delivered the judgment of the court.
That the taxing power of a State is one of its attributes of sovereignty; that it exists independently of the Constitution of the United States, and underived from that instrument; and that it may be exercised to an unlimited extent upon all property, trades, business, and avocations existing or carried on within the territorial boundaries of the State, except so far as it has been surrendered to the Federal government, either expressly or by necessary implication, are propositions that have often been asserted by this court. And in thus acknowledging the extent of the power to tax belonging to the States, we have declared that it is indispensable to their continued existence. No one ever doubted that before the adoption of the Constitution of the United States each of the States possessed unlimited power to tax, either directly or indirectly, all persons and property within their jurisdiction, alike by taxes on polls, or duties on internal production, manufacture, or use, except so far as such taxation was inconsistent with certain treaties which had been made. And the Constitution contains no express restriction of this power other than a prohibition to lay any duty of tonnage, or any impost, or duty on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing the State’s inspection laws. As was said .in Lane County v. Oregon:* “In respect to propertj', business, and persons within their respective limits, the power of taxation of the States remained, and remains entire, notwithstanding the Constitution. It is, indeed, a concurrent power (concurrent with that of the General government), and in the case of a tax upon the same subject by both governments, the claim of the United States as the supreme authority must be pre*30ferred; but with this qualification it is absolute. The ex-lent to which it shall be'exercised, the subjects upon which it shall be exercised', and the mode in which it shall be exercised, are all equally within the discretion of the legislatures to which the States commit the exercise of the pqwer. That discretion is restrained only by the will of the people expressed in the State constitutions, or through elections, and by the condition that it must not he so used as to burden or embarrass the operations of the National government. There is nothing in the Constitution which contemplates or- authorizes any direct abridgment of this power by National legislation. To the extent just indicated it is as complete in the States as the like power within the limits of the Constitution is complete in Congress.” Such are the opinions we. have expressed heretofore, and we adhere to them now.
There are, we admit, certain subjects of taxation which are withdrawn from the power of the States, not by any direct or express provision of the Federal Constitution, but by what may be- regarded as its necessary implications. They grow out of our complex system of government, and out of the fact that- the authority of the National government is legitimately exercised within the States. While it is true that government cannot exercise its power of taxation ■so as to destroy the State governments, or embarrass their lawful action, it is equally true that the States may not levy taxes the direct effect of which shall be to hinder the exercise of any powers which belong to the National government. The Constitution contemplates that none of those powers may be restrained by State legislation. But it is often a difficult question whether a tax imposed by a State does in fact invade the-domain of the General government, or interfere with its operations to such an extent, or in such a manner, as to render it unwarranted. It cannot be that a State tax which remotely affects the efficient exercise of a Federal power is for that reason alone inhibited by the Constitution. To hold that would be to deny to the States all power to tax persons or property. Every tax levied by a *31State withdraws from the reach of Federal taxation a portion of the property from which it is taken, and to that extent diminishes the subject upon which Federal taxes may be laid. The States are, and they must ever be,.coexistent with the National government. Neither may destroy the other. Hence the Federal Constitution must receive a practical construction. Its, limitations and its implied prohibitions must not be extended so far as to destroy the necessary powers of the States, or prevent their efficient exercise.
These observations are directly applicable to the .case before us. It is insisted on behalf of the plaintins that the tax of which they complain has been laid upon an agent of the General government constituted -and organized as an instrument to carry iuto effect the powers vested in that government by the Constitution, and it is claimed that such an agency is not subject to State'taxation. That the Union Pacific Railroad Company w$s created to subserve, in part at least, the lawful purposes of the National government; that it was authorized to construct and maintain a railroad and telegraph litre along the prescribed route, and that grants were made to it, and privileges, conferred upon it, upon condition that it should at all times transmit dispatches over its telegraph line, and transport mails, troops, and munitions of war, supplies and public stores, upon the railroad for the government, whenever required to do so' by any department thereof, and that the government should at all times have the preference in the use of the same for all the purposes aforesaid, must be conceded. Such are the plain provisions of its charter. So it was provided that in case of the refusal or failure of the company to redeem the bonds advanced to it by the government, or any part of them, when lawfully required by the Secretary of the Treasury, the road, with all the rights, functions, immunities, and appurtenances thereunto belonging, and also all lands granted to the company by the United States which at the time of the default should remain in the ownership of the company, might be taken possession of by the Secretary of the Treasury for the use and benefit of the United States. The char*32ter also contains other provisions looking to a supervision and control of the road and telegraph line, with the avowed purpose of securing to the government the use and benefit thereof for postal and military purposes. It is unnecessary to mention these in detail. They all look to a purpose of Congress to secure an agency competent and under obligation to perform certain offices for the General government. Notwithstanding this, the railroad and the telegraph line are neither in whole nor in part the property of the government. The ownership is in the complainants, a private corporation, though existing for the performance of public duties. The government owns none of its stock, and though it may appoint two of the directors, the right thus to appoint is plainly reserved for the sole'purpose of enabling the enforcement of the engagements which the company assumed, the engagements to which we have already alluded.
Admitting, then, fully, as we do,-that the company is an agent of the General government, designed tobe employed, and actually employed, in the legitimate service of the government, both military and postal, does it necessarily follow that its property is exempt from State taxation?
In Thompson v. The Union Pacific Railroad Company,* after much consideration, we held that the property of that company’’ was not exenjpt from State taxation, though their railroad was part of a system of roads constructed under the direction and authority of the United States, and largely for the uses and purposes of the General government. The compauy, in that case, were agents of the government, precisely as these claimants are, to the same extent and for the same purposes. Congress had made the same grants to them, and attached to the grants the same conditions. They, tod, had received from Congress grants of land, and of bonds, and of a right of way for the purpose of aiding in the construction of their railroad and telegraph line, but with the condition that they should keep their railroad and telegraph line in repair and use, and should at all times transmit dis*33patches over their-telegraph line, and transport.mails, troops, and munitions of war, supplies and public stores, upon their railroad for the government, whenever required to do so by any department thereof, and that the government should at all times have the preference in the use thereof for the purposes aforesaid. There is no difference which can be pointed out between the nature, extent, or purposes of their agency and those of the corporation complainants in the present case. Yet, as we have said, a State tax upon the property of the company, its road-bed, rolling-stock, and personalty in general, was ruled by this court not to be in conflict with the Federal Constitution. It may, therefore, be considered as settled that no constitutional implications prohibit a State-tax upon the property of an agent of the government merely because it is the property of such an agent. A contrary doctrine would greatly embarrass the States in the collection of their necessary revenue without any corresponding advantage to the United States. A very large proportion of, the property within the States is employed in execution of the powers of the government. It belongs to governmental agents, and it is not only used, but it is necessaiy for their agencies. United States mails, troops, and munitions of war are carried upon almost every railroad. Telegraph lines are employed in the National service. So are steamboats, horses, stage-coaches, foundries, ship-yards, and multitudes of manufacturing establishments. They are the property of natural persons, or of corporations, who are instruments or agents of the General government, and they are the hands by which the objects of the government are attained. Were they exempt from liability to contribute to the revenue of the States it is manifest the State governments would be paralyzed. While it is of the utmost importance that all the powers vested by the Constitution of the United States in the General government should be preserved in full efficiency, and while recent events have called for the most unembarrassed exercise of many of those powers, it has never been decided that State taxation' of such property is impliedly prohibited.
*34• It is, however, insisted that the ease of Thompson v. The Union Pacific Railroad Company differs frpm the ease we have now in hand in the fact that it was incorporated by the Territorial legislature and the legislature of the State of Kansas, while.these complainants were incorporated by Congress. We do not perceive that this presents any reason for-the application of a rule different from that which was applied in the former case. It is true that, in. the opinion delivered by the Chief Justice, reference was made to the fact that the defendants were a State corporation, and ah argument was attempted to be drawn from this to distinguish the cáse from McCulloch v. The State of Maryland.* But when the question is, as in, the present case, whether the taxation of property is taxation of means; instruments, or agencies by which the United States carries out its powers, it is impossible to see how it can be pertinent to inquire whence the property originated, or from whom its present owners obtained it. The United States have no more ownership of the road authorized by Congress than they had in the road authorized by Kansas, f the taxation of either is unlawful, it is because the States cannot obstruct the exercise of National powers. As was said in Weston v. Charleston,† they cannot, by taxation or otherwise, “ retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control the operation of the constitutional • laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the General gov. rnment.” The implied inhibition, if any exists, is against s^ch obstruction, and that must be the same whether the corporation whose property is taxed was created by Congress or by a State legislature.
Nothing, we think, in the past decisions of this court is inconsistent with the opinions we now hold. McCulloch v. The State of Maryland and Osborn v. Bank of the United States‡ are much relied upon by the appellants, but an examination of what was decided in those eases will reveal that they are in full harmony with the doctrine that the property of an agent of the General government may be *35subjected to State taxation. In the former of those cases the tax held unconstitutional was laid upon the notes of the bank. The institution was prohibited from issuing notes at all except upon stamped paper furnished by the State, and to be paid for on delivery, the stamp upon each note being proportioned to its denomination. The tax, therefore, was not upon any property of the batik, but upou one of its operations, in fact, upon its right to exist, as created. It was a direct impediment in the way of a governmental operation performed through the bauk as an agent. It was a very different thing, both in its nature and effect, from a tax on the property of the bank. . No wonder, then, that it was held illegal. But even in that case the court carefully limited the effect of the decision. It does not extend, said the Chief Justice, to a tax paid by the real property of the bank, in common with the other real property in the State, nor to a tax imposed on the interest which the citizens of Maryland may hold in the institution, in common with the other property of the same description throughout the State. But this is a tax on the operations of the bank, and is, consequently, a t*x on the operations of an instrument employed by the government of the Union to carry its powers into execution. Such a tax must be unconstitutional. Here is a clear distinction made between a tax upon the property of a government agent and a tax upon the operations of the agent acting for the government.
In Osborn v. The Bank the tax held unconstitutional was a tax upon the existence of the bank — upon its right to transact business within the State of Ohio. It was, as it was intended to be, a direct impediment in the way of those acts which Congress, for National purposes, had authorized the bank to perform. For this reason the power of the State to direct it was denied, but at the same time it was declared by the court that the local property of the bank might be taxed, and, as in McCulloch v. Maryland, a difference was pointed out between a tax upon its property and one upon its action. In noticing an alleged resemblance between the bank and a government contractor, Chief Jus*36tice Marshall said: “ Can a contractor for supplying a military post with provisions be restrained from making purchases within a State, or from transporting the provisions to the place at which the troops were stationed ? Or could he be fined or ffixed for doing so? We have not heard these questions answered in the affirmative. It is true the property of the contractor may be taxed; and so may the local property of the bank. But we do not admit that the act of purchasing,, or of conveying the articles purchased, can be under Stale control.” This distinction, so clearly drawn in the earlier decisions, between a tax on the property of a governmental agent, and a tax upon the action of such agent, or upon his right to be, has ever since been recognized. All State taxation which does not impair the agent’s efficiency in the discharge of his duties to the government has been sustained when challenged, and a tax upon his property generally has not 'been regarded as beyond the power of a State to impose. .In National Bank v. The Commonwealth of Kentucky,* when the right to tax National banks was under consideration, it was asserted by us that the doctrine cannot be maintained that banks, or other corporations or instrumentalities of the government, are to be wholly withdrawn from the operation of State legislation. Yet it was conceded that the agencies of the Federal government are uncontrollable by State legislation, so far as it may interfere with, or impair their efficiency in performing the functions by which they are designed to serve that government.
It is, therefore, manifest that exemption of Federal agencies from State taxation is dependent, not upon the nature of the agents, or upon the mode of their constitution, or upon the fact that they are agents, but upon the effect of the tax; that is, upon the question whether the tax does in truth deprive them of power to serve the government as they were intended to serve it, or does'hinder the efficient exercise of their power. A tax upon their property has no such necessary effect. It leaves them free to discharge the duties they *37have undertaken to perform. A tax upon their operations is a direct obstruction to the exercise of Federal powers.
In this case the tax is laid upon the property of the railroad company precisely as w'as the tax complained of in Thompson v. Union Pacific. It is not imposed upon the franchises or the right of the company to exist and perform the functions for which it was brought into being. Nor is it laid upon any act which the company has been authorized to do. It is not the transmission of dispatches, nor the transportation of United States mails, or troops, or munitions of war that is taxed, but it is exclusively the real and personal property of the agent, taxed in common with all other property in the State of a similar character.' It is impossible to maintain that this is an interference with the exercise of any power belonging to the General government, and if it is not, it is prohibited by no constitutional implication.
It remains only to notice one other position taken by the complainants. It is that if the act of the State under which the tax was laid be constitutional in its application to their property within Lincoln County, the property outside of Lincoln County is not lawfully taxable by the authorities of that county under the laws of the State. To this we are unable to give our assent. By the statutes of Nebraska the unorganized territory west of Lincoln Count}-, and the unorganized county of Cheyenne, are attached to the county of Lincoln for judicial and revenue purposes. The authorities of that county, therefore, were the proper authorities to levy the tax upon the property thus placed under their charge for revenue purposes.
The decree of the Circuit Court is affirmed.
7 Wallace, 77.
9 Wallace, 679.
4 Wheaton, 316.
2 Peters, 467.
9 Wheaton, 738.
9 Wallace, 353.