerial authority over him, for example, giving defendant extra
work and threatening to fire him and his family members who also worked at the store.
During one argument between the two, defendant angrily told Sanchez “not to mess with
his family.”
About two months before the murder, Sanchez was relieved of his duties as
manager, but continued to work at the store. Also prior to the murder, defendant told
coworker Ramirez that he hated Sanchez and “had the means to make him disappear.”
Defendant was apparently referring to an AK-47 assault rifle that he later admitted he
bought for the specific purpose of murdering Sanchez. After buying the weapon, he
brought Ramirez and another coworker to a wooded area off of the highway to shoot
cans. While there, defendant joked that the weapon was “really strong,” and “if you hit a
person with it . . . it would basically tear them up inside.”
On the night of the murder, just after midnight, defendant drove past Sanchez’s
home four times over the span of about 20 minutes. These passes were captured by two
nearby surveillance cameras. Defendant then parked on the street near the house around
12:25 a.m. As defendant later admitted, he “just circled around to see if [Sanchez] was
there,” and then parked on the street to wait for him to leave for work. While defendant
estimated waiting for about half an hour, the surveillance camera footage reveals he was
parked there for over an hour and a half.
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Meanwhile, Sanchez was at home in bed with his wife. He got up sometime
before 1:40 a.m. to get ready for his shift at the grocery store. Around 2:00 a.m., Sanchez
went outside and started his car to warm it up. He then went back inside the house and
made himself some coffee. Defendant took this opportunity to get out of his car,
approach Sanchez’s house with the AK-47, and position himself between a grouping of
trees closer to the home. When Sanchez came back outside to leave for work, defendant
took aim with the assault rifle and said something like, “You’re not so fucking invincible
now, are you?” Before Sanchez could respond, defendant pulled the trigger, emptying
the 30-round magazine and ending Sanchez’s life. Defendant then returned to his car and
drove away.
Later that morning, after word of Sanchez’s death made its way to the night
stocking crew at the store, including Ramirez, defendant sent Ramirez a text message
saying: “No one screws with me.”
As mentioned, defendant later admitted to Ramirez that he murdered Sanchez. He
also confessed to Investigator Callinan during a recorded interview. Defendant explained
during that interview: “There was so much hate. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . I shot the entire
cartridge on him.” Defendant also wrote and signed both a confession and a letter of
apology to Sanchez’s children.
We finally note that defendant testified at trial and denied killing Sanchez. He
claimed Investigator Callinan threatened him at gunpoint and thereby coerced him into
confessing to a murder he did not commit.
DISCUSSION
I
Lying-in-wait Special Circumstance
Defendant challenges the lying-in-wait special circumstance as unconstitutional
because it fails to genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty or
LWOP and it does not reasonably justify a more severe sentence than other premeditated
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murders. However, as defendant candidly admits, our Supreme Court has “repeatedly
rejected” this argument. (People v. Casares, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 849, disapproved on
another point in People v. Dalton, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 214; see also People v. Carasi,
supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1310; People v. Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1148.) We are
bound by these decisions. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 57 Cal.2d at
p. 455.) Defendant acknowledges as much, and raises the issue solely “to preserve it for
federal review.”
We must therefore reject defendant’s constitutional challenge to the lying-in-wait
special circumstance.
II
Pitchess Review
Defendant also asks us to review the trial court’s determination, after conducting
an in camera review of Investigator Callinan’s personnel files under Pitchess, that these
files contain no discoverable material. We have done so and conclude there was no abuse
of discretion.
A criminal defendant has the right to “compel discovery” of certain information in
police officer personnel files by demonstrating good cause. (Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d at
p. 536; see id. at pp. 536-538.) That right is codified in Penal Code sections 832.7 and
832.8 and Evidence Code sections 1043 through 1045. (City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal
Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 81 (City of Santa Cruz).)
A request for discovery of such records must be made by a written noticed motion
(Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (a)) supported by affidavits showing “good cause” for the
discovery or disclosure of the documents sought. Good cause is shown by setting forth
the “materiality” of the information sought to the subject matter of the pending litigation
and stating “upon reasonable belief” that the identified governmental agency has the
records or information sought. (Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (b)(3); City of Santa Cruz,
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supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 82.) This two-part showing is a “relatively low threshold for
discovery.” (City of Santa Cruz, at p. 83.)
Once the trial court finds good cause has been shown, it must conduct an in
camera review of the records and disclose only those records and information that are
relevant and not subject to exclusion from disclosure. (Evid. Code, § 1045, subds. (a) &
(b).) To facilitate meaningful appellate review, the trial court must make a record of the
documents it considered before ruling on the motion. (People v. Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th
at pp. 1228-1230.)
Here, defendant filed a Pitchess motion seeking discovery of personnel files
pertaining to Investigator Callinan, specifically regarding complaints for acts of
dishonesty, false arrest, illegal search and seizure, fabrication of charges or evidence,
unnecessary acts of aggressive behavior, acts of violence or attempted violence, acts of
excessive force or attempted excessive force, or any act involving morally lax character.
In support of the motion, defendant’s trial counsel submitted a declaration stating that
during jury selection a potential juror, who was a former Mono County Sheriff’s deputy,
wrote on his juror questionnaire: “ ‘The DA Investigator, Chris Callinan, is not an honest
officer and should not be working in law enforcement. Assault under the color of
authority.’ ” Based on this statement on the questionnaire, trial counsel stated in his
declaration that the information sought in the motion would be used “to impeach the
testimony of Investigator Callinan and bolster the claim of [defendant] . . . regarding
being coerced at gunpoint to admit his guilt by Investigator Callinan.”
The trial court found good cause to review Investigator Callinan’s personnel files
in camera, specifically looking for any complaints relevant to “allegations made by the
defense . . . that excessive coercion or force was used to compel a confession.” After
reviewing two sets of personnel files, one from Investigator Callinan’s time as a sheriff’s
deputy and one from his time at the district attorney’s office, the trial court found no
discoverable material.
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A trial court’s ruling on the discoverability of material in police personnel files
pursuant to Pitchess is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Hughes (2002)
27 Cal.4th 287, 330.) We have reviewed the sealed transcript of the hearing held in
camera and conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining the records
contained no discoverable material.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/
EARL, P. J.
We concur:
/s/
MAURO, J.
/s/
KRAUSE, J.
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