ADOPTION OF GRAYSON (And Two Companion Cases).

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

22-P-1051

ADOPTION OF GRAYSON (and two companion cases1).

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

After a trial, a Juvenile Court judge found the father and

the mother unfit to parent their children Grayson, born in 2015,

Amy, born in 2016, and Alan, born in 2018 (collectively, the

three children), and terminated their parental rights to the

three children. Both parents argue on appeal that their due

process rights were violated when, as a result of the COVID-19

pandemic, the judge conducted the trial via the Internet-based

video conferencing platform Zoom (Zoom), contending that she did

so without safeguards later recommended in Adoption of Patty,

489 Mass. 630, 645-648 (2022). Both parents further argue that

the judge was biased against them. The father also contends

that the judge improperly admitted certain statements of

children contained in documentary evidence including reports of

the Department of Children and Families (DCF) pursuant to G. L.

1 Adoption of Amy, and Adoption of Alan. The children's names
are pseudonyms.
c. 119, § 51B (51B reports), as permitted by Adoption of Luc,

484 Mass. 139, 152-153 (2020). Finally, the mother argues that

the judge erred in finding her unfit. We affirm.

Background. In 2013, before the three children were born,

DCF became involved with the mother after reports pursuant to

G. L. c. 119, § 51A (51A reports), were filed and later

substantiated as to neglect of two of her older children, Mary

and Susan.2 As a result, Mary and Susan remained in the custody

of DCF for several years, and DCF generated service plans for

the mother, which were amended to include the three children

after they were born. The mother was diagnosed with bipolar

disorder and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), but in 2011

stopped taking medication for those conditions.3

In November 2016, a 51A report was filed alleging neglect

of both Grayson, then one year old, and Amy, then three months

old, after police and the family's DCF ongoing social worker

responded to the hotel where the mother and father were living

with those two children.4 The mother reported that she and the

father had engaged in a verbal argument. At trial, the father

2 These children's names are also pseudonyms. The mother's
parental rights as to them are not at issue here. The father
here is not their father.
3 At trial, the mother testified that she then was taking

medication for bipolar disorder and PTSD.
4 During the first year of Grayson's life, two 51A reports were

filed alleging neglect, but both were unsupported.

2
testified that the mother was "very erratic, very violent,

throwing things . . . , being very vulgar, very disruptive."

DCF created a safety plan under which the father would be the

caretaker for Grayson and Amy while the mother went to a

hospital for an evaluation. However, shortly after arriving at

the hospital, the mother left and later refused to attend an

outpatient program because day care was not available for

Grayson and Amy. When a DCF investigator reminded the father

that he was supposed to be acting as the caretaker for Grayson

and Amy, the father raised his voice, asked to speak to a

supervisor, and hung up the telephone.

In April 2017, a 51A report was filed that was later

substantiated to the extent that it alleged that during a visit,

Mary and Susan were subjected to neglect by both the father and

the mother. During the investigation, Susan disclosed that the

father disciplined her and Mary by requiring them to hold a

"plank" position until he said they could stop. The father

admitted to DCF that he disciplined Mary and Susan by requiring

them to perform "planking," and he testified at trial that they

"enjoy[ed] doing it." The mother also testified that the father

disciplined Mary and Susan with planking.

By mid-2017, both the mother and the father had fully

completed the tasks set on DCF's most recent service plan.

Beginning in June 2017, Mary, then six years old, and Susan,

3
then four, lived with the mother, the father, Grayson, and Amy.

At that time, DCF's family action plan included tasks that both

the father and the mother engage actively in mental health

counselling to address their personal trauma history and how it

affected their parenting skills. Both the father and the mother

later claimed to be engaged in individual counselling but did

not provide DCF with sufficient information to verify their

participation. DCF also provided the parents with a parenting

aide, but the parents fired her and would not allow her access

to their home.

In September 2017, 51A reports were filed alleging physical

abuse of Mary, Susan, and Amy by the father, and neglect of

those children and Grayson as a result of witnessing domestic

violence in the home. During the ensuing investigation, both

Mary and Susan disclosed to DCF that the father hit them with a

belt, and Mary reported that the father covered Amy's mouth to

stop her from crying. Susan disclosed that she once saw the

father push the mother onto a bed, and Mary disclosed that the

father and the mother mostly used words to fight but sometimes

used their hands. The mother agreed to abide by a DCF safety

plan including that she would refrain from physical discipline;

the father refused to sign the safety plan.

On October 9, 2017, a 51A report was filed alleging

physical abuse of Mary by the father, after Mary disclosed to

4
her attorney that a bruise on her hip was caused when the father

pushed her to the ground. During the ensuing investigation, an

additional 51A report was filed alleging neglect of all four

children, and DCF filed care and protection petitions.

The next day, October 10, 2017, DCF workers and police went

to the home to take emergency custody of Grayson, then two and

one-half years old, and Amy, then fourteen months old.5 For over

two hours, the father refused to open the door, yelling that the

DCF workers could be arrested for kidnapping. To a police

officer, the father stated that Mary sustained the bruise when

she hit her hip on a doorway while he was "tossing the racks."6

At trial, the mother testified that the father did "toss the

racks" by throwing mattresses on the floor when beds were not

made properly.

On October 31, 2017, the mother obtained a G. L. c. 209A

order (209A order) against the father requiring that he refrain

from abusing her, not contact her, and stay at least fifty yards

away from her.7 A week later, the mother requested that the 209A

5 Mary and Susan were also taken into emergency DCF custody, but
they were removed from their schools.
6 The 51B report included a police officer's description of a

military term that applies when a superior officer inspects a
subordinate's bunk and determines that it is not made to the
proper standard, and the superior "tosses the rack" by making a
mess of the bunk and requiring the subordinate to remake it.
7 The mother's affidavit in support of that 209A order is not in

the record.

5
order be modified to remove the no-contact and stayaway

provisions, averring, "I would like to go back to my house," "I

also feel I was being pushed by DCF to [apply] for the order,"

and "I have also found out that we are expect[ing] in . . .

2018."

In November 2017, Grayson and Amy were placed in what

became their preadoptive home.

In late 2017 and early 2018, 51A reports were filed after

Mary and Susan, who were in a foster placement separate from the

three children, made additional disclosures that included

physical abuse by the father of Grayson and Amy and witnessing

domestic violence by the father of the mother. Mary disclosed

that the father hit Grayson on the head and hit Amy on the head

and the buttocks. Mary also disclosed that she saw the father

hit the mother with a belt, his hands, and a toy. During

investigation of those allegations, the father admitted that he

used to show the children a belt as a deterrent, and he once

used it on Mary. The father also admitted that Grayson "has

been spanked once."

In February 2018, DCF filed an emergency motion to suspend

the father's visits with Grayson and Amy. When the father moved

to compel weekly visitation, a Juvenile Court judge appointed a

guardian ad litem (visitation GAL) to investigate the facts and

circumstances pertaining to the father's visits. A judge also

6
appointed a guardian ad litem from the Court Appointed Special

Advocates for Children Project (CASA GAL) for Grayson and Amy.

In the spring of 2018, Alan was born. Two days later, DCF

filed a care and protection petition on his behalf. Alan was

placed in the same home as Grayson and Amy.

DCF continued to schedule visits between both parents and

the three children. The mother attended the visits

consistently, but the father did not attend at least one

scheduled visit, and three visits were cancelled because the

father insisted on recording the visits with a body camera.

Throughout 2018, Grayson and Amy displayed adverse

reactions before or after visits with each parent and began

seeing a trauma therapist. Those reactions became more serious

over time, and included both children having diarrhea, crying

and screaming uncontrollably, and clinging to the preadoptive

mother. Amy also experienced panic attacks during diaper

changes: she would cover her eyes and her legs would either go

limp or be tightly kept together. During visits with the

mother, Grayson would defecate and then insist that a social

worker, and not the mother, take him to the bathroom. All three

children had difficulty interacting with the mother and would

gravitate or cling to the social worker.

On June 18, 2018, the father video-recorded DCF personnel

without their knowledge and posted the video on a social media

7
website. In a voicemail, the father threatened that he would be

"coming after" a DCF supervisor, he could "find her address,"

and "I promise you there is going to be backlash." As a result,

DCF reassigned the family's case to a new team, and sent the

father a no-trespass order prohibiting him from coming to the

DCF office unless he had an appointment. DCF also instituted a

requirement that the father's visitation take place at a DCF

office on days when a police detail was present. Because of

concerns about domestic violence, DCF scheduled the parents'

visits separately.

In mid-2018, DCF's goals for each of the three children

changed from reunification with the father and the mother to

adoption. Each of the three children has special needs.

Grayson has autism, PTSD, anxiety, and attention deficit

hyperactivity disorder. Amy has experienced suspected seizure

activity, episodes of anxiety and aggression, and panic attacks.

Alan has been diagnosed with cerebral palsy and as being on the

autism spectrum.

At a November 2018 hearing concerning visitation with Mary

and Susan, the mother testified that the father hit her in front

of the children and that she was aware that he was hurting the

children. In a January 2019 affidavit in support of a 209A

order, the mother averred that during the summer of 2017, the

father "hit me in front of my children" and "has thrown me on

8
the bed in front of my children." Nevertheless, the mother

continued to have contact with the father.

Based on his investigation, the visitation GAL recommended

that the father's visits with Grayson and Amy be discontinued.8

In May or June of 2019, DCF administratively suspended the

father's visits with Grayson and Amy, and then moved for court

approval of the suspension, which was allowed. The father's

visits with Alan continued, although he voluntarily missed

visits with Alan for several months in a row throughout 2019 and

2020, and during the COVID-19 pandemic he refused to use

videoconferencing for visits.

During the spring and summer of 2020, the mother visited or

stayed at the father's home on several occasions. In November

2020, the mother gave birth to a child whose father was another

man against whom the mother had a 209A order based on

allegations of domestic violence.9

In a January 2021 affidavit in support of a 209A order, the

mother averred that in the past the father had choked, hit, and

pushed her. At the related hearing, the mother testified that

8 The visitation GAL later updated that report, recommending that
both parents' parental rights be terminated without visitation.
9 That child was subsequently placed in the same foster home as

Grayson, Amy, and Alan. The mother's parental rights as to that
child are not at issue here.

9
the father had beaten her to within an inch of her life, and

that she was aware that he had sexually abused the children.

Psychologist Richard Stewart, Ph.D., evaluated the bonds

between each of the three children and the preadoptive parents.

The judge credited Dr. Stewart's opinion that "there was an

important, significant attachment-bond between all three

children and the pre-adoptive parents," and that any

interruption or termination of those bonds would place the

children "at risk of immediate emotional distress and

significant future maladjustment." A guardian ad litem (GAL

evaluator) appointed to evaluate the case concluded that neither

the father nor the mother had demonstrated the ability to

correct their issues, including those concerning mental health,

domestic violence, and physical abuse, making it unlikely that

either would be able to care for the three children.

After eleven nonconsecutive days of trial between March 23

and June 11, 2021, the judge issued decrees terminating the

father's and the mother's parental rights to each of the three

children and declining to order posttermination visitation. The

judge subsequently issued 313 findings of fact and forty-two

conclusions of law, "demonstrating, as we require, that close

attention was given to the evidence." Adoption of Don, 435

Mass. 158, 165 (2001). Both parents appealed.

10
 Discussion. "To terminate parental rights to a child and

to dispense with parental consent to adoption, a judge must find

by clear and convincing evidence, based on subsidiary findings

proved by at least a fair preponderance of evidence, that the

parent is unfit to care for the child and that termination is in

the child's best interests" (citation omitted). Adoption of

Yalena, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 542, 549 (2021). DCF bears the

burden of proof as to both parental unfitness and best

interests. See Care & Protection of Erin, 443 Mass. 567, 571

(2005). Because termination of parental rights is an "extreme

step, . . . it is appropriate for a judge to consider whether,

on the basis of credible evidence, there is a reasonable

likelihood that the parent's unfitness at the time of trial may

be only temporary" (citation omitted). Care & Protection of

Zeb, 489 Mass. 783, 788 (2022). "Because childhood is fleeting,

a parent's unfitness is not temporary if it is reasonably likely

to continue for a prolonged or indeterminate period." Id.,

quoting Adoption of Ilona, 459 Mass. 53, 60 (2011).

1. Safeguards recommended in Adoption of Patty. Both

parents argue that their due process rights were violated when

the judge conducted the trial via Zoom without sufficiently

adhering to the safeguards later announced in Adoption of Patty,

489 Mass. at 645-647. See Vazquez Diaz v. Commonwealth, 487

Mass. 336, 342 (2021). DCF and the three children argue that

11
the mother waived this claim by failing to bring to the judge's

attention any difficulties she was having with Zoom. We need

not decide whether she waived the claim, because our review of

the trial record shows that the judge carefully protected both

parents' due process rights and was sufficiently anticipated and

implemented what the court later recommended in Adoption of

Patty. Although technical difficulties occasionally arose, the

judge made appropriate allowances, and neither parent's rights

were prejudiced.

The father moved for an in-person trial, which the judge

denied, ruling that trial would be conducted via Zoom. Before

trial began, the judge informed the parents that if either of

them needed an opportunity to speak to counsel, "you have that

opportunity. Just let me know."10 See Adoption of Patty, 489

Mass. at 645-646 ("An explanation of what a breakout room is and

how it can be requested and used during a trial should be part

of the instructions provided before the commencement of a

virtual trial"). The judge explained what the parties should do

in the case of technical difficulties: "[I]f you are trying to

talk and you don't think I can hear you . . . , just raise your

10During trial, the judge at one point used the Zoom breakout
room to permit the mother to have a private conference with her
attorney. On several occasions, the judge took breaks to permit
the father to communicate with his counsel by telephone. The
father also communicated with counsel during trial by text
message.

12
hand and let me know that you need something." Contrast id. at

647 ("If discussions had occurred in advance of the hearing, the

parties and the court might have been better prepared to enact a

troubleshooting plan to try to overcome the technological issues

that presented"). During trial, the judge also told the lawyers

that they could use the screen-share function on the Zoom video

conferencing platform to show documents to witnesses. See id.

at 646 (describing Zoom screen-share function).

In those circumstances, the judge acted within her

discretion in choosing to conduct the trial via Zoom, as

permitted by the orders of the Supreme Judicial Court and

Standing Order 1-21 of the Juvenile Court then in effect. See

Adoption of Patty, 489 Mass. at 642. The safeguards that the

judge described and monitored throughout the trial ensured that

the parents' due process rights were protected. See id.

("assuming the safeguards outlined . . . are provided and

monitored, a termination trial conducted via an Internet-based

video conferencing platform when, because of the COVID-19

pandemic, in-person proceedings are not possible without

jeopardizing the health and safety of the public, is not a per

se violation of a parent's right to meaningfully participate").

The father argues that his due process rights were violated

by conducting the trial on Zoom because he did not have access

to the exhibits during his testimony as he would at an in-person

13
trial. We agree with the judge that any difficulty the father

had in reviewing documents arose from his failure to make

himself available for his testimony in a private place with

access to the documents that were in his possession. On the

first day of trial, the father accessed the Zoom trial from his

workplace in a warehouse in Ohio. The father was the first

witness called by DCF, and during direct examination repeatedly

testified that he could not remember events because he did not

have documents in front of him. Questioned by the mother's

counsel about the possibility of using the Zoom screen-sharing

function, the judge stated that she would not permit it then

because the father was not in a private location. As

recommended in Adoption of Patty, 489 Mass. at 646, the judge

confirmed that the father's counsel had given him copies of all

of the documents and other exhibits.11 After the judge told both

parents that they needed to appear for the trial in places where

each of them could be alone and on video, the father renewed his

motion for an in-person trial, which the judge denied. The

father then left the Zoom video conference, and so trial resumed

with direct examination of the mother. The father briefly

11Redactions were required by statutes including G. L. c. 119,
§ 51E. See Brantley v. Hampden Div. of Probate & Family Court
Dep't, 457 Mass. 172, 188 n.22 (2010). Although the record does
not establish with certainty that the father received redacted
copies of certain exhibits, the father makes no specific
argument on appeal with respect to those exhibits.

14
reappeared during the mother's testimony, and then logged off.

For the remainder of the day, the judge interrupted the mother's

testimony periodically to ask if the father was in the Zoom

waiting room and to instruct his counsel to try to reach him by

text message.

On the second day of trial, the father moved to continue

the trial because of his work responsibilities, which the judge

denied.12 Just after the judge denied the motion, the father

stated, "I'm going to excuse myself from proceeding," and then

abruptly logged off. The trial continued, during which the

judge interrupted the mother's testimony every ten minutes and

determined that the father was not the Zoom waiting room. The

father's counsel told the judge that she had informed the father

by text message that the judge was doing so, and that the father

had instructed counsel to renew his request for a continuance

every ten minutes. The judge found that the father was

"willfully not joining this trial," rather than absent as a

result of any technical difficulty.

The father never resumed testifying, and thus was never

cross-examined by counsel for the children, the mother, or his

own counsel. If he had sought to clarify something in the

exhibits or to have access to them when he testified, he could

12The father sought to appeal the denial of the continuance,
which was denied by a single justice of this court.

15
have instructed his own lawyer to recall him and cross-examine

him.13 His failure to do so did not amount to a violation of his

due process rights. Contrast Adoption of Patty, 489 Mass. at

646 (self-represented mother participating in Zoom trial by

telephone wanted to use "paperwork" in mounting her defense, but

lacked understanding of how to do so).

2. Alleged bias of judge. Both parents argue that the

judge showed bias against them and in favor of DCF. The mother

contends that the judge showed favoritism to DCF by permitting

DCF's counsel to "interrupt" witnesses' testimony, and the

father contends that the judge was unfair in forming the opinion

early in the trial that he was "a very frustrating witness."

Setting aside the question whether the mother preserved

this issue below, from our review of the trial record, we

conclude that the judge did not display bias for or against any

party. On the contrary, "[t]he judge acted with due regard for

all parties in a professional, respectful, and judicious way."

Adoption of Querida, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 771, 776 (2019). See

Care & Protection of Doretta, 101 Mass. App. Ct. 584, 594-595

(2022). To the extent that the judge occasionally provided

13On the fifth day of trial, April 28, 2021, the judge allowed
the motion to withdraw filed by the father's counsel, and for
the remainder of trial, that attorney acted as standby counsel.
The judge later stated that if the father decided to call
himself as a witness, she would permit him to testify in
narrative form.

16
DCF's counsel with reminders or suggestions, she also did so for

the father's counsel and for the father when he was representing

himself, as well as for the mother's counsel. Contrast Adoption

of Norbert, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 542, 546 (2013) (judge improperly

"assumed an active role" and asked many more questions than did

the attorneys combined). At the end of the trial, the judge

told the lawyers how grateful she was for their "stellar" work

in the case, praising the father's standby counsel as "the MVP."

3. Admission of children's statements in DCF reports. The

father contends that the judge erred in admitting certain

statements of children contained in the documentary evidence,

including 51B reports and reports of the CASA GAL. The father

moved in limine to exclude or redact those statements, and the

judge denied the motion, ruling them admissible as "statements

of primary fact" because "the hearsay source[s] w[ere]

specifically identified in the document[s] and [were] available

for cross-examination, should the party challenging the evidence

request to do so." Adoption of Luc, 484 Mass. at 154. The

father argues that this put him in an untenable position:

either call the children as witnesses and cause them additional

trauma, or forego calling them and have an adverse inference

drawn against him. The father made no such argument to the

judge, and thus it is waived. In any event, we are not

persuaded.

17
 The judge scrupulously followed the evidence doctrine

applicable in care and protection proceedings set forth in

Adoption of Luc, 484 Mass. at 153. See Care & Protection of

Doretta, 101 Mass. App. Ct. at 591. See also Mass. G. Evid.

§ 1115(b)(2)(B) (2023). Essentially, the father asks us to

carve an exception out of Adoption of Luc when the hearsay

statements were made by children. In enunciating the doctrine,

the Supreme Judicial Court plainly anticipated that it would

apply to statements of children contained in DCF reports. In

Adoption of Luc, supra at 152, the court cited Care & Protection

of Leo, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 237, 241-242 (1995), in which this

court ruled admissible hearsay statements of a child contained

in DCF investigator's report so long as the father had the

opportunity to call the child as a witness. We decline to treat

the hearsay statements of children differently from those of any

other witness.

Moreover, almost all of the statements of children admitted

pursuant to Adoption of Luc were those of Mary and Susan, who

are not the father's children, and so calling them as witnesses

would not have harmed any parent-child bond. The only

statements of any of the three children that were admitted

against him were two statements of Grayson.14 The first was

14The judge also admitted Amy's therapist's testimony that Amy
said she did not want to go to visits with the mother because

18
contained in a CASA GAL report that the father had moved to

exclude, relating that Grayson had said that his "butt hurts"

and the father "hurt me." The judge did not err in admitting

that statement under the Adoption of Luc doctrine. See Mass. G.

Evid. § 1115(c)(3) (doctrine applies to CASA reports). The

judge's findings did not quote that statement, but merely

inferred from it that in October 2018, Grayson "began disclosing

possible sexual abuse," without concluding that the father was

the perpetrator. Thus, that statement was not particularly

prejudicial. Further, it was to a considerable degree

corroborated by the father's admission to DCF that Grayson

"ha[d] been spanked once."

The second statement of Grayson admitted under Adoption of

Luc was in a 51B report documenting that on August 4, 2020,

Grayson told a DCF staff person that the father put his fingers

and his penis in Grayson's "bum."15 The father moved in limine

to exclude that statement, which the judge denied. The judge

noted that she considered that statement of Grayson as permitted

under Adoption of Luc, 484 Mass. at 154. She did not err.

the mother "was not nice." The judge noted that she did not
consider that statement for its truth, but only for Amy's state
of mind.
15 The judge did allow the father's requests to exclude similar

statements of Grayson to his therapist and the preadoptive
mother.

19
 As for the statements of Mary and Susan, those too were

properly admitted under Adoption of Luc, 484 Mass. at 154.16

Further, those two girls' statements about the father's use of

"planking" as discipline, his "tossing the racks," and his

hitting them with a belt were cumulative of other evidence

including the father's own statements to DCF and both parents'

trial testimony. See id. at 148 (judge's findings relying on

hearsay were "largely cumulative" of testimony). Similarly, the

statements of Mary and Susan about witnessing domestic violence

by the father against the mother were cumulative of the mother's

trial testimony, her averments in affidavits in support of 209A

orders, and her testimony at 209A hearings, as testified to by

witnesses present at those hearings. See id. It was within the

judge's purview to credit the mother's testimony about the

domestic violence perpetrated on her by the father. See

Adoption of Querida, 94 Mass. App. Ct. at 778. Merely because

on other occasions the mother had denied its occurrence did not

preclude the judge from crediting her testimony that it did

happen.

16Some statements of Mary and Susan admitted under the doctrine
of Adoption of Luc alleged sexual abuse of them by the father.
The judge noted that sexual abuse was not an "essential element"
of her finding as to the father's unfitness to parent the three
children. See Care & Protection of Laura, 414 Mass. 788, 793-
794 (1993).

20
 Moreover, the evidence of the father's unfitness was

strong.17 The judge concluded that DCF had proven by clear and

convincing evidence the father's physical abuse of Grayson and

his neglect of Grayson and Amy. The judge also considered the

likelihood that Grayson and Amy had witnessed domestic violence

the father had inflicted on the mother, and noted that the

father never took any course related to domestic violence and

invoked his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the United

States Constitution when asked about harming the mother. The

judge further concluded that the father's untreated mental

health issues, his character and temperament, and his failure to

address his parental shortcomings rendered him unfit to parent

the three children. Based on her own observations of the father

at trial, the judge found that he was "uncooperative, abrasive,

and controlling."

4. Mother's unfitness. The mother argues that the judge

erred in finding her unfit to parent the three children. The

mother contends that the judge failed to adequately consider the

progress she made, including having a 209A order in place

against the father at the time of trial. The judge declined to

credit the mother's testimony that she had not spoken to the

father since she obtained a fourth 209A order against him three

17The father does not contest the sufficiency of evidence of his
unfitness.

21
months before trial began. We do not disturb the judge's

credibility determinations on appeal. See Adoption of Querida,

94 Mass. App. Ct. at 778.

The judge did credit the testimony of the DCF supervisor

that the mother's mental health issues affected her ability to

keep her children safe for reasons including her inability to

tell the truth, to maintain safe relationships, and to work

through her own trauma and recognize her children's trauma. See

Adoption of Luc, 484 Mass. at 146-147 (failure to recognize need

for or to engage consistently in treatment is relevant to

determination of unfitness). The judge's findings as to the

mother's failure to protect her children from domestic violence

were amply supported by the record. See Custody of Vaughn, 422

Mass. 590, 599 (1996). See also Adoption of Jacob, 99 Mass.

App. Ct. 258, 262-263 (2021).

Conclusion. Accordingly, the decrees terminating the

father's and the mother's parental rights to each of the three

children are affirmed.

So ordered.

By the Court (Sacks, Grant &
Smyth, JJ.18),

Clerk
Entered: July 28, 2023.

18 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

22