dissenting.
In a great many of the States of the Union a period* is allowed of from twelve to fifteen months to redeem real estate from sale under execution, by payment of the amount for which it was sold, and interest on that amount. In nearly all these States this right of redemption attaches in sales made under chancery. decrees as well as judgments at law.
In such cases, whether the statute, as in Massachusetts, provides that the conveyance shall be made by the sheriff or other officer immediately after the sale, or, as in many of the western States, only at the end of the time allowed for redemption, the title of the purchaser does not become absolute until that time has expired. In the case before us, it is not denied that the appellant received the sheriff’s deed in accordance with the law of the State, and that the appellee failed to redeem within the time allowed.
It is of the' utmost importance where this redemption law' prevails, that the right thus granted should be strictly exercised according to the statute. For, in addition to the sanctity which the law concedes to judicial sales, founded on well-considered reasons of policy as old as the law itself, the favor of allowing the debtor one year more to save his land, after judgment and sale under execution have fixed his rights, only adds ' to his obligation to exercise the right thus granted in strict accordance with its terms.
In- the case before us the judge who rendered the decree below stated that the conspiracy charged in the bill was not *197proved, nor did be rely upon any act of fraud, and for that reason he refused to set aside the sale, but permitted, under a new prayer in the bill, the appellee to redeem on payment of the debt, interest and all costs, including fees of counsel. The counsel of appellee in the brief expressly declines to rely upon an actual fraud on the part of Graham. In our opinion there is no evidence of such misconduct on his part as afforded any ground, in law or equity, to justify appellee in her failure to redeem from the sale. There is no reason why she did not pay the judgment rendered against her, of which she had full notice. Certainly no obstruction was • interposed to her exercise of the right of.redemption, and no promise.made to induce her to forego it. Yet, after Graff am had acquired a complete legal title under judicial proceedings which were unimpeachable, the court treats the case as if the whole matter was still in fieri, and gives further time for redemption.
I do not deem it appropriate to enter into the discussion of the evidence in this case, but I dissent from the judgment and the opinion of the court as leading to evil results, in discrediting judicial sales, and embarrassing the due and just exercise of the right of ■ redemption, by turning it into a question of judicial discretion.-
Justices Woods, Matthews and Gray concur in this opinion.