dissented.
In this case I find myself constrained to disagree with the opinion of the court just pronounced. This disagreement is not so much the result of any view taken by me of the testimony in this case, in conflict with that adopted by my brethren; for, with respect to the character of the testimony, were that the subject regularly before us, there perhaps would exist little or no- differ* ence of opinion. With some modifications, perhaps unimportant, I might have agreed also to the legal propositions laid down by the court, so far as I have been able to extract them from the charge of the judge. My disagreement with the majority, relates to a great principle lying at the foundation of all legal inquiries into matters of fact; lying indeed at the foundation of civil society itself: the preservation, in its fullest scope and integrity, unaffected, and even unapproached by improper influences, direct or indirect, of the venerable, the sacred, thé unappreciable trial by jury. In the remark just made, or in any criticism which may be attempted as to the charge of the judge at circuit, in this case, I would have it understood that there is no officer , to whose learning, or to whose integrity of purpose, I would with greater confidence intrust either-the rights of the citizen, or the exposition of the law, than I would to the judge whose opinion is before us; but in this instance, it seems to me, that in accordance with a practice which, although it has obtained in some of the courts, is regarded as irregular and mischievous, he has stepped beyond the true limits of the judicial province. D.uty.demands of me, therefore, however ineffectual the effort, that I should oppose my feeble resistance to the aggression.
I object to the-charge of the judge in this 'ease, as I would to every similar charge of a court presiding over a jury trial at common law, because it is not confined to a statement of the points of law raised by the pleadings, and to the competency or relevancy of the testimony offered by either party in reference to those points; but extends.to the weight and efficiency of the. evidence, all admissible, and in fact admitted, and declares to the jury minutely and emphatically, what that testimony does or does not prove. And now let us examine the language oí the charge. It is as follows:
“ One ground on which the defence is placed is, that the plaintiff was engaged in an unlawful trade with the public enemy, and that, being engaged in an unlawful trade, his goods were liable to confiscation; and any person, particularly an officer of the army, could seize the same.
This ground, as I understand the evidence, has altogether failed. He was not only not so engaged, but was engaged in trading *139with that portion of the territory reduced to subjection by our arms, and where his trading with the inhabitants was permitted and encouraged. The army was directed to hold out encouragement to the tradérs. There is no foundation, therefore, for this branch of the defence. Another ground taken by the defendant, and relied upon, depends upon another principle of public law, viz., the taking possession of the goods at a time and place when it was necessary for the purpose of preventing them from falling into the'hands of the enemy. This has been urged as particularly applicable to the plaintiff’s goods, some of which consisted of articles which might be used as munitions of war, wagons for transportation, &c.
Taking the whole of the evidence together, and giving full effect to every part of it, we think this branch of the defence has also failed.
No case of peril or danger has .been proved which would lay a foundation for taking possession of the goods of the plaiqtiff at San Elisario, on that ground, either as it respects the state of the country, or the forcé of the public enemy. On the contrary, it was in the possession of the arms of this government. There was no enemy, no'public force at the time in the neighborhood, which put the goods in the danger of being captured. The plaintiff’s goods, therefore, stood in the same condition as the goods of any other trader in the country. The testimony does not make out a case of seizure of property justified by the peril of- its falling into the enemy’s hands. The peril must be immediate and. urgent, not contingent or remote; otherwise every citizen’s property, particularly on the frontiers, would be liable to be seized or destroyed, as it must always be more or less exposed to capture by the public enemy. The principle itself, if properly applied, of the right to take property to prevent it from falling into the hands of the enemy,is undisputed. But in this case there was no immediate or impending. danger, no enemy advancing to put the goods in peril. They were more exposed to marauding parties than to any public force, the danger from which the plaintiff considered himself able to take care of. The next ground of defence, and which constitutes the principal question in the case, and upon which it must probably ultimately turn, is the taking of the goods by the public authorities for public use. I admit the principle of public law; but this rests likewise upon the'law of necessity. I have - no doubt of the right of a military officer, in a case of extreme necessity, for the safety of the government or of the army, to take private property for the public service.
An army upon its march, in danger from the public enemy, would have a right to seize the property of the citizen, and use *140it to fortify itself against assault while the danger existed and was impending, and the officer ordering the seizure would not be liable as a trespasser; the owner must look to the Government for indemnity. The safety of the country is paramount, and the rights of the individual must yield in case of extreme necessity. No doubt, upon the testimony, if the enemy had been in force, in the neighborhood of the United States troops, with the disparity which existed at Sacramento, and the same danger for the safety of the troops existed at San Elisario that threatened them there, thé commanding offiber might, for the safety of this army, seize and use, while the danger continued, the Wagons and teams of the plaintiff that could be immediately brought into the service, to meet and overcome the impending danger. An immediate, existing, and overwhelming necessity would justify the seizure for the safety of the army.
Looking, however, at the testimony, it seems to me quite clear that these goods were seized, not on account of any impending danger.at the time, or for the purpose of being used against an immediate assault of the enemy, by which the command might be endangered, but that they were seized and taken into the public service for the purpose of coopérating with the army in their expedition into the enemy’s country, to Chihuahua. The mules, wagons, and goods were taken into the public service for the purpose of strengthening the army, and aiding in the accomplishment of the ulterior object of the expedition, which was the taking of Chihuahua; it was not to repel a threatened assault, or to protect the army from an impending peril; in my judgment, all the evidence taken together does not make out an immediate peril or urgent necessity existing at the time of seizure which would justify the officer in taking private property and impressing it into the public service ; the evidence does not bring the case within the principle of extreme necessity; it does not make out such a base, or one doming within the principle; there is not only no evidence of an impending peril to be resisted by the public force, but the goods were taken for a different purpose, viz., for the purpose of cooperating with the army against Chihuahua ; the army had to march over two hundred miles before it reached or found the enemy; the danger, if any, lay in the pursuit, not in remaining at San 'Elisario or returning to Santa Fé; there had been a sudden insurrection against the authority of the government in that neighborhood, but it was immediately suppressed.
As to the remaining grounds of defence, the liability of the defendant for taking the goods and appropriating them to the public service accrued at the time of the seizure ;• if it was an unlawful taking, the liability immediately attached, and the *141question was whether that liability had been discharged or released by any subsequent act of the plaintiff; Colonel Mitchell, who executed the order, was not alone responsible, Colonel Doniphan, who gave the order, was also liable; they were jointly and severally responsible; then, was any act done by the plaintiff which waived the liability, or by which he resumed the ownership and possession of the goods ? Certainly the abandonment of the goods to Colonel Doniphan cannot be regarded as an act of resumption of ownership; on the contrary, it was consistent with the assertion'of his liability; there had been a negotiation between them; Colonel Doniphan advised him to sell the goods at Chihuahua and look to the government for indemnity, and, in pursuance of this, measures were taken for their protection and safe-keeping. 1 doubt if there be any evidence showing an intent on the part of the plaintiff to resume ownership over the goods as his'private property after they had been seized by the army, or any act done by him that would, when properly viewed, lead to that result.”
The bill of exceptions concludes as follows:
“ After the judge expressed his views of the case as above stated, the counsel on both sides declined going to the jury.
The presiding judge accordingly charged the jury that the law was as had been stated by him, and that if they agreed with jiim in his view of the facts, that they would find for the •plaintiff, otherwise for the defendant.
The counsel for the defendant did then and there except to each of the four propositions mentioned in the charge above stated.
The jury, without leaving their seats, returned a verdict for the plaintiff for $90,806.44.
And because none of the said exceptions, so offered and made to the opinions and decisions of the said associate justice, do appear upon the record of the said trial; therefore, on the prayer of the said defendant, by his said- counsel, the said associate justice hath tq the bill of exceptions set his seal, April term, one thousand eight hundred and fifty. S. Nelson, [seal.]”-
The record, above cited, informs us that after the judge had expressed his views of the case as above stated, the counsel on both sides declined going to the jury. And surely, after such an expression, no other result could -well have been anticipated. In the first place, the counsel for the plaintiff could not have made to the jury so authoritative an argument in behalf of his client; and in the next place the counsel for the defendant must have been a rash, man could he have attempted to throw his individual weight (whatever might have been his ability) in opposition to this authoritative declaration and influence of the court. Nay, *142it may be insisted, that if the court, in passing upon the 'weight of the evidence, was acting within its legitimate sphere, the counsel would have been justly obnoxious to-the imputation of indecorum, if not of contempt, in assailing before'the jury the judge’s decision; for the respective provinces of -the court, the counsel, and the jury, are separate, distinct, and well defined, and neither should be subject to invasion by-the other.
But after the counsel had been thus silenced, and the weight of the evidence -fully and minutely pronounced upon by the court, it. is insisted, that the alleged irregularity was entirely cured, by a declaration from the court to the jury, “ that if they agreed with him in his view of the facts, they should find for the plaintiff, otherwise they might find for the defendant.” But the natural and obvious inquiry here is, what the judge’s view of the facts had to do with this matter. It was the jury who were to find the facts for the judge, and not the judge who was to find the facts for the jury; and if the verdict is either formally, or in effect, the verdict of the judge, it is neither according to truth nor common sense, the verdict of the jury; and these triers of fact had better be dispensed with, as an useless, and indeed an expensive and cumbersome formula in courts of law,, than be preserved as false indicia of ■ what they in reality do not show. Moreover, this determination of facts by the court does not place the parties upon fair and equal grounds of contest before the minds of-the jury; it is placing the weight of the court, which must always be powerfully felt, on the side of one of the parties, and causing the scale necessarily to preponderate by throwing the sword, which, under such circumstances, can hardly be called the sword of justice, into one of the scales in which the rights- of the parties are hanging.
The practice of passing upon the weight of the evidence and of pronouncing from the bench what that evidence does or does not prove, accords neither wiui the nature and objects of jury trial, as indicated by its very name, nor as affirmed by-the fathers ■of the law who have defined this institution and proclaimed it to be the ark of safety for life, liberty, and property. Thus'it is called the trial per pais, or by the country, to distinguish it as a determination of the rights of the subject or citizen by.his fellow subjects or citizens, from a determination thereon by the action of mere officials or creatures of. the government. And with respect to the peculiar intent and effects of this tribunal of the people we read thus: Justice Blackstone, speaking of this institution, says: “ The trial by jury has ever been, and, I trust, ever will be, looked upon as the glory of the English law. ' And if it has so great an advantage over others in regulating civil property, how much must that advantage be heightened whep. *143it is applied to criminal cases! It is the most transcendent privilege which any subject can enjoy or wish for, that he cannot* be affected, either in his property, his liberty, or his person, But by the'unanimous consent of twelve of his neighbors and equals.” Again he says: “ Great as this eulogium may seem, it is no more than this admirable constitution, when traced to its principles, will be found in sober reason to' deserve. The impartial administration of justice, which' secures both our persons and our property, is the great end of civil society. But if that be entirely intrusted to the magistracy, a select body of men, and those generally selected by the prince, or such as enjoy the highest offices in the state, their decisions, in spite of their own natural integrity, will have frequently an involuntary bias towards those .of their own rank and dignity. It is wisely ordered, therefore^ that the principles and axioms of law, which are general propositions flowing from abstracted reason, and not accommodated to times or men, should be deposited in the breasts of the judges, tO'be occasionally applied to such facts as come properly ascertained before them. For here partiality can have little scope : the law is well known, and is the same for all ranks and degrees; it follows as a regular conclusion from the premises of facts .preestablished. But in settling and adjusting a question of fact, when intiusted to any single magistrate,- partiality and injustice have an ample field to range in, either by boldly asserting that to be proved which is not so, dr by more artfully suppressing some circumstances, stretching and warping others, and distinguishing away the remainder.” And again: “ Every new tribunal erected for the decision of facts without the intervention of a jury (whether composed of justices of the peace, commissioners of the revenue, or judges of a court of con science, or any other standing magistracy,) is a step towards establishing aristocracy, the most oppressive of absolute governments. It is, therefore, upon the whole, a duty which every man owes to his country, his friends, his posterity, and himself, to maintain, to the utmost of his power, this valuable constitution in all its rights; to restore it to its ancient dignity if at all impaired by the different value of property, or otherwise deviated fromi its first institution; and above all to'guard it against the introduction of new and arbitrary methods of trial, which, under á variety of plausible pretences, may in time imperceptibly undermine this best preservative of English liberty.”
"With regard to the legitimate and proper mode of operation, and effect of the trial by jury, the language of Lord Coke should ever be kept in mind, as furnishing the true and only true standard by which to measure this valuable institution. After giving his derivation of the terms verdict and judgment, *144this great common lawyer proceeds, “ Et sicut ad qucestionem juris non respondent juratores sed judices ; sic ad qucestionem facti, non respondent judices sed juratores.” For jurors are to try the fact, and the judges ought to judge according to the law that ariseth upon the fact, for ex facto jus oritur. The, manner' of stating the above proposition^ by this great lawyer and commentator is worthy of particular attention, as defining and illustrating with clearness and precision, the powers and duties of the court and the jury. He has not simply said, ad qu'cestionem juris respondent judices, nor in like manner ad qucestionem facti, respondent juratores, but he has placed them in a striking opposition and contrast, and drawn a well-defined limit around the functions of both the court and the jury, and informed them, in terms too unequivocal for misapprehension, that the limit, thus prescribed, neither has the power to transcend; has declared to each what it shall not do. Thus, literally translated, his annunciation is “And as. with respect to the questions of law,-the jury,must not respond, but only the judges; so, or'in like manner, or under like restriction, the judges must not respond to questions of fact, but only the jury.” There can be no escape from- the force of the positions thus laid down by Lord Coke, by the argument that the jury are not absolutely bound by the opinion pronounced by the court upon the weight of the evidence. The proper inquiry here is, not as to the .absolute and binding authority of the court’s opinion upon the weight of evidence, but that inquiry is, what are the legitimate and appropriate functions of the court and the jury; whether the former, in pronouncing upon the weight of the evidence, can, within any rational sense, be responding only to questions of law, or whether it is not controlling the free action of the jury by the indirect exertion of a power which all are obliged.to concede that it does not legitimately possess; the power of responding to the facts of the case. This is one of the mischievous consequences against which we are assured by Justice Blackstone, that the trial by jury was designed to guard, when he remarks that, “ in settling and adjusting a question of fact when intrusted to any single magistrate, partiality and injustice have an ample field to range in, either by boldly asserting that to be proved which is not so, or by more artfully suppressing some circumstances, stretching and warping others, and distinguishing away the remainder.” And if this power of interpretation or of weighing the evidence cannot safely be deposited within the regular commission of the judge, much less should an attempt to wield that power be tolerated, when confessedly beyond his commission. The objection here urged to the interposition of the court as to the weight of evidence, is by *145no means weakened by the excuse or explanation that sucfi declaration by the court is not binding, but is given in the way of advice ,to the jury; the essence of the objection is perceived in the control and influence which an interposition by court is almost certain to produce upon the otherwise free and unembarrassed action of the jury, and the restraint it imposes upon tl}e views and efforts of the advocate, who, in a great majority of instances, will hardly venture to throw himself openly into a conflict with the court. And again the maxim which declares that ad qucestimem facti non respondent judices, would seem to forbid this advice altogether, or to render it officious or irregular at least. The court can exercise a legitimate and effectual .control over the verdict of juries by the award of new trials, and should be restricted to this regular exertion of its acknowledged power. Let us test this interposition by the court, by comparing it with a similar irregularity on the part of the jury. “ Ad qucestionem juris non respondent juratores sed judices,” says the maxim. Now, suppose the jury sworn in a cause should declare to the court what evidence was competent or relevant.to the issues they were to try, and what, in their view, should be the law governing the contest between .the parties. .Would not such a proceeding be regarded as extremely irregular and wholly unjustifiable ? And why would it be so regarded ? Simply because in so acting the jury would transcend the province assigned them by their duty; because they would not be conforming to the maxim ad qucestionem legis non respondent juratores sed judices. And yet, perhaps, there would be greater color for this proceeding than can be found to excuse' the interference by the court in questions of fact; for it is undeniable that from the earliest periods of the practice of jury trials, the jury, of right, could find á general verdict, thereby constituting themselves judges both of law and fact.
In accordance with the maxim quoted from Lord Coke, may be cited other authorities of .great weight. Thus, in the case of, Rex v. Poole, to be found in Cases in the King’s Bench, in the, time of Lord Hardwicke, it is said by Hardwicke, C. J., that “ it is of the greatest consequence to, the law of England,, and to the subject, that the powers of the judge and the jury be kept distinct; that the judge determine the law, and the jury' the fact; and if ever they come to be confounded, it will prove the confusion and destruction of the law of England.” So likewise in Foster, p. 256, it is said,.that “the construction of the law,' upon the facts found by the jury,, is in all cases undoubtedly the proper province of-- the court.” It has been said, that the ,course pursued by the judge in this case is in eonfotmity with, the practice of the courts' of England, and in the *146majority of the States of this Union. For the establishment of the position assumed, either'with regard to the English courts, or with respect to the tribunals of the several States, no authorities have been cited; but, even. if this position should be conceded, it is not the less clear that the rule it is invoked to sustain is a flagrant departure from the great principle so emphatically asserted by the fathers of thelaw, and should not the less be viewed and shunned as an abuse rather than an example' worthy of imitation. In what number of States of this confederacy such a practice (such an abuse, as I would term it,) may prevail has not been shown; certain it is, that in many of thfe Southern States it does not obtain, and would not be tolerated. It has' also been said, that the right of the judge to instruct the jury upon the weight of testimony has been ruled as the established- doctrine of this court. If this be so, it is a revelation which the friends of jury trial, in its full integrity and independence, will grieve tolearn, and will be disposed to regard as^i demolition by this court of that sacred ark of civil liberty, whichjSb'y the greatest services- it may render, it Can hardly ever be able to atone. It is true-that, in the case of Carver v. Jackson, 4 Pet. 80, there is an "expression .of Mr. Justice Story, in delivering the opinion of the court, broad enough to cover this irregular exercise of power by the court in its widest extent. .But, upon examination,'it will be seen that this expression had nox real connection with the- points regularly before the court, and, as a .mere dictum, was entirely without authority. In the introductory part of his opinion, Mr. Justice Story, meaning merely to express his disapprobation of a practice of bringing up for review the entire charge ..of the corut below, with Cut stating specific points or grounds of exception, as extremely inconvenient, takes occasion toúrse the following remark, namely, — that, “ with the charge of the court to the jury upon mere matters of fact, and with its commentaries upon the weight of evidence, this court has nothing to do.” , But it is remarkable that this judge goes on to say, with respect to these commentaries, that they are of no binding legal effect; thus, in reality, - pronouncing their condemnation in .the same breath which sanctions their. admission to affect, if it can be done without legal ‘or binding obligation, the minds of the jurors. Surely it may be assumed as a postulate, that a cdprt of justice, in adjudicating upon the rights of the eitizén or. of the State, should do, and can .have power to do, nothing which is irregular, of vain, or useless. Its duty and its office is to do the law, and nothing but the law. The anomalous and contradictory doctrine above noticed has, I think, been condemned by a more recent and a far more corre'ct decision of this court; a decision *147directly in point upon this subject, — I allude to the case oí Hanson v. Eustace, 2 How. 706. In that case, the late Justice Baldwin, under the rule which admits, of secondary evidence when the primary evidence is not within the power of a party, or is withheld improperly by his adversary, went so far beyond the just application of the rule as to say to the jury what the secondary or presumptive evidence did actually prove; but still accompanied his declaration with the salvo, “ that if they agreed with him in opinion.” • This is his language: “ Should your opinion agree with ours on this point, you will presume that there was a deed from Robert Phillips, or his heirs, competent to vest the title to the sixth street lot in the firm of Robert & Isaac Phillips; that it so remained at the time of the assignment, ' and that it was by such conveyance as would enable them to enjoy the property against Robert Phillips and his heirs.” And this court reversed the decision of the Circuit Court, upon the ground that the judge’s charge declared. to the jury what their conclusions, from the secondary evidence, ought specifically. to be. This decision I regard as in strict conformity with the doctrines promulged by the fathers of the law, the doctrine which- alone can prevent the inestimable trial- by jury, from becoming a mere mockery and a deception to those who have been taught to revere and rely upon it as the best safeguard of these rights. Transforming this institution from what it was intended to be, and once was in reality, — a trial by the country, — into a’mere formula, be moulded at-the discretion of the court. I think that the judgment of the Circuit Court should be reversed.
David D. Mitchell, Plaintiff in Error, v. Manuel X. Harmony.
In obedience to the order of the court in this case, yesterday, the clerk of this court having filed the following report, namely: —
Supreme Court of the United States. No. 178. December Term, 1851.
David D. Mitchell, Plaintiff in Error, v. Manuel X. Harmony.
States'for the Southern Distóct of - New York.
In calculating the interest on the judgment of affirmance iri the above-entitled cause, the clerk respectfully presents, at the instance of the respective counsel, the following different modes for the consideration of the court: —
1. Interest, at the rate of six per cent., on the judgment of the Circuit Court, fijiap the 9th November, -1850, the day "the judgment was signed,'to this date.
*1482. Interest, from tbe 1st April; 1850, the first day of the term at which the judgment was rendered, to this date.
3. Interest, at the rate of 7 per cent., from 9th November, 1850, to 26th February, 1851, (the date of the writ of error,) and then at 6 per cent, on the aggregate, to this date.
4. Interest, at the rate of 7 per cent., from 1st April, 1850, to 26th February, 1851, and then at 6 per cent, on the aggregate, to this date.
The clerk feels bound to confine his calculations to the 18th rule of. the court, irrespective of the act of Congress of . 23d August, 1842. ¥m. Thomas Carroll, C. S. C. U. S. '14th May, 1852.
Calculation No. 1.
$95,855.38 Judgment of Circuit Court, U. S., for New York, signed 9th November, 1850. • 8,706.85 Interest, at 6 per cent, per annum, from 9th No- - vember, 1850, to 14th May, 1852,' — one year, $104,5.62.23 six months, and five days.
Calculation No. 2.
‘$95,855.38 Judgment of Circuit Court, U. S., for New York, rendered 1st April, 1850. 12,204.57 Interest, at 6 per cent, per annum, from 1st April, -- 1850, to 14th May, 1852, — -two years, one $108,059.95| month, and fourteen days.
Calculation No. 3.
$95,855.38 Judgment of Circuit Court, U. -S., for. New York, signed 9th November, 1850. 1,994.35 Interest, at 7 per cent, per annum, from 9th No- -:- vember, 1850, to 26th February, 1851, ■ — . three 97,849.73 months and seventeen days. 7,139.51 Interest on this, amount at 6 per cent, per annum,- —:-- from 26th February, 1851, to 14th May, 1852, $104,989.24 — one year, two months, and eighteen days.
Calculation No. 4.
$95,855.38 Judgment of Circuit Court, U. S., for New York, rendered 1st April, 1850. 6,076.15. Interest, at 7 per cent, per annum, from 1st April, —-- 1850, to 26th February, 1851,: — ten months $101,931.53 and twenty-six days. 7,440.99 Interest on this amount, at 6 per cent, per annum, ■- from 26th February, 1851, to 14th May, 1852, $109,372.52 — one year, two months, arid eighteen days.
*149And Mr. Vinton having filed the following exceptions, namely: —
The defendant in error, M. X. Harmony, excepts to the report of the clerk, touching the computation of interest on the above-named judgment of the Circuit Court, U. S., for the Southern' District of New York, in this, namely : —
1st. That, by the act of Congress of the 23d of August, 1842, the said defendant in error is entitled to the same rate of interest on said judgment (being 7 per cent.) as he would be entitled to if said judgment had been rendered in a State court of the State of New York; whereas, the • said computation allows 6 per cent, only on said judgment. See 5 Statutes at Large, 518.
2d. That the said interest ought to be computed, on said judgment, from the 1st Monday in April, 1850, instead of from the 9th of November of that year. See printed record, pages 19 and 20. S. F. Vinton,
May 14,1852. For Defendant in Error.
And the said defendant in error, also, at the same time, moves the court to open up the judgment of affirmance (rendered in this court at its present term) of said judgment of said Circuit Court, touching the damages allowed in said judgment of affirmance;. and in lieu of 6 per cent, per annum, therein given on said judgment below, to allow 7 per cent, per annum therein, to be computed from the day of 1850, in conformity to said act of Congress, of the 23d of August, 1842. S. F. Vinton^
For Defendant in Error.
It is thereupon now here ordered by the court, that the said report and exceptions be set down for argument next Monday, the 17th instant.
The court declined to hear any argument on the motion of Mr. Vinton,'and the exceptions filed by him to the clerk’s report, and took the same under advisement.
On consideration of the motion made by Mr. Attorney-General Crittenden, on the 13th instant; of the report by the clerk, filed the 14th instant; of the exceptions to said report, by Mr. Vinton, filed the same instant; and of the motion filed by Mr. Vinton, the 15th instant, it is the opinion of the court, that the first calculation, by the clerk in his report is the proper mode of calculating the damages given under' the rule of court. . Wherefore, it is now here ordered by the court, that the judgment entered in this case, on the 12th instant, do stand as the judgment of this court.
*150 Order.
.This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of thé record from the Circuit Court of the United States, for the Southern District of New York, and was argued by counsel. ' On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court, that the judgment of the said Circuit Court in. this cause be, and- the .same is hereby,' affirmed, with costs, and damages, at the rate of six per eentunr per annum.