In re C.D.

NOTICE 2023 IL App (4th) 221085-U FILED
This Order was filed under July 24, 2023
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-22-1085 Carla Bender
not precedent except in the 4th District Appellate
limited circumstances allowed Court, IL
under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

In re: C.D., a Minor; ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
(The People of the State of Illinois, ) Sangamon County
Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 21JA129
v. )
Kendra B., ) Honorable
Respondent-Appellant). ) Dwayne A. Gab,
) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE LANNERD delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice DeArmond and Justice Doherty concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The trial court’s adjudicatory and dispositional orders are affirmed.

¶2 On October 20, 2022, the trial court found C.D., born October 23, 2021, was a

neglected minor pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West

2020)) because his environment was injurious to his welfare. Specifically, the court found the

environment was injurious to C.D.’s welfare because of respondent Kendra B.’s mental instability

and domestic violence issues between respondent and C.D.’s father, Justin D. On November 16,

2022, the court found it to be in C.D.’s best interests to be made a ward of the court. Respondent

appeals, raising a wide range of issues. We affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On October 26, 2021, the State filed a petition alleging C.D. was a neglected,

abused, or dependent minor pursuant to section 2-3(1), (2) or 2-4 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/2-
3(1)(2), 2-4 (West 2020)). That same day, the trial court entered an order indicating the shelter

care hearing had been called and then continued on the “parents’ motion” until October 28, 2021,

to allow C.D.’s parents time to speak with their court appointed attorneys. The court’s order also

indicated both parents received notice and were present. Further, the order stated C.D. had been

brought before a judicial officer within the time required by section 2-9 of the Act (705 ILCS

405/2-9 (2020)) and remained in protective custody.

¶5 In a written order dated October 28, 2021, which was entered after the shelter care

hearing, the trial court found probable cause that C.D. was neglected and that it was a matter of

immediate and urgent necessity for C.D.’s protection that he be placed in shelter care. The order

indicated respondent claimed she had Native American ancestry and the State would contact the

department of “Native American Affairs.” The next hearing was scheduled for December 22, 2021.

¶6 On December 22, 2021, the trial court entered an order indicating the case had come

before the court for a pre-trial hearing, the investigation had been disclosed, and the case was being

continued until January 26, 2022. The order does not indicate that anyone objected to the

continuance. On January 26, 2022, the court entered a written order finding good cause to set the

adjudicatory hearing beyond the 90-day limit on March 10, 2022, because Justin D.’s attorney was

not unavailable. The order indicated the court was told no one objected to the continuance. The

order also indicated respondent stated she possibly had Cherokee ancestry.

¶7 On March 10, 2022, the trial court continued the case again until April 21, 2022,

on the State’s motion because its witnesses were not available. The court’s written order indicates

no one objected to the State’s motion.

¶8 On April 22, 2022, respondent’s attorney made a motion to continue the

adjudicatory hearing because respondent’s Native American ancestry had never been addressed.

-2-
The guardian ad litem and the State objected to continuing the hearing. The State asked the court

to question respondent about her ancestry claims. The State indicated the assigned case worker

had made inquiries about tribal ties and expected a response by July.

¶9 The trial court then questioned respondent regarding C.D.’s ancestry. Respondent

claimed C.D. was eligible for membership in the Cherokee Nation because of respondent’s

grandparents. Respondent conceded neither she nor her parents were members of any Native

American tribe. According to respondent, she based her claim this case belonged in a tribal court

on her ancestry, her molecular DNA, and other things she did not name. The State asked

respondent which immediate grandparent she spoke to about his or her membership in the

Cherokee Nation. Respondent answered she spoke to all of them before they passed away, called

the State’s line of questioning crazy, and told the State to prove her claim wrong. When respondent

was asked what specific names she had seen “on the rolls” for the Cherokee Nation, she avoided

answering the question and said she was not going to continue answering these questions. When

asked if she had turned over to the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) any of

the ancestry records she claimed to have in her possession, respondent answered, “I have not

spoken to anybody from [DCFS] since they washed their hands, which they always do the first

day, and then pass it off to people who have no idea what they’re doing.” Justin D. testified he was

not a member of a Native American tribe.

¶ 10 The State argued C.D. could not be considered an “Indian child” under the

definition provided by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. §§ 1901 to 1963 (2018))

because neither of C.D.’s parents were members of a Native American tribe. Based on the

representations respondent made under oath, the trial court granted respondent’s motion to

continue the case until July 14, 2022, over the objection of the State and C.D.’s guardian ad litem.

-3-
The court’s written order indicates respondent testified she is not a member of a Native American

tribe but is eligible for membership. The court noted DCFS had sent letters to the Federal Bureau

of Indian Affairs and expected information by July.

¶ 11 On July 13, 2022, respondent’s court-appointed counsel, Salena R. Young, filed a

motion to withdraw, asserting the attorney-client relationship had deteriorated to a point where her

representation of respondent was not possible. At a hearing on July 14, 2022, the trial court allowed

attorney Young’s motion with respondent’s agreement. Respondent requested a new attorney, and

the court appointed attorney Brendan Harris and continued the case for 21 days on respondent’s

motion without objection. The court scheduled the adjudicatory hearing for August 18, 2022. With

regard to the applicability of ICWA, the State indicated a search for tribal membership had been

done using the names of C.D.’s parents and none was found. The State noted that for a child to

have tribal affiliation, one of the parents would have to have tribal affiliation. Then, respondent

told the court the tribe her family was associated with is now “considered extinct” and claimed to

be in the process of filing for recognition. However, the State asserted the ICWA only applies to

federally recognized tribes.

¶ 12 The adjudicatory hearing began on August 18, 2022, with testimony from several

officers from the Springfield Police Department. Officer Jeremy Roberts testified he responded to

a disturbance call at respondent’s home on March 9, 2021, indicating a white male was chasing a

female with an axe or a hammer. Respondent, who had a small laceration to one of her fingers,

was not cooperative. Justin D. claimed respondent hit him, causing the injuries to his face. Both

respondent and Justin D. were arrested. Officer Roberts testified respondent and Justin D. had a

history of domestic violence together.

¶ 13 Officers Rhet Spengel and Steven Baker testified they were each dispatched to

-4-
respondent’s address on January 30, 2021, and February 19, 2021, respectively, in response to

reported batteries. Respondent claimed Justin D., who was not present on either occasion, hit her

with his fists. However, respondent had no observable injuries either day. Officer Spengel testified

an infant and a 13-year-old child were present when he was there in January. Respondent said the

infant was her child but refused to provide the child’s name. Upon Officer Spengel’s inquiry,

respondent denied living with or having a romantic relationship with Justin D. However,

respondent told Officer Baker that Justin D. had been her roommate for about five months and

they had a history of violence. Officer Baker did not recall seeing any children with respondent in

February.

¶ 14 Officer Tim Day testified he was dispatched to respondent’s address for a reported

battery on February 22, 2021. Initially, respondent talked about drugs being sold in the

neighborhood and several other topics Officer Day characterized as “odd” and “out of place.”

When he asked why she called 911, respondent indicated Justin D., who again was not present,

had punched her in the face approximately two hours earlier. Officer Day observed no injuries

consistent with a battery. Respondent said Justin D. had been her roommate for about five months

and reported five prior domestic violence incidents. Officer Day indicated respondent jumped from

topic to topic and was difficult to understand. Additionally, Officer Day testified he had many

contacts with respondent and had witnessed verbal altercations between respondent and Justin D.

According to Officer Day, he was concerned respondent might have mental health issues based on

statements she made. When he was present, he did not see any children at respondent’s home.

¶ 15 Officer Monica Dorsey testified she was dispatched to a small apartment above a

bar for a reported battery on October 11, 2021. Before entering the apartment, Officer Dorsey

heard a verbal disturbance occurring in the apartment. Once she was inside, both respondent and

-5-
Justin D. said they were only having a verbal argument. However, respondent later claimed Justin

D. grabbed her face. Officer Dorsey did not observe any injury. Both respondent and Justin D.

claimed to live at the apartment, and both refused to leave. Respondent told Officer Dorsey she

was pregnant, had been in a dating relationship with Justin D. for approximately two years, and

had a history of domestic violence with Justin D. Neither party was arrested or forced to leave the

residence. Later, during the same shift, Officer Dorsey was again dispatched to the apartment,

where respondent indicated Justin D. had punched her in the face approximately six times. Officer

Dorsey again saw no injuries to respondent’s face and Justin D. denied any physical altercation

occurred. Officer Dorsey testified no children were present.

¶ 16 Apple Glover, a DCFS child protection specialist, testified DCFS received a report

regarding respondent’s mental health on October 24, 2021, which was the day after C.D.’s birth.

Glover went to the hospital and met with respondent. Respondent said she had completed a mental

health evaluation at Memorial Behavioral Health Center. Glover indicated this was a self-reporting

evaluation where the individual conducting the assessment asks questions and assesses the subject

based on the answers given. As a result, the subject can simply state she does not have any issues.

Glover indicated she was concerned with respondent’s mental health because of the way she spoke.

Respondent denied having any mental health issues but told Glover she had three other children

who were not in her care. As for C.D.’s father, respondent acknowledged she and Justin D. had a

history of domestic violence and had married in July 2021.

¶ 17 Because the investigation had just started and C.D. was a newborn, Glover had to

make a safety determination for C.D. without the ability to verify certain information because it

was a Sunday. On cross-examination, Glover indicated the hospital had initially discussed letting

C.D. leave the hospital with respondent and Justin D. However, Glover directed the hospital not

-6-
to release the baby.

¶ 18 The adjudicatory hearing was continued until September 29, 2022, without any

objection from the parties. Respondent requested an earlier date, but the trial court did not have

dates available. On September 29, 2022, respondent and Justin D. moved to dismiss the petition

pursuant to section 2-14 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/2-14 (West 2020)) because the adjudicatory

hearing was not timely held. The court denied the motion, stating the State’s only motion to

continue was granted without objection and with good cause shown on March 22, 2022. The court

attributed the other continuances to either agreement or the parents.

¶ 19 Joseph Dabrowski testified he worked on this case as a child protective investigator

beginning on October 25, 2021. He determined respondent and Justin D. were C.D.’s parents and

respondent had a prior DCFS investigation dating back to January 2021, which started because of

domestic violence in the home. Respondent’s mental health was also at issue. Respondent’s other

three children were removed from her care and placed with their fathers. Dabrowski noted he was

the investigator on the prior case. In that case, respondent made irrational statements that

individuals were breaking into her house, sharing a key to her house, the State was drugging her,

and her daughter was a witch and making pornographic movies. Respondent also accused Justin

D. of human trafficking, including trafficking respondent’s daughter. In the prior case, Dabrowski

had offered respondent an intact case, but she wanted nothing to do with DCFS and denied both a

request for a toxicology screen and a mental health assessment from a licensed psychologist or

psychiatrist. When the fathers of the three children took custody of the children, Dabrowski’s

involvement in the prior case ended. Respondent was not allowed unsupervised contact with her

children while the case was active.

¶ 20 Turning to the October 2021 investigation at issue here, Dabrowski testified

-7-
DCFS’s main concerns were respondent’s mental health and the domestic violence that had

occurred after January 2021. After meeting with respondent and Justin D. on October 25, 2021, at

their home, Dabrowski determined respondent had not completed an acceptable mental health

assessment. He told respondent she was going to be required to have a psychological evaluation.

Because respondent had not corrected the issues from the prior case and refused to work with

DCFS, Dabrowski did not institute a safety plan.

¶ 21 Jamie Bramblett, a public service administrator at DCFS, testified she was

Dabrowski’s supervisor in October 2021 and was also involved in respondent’s prior case. In

January 2021, she determined a safety plan needed to be implemented because respondent

presented as erratic and irrational. Bramblett was concerned about respondent’s mental health

because she made statements that small holes in her wall were being used by Justin D. and others

to control her daughter’s mind and engage her in child trafficking, Justin D. was part of a group

called “Shade Balls” that was trafficking children, and she was working with the Federal Bureau

of Investigation (FBI). Although respondent believed Justin D. was dangerous, she indicated a

need to keep him close to her so she could have access to evidence of trafficking on his phone.

¶ 22 According to Bramblett, in October 2021, C.D. was at risk of harm and DCFS

needed to determine if respondent’s mental health and domestic violence issues had been

corrected. They determined these issues had not been resolved. Despite Justin D.’s alleged

violence toward respondent, they continued in their relationship and the domestic violence issues

continued as well between January and October 2021. Further, respondent had not obtained an

appropriate mental health evaluation. Bramblett testified she decided to take protective custody of

C.D.

¶ 23 The adjudicatory hearing was continued again to October 20, 2022. Respondent

-8-
and Justin D. objected to the continuance. On September 30, 2022, respondent filed a pro se motion

to dismiss the State’s adjudicatory petition even though she was represented by attorney Harris at

the time. Respondent’s motion again challenged the timing of the adjudicatory hearing. Then, on

October 3, 2022, respondent filed a pro se motion to vacate C.D.’s temporary custody order

pursuant to section 2-10 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/2-10 (West 2020)) because C.D. was not

brought before a judicial officer within 48 hours. According to respondent, C.D. was taken into

protective custody on October 24, 2021, at 4:00 p.m., the matter was brought before a trial judge

on October 26, 2021, and it was continued to October 28, 2021.

¶ 24 On October 20, 2022, at the continuation of the adjudicatory hearing, at

respondent’s request, attorney Harris indicated he had filed an agreed order to withdraw as

respondent’s counsel. Harris advised their communication had become so poor he did not believe

he could effectively represent her interests. Respondent told the court she would prefer not to have

anyone represent her. As a result, the court allowed attorney Harris’s motion to withdraw and

permitted respondent to represent herself. The court then addressed the pro se motions filed by

respondent, which it denied. As to the motion to vacate C.D.’s temporary custody order, the court

noted the minor did not have to be physically brought to court. Further, the court asserted the

shelter care hearing was timely held. After a break in the proceeding, respondent failed to return

to the courtroom when the adjudicatory hearing continued.

¶ 25 Justin D. testified C.D. was his only child. He denied ever being arrested for

domestic violence or battery, denied physically harming respondent, but admitted they argued. He

denied being told he could take C.D. home with him if he was not going to be with respondent. On

cross-examination, Justin D. said he and respondent were living together when C.D. was born.

After C.D.’s birth, he moved to his current address on Fourth Street in Springfield where

-9-
respondent was currently also residing.

¶ 26 The trial court found the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that C.D.

was a neglected minor and his environment was injurious to his welfare. In the court’s written

adjudicatory order, it found C.D.’s environment was injurious to his welfare as evidenced by

respondent’s instability and domestic violence between her and Justin D. The order indicated

C.D.’s parents were admonished they were required to cooperate with DCFS, comply with service

plans, and correct conditions requiring C.D. to be in care. Otherwise, they risked termination of

their parental rights.

¶ 27 On November 16, 2022, the trial court entered a dispositional order, finding it was

in C.D.’s best interest to be made a ward of the court, and placed him in the custody and

guardianship of the guardianship administrator for DCFS.

¶ 28 On December 8, 2022, respondent filed this appeal.

¶ 29 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 30 A. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 311(a) (eff. July 1, 2018)

¶ 31 Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 311(a) (eff. July 1, 2018), our decision was

due to be filed on May 8, 2023. This court had good cause for not meeting this deadline. While

continuances are disfavored and shall be granted only for compelling circumstances pursuant to

Rule 311(a)(8), this case presented situations where this court found it necessary to grant

respondent’s multiple requests for extensions of time to file her appellant’s brief for various

reasons, including counsel’s need to be out of state for a family matter, counsel’s need to review

arguments and authority respondent wanted included in her brief to avoid potential disciplinary

action for the attorney, and the need to supplement the record with transcripts from the adjudicatory

hearing and hearings where ICWA was discussed and possibly ruled on by the trial court.

- 10 -
¶ 32 Then, on March 31, 2023, respondent’s appointed appellate counsel filed a motion

to withdraw as respondent’s attorney of record. Counsel indicated that on March 10, 2023,

respondent attempted to file a motion to represent herself and a pro se appellant’s brief. After

doing so, respondent contacted counsel and expressed her strong desire to represent herself on

appeal despite counsel’s attempt to dissuade her. On April 10, 2023, this court allowed counsel’s

motion to withdraw. That same day, respondent, pro se, filed a 50-page appellant’s brief. The State

filed its brief on May 1, 2023. Respondent had until May 8, 2023, to file a reply brief but failed to

do so. As a result, the case was not ready to be ruled on or assigned to this panel until after the

May 8, 2023, deadline had passed. Regardless, pursuant to the spirit of Rule 311, we have decided

the case as quickly as possible considering the numerous issues respondent raised in her lengthy

pro se brief.

¶ 33 After respondent filed her appellate brief, she also filed numerous motions, which

we have taken with the case. Two of these motions asked this court to expedite this appeal and

advance the case on our docket. We deny these motions as moot because we have expedited this

case pursuant to Rule 311.

¶ 34 B. Motion to Strike the State’s Brief

¶ 35 Before moving to the merits of respondent’s appeal, we note respondent filed a

motion, which we took with this case, asking this court to strike the State’s brief because it

summarized testimony from witnesses that was not part of the record. We deny this motion as the

testimony in question can be found in supplements to the record that were allowed by this court.

¶ 36 C. General Appellate Principals

¶ 37 Respondent chose to proceed pro se in this appeal. Illinois courts treat pro se

litigants the same as licensed attorneys. A pro se litigant must comply with the same rules and is

- 11 -
held to the same standard as licensed attorneys. Holzrichter v. Yorath, 2013 IL App (1st) 110287,

¶ 78, 987 N.E.2d 1.

¶ 38 We first note issues not raised in the trial court are forfeited on appeal. In re Z.J.,

2020 IL App (2d) 190824, ¶ 50, 168 N.E.3d 210. While the plain-error doctrine can be applied in

abuse and neglect cases (In re Andrea D., 342 Ill. App. 3d 233, 242, 794 N.E.2d 1043, 1050-51

(2003)), respondent makes no argument regarding its applicability here. Further, “[a] party cannot

complain of error which he induced the court to make or to which he consented.” McMath v.

Katholi, 191 Ill. 2d 251, 255, 730 N.E.2d 1, 3 (2000). “ ‘It is fundamental to our adversarial process

that a party waives his right to complain of an error where to do so is inconsistent with the position

taken by the party in an earlier court proceeding.’ ” McMath, 191 Ill. 2d at 255, 730 N.E.2d at 3

(quoting Auton v. Logan Landfill, Inc., 105 Ill. 2d 537, 543, 475 N.E.2d 817, 818 (1984)).

¶ 39 Further, even if an issue was raised in the trial court, Illinois Supreme Court Rule

341(h)(7) (eff. October 1, 2020) requires an appellant’s brief to include “[a]rgument, which shall

contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities

and the pages of the record relied on.” A reviewing court is not a depository for which the

appellant, in this case respondent, may unload her burden of argument and research. People v.

Macias, 2015 IL App (1st) 132039, ¶ 88, 36 N.E.3d 373. Pursuant to Rule 341(h)(7), “[p]oints not

argued are forfeited and shall not be raised in the reply brief, in oral argument, or on petition for

rehearing.”

¶ 40 It is also the appellant’s burden to provide this court with a complete record to

decide the issues raised on appeal. In Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92, 459 N.E.2d 958,

959 (1984), our supreme court stated:

“[A]n appellant has the burden to present a sufficiently complete record of the

- 12 -
 proceedings *** to support a claim of error, and in the absence of such a record on

appeal, it will be presumed that the order entered by the trial court was in

conformity with law and had a sufficient factual basis. Any doubts which may arise

from the incompleteness of the record will be resolved against the appellant.”

We note the record on appeal does not contain transcripts of any hearings held prior to April 2022.

¶ 41 Respondent forfeited most of the issues she raises on appeal or is precluded from

now arguing the trial court erred in several respects.

¶ 42 D. ICWA

¶ 43 Because respondent’s argument regarding ICWA challenges the trial court’s right

to exercise its jurisdiction in this case, we address this issue first. Respondent provides no cogent

legal analysis why the trial court erred by exercising its jurisdiction. As a result, we find respondent

failed to comply with Rule 341(h)(7). However, considering ICWA is intended to serve the

interests of Native American tribes, it is unclear whether a parent can forfeit the applicability of

provisions under this federal law. In re T.A., 378 Ill. App. 3d 1083, 1089, 883 N.E.2d 639, 644

(2008). As a result, regardless of respondent’s failure to comply with Rule 341(h)(7), we will

consider whether the trial court erred in exercising its jurisdiction. Essentially, the question of

whether ICWA applies is one of statutory interpretation. Therefore, we will apply a de novo

standard of review. T.A., 378 Ill. App. 3d at 1087, 883 N.E.2d at 643.

¶ 44 “[ICWA] was adopted to respond to a crisis occurring in Indian tribes in which

large numbers of Indian children were being separated from their families and placed in non-Indian

homes.” In re Stiarwalt, 190 Ill. App. 3d 547, 550, 546 N.E.2d 44, 47 (1989) (citing Mississippi

Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32 (1989)). This separation potentially

deprived the children of their Indian heritage and threatened “the tribes’ ability to function as an

- 13 -
autonomous community.” Stiarwalt, 190 Ill. App. 3d at 551, 546 N.E.2d at 47 (citing Holyfield,

490 U.S. at 35-36).

¶ 45 Section 1911(b) of ICWA (25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (2018)) states:

“In any State court proceeding for the foster care placement of, or termination of

parental rights to, an Indian child not domiciled or residing within the reservation

of the Indian child’s tribe, the court, in the absence of good cause to the contrary,

shall transfer such proceeding to the jurisdiction of the tribe, absent objection by

either parent, upon the petition of either parent or the Indian custodian or the Indian

child’s tribe: Provided, That such transfer shall be subject to declination by the

tribal court of such tribe.” (Emphasis in original.)

Further, section 1912(a) of ICWA (25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (2018)) states in part:

“In any involuntary proceeding in a State court, where the court knows or

has reason to know that an Indian child is involved, the party seeking the foster care

placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child shall notify the

parent or Indian custodian and the Indian child’s tribe, by registered mail with

return receipt requested, of the pending proceedings and of their right of

intervention.” (Emphasis added.)

It appears respondent believes C.D. should be considered an “Indian child.” However, Congress

specifically defined who is considered an “Indian child” under ICWA. Section 1903(4) of ICWA

(25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (2018)) states an “Indian child” is “any unmarried person who is under age

eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian

tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.”

¶ 46 This court has held “[t]he party asserting the applicability of the Act has the burden

- 14 -
of producing sufficient evidence for the [trial] court to determine if the child is an [‘]Indian

child.[’] ” T.A., 378 Ill. App. 3d at 1090, 883 N.E.2d at 644. Respondent did not seem to understand

it was her burden to present evidence C.D. qualified as an “Indian child.” Instead, she took the

approach it was the State’s obligation to prove C.D. was not an “Indian child.”

¶ 47 Based on the record on appeal, neither respondent nor anyone else provided the

trial court with evidence which established the court knew C.D. was an “Indian child” as defined

by ICWA. No one presented evidence C.D. was a member of a tribe. Further, both respondent and

Justin D. each testified they were not members of a tribe.

¶ 48 Turning to whether the trial court had reason to know C.D. was an “Indian child,”

section 23.107(c) of Title 25 of the Code of Federal Regulations (25 C.F.R. § 23.107(c) (2021))

provides:

“A court, upon conducting the inquiry required in paragraph (a) of this

section, has reason to know that a child involved in an emergency or child-custody

proceeding is an Indian child if:

(1) Any participant in the proceeding, officer of the court involved

in the proceeding, Indian Tribe, Indian organization, or agency informs the

court that the child is an Indian child;

(2) Any participant in the proceeding, officer of the court involved

in the proceeding, Indian Tribe, Indian organization, or agency informs the

court that it has discovered information indicating that the child is an Indian

child;

(3) The child who is the subject of the proceeding gives the court

reason to know he or she is an Indian child;

- 15 -
 (4) The court is informed that the domicile or residence of the child,

the child's parent, or the child’s Indian custodian is on a reservation or in an

Alaska Native village;

(5) The court is informed that the child is or has been a ward of a

Tribal court; or

(6) The court is informed that either parent or the child possesses

an identification card indicating membership in an Indian Tribe.”

Once again, when section 23.107(c) (25 C.F.R. § 23.107(c) (2021)) refers to an “Indian child,” it

is referring to the term as defined by both ICWA and section 23.2 of Title 25 of the Code of Federal

Regulations (25 C.F.R. § 23.2 (2021)). According to the Guidelines for Implementing ICWA

found on the Bureau of Indian Affairs website:

“[Rule 23.107] reflects the statutory definition of ‘Indian child,’ which is

based on the child’s political ties to a federally recognized Indian Tribe, either by

virtue of the child’s own citizenship in the Tribe, or through a biological parent’s

citizenship and the child’s eligibility for citizenship. ICWA does not apply simply

based on a child or parent’s Indian ancestry. Instead, there must be a political

relationship to the Tribe.

Most Tribes require that individuals apply for citizenship and demonstrate

how they meet that Tribe’s membership criteria. Congress recognized that there

may not have been an opportunity for an infant or minor child to become a citizen

of a Tribe prior to the child-custody proceeding, and found that Congress had the

power to act for those children’s protection given the political tie to the Tribe

through parental citizenship and the child’s own eligibility.” See U.S. Department

- 16 -
 of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Guidelines for Implementing the Indian

Child Welfare Act (Dec. 2016),

https://www.bia.gov/sites/default/files/dup/assets/bia/ois/pdf/idc2-056831.pdf.

None of these events occurred in this case. Instead, respondent simply tried to rely on her

unsubstantiated claims of tribal ancestry. This court has held “the mere mention of Indian heritage

does not give a trial court reason to know that the child is an Indian child.” T.A., 378 Ill. App. 3d

at 1092, 883 N.E.2d at 646-47.

¶ 49 We note this is not a situation where the trial court ignored respondent’s assertion

C.D. had Native American ancestry. This matter was extensively discussed during proceedings

before the court. At a hearing on April 21, 2022, respondent claimed C.D. was eligible for

membership in the Cherokee Nation because “all” her grandparents are “listed on the rolls.”

However, she did not indicate she had personally seen their names “on the rolls.” Instead,

respondent explained she believed her grandparents were members of a Native American tribe

based on ancestry, molecular DNA, and other things she did not name. In addition, it appears the

State also looked into respondent’s claims of Native American ancestry and found nothing

requiring application of ICWA.

¶ 50 Even assuming, arguendo, respondent could have established one or more of her

grandparents were members of a Native American tribe, that fact would not qualify C.D. as an

“Indian child” as defined by ICWA. Based on the evidence contained in the record on appeal,

respondent failed to establish C.D. meets the statutory definition of an “Indian Child” and as a

result ICWA was inapplicable. Consequently, the trial court had jurisdiction to hear this case.

¶ 51 We note respondent filed two motions, which we took with this case, asking this

court to vacate the trial court’s orders and return custody of C.D. to respondent because of ICWA.

- 17 -
Because we have determined ICWA does not apply based on the available evidence in the record,

we deny these motions for the reasons set forth herein.

¶ 52 E. Timeliness of the Adjudicatory Hearing

¶ 53 We next turn to respondent’s claim the State’s petition should have been dismissed

without prejudice because the adjudicatory hearing was not held within the time allowed by section

2-14(b) of the Act (705 ILCS 405/2-14(b) (West 2020)) and the trial court continued the case on

more than one occasion in excess of 30 days. Section 2-14(b) of the Act (705 ILCS 405/2-14(b)

(West 2020)) provides:

“When a petition is filed alleging that the minor is abused, neglected or

dependent, an adjudicatory hearing shall be commenced within 90 days of the date

of service of process upon the minor, parents, any guardian and any legal custodian,

unless an earlier date is required pursuant to Section 2-13.1. Once commenced,

subsequent delay in the proceedings may be allowed by the court when necessary

to ensure a fair hearing.”

Respondent ignores that the statute also provides the time limits of section 14 may be waived with

the consent of all parties and the court’s approval (705 ILCS 405/2-14(d) (West 2020)).

¶ 54 In the trial court, respondent orally raised this issue in a motion to dismiss.

However, she failed to do so until September 29, 2022, which was after the adjudicatory hearing

was underway. In denying the motion to dismiss, the court indicated the only motion to continue

filed by the State was on March 22, 2022. It was granted without objection and also for good cause

shown. The court attributed all other continuances to either agreement of all the parties or to the

parents. Respondent’s brief does not address the court’s reasoning for denying the motion to

dismiss based on the time requirements found in section 2-14 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/2-14 (West

- 18 -
2020)).

¶ 55 We find respondent’s argument forfeited for several reasons. First, she failed to

make timely objections to the continuances and did not make a timely objection to the adjudicatory

hearing itself. Z.J., 2020 IL App (2d) 190824, ¶ 50. Second, pursuant to Rule 341(h)(7), she failed

to provide this court with any cogent legal analysis explaining why the adjudicatory hearing was

untimely considering she requested, agreed to, or did not object to the multiple continuances.

Finally, even assuming, arguendo, respondent could establish the trial court erred in allowing so

many continuances, respondent could not take advantage of the error pursuant to the invited error

doctrine. McMath, 191 Ill. 2d at 255, 730 N.E.2d at 3. As a result, we decline to address this issue

further.

¶ 56 F. Adjudication of Neglect

¶ 57 We next turn to respondent’s arguments regarding the trial court’s October 20,

2022, adjudicatory order, where the court found C.D. was neglected because his environment was

injurious to his welfare as evidenced by respondent’s mental instability and her domestic violence

issues with Justin D. Respondent argues C.D. had never been in an environment injurious to his

welfare with respondent because they had never been together outside the hospital before C.D.

was taken into protective custody. In addition, respondent asserts the State had no evidence C.D.

had been neglected, respondent suffered from a mental illness, respondent had been injured by

domestic violence, or that any child had witnessed the alleged domestic violence. Further,

respondent claims the State had no evidence respondent had ever blatantly disregarded her parental

responsibilities. At most, according to respondent, the State had evidence respondent had erratic

thoughts and communication, which she contends are protected under the first amendment.

¶ 58 “There is no fixed meaning for the term ‘neglect,’ but it has been generally defined

- 19 -
as the failure to exercise the level of care that is required under the circumstances and it

encompasses both the willful and the unintentional disregard of parental duty.” In re An.W., 2014

IL App (3d) 130526, ¶ 57, 17 N.E.3d 878. “[N]eglect may be found where a minor’s environment

is injurious to his or her welfare.” An.W., 2014 IL App (3d) 130526, ¶ 57. The term “injurious

environment,” like the term “neglect,” does not have a fixed meaning. An.W., 2014 IL App (3d)

130526, ¶ 57. “In general, the term ‘injurious environment’ has been defined as the breach of a

parent’s duty to ensure a safe and nurturing shelter for his or her children.” An.W., 2014 IL App

(3d) 130526, ¶ 57.

¶ 59 “When faced with evidence of prior neglect by a parent or parents, a trial court need

not wait to take action until after each particular minor suffers an injury.” An.W., 2014 IL App (3d)

130526, ¶ 58. Our supreme court has explained:

“Under the anticipatory neglect theory, the State seeks to protect not only

children who are the direct victims of neglect or abuse, but also those who have a

probability to be subject to neglect or abuse because they reside, or in the future

may reside, with an individual who has been found to have neglected or abused

another child.” In re Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d 441, 468, 819 N.E.2d 734 (2004).

Granted, “there is no per se rule that the neglect of one child conclusively establishes the neglect

of another child in the same household.” Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d at 468, 819 N.E.2d at 749. “Each

case concerning the adjudication of minors, including those cases pursued under a theory of

anticipated neglect based upon the neglect of a child’s sibling, must be reviewed according to its

own facts.” Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d at 468-69, 819 N.E.2d at 750.

¶ 60 Turning to respondent’s evidentiary arguments, the State has the burden of proving

allegations of neglect by a preponderance of the evidence at the adjudicatory hearing. Arthur H.,

- 20 -
212 Ill. 2d at 463-64, 819 N.E.2d at 747. We will only reverse a trial court’s finding of neglect if

it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. A.P., 2012 IL 113875, ¶ 17. “A finding is against

the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident.” A.P., 2012

IL 113875, ¶ 17.

¶ 61 The State presented the testimony of several police officers who indicated they had

responded to reports of domestic violence between respondent and Justin D. during the year prior

to C.D.’s birth. Both respondent and Justin D. told responding police officers they had been struck

by the other. The State also presented evidence some of the police officers found it difficult to

comprehend what respondent was saying because she would jump from one topic to another while

speaking.

¶ 62 Apple Glover, a DCFS child protection specialist, who spoke with respondent at

the hospital after C.D.’s birth also testified respondent indicated she and Justin D. had a history of

domestic violence. Glover also indicated she was concerned about respondent’s mental health

because respondent jumped from topic to topic during their conversation.

¶ 63 Joseph Dabrowski, a DCFS investigator, testified he began working on this case on

October 25, 2021, and learned another DCFS investigation was already under way involving

respondent and her other children because of domestic violence issues in the home and

respondent’s mental health. During the prior January 2021 DCFS investigation, respondent made

odd statements that the State was drugging her, one of her daughters was a witch and making

pornographic movies, and Justin D. was involved in human trafficking and was trafficking

respondent’s daughter. Respondent also indicated she wanted nothing to do with DCFS and

refused to submit to a toxicology screen and a mental health assessment from a licensed

psychologist or psychiatrist. When investigating this case, Dabrowski determined respondent had

- 21 -
not undergone an acceptable mental health assessment and told respondent she was going to be

required to complete a psychological evaluation.

¶ 64 Jaime Bramblett, a public service administrator at DCFS who was also involved in

both the prior investigation and this case, indicated respondent appeared erratic, irrational, and

unable to maintain a clear train of thought when Bramblett had contact with her during the January

2021 case. During the January 2021 investigation, respondent claimed Justin D. and others were

using small holes in her walls to control her daughter’s mind and also traffic her. Respondent also

stated the “mark of the beast” had formed and later fell off her neck. Moreover, respondent was

concerned about “the end of days.” In addition, although respondent believed Justin D. was a

danger to her because of domestic violence issues, respondent indicated she needed to keep him

close to gather evidence of his child trafficking. According to respondent, she was working with

the FBI. However, she stated the FBI refused to accept information she tried to provide them.

Bramblett testified respondent’s statements during the January investigation made Bramblett

concerned for respondent’s mental health. Further, it appeared respondent’s mental issues had

escalated to a point where her three children at the time were in danger. According to Bramblett,

respondent made statements she punished her daughter for being a witch, a statement a rational

person would have known was not the case.

¶ 65 During the October 2021 investigation, Bramblett indicated DCFS was

investigating whether C.D. was subject to a risk of harm, considering the removal of the other

children nine months earlier and respondent’s inability to be around those children without

supervision. DCFS was concerned about respondent’s mental health and the ongoing domestic

violence issues between respondent and Justin D. Bramblett testified C.D. was not safe in the care

of either respondent or Justin D. because they were still in a relationship despite the domestic

- 22 -
violence respondent alleged. According to Bramblett’s testimony, the police had continued to

respond to domestic violence calls from respondent during the period from January 2021 until

C.D.’s birth. Further, Bramblett testified respondent had not obtained an appropriate mental health

evaluation.

¶ 66 When Bramblett was asked why she was concerned about respondent parenting

C.D., Bramblett responded children in respondent’s care could be in danger because respondent

had used corporal punishment on one of her children in the past for alleged behavior a rational

person would know was not true. Specifically, Bramblett said respondent’s nine-year-old daughter

reported that respondent had subjected her to corporal punishment because respondent believed

the young girl was engaging in child pornography and trafficking. Bramblett testified,

“Unfortunately, mental health is not something we can predict, so if a parent has already

established that their beliefs will result in a child being punished, including corporal punishment,

that’s a very serious concern.”

¶ 67 The evidence in this case was sufficient to establish by a preponderance of the

evidence that C.D.’s environment with respondent and Justin D. would be injurious to his welfare

based on respondent’s mental instability and the domestic violence issues between respondent and

Justin D. Based on this evidence, it is not clearly evident the trial court erred in finding C.D.’s

environment was injurious to his welfare.

¶ 68 G. Other Issues

¶ 69 Respondent raised a host of other procedural issues in her pro se brief. However,

many of these issues are forfeited, others are moot, and some are meritless. For example,

respondent contends the investigation was arbitrary and the State engaged in malicious

prosecution. She also argues the case was subject to involuntary dismissal because the facts had

- 23 -
already been adjudicated in a prior hearing. Considering the evidence described above and the fact

C.D. was not born during the prior adjudication referred to by respondent, these are meritless

claims we need not address further.

¶ 70 Turning to respondent’s argument the seizure of C.D. violated the Illinois

Reproductive Health Act (775 ILCS 55/1-20 (West 2020)) and section 3.4(a)(15) of the Medical

Patient Rights Act, we find respondent forfeited this argument pursuant to Rule 341(h)(7) because

she provided no cogent legal analysis explaining how DCFS’s actions violated either of these

statutes based on the facts in this case.

¶ 71 Respondent also claims she was denied her constitutional right to a jury trial.

However, as the First District explained in In re K.J., 381 Ill. App. 3d 349, 351-53, 885 N.E.2d

1116, 1118-1120 (2008), respondent did not have a right to a jury trial in this type of case. Thus,

this issue is meritless.

¶ 72 Moving on, respondent argued the trial judge had a duty to recuse himself. First,

respondent provides no indication she filed a motion seeking a substitution of judge as a matter of

right or a petition seeking the judge’s recusal for cause. As a result, this issue is forfeited on that

basis. Z.J., 2020 IL App (2d) 190824, ¶ 50. In addition, respondent forfeited this issue pursuant to

Rule 341(h)(7) because she failed to provide this court with any legal analysis why her allegations

regarding the trial judge necessitated his removal. Regardless, we find no reason in the record to

support why the trial judge would have been removed for cause or had a duty to recuse himself.

¶ 73 Additionally, respondent argues the State’s petition was not properly drafted. This

argument is forfeited because she did not raise it in the trial court. Z.J., 2020 IL App (2d) 190824,

¶ 50.

¶ 74 Next, respondent contends her due process rights were violated at the shelter care

- 24 -
hearing. She asserts she was not provided notice of the shelter care hearing or counsel at the

hearing. Further, she claims C.D.’s right to counsel was violated. The trial court’s written order on

October 26, 2021, contradicts these claims. The order indicates respondent did receive notice, was

present, counsel was appointed to represent her, and a guardian ad litem was present on behalf of

C.D. Respondent also claims the shelter care hearing was not timely held. However, the court’s

order indicates the shelter care hearing was continued from October 26, 2021, until October 28,

2021, at the request of respondent and Justin D. so they could consult with their respective

appointed attorneys. As a result, we need not look at this issue further because the alleged error

was invited by respondent. See McMath, 191 Ill. 2d 251 at 255, 730 N.E.2d at 3 (“A party cannot

complain of error which he induced the court to make or to which he consented.”).

¶ 75 Further, respondent takes issue with the fact C.D. was not physically brought to the

shelter care hearing and argues C.D. should be immediately released. The written order from the

October 26, 2021, hearing indicates a guardian ad litem was present but C.D. was not. We do not

have a transcript from the hearing to see if an explanation was given for C.D.’s absence and do not

know whether respondent objected to or agreed to it. Regardless, based on this court’s decision in

In re J.W., 386 Ill. App. 3d 847, 852, 898 N.E.2d 803, 808 (2008), this issue is moot because we

have ruled the trial court did not error in adjudicating C.D. a neglected minor and respondent did

not challenge the court’s dispositional finding. Respondent filed a motion that we took with the

case also seeking C.D.’s immediate release because C.D. did not appear personally at the shelter

care hearing. For the reasons stated above, we also deny this motion as moot.

¶ 76 Turning to the portion of respondent’s briefs with the heading, “W[h]ether the

Integrated Assessment and Other Hearsay Evidence was Admissible,” it is not clear what

respondent is requesting from this court. As for the portion of her brief alleging breach of contract

- 25 -
and child abduction, it appears she is discussing things that did not occur in this particular case.

Finally, she makes claims throughout her brief regarding federal funding and alleges this case

constitutes a false claim as a matter of law. While not entirely clear, it does not appear these claims

have any relevance to our review of the trial court’s findings at issue in this appeal. As a result, we

conclude, based upon the record before us, that said claims are without merit and decline to address

these issues further.

¶ 77 H. Additional Motions

¶ 78 Finally, we address respondent’s four remaining motions that were taken with the

case. In the first of these motions, respondent asks this court to strike confidential health

information from the record. We deny the motion because it is unclear the information is even

contained in the record because she failed to provide a record citation. Respondent’s next two

motions ask this court to order DCFS to return C.D. to her custody and to strike evidence in the

record from Sangamon County case Nos. 21-OP-169, 21-OP-163, and 19-F-513. We deny both of

these motions pursuant to Rule 341(h)(7) because issues regarding the trial court’s dispositional

ruling and evidentiary rulings should have been raised and argued in respondent’s appellant’s brief

instead of in motions filed after respondent filed her appellant’s brief. Although Rule 341(h)(7)

does not specifically state forfeited points shall not be raised in motions filed by an appellant after

she has filed her appellant’s brief, a contrary ruling would create an unacceptable exception to the

forfeiture provision in Rule 341(h)(7). Finally, respondent filed a motion to compel DCFS to

produce the case file for her case that began in January 2021. We deny this motion because it is

unclear respondent raised this issue in the trial court. Assuming, arguendo, she did raise the issue

and the trial court denied her request, the issue should have been argued in her appellant’s brief,

not in a motion.

- 26 -
¶ 79 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 80 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 81 Affirmed.

- 27 -