delivered the opinion of the Court. The question in this case arises upon the following certificate of a division of opinion of the judges of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Rhode Island. “ This cause came on to be heard, and was argued by counsel on both sides, and. thereupon the following question occurred : viz. whether, upon rhe amended pleas in this case, severa ly pleaded to the first and .second counts of the *375plaintiff’s declaration, and to which there are. demurrers, and joinders in demurrer, the defendant is entitled to judgment, on the ground that the' matters set forth therein, on the part of the defendant, are sufficient to bar the action; or whether the plaintiff is entitled, upon said demurrers and joinders, to judgment 1 Upon which question the Court was divided in opinion.”
It is not understood by this Court, that any question, as to the sufficiency of the pleas, in point of form, is drawn under examination, but simply, whether, upon the merits, the matter thereby set up is sufficient to bar the action. The action is founded upon two several bonds, given by the defendant to the plaintiff, and one Bates, whom the plaintiff survives, one dated the 14th, and the other the 29th of March, 1814. The condition in both bonds is the same, except as to dates and sums, and is as follows: “ The condition of the above obligation is such, that if the above bounden Nathan Haile, now a prisoner in the State’s jail, in Providence, within the county of Providence, at the suit of said Mason and Bates, do, and shall from henceforth continue to be a true prisoner, in the custody, guard, and safe-keeping of Andrew W.aterman, keeper, of said prison, and in the custody, guard, and safe keeping of his deputy, officers, and servants, or some one of them, within the limits of said prison, until he shall be lawfully discharged, without committing any manner of escape or escapes during the time of restraint, then this obligation to be void, or else to remain in full force and virtue.”
The defence set up by the pleas, to show there has been no breach of the condition of the bond, is substantially, thai in June, 1814, aftei giving the bond in question, the defendant presented a petition to the legislature of Rhode Island, praying relief, and the benefit of the. insolvent act of 1756: and that, in the mean time, all proceedings against his person and estate# for the collection' of debts, might be stayed, and he be liberated from jail, on giving bonds to return in case his petition should not be granted. Upon this petition, the legislature, in February, 1816, passed the following resolution : “ On the petition of Nathan Haile, praying, for the reasons therein stated, that the benefit of an act, entitled, an act for the relief of insolvent debtors, passed in the year *3761756, be extended to him, voted, that said petition be con-tinned until the next session of this assembly ; and that, in tjje mean time, all proceedings against the said Haile, on account of his debts, be stayed ; and that the said Haile be liberated from his present imprisonment, in the jail, in the county of Providence, on his giving sufficient bond to the sheriff of the county, conditioned to return to jail in case said petition is not granted.1’ The defendant, after the passing of this resolution, gave the bond required by it, and, on the 28th of the same month, was discharged, from imprisonment,, and has ever since been at large, out of the custody of the sheriff. In February, 1816, the legislature, upon a due hearing, granted the prayer of the defendant, and passed the following resolution: “ On the petition of Nathan Haile, of Foster, praying, for the reasons 'therein stated, that the benefit of an act, passed in June^ 1756, for the relief of insolvent debtors, may be extended to him, voted, that the prayer of the said petition be, and the same is hereby granted.” By the granting of the prayer of the petition, the condition of the second bond given to the sheriff was complied with, and the bond became extinguished.
The defendant afterwards proceeded to take the benefit of the insolvent act revived in his favour, according to the statute provisions, and received in .due form from the proper Court, a judgment, “ that he should be, and thereby was fully discharged of and from all debts, contracts and demands, of every name, nature, and kind, outstanding against him, debts due to the State aforesaid, or to the United States, excepted, and from all imprisonment, arrest, and restraint of his person therefor.” The insolvent act of 1756 is not considered in force as a general and permanent law, but the legislature-of Rhode Island has been in the constant habit of entertaining petitions, like the present, and has by the general law of 1798, (now in force,) prescribed the mode by which such petitions are to be regulated, and in case of granting the prayer of the petition, the course is to pass an act or resolution, giving the benefit of the act of 1756 to the petitioner, and thus, in effect, reviving it for his particular benefit. So, that the mode pursued to obtain the discharge of the defendant, as set out in the pleas, was according to the established course *377of proceeding in cases of insolvency, and in conformity to the laws of Rhode island, by which the defendant tvas discharged from all his contracts, and from imprisonment.
Condition of the bond,who ^ ths“t,s*jrá Charge, according to the insolvent laws usage aild practiceThe effect of this discharge upon tne original judgment against Haile is not now drawn in question. The only inquiry is,.whether he has violated the condition of his bonds of March, 1814, by going at large, under the authority and sanction of the resolutions of the legislature, as before sta- , , l i '-ii' ■ • ' •i tea. tiis bond required him to remain a true prisoner, until he should be lawfully discharged, without committing any manner of escape during the time of restraint. The bond is not that he shall remain a true prisoner until the debt shall be paid. Nor is there any thing upon the face of the bond, or if we look out-of it, to the known and established laws ana usages in that State, calling for such a construction. A lawful discharge, in its general signification, will extend to, and be satisfied by, any discharge obtained under the legislative authority of the State. And it is not unreasonable to consider such prison bonds as given subject to the ordinary and uréll known practice in Rhode Island, for the legislature to entertain .petitions in the manner pursued by the defendant, to obtainthe benefit of the insolvent act of 1756, in the manner in which these petitions are received and proceeded upon, as prescribed by the act of 1798. And, indeed, this cannot strictly be considered a private contract between the parties, but rather as ar statute engagement, imposed by an act of the legislature, and as a part of the process under .which the defendant was held as a prisoner. And with the full knowledge of this regulation and practice, it is hardly to be presumed, that such discharges were not understood to be lawful discharges. And the same remarks will apply to the term escape in the bond, which can mean no more than a departure from the limits without lawful authority. Suppose the legislature, after the execution of this bond, had enlarged the jail limits ? It surely would not have been an escape for the defendant to have availed himself of the enlarged limits, and gone beyond his former bounds. And yer, if the limits prescribed at the time the bond was executed, are to govern the effect and operation of the bond, it would be an escape. Such bonds may well be considered
*378gisiatureshave erVeiover P°the suBject of ^¡m§eBt°,nonnproown Courts.61 The discharge, was?? lawful discharge, n dition of the jaii liberties?6as an enlargement of the prison limits, and a mere modification of the imprisonment, according to the provisions of the laws of Rhode Island.
Can it be doubted, hot the legislatures of the States, so far as relates to their own process, have a right to abolish imprisonment for debt altogether, and that such law might extend to present, as well as future imprisonment ? We aré not aware that such a power in the States has ever been questioned. And if such a general law would be valid under the constitution of the United States, where is the prohibition to be found, that denies to the St'ate of Rhode Island the right of applying the same remedy to individual cases ? This is a measure which must be regulated by the views of policy and expediency entertained by the State legislatures. Such laws.act merely upon the ren-.dy, and that in part only. They do not take away the entire remedy, but only so far as imprisonment forms a part of such remedy. The doctrine of this Court in the case of Sturges v. Crowninshield, (4 Wheat. Rep. 200.) applies with full force to the present case. “ Imprisonment of the debtor,” say the Court, “ may be a punishment for not performing his contract, or may be allowed as a mean for inducing him to perform it.- But a State may refuse to inflict this punishment, or may withhold it altogether, and leave the contract in full force. Imprisonment is no part of the contract, and simply to release the prisoner, does not impair its obliga-tion.”
In whatever light, therefore, the question is viewed, no breach of the condition of the bond, according to its true sense an^interpretation,has been committed. The liberation of the defendant from confinement, on his giving bond to the sheriff to return to jail in case his petition for a discharge should not be granted, was sanctioned by the due exercise of legislative power, and was analogous to extending to him more enlarged jail limits, and would not be considered an escape. And both this and the final discharge, so far, at all events, as it related to the imprisonment of the defendant, affected the remedy in part only, and was in the due and ordinary exercise of the powers vested in the legislature of Rhode Island, and was a lawful discharge, and no *379{íscape, and of course, no breach of the. condition of the bond in question.
It must, accordingly, be certified to the Circuit Court, that the matters set forth in the defendaiits Amended pleas, are sufficient to bar the plaintiff’s action.