Walgreen Co. v. Anest CA3

Filed 7/24/23 Walgreen Co. v. Anest CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Butte)
----

WALGREEN CO., C097574

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 21CV00269)

v.

CHRISTINA P. ANEST,

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant and appellant Christina P. Anest was employed by plaintiff and
respondent Walgreen Co. (Walgreens).1 When she was hired, she signed an agreement
pursuant to which Walgreens would immediately pay her a $35,000 incentive payment,
but if she failed to remain continuously employed for three full years, she had to repay
the entire amount. Anest left Walgreens before completing three years of employment,

1 Plaintiff and respondent is identified as “Walgreen Co.” in the papers and as
“Walgreens” in the agreement that lies at the heart of this case. We refer to it as
Walgreens throughout.

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and when she failed to repay the incentive payment, Walgreens sued her for breach of
contract. Walgreens then moved for summary judgment and the trial court granted the
motion and entered judgment against Anest. Anest appeals and we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Anest was hired by Walgreens in May 2016 as a pharmacist. When she was hired,
she was offered a $30,000 sign-on bonus incentive payment and a $5,000 relocation
incentive payment (she lived in Los Angeles at the time and relocated to the
Chico/Redding area for the position), subject to the following terms and conditions:

“1. To avoid any repayment obligation with respect to the
incentive payment, Pharmacist must remain continuously
employed by Walgreens . . . for a period of 3 full year(s) of
actual service (the ‘required employment period’). . . .

“2. If Pharmacist leaves Walgreens (for any reason) before
completely fulfilling the required employment period, then
Pharmacist must repay Walgreens the entire incentive
payment amount (‘repayment obligation’). Partial completion
of the required employment period will not reduce
Pharmacist’s repayment obligation. . . .

“3. By accepting the incentive payment Pharmacist
authorizes Walgreens to satisfy Pharmacist’s repayment
obligation with any amounts owed by Walgreens to
Pharmacist . . . . Any remaining repayment obligation
balance must be repaid in full within thirty (30) calendar days
after request by Walgreens. If not timely repaid, then the
entire unpaid balance shall be increased by a penalty of 8%
per year . . . . [¶] . . . [¶]

“5. This Agreement is not a contract or guarantee of
employment for a definite period. As always, either
Pharmacist or Walgreens may terminate the employment
relationship for any reason, at any time, with or without cause
or notice (i.e., ‘at-will’).”
In June 2016, Anest accepted the offer by electronically signing the agreement and
checking a box attesting she “accepts and agrees to all of the terms and conditions set

2
forth in this Incentive Payment Agreement,”2 and Walgreens paid her the incentive
payment, with payroll taxes deducted.
Anest was terminated in February 2018 (we are not told why), after 21 months of
employment, which triggered her obligation to repay the incentive payment. In March
2018, Walgreens sent her an invoice for $32,322.50 ($35,000 less $2,677.50 for FICA
payments that Walgreens was obligated to pay). When Anest failed to pay the invoice in
full, Walgreens filed a complaint against her for breach of contract and a common count
(money had and received), and it ultimately filed a motion for summary judgment. At the
time the summary judgment motion was filed, Anest had made some payments, and
Walgreens asserted she still owed it $27,890.51 pursuant to the terms of the agreement.
In opposition to the motion, Anest, who represented herself, argued: the
agreement was void and unenforceable because Walgreens had effectively altered its
terms by characterizing the incentive payment as a loan in its motion papers; she did not
breach the agreement; Walgreens breached the agreement by terminating her; requiring
her to repay the incentive payment would be tantamount to an employer collecting wages
previously paid, in violation of Labor Code section 221; and Walgreens could not
substantiate the amount it claimed she owed.
The trial court granted the motion, finding the following facts were undisputed and
established Walgreens was entitled to judgment: (1) Walgreens hired Anest in May
2016, and her employment was terminated in February 2018; (2) in connection with her
employment, Walgreens offered Anest $35,000 in incentive payments subject to the
terms and conditions quoted above, and she accepted the offer; (3) a month after she was

2 There were actually two separate agreements—one for the sign-on bonus incentive
payment and one for the relocation incentive payment. The terms of both agreements
were identical. The parties do not discuss the agreements separately, and we thus
frequently refer to the “agreement” in the singular and to a single $35,000 incentive
payment.

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terminated, Walgreens sent her an invoice for the full amount owed; and (4) taking into
account amounts she had already repaid, she still owed $27,890.51. On December 1,
2022, judgment was entered in favor of Walgreens against Anest in the sum of
$27,890.51. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
This case comes to us after the trial court granted Walgreens’ motion for summary
judgment. “We review a grant of summary judgment de novo; we must decide
independently whether the facts not subject to triable dispute warrant judgment for the
moving party as a matter of law.” (Intel Corp. v. Hamidi (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1342, 1348.)
“We need not defer to the trial court and are not bound by the reasons in its summary
judgment ruling; we review the ruling of the trial court, not its rationale.” (Oakland
Raiders v. National Football League (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 621, 630.) Thus, “We may
affirm the summary judgment on any correct legal theory, as long as the parties had an
adequate opportunity to address the theory in the trial court.” (Drake v. Pinkham (2013)
217 Cal.App.4th 400, 406.) Although our review is de novo, that does not mean we
ignore the trial court’s decision. Instead, that decision is presumed correct, and the
appellant has the burden of affirmatively establishing reversible error. (Swigart v. Bruno
(2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 529, 535.)
We begin by noting that Anest is representing herself. A self-represented party,
however, “is to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater
consideration than other litigants and attorneys.” (Barton v. New United Motor
Manufacturing, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1210.) That means Anest is subject to
all applicable rules of appellate procedure and briefing, including the rule that judgments
and orders are presumed correct, and it is the appellant’s job to affirmatively demonstrate
error. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) “To demonstrate error,
appellant must present meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority and
citations to facts in the record that support the claim of error.” (In re S.C. (2006)

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138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.) “[A]n appellant is required to not only cite to valid legal
authority, but also explain how it applies in his case.” (Hodjat v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Ins. Co. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1, 10.) “ ‘[O]ne cannot simply say the court
erred, and leave it up to the appellate court to figure out why.’ ” (People v. JTH Tax, Inc.
(2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1237.) Appellate courts thus may, and ordinarily do,
“disregard conclusory arguments that are not supported by pertinent legal authority or fail
to disclose the reasoning by which the appellant reached the conclusions he [or she]
wants us to adopt.” (City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 287.)
Before turning to Anest’s arguments, we note that written incentive payment plans
that are contingent on an employee remaining with an employer for a specified amount of
time are generally enforceable. In Neisendorf v. Levi Strauss & Co. (2006)
143 Cal.App.4th 509, for example, the court upheld an annual incentive plan (AIP) that
provided, “ ‘Unless termination is due to retirement, layoff, long-term disability or death,
a participant must be an active employee of the company on the payment date in order to
receive an AIP payment,’ ” and “ ‘If an employee is involuntarily discharged (e.g., poor
performance or misconduct) prior to the AIP payment date, that employee will have no
right to AIP.’ ” (Id. at p. 521, italics omitted.) The court held an employee’s “eligibility
for bonus payments is properly determined by the bonus plans’ specific terms and
general contract principles. California courts have consistently characterized bonus and
profit-sharing plans as constituting an offer of the stated benefits in exchange for the
service of an employee, and upon the employee’s completion of the required services in
accordance with the terms of the plan, a binding contract is formed under which the
employer is obligated to deliver the promised benefits.” (Id. at p. 523, first italics added.)
Because the plan only obligated the employer to make bonus payments if the employee
was an active employee of the company on the payment date, and because the employee
was terminated before the payment date, the court held she was not entitled to any bonus.
(Id. at p. 524.) In so holding, the court also noted there was no public policy in California

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that prohibited such plans. (Id. at p. 522; accord Lucian v. All States Trucking Co. (1981)
116 Cal.App.3d 972, 974-976.)
Our Supreme Court has also upheld such plans. In Schachter v. Citigroup, Inc.
(2009) 47 Cal.4th 610, for example, it upheld a plan pursuant to which employees could
elect to receive a percentage of their annual compensation in restricted company stock
that could not be sold or transferred for two years. If a participating employee left the
company before the end of the two-year period, they forfeited both the stock and the
percentage of their annual compensation used to pay for the stock. (Id. at pp. 614-615.)
The plaintiff enrolled in the plan and elected to receive 5 percent of his annual
compensation in restricted stock. He left the company before the end of the two-year
period, and then sued the employer, arguing the forfeiture of the percentage of his annual
compensation used to purchase the stock violated various Labor Code provisions
requiring the prompt payment of all earned wages when an employee is terminated or
resigns. (Id. at p. 615.) Our Supreme Court disagreed. It explained: “Incentive
compensation, whether in the form of a traditional cash bonus program or a more
complex restricted stock plan, is generally understood as an ‘ “inducement to employees
to procure efficient and faithful service.” ’ [Citation.] Eligibility to receive incentive
compensation ‘is properly determined by the . . . plans’ specific terms and general
contract principles.’ [Citation.] While ‘[t]he public policy in favor of full and prompt
payment of an employee’s earned wages is fundamental and well established . . .’
[citation], ‘nothing in the public policy of this state concerning wages . . . transforms [a]
contingent expectation of receiving bonuses into an entitlement’ [citation]. Only when an
employee satisfies the condition(s) precedent to receiving incentive compensation, which
often includes remaining employed for a particular period of time, can that employee be
said to have earned the incentive compensation.” (Id. at p. 621, italics added.) Because
the plaintiff did not remain with the company for the full two-year period, he “ ‘did not

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earn—and thus had no right to receive—either the restricted stock or the funds used to
purchase it.’ ” (Ibid.)
With this legal background in mind, we address Anest’s arguments in the general
order in which they are made.
A. Anest fails to demonstrate any material facts are disputed
Anest first argues she disputed almost all of Walgreens’ proffered undisputed
material facts—which is at least nominally true. It is not enough, however, merely to
state that a particular fact is disputed. Instead, for “[e]ach material fact contended by the
opposing party to be disputed,” that fact “shall be followed by a reference to the
supporting evidence” that demonstrates there is a dispute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c,
subd. (b)(3); see also Bacoka v. Best Buy Stores, L.P. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 126, 131,
fn. 1 [“Opposition separate statements must cite to facts and evidence for the evidence to
be considered by the court”].) “Failure to comply with this requirement of a separate
statement may constitute a sufficient ground, in the court’s discretion, for granting the
motion.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(3).)
Here, the trial court found the critical facts noted above were undisputed, and
Anest fails to either discuss or analyze the trial court’s findings, or demonstrate that the
trial court erred in finding the critical facts were undisputed. We find the facts relied on
by the trial court are effectively undisputed. By way of example, the trial court found it
was undisputed that Walgreens offered Anest a $30,000 sign-on bonus incentive payment
and a $5,000 relocation incentive payment pursuant to a written agreement, and that
Anest accepted the offer by electronically signing the agreement. Walgreens supported
this fact by copies of the agreements themselves, which show they were electronically
signed by Anest on June 14 and 15, 2016. Anest did not dispute either the terms of the
agreements or her acceptance of those terms. Indeed, she cited the agreements with her
opposition papers, and acknowledged she entered into the agreements. Instead, the only

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thing Anest disputed was the way Walgreens referred to the incentive payments in its
moving papers—namely, as loans, which we address below.
B. The provision requiring Anest to repay the incentive payments does not
violate Labor Code section 221
Anest suggests (albeit with no discussion or analysis) that requiring her to repay
the incentive payments would violate Labor Code section 221, which provides, “It shall
be unlawful for any employer to collect or receive from an employee any part of wages
theretofore paid by said employer to said employee.” We disagree. To see why, we
analogize the incentive payments in this case to advances on commissions, which courts
have held may be recouped by the employer if the conditions for payment are ultimately
not met. Steinhebel v. Los Angeles Times Communications, LLC (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th
696 provides a good example. The plaintiffs in that case worked for the Los Angeles
Times newspaper as telesales employees. Telesales employees telephoned prospective
customers to sell them newspaper subscriptions, and they were paid a commission for
each new subscription they sold. (Id. at p. 700.) In order to earn the commission, the
customer had to keep the paper for a minimum of 28 days, and if the customer did not
keep the paper for 28 days, no commission was earned. Rather than waiting the full 28
days to pay the commission, however, the newspaper paid commissions in advance. The
employment agreement provided, “ ‘Even though an order is not commissionable until
the customer keeps it 28 days, The Times will pay you two weeks in advance for the
order.’ ” (Id. at pp. 702-703.) If the customer ended up cancelling the subscription
before 28 days, the agreement provided “ ‘the amount advanced in respect to [that]
subscription will be deducted from your compensation payable subsequent to the date of
such rejection . . . and you hereby authorize such deductions.’ ” (Id. at p. 702.) A group
of employees sued the newspaper, arguing that this charge-back or recoupment provision
violated Labor Code section 221. The trial court disagreed and granted the newspaper’s
motion for summary judgment, and the appellate court affirmed.

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 As relevant here, the court agreed that while commissions are wages, the right to a
commission “must be governed by the provisions of the Agreement” and those “terms
must be met before an employee is entitled to a commission.” (Steinhebel v. Los Angeles
Times Communications, LLC, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 705.) Pursuant to the terms of
the agreement, the right to a commission was contingent on the customer keeping the
subscription for at least 28 days. Unless and until this condition was met, the employee
had not earned a commission. The court then explained, “The essence of an advance is
that at the time of payment the employer cannot determine whether the commission will
eventually be earned because a condition to the employee’s right to the commission has
yet to occur or its occurrence as yet is otherwise unascertainable. An advance, therefore,
by definition is not a wage because all conditions for performance have not been
satisfied.” (Id. at p. 705.) The court thus held the agreement did not violate Labor Code
section 221 because that section “prohibits an employer only from collecting or receiving
wages that have already been earned by performance of agreed-upon requirements.”
(Steinhebel, at p. 707; see also Koehl v. Verio, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1329-
1337 [holding similar commission plan did not violate Lab. Code, § 221].) In other
words, an employer can advance wages to an employee before they are earned, and if the
employee does not actually earn those wages, the employer may recoup the amount
advanced without running afoul of Labor Code section 221.
Although this case involves an incentive payment rather than a commission, we
find Steinhebel’s reasoning equally applicable here. Walgreens essentially agreed to pay
Anest her bonus in advance. Anest’s right to that bonus, however, was conditioned on
her remaining continuously employed for three years. If she failed to remain employed
for three years, she never earned the bonus, and, pursuant to the terms of the agreement,
she was required to repay it. As in Steinhebel, we find the agreement in this case does
not run afoul of Labor Code section 221.

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 C. Referencing the incentive payments as “loans” did not render the
agreement unenforceable
As previously mentioned, Anest also complains that Walgreens referred to the
incentive payment as a “loan” in its motion papers. She contends that Walgreens
effectively changed the terms of the agreement when it referred to the incentive payment
as a loan. We disagree. The actual terms of the agreement remained unchanged, and
Walgreens merely sought to enforce the agreement according to its terms. As relevant
here, those terms required Anest to repay the entire incentive payment if she failed to
remain continuously employed by Walgreens for a period of three full years. Particularly
with no cogent argument from Anest on this issue, we find that, regardless of how
Walgreens characterized the payment in its motion papers, the relevant issue in this case
is whether Walgreens was entitled to enforce the agreement according to its terms. For
the reasons explained herein, we find that it was.
Anest also argues the agreement is unenforceable. To support this argument, she
cites Civil Code sections 1550 and 1572, but she does not discuss either section or
explain how they apply here.3 She also cites Yoo v. Jho (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1249 for
the proposition that illegal contracts are void and courts will not enforce them, but she
fails to explain how or why the agreement in this case is illegal. As noted above, “an
appellant is required to not only cite to valid legal authority, but also explain how it
applies in his case,” (Hodjat v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., supra,
211 Cal.App.4th at p. 10), and Anest fails to provide such an explanation, thus we decline
to address it. (Atchley v. City of Fresno (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 635, 647 [when a point is
asserted without argument and authority for the proposition, an appellate court may deem

3 Civil Code section 1550 provides the essential elements of a contract are (1)
parties capable of contracting, (2) their consent, (3) a lawful object, and (4) consideration,
and Civil Code section 1572 defines types of fraud.

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it to be without foundation and need not discuss it].)
D. The circumstances of Anest’s termination are not before us
Anest cites Kelecheva v. Multivision Cable T.V. Corp. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 521,
531, for the proposition that California law implies into all contracts a covenant of good
faith and fair dealing “which requires that neither party do anything to deprive the other
of the benefits of the agreement.” She then argues—with no citation to authority—that
this means, “In California, employers are obligated to keep employees employed, as long
as the terms of the contract are being met by both parties.” That is not the law in
California. Instead, there is a presumption in California that employment is at will, and
may be terminated by either party, at any time, for any or no reason. (See Lab. Code,
§ 2922; Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 335.) The agreement in this
case incorporates this presumption by providing, “This agreement is not a contract or
guarantee of employment for a definite period. As always, either Pharmacist or
Walgreens may terminate the employment relationship for any reason, at any time, with
or without cause or notice (i.e., ‘at-will’).” To the extent Anest argues Walgreens
impliedly promised to employ her for three years, this argument is belied by the terms of
the agreement. Anest asserts an employer cannot terminate an employee in bad faith or
for discriminatory reasons. This may be true, but it is irrelevant because she points to no
evidence in the record that suggests Walgreens terminated her in bad faith or for
discriminatory reasons, and she did not oppose the summary judgment motion on this
basis.
Anest appears to suggest that because Walgreens terminated her employment, it
caused or initiated any breach of the agreement, and it thus should not be able to recoup
the incentive payment. She cites no legal authority to support this suggestion, and the
agreement provides she is obligated to repay the entire incentive payment amount if she
“leaves Walgreens (for any reason)” before completing three years of employment.
Leaving because she was terminated by Walgreens is “any” reason.

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 E. Anest has not proven a violation of Labor Code 970
Anest cites Labor Code section 970, which provides, “No person . . . shall
influence, persuade, or engage any person to change from one place or another in this
State . . . for the purpose of working in any branch of labor, through or by means of
knowingly false representations . . . concerning . . . [¶] . . . [t]he kind, character, or
existence of such work . . . [or] [¶] . . . [t]he length of time such work will last, or the
compensation therefore.” This section “prohibits employers from inducing employees to
relocate and accept employment by way of knowingly false representations regarding the
kind, character, or existence of work, or the length of time such work will last.” (White v.
Smule, Inc. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 346, 349.) Anest also cites Labor Code section 972,
which provides for double damages in a civil action brought for violation of Labor Code
section 970. She fails to explain, however, how either Labor Code section is relevant
because it does not appear she filed an action against Walgreens for violating section 970.
She may contend Walgreens violated section 970 by enticing her to move from Los
Angeles to the Chico area in anticipation of at least three years of work, and then
terminating her after only 21 months. However, she points to no evidence in the record
that suggests Walgreens induced her to move by means of knowingly false
representations that she would be employed for at least three years, and, again, the
agreement clearly states, “This Agreement is not a contract or guarantee of employment
for a definite period. As always, either Pharmacist or Walgreens may terminate the
employment relationship for any reason, at any time, with or without cause or notice (i.e.,
‘at-will’).”
F. Whether the repayment portion of the agreement is an unenforceable
liquidated damages clause is not before us
Anest cites Civil Code section 1671, subdivision (b), which provides “a provision
in a contract liquidating the damages for the breach of the contract is valid unless the
party seeking to invalidate the provision establishes that the provision was unreasonable

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under the circumstances existing at the time the contract was made.” Anest argues the
provision in the agreement requiring her repay the incentive payment if she did not fulfill
the required three years of employment is an unenforceable liquidated damages
provision. We need not consider this argument because Anest did not raise it in
opposition to the motion for summary judgment, and as a general rule, an appellant
cannot raise a new argument for the first time on appeal. (See Christina C. v. County of
Orange (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1383; L. Byron Culver & Associates v. Jaoudi
Industrial & Trading Corp. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 300, 306, fn. 4.) Even if she had raised
this argument below, we would reject it for two reasons. First, Civil Code section 1671,
subdivision (b) provides a liquidated damages provision is “valid” unless the party
seeking to invalidate it establishes it was unreasonable at the time the contract was made,
and Anest never addresses whether the challenged provision was unreasonable. Second,
and more importantly, we find the challenged provision is not a liquidated damages
provision—i.e., it does not liquidate (i.e., predetermine or set in advance) damages for
breach of the agreement. Instead, it provides Walgreens agrees to pay Anest a $35,000
incentive payment, and Anest agrees to repay the full amount if she does not remain
employed by Walgreens for three full years (and we note that failing to remain employed
is not a breach of the agreement).
G. Anest’s argument regarding damages is not before us
Anest cites Schachter v. Citigroup, Inc., supra, 47 Cal.4th at page 622 for the
proposition that, “ ‘If the employee is discharged before completion of all the terms of the
bonus agreement, and there is not valid cause, based on the conduct of the employee, for
the discharge, the employee may be entitled to recover at least a pro-rata share of the
promised bonus.’ ” She does not discuss Schachter further or explain how it applies in
this case. To the extent she argues she is entitled to a pro rata share of the incentive
payment, there are at least two problems with this argument. First, and fatally, she did
not raise it below in opposition to the summary judgment motion, and, as just noted, a

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party may not seek reversal of summary judgment by raising for the first time on appeal
an argument not raised in the trial court. (See Christina C. v. County of Orange, supra,
220 Cal.App.4th at p. 1383.) Second, even if she had raised the issue below, she fails to
establish she is entitled to a pro rata share of the incentive payment. The quote from
Schachter states an employee may be entitled to a pro rata share of a promised bonus if
he or she is discharged “ ‘and there is not valid cause.’ ” (Schachter, at p. 622.) Anest,
however, submitted no evidence in opposition to the summary judgment motion that
explains why she was discharged, much less that she was discharged without a valid
cause. Moreover, the quote from Schachter is actually a quote from the Department of
Industrial Relations, Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) Policies and
Interpretations Manual, and the DLSE manual, in turn, cites a June 3, 1987, opinion
letter, which provides, in full:

“1. A bonus plan may provide payments to be made only to
those plan participants who are actively employed on a bonus
payment date. However, there are always questions of
substantial performance and questions relating to the services
required to earn the bonus. The Division accepts on a case-
by-case basis claims for bonus, or a partial bonus, on the basis
of substantial performance when termination takes place
before the bonus is paid out. Each case is analyzed on its
own facts to determine if a bonus or partial bonus is
appropriate.

“2. The cause of termination may be a factor even though the
main question is whether the employee earned the bonus or a
portion of it. There are situations where the employee
terminates a relationship when he/she may have good cause
for resigning or when there are factors beyond his/her control
which may affect his/her eligibility for the bonus.

“I am aware that the above answers are not definitive;
however, as bonus plans have so many variables as to
qualifying performance and how amounts are calculated, I
can only give you answers in general terms. It is our policy
to look at disputed claims for bonuses on a case-by-case

14
 basis; each claim must be reviewed on its merits.” (DLSE
Opn. Letter No. 1987.06.03 (June 3, 1987) p. 1
.)
As this letter shows, the issue of whether an employee might be entitled to a pro
rata share of a bonus is fact intensive and must be decided on a case-by-case basis, and is
thus particularly inappropriate to raise for the first time on appeal.
Anest’s final argument has something to do with the fact that Walgreens withheld
$2,677.50 from her incentive payment to make FICA payments, and deducted this from
the $35,000 she owed, resulting in a balance due of $32,322.50. Because she fails to
explain how or why this fact demonstrates the trial court erred in granting Walgreens’
motion for summary judgment, we disregard this argument.
The bottom line is that it is undisputed Anest signed an agreement pursuant to
which Walgreens would immediately pay her a $35,000 incentive payment, but if she did
not remain continuously employed by Walgreens for three years, she was required to
repay the full amount. It is also undisputed Anest did not remain continuously employed
by Walgreens for three years, and was thus required by the terms of the agreement to
repay the incentive payment. We find the agreement is enforceable according to its
terms, and we thus also find the trial court properly granted Walgreens’ motion for
summary judgment.

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 DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed, and each side will bear its costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)

/s/
EARL, P. J.

We concur:

/s/
HULL, J.

/s/
RENNER, J.

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