delivered the opinion of the- Court.
This case comes up on appeal from the circuit court of the District of Columbia, for the county of Alexandria. The appellees were the. complainants in the court below; and as heirs at law of their mother, Eleanor Jenkins, filed their bill, by their father, James B. Pye, as next friend,.to set aside a deed given by their mother, to George Jenkins, her father, bearing date the 15th of March, 1813.- The' bill charges, that the deed was made wholly without consideration,, and operated only to create a resulting trust in favour of the grantor and her heirs; and if their claim cannot be sustained on that ground, they charge that the- deed was obtained by the undue influence of parental authority, and therefore void in equity, against the said Eleanor Jenkins and her heirs.
The consideration expressed in the deed is one dollar; and as to the allegation of undue influence, the bill charges that the said Eleanor inherited, as heir of her mother, the land conveyed to her father, and in which her father was entitled to a life estate. That at the time of her mother’s death, she was an infant of very tender years, residing with her father, and continued to reside with him until her marriage.. That she never was informed of the extent of *252her property, to which she became entitled on the death of her mother; and having led' a life of great seclusion, in the coyn'try, at a distance from Alexandria, where the. lands, are’ situated, she had no means of acquiring information on the subject That very spon after the said Eleanor had attained the age of twenty-one years, and whilst she still resided with her father, and remained-in ignorance of the extent and valué of her rights; the said"George Jenkins, availing himself of his parental authority; and of the habit of implicit obedience, and submission on the part of his child, procured from her the deed in question.
The answers of-the appellant's deny every material charge and specification in the bill, tending to show that any undue influence was exercised by the father, to obtain the deed from his daughter; but that the act was voluntary and free on her part. That she was well acquainted' with her rights, and the value of the property, That at the time of executing the deed, she was twenty-three years of age; and that the; same was not done in expectation of her marriage, as. she was not married for two years afterwards.
The mere nominal consideration expressed on the face of the deed was'enough to pass the estate to, the grantee, no uses being declared' in the deed'. .It is true, as a general proposition, «that he who pays the consideration, means, in the absence of all rebutting circumstances to purchase for his own benefit ;” and there may be a resulting trust, for the use of the party paying the consideration. But this is founded upon a mere implication of law, and may bé rebutted by evidence, showing that Such was not the intention of the parties. And in the present case, the evidence is conclusive to show that no such resulting use was intended. But it is unnecessary particularly to notice this evidence, as-this part of the case was not very much pressed at the argument. ■ And in addition to this, the evidence shows that ou the 3d of November;1813, the day her deed was offered for.record in Alexandria, George Jenkins paid to his daughter two thousand dollars; which, uhder the situation of the property, might well be considered nearly, if not quite, an adequate consideration. The property being ih a dilapidated state, requiring great, expense in repairs; and the 'grantee, George Jenkins, having a life estate in it, which, from the circumstance of his living eighteen years after the date of the deed, there is reason to conclude, that the state of his health and constitution Was such at that time, as justly to estimate his life estate of considerable value.
*253The.evidence of the payment of two thousand dollars, in addition to the'nominab consideration of one dollar mentioned in the deed, was admissible; without any amendment of the answer. It rebutted the allegation in the bill, that the deed was made wholly without consideration.
But the grounds mainly relied upon to invalidate.the deed, were, that being from a daughter to her father, rendered it at.least, prima facie,- void; And if not void on this ground, it was so because it was obtained by the undue influence of paternal authority.
- The first ground of objection seeks to-establish' the broad priflci-. pie, that a deed from a child tó a parent, conveying the real estáte of the child, ought, upon considerations of public policy, growing.out' of the relation of the parties, to be deemed void: and numerous cases in the English chancery have been referred to,, which are supposed to establish -this principle. We do not deem it necessary-tb -travel over all. these authorities; we have looked into the leading: ■cases, and cannot discover any thing to warrant the broad- and -tin-' qualified doctrine contended for on the part of the appellees. All the. cases are accompanied with some.ingredient, showing undue influence exercised' by the parent, operating upon the- fears or hopes of the child; and. sufficient to show reasonable grounds to presume that the act was not perfectly free and voluntary on the part of -the child; and in some cases,.although there may be circumstances tending, in some small degree, to show, undue influence; yet if the agreement appears reasonable, it has been considered enough to outweigh light circumstances, so as not to affect' the validity of the deed.
It becomes the less necessary for us to go into a critical examination of the English chancery doctrine on this subject, for should the cases.be found- to countenance it, we should not be disposed to adopt child Or sanction the broad principle contended for, that the deed of a to á parent is to be deemed, prima facie, void. It is .undoubtedly the -duty of courts carefully to watch .and examine the'circumstances attending transactions of this kind, when brought under review before them, to discover if any undüe influence has been exercised in obtaining the conveyance. . But to consider a parent disqualified to-take a voluiltary deed from his child, without consideration, on account of their relationship; is assuming a principle at war with all filial as well as parental duty and affection; and acting on the presumption, that a parent, instead of wishing to promote the interest *254and welfare, would be seeking to overreach and defraud his child. Whereas, the presumption ought to be, in the absence of all proof tending to á contrary conclusion, {hat the advancement of the interest of the child was the object in view; and to presume the existence of circumstances conducing to that result. Such a presumption harmonizes with the moral obligations of a parent to provide for his child.; and is founded upon the same benign principle that governs eases of purchases made by parents in the name of a child. The prima facie presumption is, that it was intended as an advancement to the -child, and so not falling within fhe principle of a resulting trust. The natural and reasonable presumption in all transactions of this kind is, that a benefit was intended the child, because in the discharge of a moral and parental duty. And the interest of the child is abundantly guarded and protected, by keeping a watchful eye over the transaction, to see that no undue influence was brought to bear upon it.
In the present case, every allegation in the bill tending to show that any undue influence was used, is fully met and denied in the answer .'.nd is utterly without proof to sustain it. . And indeed this allegation seemed to be abandoned on the argument.
But if any thing was wanting to resist the cMm on the part of the appellees, and to establish the deed, and the interest derived under it, it will be found in the-lapse of time. The deed .bears date the 3d of November, 1813; the grantor, Eleanor Jenkins,.then being twenty-three years of age. She -was married about two years thereafter, and died in the year 1818;-and not a whisper of complaint was heard against the transaction during her lifetime. George Jenkins, the grantee, lived until the year 1831, and no complaint was made in. his lifetime; after a lapse of eighteen years, it is difficult, if .not impracticable, fully to explain the transaction.
Lapse of time, and the death of the parties to the deed, have always been considered in a court of chancery, entitled to great weight, and almost controlling circumstances, in cases of this kind.
But the circumstances, as disclosed by the proofs, not only rebut every presumption of unfairness on the part of George. Jenkins, but disclose circumstances, tending to show that he was governed by motives highly honourable and commendable. He was a man of large estate; the property conveyed to him by his daughter was in a dilapidated and unprofitable condition. He had a life estate in it. And it would have been unreasonable, if not unjust to his other children, to
*255have required him to incur great expenses in improving this property, which would enure to the exclusive benefit of this daughter. Hjs object, as well as that of his daughter, seems to have been to enable him the more easily and satisfactorily to make an equal distribution of his property among all his children; as well the said Eleanor, as those he had by a second marriage. This was a measure well calculated to promote harmony among his children: and his intention to carry th'at disposition of his property into execution, was manifested by the .will he made; which failed however of its full operation, by reason, of some informality in its execution. But the appellees have succeeded to a full and equal share of his estate, under the distribution which the law has made; which is all that in equityand justice they could claim.
This view of the case, renders it unnecessary to notice the poiiits made on the argument, in relation to the accounts which the appellees were called upon to render.
The decree of the court below is accordingly reversed, and-the bill' dismissed.-