with whom concurred Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Brewer, dissenting.
Mr. Justice Harlan, Mr. Justice Brewer and myself are unable to concur in this judgment. As our dissent is based on *126the previous decisions of this court, the respect due to our associates, as well as to our predecessors, induces us to state our position, as far as possible, in the words in which the law has been heretofore declared from this bench.
The facts of the case, and the substance of the statutes whose validity is drawn in question, may be briefly stated.
It was an action of replevin of sundry kegs and cases of beer, begun in an inferior court of the State of Iowa against a constable of Lee County in Iowa, who had seized them at Keokuk in that county under a search-warrant issued by a justice of the peace pursuant to the statutes of Iowa, which prohibit the sale, the keeping for sale, or the manufacture for sale, of any intoxicating liquor (including malt liquor) for any purpose whatever, except for pharmaceutical, medicinal, chemical or sacramental purposes, and under an annual license granted by the district court of the proper county, upon being satisfied that the applicant is a citizen of the United States and of the State of Iowa, and a resident of the county, and otherwise qualified.
The plaintiffs were citizens and residents of the State of Illinois, engaged as brewers in manufacturing beer at Peoria in that State, and in selling it in the States of Illinois and Iowa. The beer in question was manufactured by them at Peoria, and there put up by them in said kegs and cases; each keg being sealed, and having upon it, over the plug at the opening, a United States internal revenue stamp; and each case being substantially made of wood, containing two dozen quart bottles of beer, and sealed with a metallic seal which had to be broken in order to open the case. The kegs and cases owned by the plaintiffs, and so sealed, were transported by them from Peoria by railway to Keokuk, and there sold and offered for sale by their agent, in a building owned by one of them, and without breaking or opening the kegs or cases.
The Supreme Court of Iowa having given judgment for the defendant, the question presented by this writ of error is whether the statutes of Iowa, as applied.to these facts, contravene section 8 of article 1, or section 2 of article 4 of the Constitution of the United States, or section 1 of article 14 of the Amendments to the Constitution.
*127By section 8 of article 1 of the Constitution, “ the Congress, shall have power,” among other things, “to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States,” and “to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers.”
By section 2 of article 4, “ the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the ¡several States.”
By section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, “ no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; ñor -shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 'the laws.”
By the Tenth Amendment, “the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”
Among the powers thus reserved to the several States is what is commonly called the police power — that inherent and necessary power, essential to the very existence of civil society, and the safeguard of the inhabitants of the State against, disorder, disease, poverty and crime.
“ The police power belonging to the States in virtue of their general sovereignty,” said Mr. Justice Story, delivering the judgment of this court, “ extends over all subjects within the territorial limits of the States ;. and has never been conceded to the United States.” Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539, 625. This is well illustrated by the recent adjudications that a statute prohibiting the sale of illuminating oils, below a certain fire-test is beyond the constitutional power of Congress to enact, except so far as it has effect within the United States (as, for instance, in the District of Columbia) and without the limits of any State; but that it is within the constitutional power of a State to. pass such a statute, even as to oils manufactured under letters patent from the United States. United States v. Dewitt, 9 Wall. 41; Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U. S. 501.
*128The police power includes all measures for the protection of the. life, the health, the property and the welfare of the inhabitants, and for the promotion of good order and the public morals. It covérs the suppression of nuisances, whether injurious to the public health, like unwholesome trades, .or to ,the public morals, like gambling houses and lottery tickets. Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 62, 87; Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S. 659 ; Phalan v. Virginia, How. 163, 168; Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814.
This power, being essential to the maintenance of the authority of local government, and to the safety and welfare of the people, is inalienable. As was said by Chief Justice Waite, referring to earlier decisions to the same effect, “No legislature can bargain away the public health or the public 'morals. The people themselves cannot do it, much- less their servants. The supervision of both these subjects of governmental power is continuing, in its nature, and they are to be dealt with as the special exigencies of the moment may require. Government is organized with a view to their preservation, and cannot divest itself of the power to provide for them. For this purpose the largest legislative discretion is allowed, and the discretion cannot be parted with any more than the power itself.” Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814, 819. See also Butchers’ Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U. S. 746, 753; New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U. S. 650, 672; New Orleans v. Houston, 119 U. S. 265, 275.
The police power extends not only to things intrinsically dangerous to the public health, such as infectéd rags or diseased meat, but to things which, when used in a lawful manner, are subjects of property and of commerce, and yet may be used so as to be injurious or dangerous to the life, the health or the morals of the people. ■ Gunpowder, for instance, is a subject of commerce and of lawful use, yet, because of its explosive and dangerous quality, all admit that the State may regqlate its keeping and sale. And there is no article, the right of the State to control or to prohibit the sale or manufacture of which within its limits is better established, than *129intoxicating liquors. license Cases, 5 How. 504 ; Downham v. Alexandria Council, 10 Wall. 173 ; Bartemeyer v. Iowa,. 18 Wall. 129; Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25 ; Tiernan, v. Rinker, 102 U. S. 123 ; Foster v. Kansas, 112 U. S. 201; Mugler v. Kansas and Kansas v. Ziebold, 123. U. S. 623; Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1; Eilenbecker v. Plymouth County Court, 134 U. S. 31.
In Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, above cited, this court, affirming the judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, reported in 115 Mass. 153, held that a statute of the State, prohibiting ’the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors, including malt liquors, except as theréin provided, applied to a corporation which the State had long before chartered, and authorized to hold real and personal property, for the purpose of manufacturing malt liquors. Among the reasons assigned by this court for its' judgment, were the following:
“ If. the public safety or the public morals require the discontinuance of any manufacture or traffic, the hand of the legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance, by any incidental inconvenience which individuals or corporations may suffer. All rights are held subject to the police power of the State.”
“Whatever differences of opinion may exist as to the extent and boundaries of the police power, and however difficult it may be to render a satisfactory definition of it, there seems to be'no doubt that it does extend to the protection of the -lives, health and property of the citizens, and to the preservation of good order and the public morals. The legislature cannot, by any contract, divest itself of the power to provide for these objects. They belong emphatically .to that class of objects which demand the application of the maxim, salus popidi suprema lex ; and they are to be attained and provided for by such appropriate means as the legislative discretion may devise. That discretion can no more be bargained away than the power itself.”
“Since ,we have already held, in the case of Bartemeyer v. Iowa, that as a measure of police regulation, looking to the *130preservation of public morals, a state law prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors is not repugnant to any clause of the'Constitution of the United States, we see nothing in the present case that can afford any sufficient ground for disturbing the decision of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts.” 97 U. S. 32, 33.
In 'Mugler v. Kansas and Kansas v. Ziebold, above cited, a' statute of Kansas, prohibiting the manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquors as a beverage, and declaring all places, where such liquois were manufactured or sold in violation of the statute, to be'common nuisances, and prohibiting their future use for the purpose, was held to be a valid exercise of the police power of the State, even as applied to persons who, long before the passage of the statute, had constructed buildings specially adapted to such manufacture.
It has also, been adjudged that neither the grant of a license to sell intoxicating liquors, nor the payment of a tax on such liquors, under the internal revenue laws of the United States, affords any defence to an indictment by a State for selling the same liquors contrary to its- statutes. License Tax Cases, 5 "Wall. 462; Pernean v. Commonwealth, 5 Wall. 475.
The clause of the Constitution, which declares that “the ■ citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States,” has no bearing upon this case. The privileges and immunities thus secured are those fundamental rights and privileges which appertain 'to citizenship. Conner v. Elliott, 18 How. 591, 593 ; Curtis, J., in Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 580 ; Paul v. Virginia, 8 (Wall. 168, 180; McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391, 395. As Observed by the court in Bartemeyer v. Iowa, “ The right to áell intoxicating liquors, so far as such a right exists, is not one of the rights growing out of citizenship of the United States.” 18 Wall. 133.
Nor is the case affected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. As was said in the unanimous opinion of this court in Barbier v. Connolly, after stating the true scope of that amendment, “ But neither the amendment — broad aqd comprehensive as.it is — nor any other amendment, was *131designed to interfere with the power of the State, sometimes termed its police power, to prescribe regulations to promote' the health, peace, morals, education and good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the State, develop its resources, and add to its wealth and prosperity.” 113 U. S. 27, 31. Upon that ground, the amendment has been adjudged not to apply to a state statute prohibiting the sale or manufacture of intoxicating liquors in buildings long before constructed for the purpose, or the sale of oleomargarine lawfully manufactured before the passage of the statute. Mugler v. Mansas, 123 U. S. 623, 663 ; Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678, 683, 687.
The remaining and the principal question is, whether the statute of Iowa, as applied to the sale within that State of intoxicating liquors in the same cases or kegs, unbroken and unopened, in .which they were brought by the seller from another State, is repugnant to the clause of the Constitution granting to Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States.
In the great and leading case of Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, the point decided was that acts of the legislature of New York, granting to certain persons for a term of years the exclusive navigation by steamboats of all waters within the jurisdiction of the State, were, so far as they affected such navigation by vessels of other persons licensed under the laws of the United States, repugnant to the clause of the Constitution empowering Congress to regulate foreign and interstate commerce.
Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering judgment, after speaking of the inspection laws of the States, and observing that they had a remote and considerable influence on commerce, but that the power to pass them was not derived from a power to regulate commerce, said: “ They form a portion of that immense mass of legislation, which embraces everything within the territory of a State, not surrendered to the general government: all which can be most advantageously exercised by the States themselves.' Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every description, as well as laws for regulating *132the internal commerce of a. State, and those which respect, turnpike roads, ferries, etc., are component parts of this mass. No direct general power over these objects is granted to Congress ; and, consequently,' they remain subject to state legislation^ ■ If the legislative power of the Union .can reach them, .it must be for national purposes; it must be where the power is expressly given for a special purpose, or is clearly .incidental to some power which is expressly given.” pp. 203, 204. Again; he said that quarantine and- health laws “ are considered as flowing from the- acknowledged power of a State, to provide for the health of its citizens,” and that the constitutionality of such laws had never been denied, p. 205.
Mr. Justice Johnson, in his concurring opinion, said: “ It is no objection to the existence of distinct, substantive powers, that, in their application, they bear upon the same subject. The same bale of goods, the same cask of provisions, or the same ship, that may be the subject of commercial regulation, may also be the vehicle of disease. And the health laws that require them to be stopped and ventilated are no more intended as regulations on commerce, than the laws which permit their importation are intended to inoculate the community with disease. Their different purposes mark the distinction between the powers brought into action; and while frankly exercised, they can produce no serious collision.” p. 235.
That Chief Justice Marshall and his associates did not consider the constitutional grant of power to Congress to regulate foreign and interstate commerce as, of its own force, and without national legislation, impairing the police power of each State within its own borders to protect the health and welfare of its inhabitants, is clearly indicated in the passages above quoted from the opinions in Gibbons v. Ogden, and is conclusively proved by the unanimous, judgment of the court delivered by the Chief Justice five years later in Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245.
" In that case, the legislature of Delaware had authorized a dam to be erected across a navigable'tide-water creek which opened into Delaware Bay, thereby obstructing the navigation of the creek bv a vessel enrolled and licensed under the navi*133gation laws of the United States. The decision in Gibbons v. Ogden was cited by counsel', as conclusive against the validity of the statute of the State. But its validity was upheld by the court, for the following reasons:
“ The act of assembly, by which the plaintiffs were authorized to construct their dam, shows plainly that this is one of those many creeks, passing through a deep level marsh adjoining the Delaware, up which the tide flows for some distance. The value of the property on its banks must be' enhanced by excluding the water from the marsh, and the health of the inhabitants probably improved. Measures calculated to pro1 duce these objects,, provided they do not come into collision with the powers of' the general government, are undoubtedly within those which are reserved to the States. But the measure authorized by this act stops a navigable creek, and must be supposed to abridge the rights of those who have been accustomed to use it. But this abridgment, unless it comes in conflict with the Constitution or a law of the United States, is an affair between the government of .Delaware and its citizens, of which this court can take no cognizance.
“ The counsel for the plaintiffs in error insists that it comes in conflict with the power of the United States ‘to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States.’
“ If Congress had passed any act which bore upon the case; any act in execution of the power to regulate commerce, thé object of which was to control state legislation over those small navigable creeks into which the tide flows, and which abound throughout the lower country of the middle and southern States; we should feel not much difficulty in saying that a state law coming in conflict with such act would be void. But Congress has passed no such act. The repugnancy of the law of Delaware to the Constitution is placed entirely on its repugnancy to the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States; a power which has not been so exercised as to affect the question.
• “We do not think that the act empowering the Blackbird Creek Marsh Company to place a dam across the creek can, under all the circumstances of the case, be considered as *134repugnant to the power to regulate commerce in its dormant state, or as being in conflict with any law passed on the subject.” 2 Pet. 251, 252.
• In Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, the point decided was that an act of the legislature of Maryland, requiring all importers of foreign goods by the bale or package, or of spirituous liquors, and “ other persons selling the same by wholesale, bale or package, hogshead, barrel or tierce,” to first take out a license and pay fifty dollars for it, and imposing a penalty for failure to do so, was, as applied to sales by an importer of foreign liquors in the original packages, unconstitutional, both as laying an impost, and as repugnant to the power of Congress to regulate foreign commerce.
The statute there in question was evidently enacted to raise revenue from importers of foreign goods- of every description, and not as an exercise of the police power of the State. And Chief Justice Marshall, in answering an argument of counsel, expressly admitted that the power to direct the removal of gunpowder, or the removal or destruction of infectious or unsound articles which endanger the public health, “ is a branch of the police power, which unquestionably remains, and ought to remain, with the States.” pp. 443, -444.
Moreover, the question there presented and decided concerned foreign commerce only, and not commerce among the States. Chief Justice Marshall, at the outset of his opinion, so defined it, saying : “The cause depends entirely on the question, whether the legislature of a State can constitutionally require the importer of foreign articles to take out a license from the State, before he shall be permitted to sell a bale or package so imported.” p. 436.
It is true, that, after discussing and deciding that question, he threw out this brief remark : “ It may be proper to add, that we suppose the principles laid down in this case, to apply equally to importations from a sister State.” p. 449. But this remark was obiter dictum, wholly -aside from the question before the court and having no bearing on its decision, and therefore extrajudicial, as bas since been noted by Chief Justice Taney and Mr. Justice McLean in the License Gases, *1355 How. 504, 575, 578, 594, and by Mr.. Justice Miller in Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123, 139.
To á remark made under such circumstances are peculiarly applicable the warning words of Chief Justice Marshall himself in an earlier case, where, having occasion to explain away some dicta of his own in delivering judgment in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137, he said.: “It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expres-' sions are used. If they go beyond the case, they> may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is presented for decision. The reason of this maxim - is obvious. The question actually before the court is investigated with care, and considered in its full extent. Other principles, which may serve to illustrate it, are considered in their relation to the case decided, but their possible bearing on all other cases is seldom completely investigated.” Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 399, 400; Another striking instance in which that maxim has been applied arid acted on is to be found in the opinion of the court at the present term in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1, 20.
But the unanimous judgment of this court in 1847 in Peirce v. New Hampshire, reported together, with Thurlow v. Massachusetts and Fletcher v. Rhode Island as the License Cases, 5 How. 504, is directly in point, and appears to us con'clusiveíy to govern the case- at bar. Those cases were elaborately-argued by eminent counsel, and deliberately considered by the court, and Chief Justice Taney, as well as each of six associate justices, stated his reasons for concurring- in the judgment.
The cases from Massachusetts and .Rhode Island arose under statutes of either State, prohibiting sales of spirituous liquors by any person, in less than certain quantities, without first having obtained an annual license from municipal officers; in the one case, from county commissioners, who, by the express terms of the statutes, were not required to grant any licenses when in their opinion the public good did not require them to be granted; and in the other .case, from a, town council, who *136were forbidden to grant licenses whenever the voters of the town in town meeting decided that none should be granted. Mass. Rev. Stat: 1836, c. 47, §§ 3, 17, 23-25; Stat. 1837, c. 42, § 2; R. I. Pub. Laws of 1844, p. 496, § 4; Laws of 1845, р. 72; 5 How. 506-510, 540. Those statutes were held, to be constitutional, as applied to foreign liquors which had passed out of the hands of the importer; while it was assumed that, under . the decision in Brown v. Maryland, those statutes could be allowed no effect as to Such liquors while they remained in the hands of the importer in the original packages upon which duties had been, paid to the' United States. 5 How. 576, 590, 610, 618.
" The case of Peirce v. New Hampshire directly involved the validity, as applied to liquors brought in from, another State, of a statute of New Hampshire, which imposed a penalty on any person selling any wine, rum, gin, brandy,or other spirits, in any quantity, “ without license from the selectmen of the town or place where such person resides.” N. H, Laws of 1838, с. 369 ; 5 How. 555.. The plaintiffs in error, having been indicted under that statute for selling to one Aaron Sias in the town of Dover in the State of New Hampshire one barrel of gin, without license.from the selectmen of the town, at the trial admitted that they so sold to him a barrel of American gin; and introduced evidence that “ the barrel of gin was purchased by the defendants in Boston in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, brought coastwise to the landing at PiscataquaBridge, and from thence to the defendant’s store in Dover, and afterwards sold to Sias in the same barrel and in the same condition in which it was purchased' in Massachusetts.” The defendants contended that the statute was unconstitutional, because it was “ in violation of certain public treaties of the United States with Holland, France and other countries, containing stipulations for the admission of spirits into the United States; ” and because it was repugnant to the clauses of the Constitution of the United States restricting the power of the ■States to lay duties on imports or exports, and. granting the power to Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States. Chief Justice Parker *137instructed the jury “that this State could not regulate commerce between this and other States; that this State could not prohibit the introduction of articles from another State with such a view, nor prohibit a sale-of them with such a purpose ; but that, although the State could not ■ make such laws with such views and for such purposes, she was not entirely forbidden to legislate in relation to articles introduced from foreign countries or from other States; that she might tax them the same as other property, and might regulate the sale to some extent; that a State might pass health and police laws, which would, to a certain extent, affect foreign- commerce and 'commerce between the States; and that this statute was a regulation of that character, and constitutional.” After a verdict of guilty, exceptions to this instruction were overruled by the highest court of. the State. 5 How. 554-557 ; 13 N. H. 536.
In that case, as in the case at bar, the statute of the State prohibited sales of intoxicating liquors by any person without a license from municipal 'authorities, and authorized licenses to be granted only to persons residing within the State ; and the liquors were sold within the State by the importer, and in the' same barrel, keg or case, unbroken and in the same condition, in which he had brought them from another State. Yet the judgment of the highest court of New Hampshire was unanimously affirmed by this court.
Chief Justice . Taney, Mr. Justice Catron and Mr. Justice Nelson were of opinion that, the statute of New Hampshire was a regulation of'interstate commerce; but yet valid so long as it was not in conflict with any act of Congress.
Chief Justice Taney, after1 recognizing that “ spirits and distilled liquors are universally^ admitted to be subjects of ownership and property, and are therefore subjects of exchange, barter and traffic, like any,other commodity in which, a right of property exists; and Congress, under its general power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, may prescribe what article of merchandise shall be admitted and what excluded, and may therefore admit, or not, as it shall deem best, the importation of ardent spirits; and inasmuch as the, laws of Congress authorize their importation, no State has a *138right to prohibit their introduction; ” and yet upholding the validity of the statutes of Massachusetts and Rhode Island, as not interfering with the trade in ardent spirits while they remained a part of foreign commerce, and were in the hands of the importer for sale, in the cask or vessel in which the laws of Congress authorized them to be imported; p. 577; proceeded to state the case from New Hampshire as follows :
“ The present case, however, differs from Brown v. Maryland in this: that.the former was one arising but of commerce with foreign nations, which Congress has regulated by law; whereas the present is a case of commerce between two States,' in relation to which Congress has not exercised - its power. . Some acts Of. Congress have indeed been referred to in relation to - the coasting trade. But they are evidently intended merely to prevent smuggling, and do hot regulate imports or exports from one State to another.' This case differs also from the cases of Massachusetts and Bhode Island ; because, in these two cases, the laws of the States operated upon the articles,after they had passed beyond the limits of foreign commerce, and consequently were beyond the control and power of Congress. But the law of New Hampshire acts directly upon an import from one State to another, while in the hands of the importer for sale, and is therefore a regulation of commerce, acting upon the article while it is within the admitted jurisdiction of the general government, and subject to its control and regulation.” p. 578. And he concluded his opinion thus: “ Upon the whole, therefore, the law of New Hampshire , is, in my judgment, a valid, one. For, although the gin sold was an import from another State, and Congress has clearly the power to regulate such -importations, under the grant of power to regulate commerce among the -several States, yet, as Congress has made no regulation on the subject, the traffic in the article may- be lawfully regulated by the State as soon as it is landed in its territory, and a tax imposed upon it, or a license required, or the sale altogether prohibited, according to the policy which the State may suppose to be its interest or duty tó pursue.” p. 586.
Mr. Justice Catron expressed similar views. While he was *139of opinion that the ultimate right of determining what commodities might be lawful subjects of interstate commerce belonged to Congress in the exercise of its power to regulate commerce, and not to the States in the exercise of the police power, he was equally clear that the statute of New Hampshire was a valid regulation, in the absence of any- legislation upon the subject by Congress. After pointing out the difficulties standing in the way of any attempt. by Congress to make the special and various regulations required at different. places at the maritime or inland borders of the States, he said: “I admit that this condition of things does not settle the question of contested power; but it satisfactorily shows that Congress cannot do what the States have done, are doing and must continue to do, from a controlling necessity, even should the exclusive power in Congress be maintained by our .decision.” p. 606. “Congress has stood by for nearly sixty years, and seen the States regulate the commerce of the whole country, more or less, at the ports of entry and at all their borders, without objection; and for this court now to decide that the power did not exist in the States, and that all they had done in this respect was void from the beginning, would overthrow and annul entire codes of state legislation on the -particular subject. We would by our decision expunge more state laws and city corporate regulations than Congress is likely to make in a century on the same subject; and on no better assumption than that Congress and the state • legislatures had been altogether mistaken as to their respective powers for fifty years and more. If long usage, general acquiescence and the absence of complaint can settle the interpretation. of the clause in question, then it should be deemed as settled in conformity.to the usage by the courts.” p. 607. And finally, in summing up his conclusions, he said.: “ That the law of New Hampshire was a regulation of commerce among the States in regard to the article for selling of which the defendants.were indicted and convicted; but that the state law was constitutionally passed, because of the power of the State thus to regulate; there being no regulation of Congress, special or general, in existence, to which the state law was repugnant.” pp. 608, 609.
*140.Mr. Justice Nelson expressed his concurrence in the opinions delivered by the. Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Catron. p. 618.
Justices McLean, Daniel, Woodbury and Grier, on the other hand, were of opinion that the license laws of New Hampshire, as. well as those of- Massachusetts and Rhode Island, were merely police regulations and not regulations of commerce, although they might incidentally affect commerce.
Mr. Justice McLean, in the course of his opinion in Thurlow v. Massachusetts, said: “ The license acts of Massachusetts •do not purport to be a regulation of commerce. They are essentially police laws'. Enactments similar in principle are common to all' the States. Since the adoption of its constitution they have existed in Massachusetts.” p. 588. [Mass. Stats. 1786, c. 68; 1792, c. 25; 7 Dane Ab. 43, 44.] “It is the settled construction of every regulation of commerce, that, under the sanction of its general la.ws, no person can introduce into a community malignant diseases, or anything which contaminates its morals, or endangers its safety. And this' is an acknowledged principle applicable to all general regulations. Individuals in the enjoyment of their own rights must be careful not to injure the' rights of others. From' the explosive- nature of gunpowder, a city may exclude it. Now this is an article of commerce, and is not known to carry infectious disease; yet* to guard against a contingent injury, a city may prohibit its introduction. These exceptions are always implied in commercial regulations, where the general government is admitted to have the exclusive power. They' are not regulations of -commerce, but acts of self-preservation. And though they affect commerce to some extent, yet such effect is the result of the exercise of an undoubted power in •the State.” pp. 589, 590. “ A discretion on this subject must be exercised somewhere, and it can be exercised' nowhere but under the state authority. The State may. regulate the sale of foreign spirits, and such regulation is valid, though it reduce the quantity of spirits, consumed. This is admitted. And how can this discretion be controlled ? The powers of the general government do not extend to it.. It is in every *141aspect a local regulation, and relates exclusively to the internal police of the State.” p. 591. “ The police power of a State and the foreign commercial power of Congress must stand together. Neither of them can be so exercised as materially to affect the other. The sources and objects of these powers are exclusive, distinct and independent, and are essential to both governments.” p. 592.
In his opinion in Peirce v. New Hampshire, he declared that the same views were equally applicable to that case; and added: “The tax in the form.of a license,Where presented, counteracts no policy of the federal government, is repugnant to no power it can exercise, and is imposed by the exercise of an undoubted power in the State. The license system is a. police regulation, and, as modified in the State of New Hampshire, was designed to restrain and prevent immoral indulgence, and to advance the moral and physical welfare of society.” “ If this tax had been laid on the property as an import into the State, the law would have been repugnant to the Constitution. It would have been a regulation of commerce among the States, which has been exclusively given to Congress.” “But this barrel of gin, like all other property within the State of New Hampshire, was liable to taxation by the State. It comes under the general regulation, and cannot be sold without a license. The right of an importer of ardent spirits to sell'in the cask, without a license, does not attach to the plaintiffs in error, on' account of their having. transported this property from Massachusetts to New Hampshire.” pp. 595, 596.
Mr. Justice Daniel said: “The license laws, of Massachusetts, Rhode Island and New Hampshire, now under review, impose no exaction on foreign commerce. They are, laws simply determining the mode in which a particular commodity may be circulated within the respective jurisdictions of those States, vesting in their domestic tribunals a discretion in selecting the agents for such circulation, without discriminating between the sources whence commodities may have been derived. They do not restrict importation to any extent; they do not interfere with it, either in appearance or reality; *142they do not prohibit sales, eithér by wholesale .or retail; they assert’ only the power of regulating the latter, but this entirely within the sphere of their peculiar authority. These laws are, therefore, in violation neither of the Constitution of the United States, nor of any law nor treaty made in pursuance or under authority of the Constitution.” p. 617.
Mr. Justice Woodbury repeated and enforced the same, views,’.saying, among other things: “It is manifest, also, whether as an abstract proposition or practical measure, that a prohibition to import is one thing, while a prohibition to sell without license is another and entirely different. The first would operate on foreign commerce, on the voyage. The latter affects only the internal business of 'the State after the foreign importation is completed arid on shore.” p. 619. “ The subject of buying and selling within a State is one as exclusively belonging to the power of the State over its internal trade, as that to regulate foreign commerce is with the general government, under the. broadest construction of that power.” “ The. idea, too, that a prohibition to sell would be tantamount to a prohibition to iriiport does not seem to me either logical or founded in- fact. For, even under a prohibition to sell, a person could import, as he’ often does, for his own consumption and that of his family and plantations; and also, if a merchant r extensively engaged in commerce, often does import articles, with no view of selling them here, but of storing them for a higher and more suitable’ market in another State, or abroad.” p. 620. “ But this license is a regulation neither of domestic commerce ^between the States, nor Of foreign commerce. It does not operate on either, or the imports of either, till they have entered the State and become component parts of its property. . Then it has by the Constitution the exclusive power to regulate its own internal commerce and business in such articles, and bind all residents, citizens or not, by its regulations, if they ask its protection and privilegés; and Congress, instead of being opposed and thwarted by regulations as to this, can no more interfere in it than the States can interfere in regulation of. foreign com-. merce.” p. 625. “ Whether such laws of the States as .to *143licenses are to bé classed as police measures, or as regulations of their internal commerce, or as taxation merely, imposed on local property and local business, and are to. be justified by each .or by all of them together, is of little consequence,-if they are laws which from their nature and object must belong to all sovereign States. Call them by whatever name, if they are necessary to the well being and independence of all communities, they remain among the reserved rights of the States, -no express grant of them to the general government' having been either proper, or apparently embraced in the Constitution. So, whether they conflict or not, indirectly and slightly, with some regulations of foreign commerce, after the subject matter of that commerce touches the soil or waters within the limits of a State, is not perhaps very material, if they do not really relate to that commerce, or any other topic within the jurisdiction of the general government.” p. 627.
Mr. Justice Grier did not consider the question of the exclusiveness of- the power of Congress to regulate foreign and interstate commerce as involved in the decision, but maintained the validity of the statutes in question under “the police power, which is exclusively in the States.” pp. 631, 632.
The other members of the court at that time were Mr. Justice Wayne and Mr. Justice McKinley, who do not appear by the report to have taken part in the decision of those cases,although the former appears at page 645 to have been present at the' argument, and by the clerk’s minutes to have been upon the bench when the judgments were delivered. It is certain that neither of them dissented from the decision of the court.
The consequences of an opposite conclusion in the case from New Hampshire, regarding liquors brought from one State into another, were forcibly stated by several of the judges.
Mr. Justice McLean said: “ If the mere conveyance of property from one State to another shall exempt it from taxation, and from general state regulation, it will not be difficult to avoid the police laws of any-State, especially by those who live at or near the boundary.” p. 595.
Mr. Justice Catron said: “To hold that the state license *144law was void, as respects spirits coming in from other States as articles of commerce, would open the door to an almost entire evasion, as the spirits might be introduced in the smallest divisible quantities that the retail trade would require the consequence of which would be, that the dealers in New Hampshire would sell only spirits produced in other •States, and that the products of New Hampshire would find an unrestrained market in. the neighboring States having similar license laws to those of .New Hampshire.” p. 608.
Mr. Justice Woodbury'said: ‘‘If the proposition was maintainable, that, without any legislation by Congress as to the trade between the States, (except that in coasting, as before explained, to prevent smuggling,) anything imported from another State, foreign or domestic, could be sold of right in the package in which it was imported, not subject to any license or internal regulation of a State, then it is obvious that the whole license system may be evaded and nullified, either from abroad, or from a' neighboring State. And the more especially can it be done from the latter, as imports may be made iii bottles of any size, down to half a pint, of spirits or wines; and if its sale cannot be interfered' with and regulated, the retail business can be carried on in any small quantity, and by the most irresponsible and unsuitable persons, with perfect impunity.” pp. 625, 626.
Mr. Justice Grier, in an opinion marked by his characteristic vigor and directness of thought and expression, (after saying that he mainly concurred, with Mr. Justice McLean,) summed up the whole matter as follows:
. “ The true question presented by these cases, and one which I am not disposed to evade, is, whether the States have a right to prohibit the sale and consumption of an article of commerce which they believe to be pernicious in its effects, and the cause of disease, pauperism and crime. ' I do not consider the question of the exclusiveness of the power of Congress to regulate commerce as necessarily connected '.with the decision of this point.
“It has been frequently decided by--this court, ‘that the powers which relate to merely municipal '^regulations,- or what *145may more properly be called internal police, are not surrendered by the States, or restrained by the Constitution of- the United States; and that, consequently, in relation to these, the authority of a State is complete, unqualified and exclusive.’ Without attempting to define what' are the peculiar subjects or limits of this power, it may safely be affirmed, that every law for the restraint and punishment of crime, for the preservation of the public peace, health and morals, must come within this category. ,
“ As subjects of legislation, they are from their very nature of primary importance; they lie at the foundation of social existence; they are for the protection of life and liberty, and necessarily compel all laws on subjects of secondary importance, which relate only to property, convenience or luxury,: to recede, when they come in conflict or collision,1 salus populi mprema lex'
“ If the right to control these subjects be ‘ complete, unqualified and.exclusive ’ in the state legislatures, no regulations of secondary importance can supersede or restrain their opera-' tions, on any ground of prerogative or supremacy. The exigencies of the social compact require that such laws be executed before and above all others.
“ It is for this reason that quarantine laws, which- protect the public health, compel mere commercial regulations to submit to their control. They restrain the liberty of the passengers ; they operate on the ship which is .the instrument of -commerce, and its officers and crew, the agents of navigation.. They seize the infected cargo, and cast it overboard. The-soldier and the sailor, though in the service of the government, are arrested, imprisoned and punished for their offences, against society. Paupers and convicts are refused admission into the country. All' these things are done, not from any power which the States assume to regulate commerce or - to interfere with the regulations of Congress, but because police laws for the preservation of health, prevention of crime and protection of the public- welfare, must of necessity have full' and free operation, according to the exigency which requires. their interference!
*146“It is not necessary, for the sake of justifying the state ■legislation now under consideration, to array the appalling statistics of misery,- pauperism and crime which have their origin in the usé or abuse of ardent spirits.' The police power, which is exclusively in the States, is alone competent 'to the correction of these great evils, and all measures of restraint or prohibition necessary to effect the purpose are within the scope of that authority. There is no conflict of power, or of legislation, as between the States and the United States; each is acting within its sphere, and for the public goodand if a loss of revenue should -accrue, to the United States from a diminished consumption of ardent spirits, she will be the gainer a thousand fold in the health, wealth and happiness of-the people.” pp. 631, 632.
This abstract of the License Gases shows (what is made yet -clearer by an attentive reading of the opinions as a whole) ’that the difference of ■ opinion among the judges was upon the question' whether the state statutes, which all agreed had some influence upon commerce, and all agreed were valid exercises of the police power, could properly be called regulations of commerce.
•" While many of the judges said or assumed that a State could not restrict the sale by the importer and in the original packages' of intoxicating liquors imported from a foreign country, which Congress had authorized the importation of, and had caused duties to be levied upon; all of them undoubtingly held that, where Congress had not. legislated, a State might, for the protection of the health, the morals and the safety of-its inhabitants, restrict or prohibit, at its discretion and according to its own views of policy, the Sale by the importer of intoxicating liquors brought into it from another State, and remaining in the barrels or packages in which they were brought in.
The ability and thoroughness with Afrhich those cases were argued at the. bar and on the bench, the care and thought bestowed upon their consideration, as manifested in the opinions-delivered by the several judges, and the confidence with which each judge expressed his concurrence in the result, make *147the decision of the highest possible authority. It has been accepted and acted on as such by the legislatures, the courts and the people, of the nation and of the States, for forty years. It has not been touched by any act of Congress; it has guidéd the legislation of many of the States; and it has been treated as beyond question by this court in a. long series of cases. Veazie v. Moor (1852), 14 How. 568, 575; Sinnot v. Davenport (1859), 22 How. 227, 243; Gilman v. Philadelphia (1865), 3 Wall. 713, 730; Pervear v. Commonwealth (1866), 5 Wall. 475, 479; Woodruff v. Parham (1868), 8 Wall. 123, 139; United States v. Dewitt (1869), 9 Wall. 41, 45; Henderson v. Mayor of New York (1.875), 92 U. S. 259, 274; Beer Co. v. Massachusetts (1877), 97 U. S. 25, 33; Patterson v. Kentucky (1878), 97 U. S. 501, 503; Mobile County v. Kimball (1880), 102 U. S. 691, 701; Brown v. Houston (1885), 114 U. S. 622. 631; Walling v. Michigan (1886), 116 U. S. 446, 461; Mugler v. Kansas (1887), 123 U. S. 623, 657, 658.
In the Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, decided in 1849, two years after the License Cases, statutes of New York and Mas^ sachusetts, imposing taxes upon alien passengers arriving from abroad, were adjudged to be repugnant, to the Constitution^ and laws of the United States, and therefore void, by the opinions of Justices McLean, Wayne, Catron, McKinley and Crier, against the dissent of Chief Justice Taney and. Justices'Daniel, Nelson and if7codbury, each of the judges delivering, a separate opinion. The decision in the License Cases Was. relied on by each of the dissenting judges ; pp. 470, 483, 497, 518, 524, 559; and no doubt of the soundness of that decision was suggested in the opinions of the majority of the court,--Or.' in any of the cases in which the' judgment' of -that majority. was afterwards approved and followed. Henderson, v. Mayor of New York, and Commissioners of Immigration v. North German Lloyd, 92 U. S. 259; Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S. 275; People v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantigue, 107 U. S. 59 ; Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580.
When Mr. Justice Grier, in the Passenger Cases, 7 H6w. 462, said, “ And to what weight is' that argument entitled, which assumes, that, because it is the policy of Congress to *148leave this intercourse free, therefore it has not been regulated; and each State may put as many restrictions upon it as she pleases?” the context shows that he had in mind cases in which the policy to leave commerce free had been manifested by.statute or treaty; and he had already, on page 457, made it maiiifest that he did not intend to retract or ¡to qualify his opinion in the License Gases.
An intention on the part of Congress that commerce shall be -free from the operation of laws passed by a State in the exercise of its police power cannot be inferred from the mere fact of there being no national legislation upon the- subject, unless in matters as to which the power of Congress is exclusive.- ■ Where the power of Congress is exclusive, the- States have, of course, no power to legislate ;• and it may be said that Congress, by not legislating, manifests an intention that there should be no legislation on the subject. But in matters over which the power of Congress is paramount only, and not exclusive, the power of the States .is not excluded until .Congress has legislated; and no intention that the States should1-not exercise, or continue to exercise, .their power over the subject can be inferred from the want of congressional legislation. Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U. S. 691, 702-704.
The true test for- determining when the poWer of Congress to regulate commerce is, and when it is not, exclusive, "was formulated and established in Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299, concerning the validity of a state law for the, regulation of pilots and pilotage, in which Mr. Justice' Curtis, in delivering' judgment, said : “ When the nature of a power like this is spoken of, when it is said that the nature of the power •requires that it should be exercised exclusively by Congress, it must be intended to refer to the subjects of that power, and to say they are of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress. Now, the power to regulate commerce embraces a vast field, containing not only many, but exceedingly various subjects, quite unlike in their nature; some imperatively demanding a single uniform rule, operating equally op the commerce of the United States in every port; and some, like the subject now in question, as imperatively *149demanding that diversity, which aloné can. meet the local necessities of navigation. Either absolutely to affirm, or deny, that the nature of this power requires exclusive legislation by Congress, is to lose sight of the nature of the subjects of this power, and to assert concerning all of them, what is really applicable but to a part. “Whatever subjects of this power art' in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress.” He then stated that the act of Congress of August 7, 1789, c. 9, § 4, (1 Stat. 54) in regard to pilotage, manifested the understanding of Congress, at the outset of the government, that the nature of the subject was not such as to require its exclusive legislation, but was such that, until Congress should find it necessary to exercise its power, it should be left to the legislation -of the States, because it was local and not national, and was likely to be best provided for, not by one system or plan of regulation^ but by as many as the legislative- discretion of the sew eral States should deem applicable to the local peculiarities of the ports within their limits; and he added, in words which appear to us equally appropriate to the case now before the court: “ The practice of the States, and of the national government, has been in conformity with this declaration, from the-origin of the national government to this time; and the nature of the subject, when examined, is such as to leave no doubt of the superior fitness and propriety, not to say the absolute necessity, of different systems of regulation, drawn from local knowledge and experience, and conformed to local wants.” “We are of opinion that this state law was enacted by virtue of a power residing in the State to legislate; that it is not in conflict with any law of Congress; that it does not interfere with any system which Congress has established by making regulations, or by intentionally leaving individuals to their own unrestricted action.” 12 How. 319-321.
In Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713, 730, this court, speaking by Mr. Justice-Swayne, applying the same test, and relying on Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co. and Cooley v. Board of Wardens, above cited, upheld the validity of a stat*150ute of Pennsylvania authorizing the construction of a bridge across the Schuylkill River, so as to prevent the passage of vessels with masts ; and, after stating the points adjudged in Brown v. Maryland and in the Passenger Gases, said: “ But a State, in the exercise.of its police power, may forbid spirituous liquor imported from abroad, or from another State, to be sold by retail, or to be sold at all, without a license; and it may visit the violation of the prohibition with such punishment as it may deem proper. License Cases, 5 How. 504.”
By .the same test, and upon the authority of Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., a statute of Wisconsin; authorize ing the erection of a dam across a navigable river, was held to be constitutional in Pound v. Turck, 95 U. S. 459, 463. To the like effect are Willamette Bridge v. Hatch, 125 U. S. 1, 8-12, and other cases there cited.
. Upon like grounds, it was held, in Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, that a statute of Alabama, authorizing the improvement of the harbor of Mobile, did not trench upon the commercial power of Congress; and the court, after pointing out that some expressions of Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden as to the exclusiveness of the power of Congress to regulate commerce were restricted by the facts of that cáse, and by the subsequent judgment in Willson v. Blackbird Greek Marsh Co., said: “ In the License Gases, which were before the court in 1847, there was great diversity of views in the opinions of the different judges upon the operation of the grant of the commercial power of Congress in the absence of Congressional legislation. Extreme doctrines upon both sides of the question were asserted by some of the judges ; but the decision reached, so far as it can be viewed as determining any question of construction, was confirmatory of the doctrine that legislation of Congress is essential to prohibit, the action of the States upon the subjects there considered.” 102 U. S. 700, 701.
In Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123, a state statute, imposing a uniform tax on all sales by auction within it, was held constitutional, as applied to sales of goods the product of other, States and sold in the original and unbroken packages. *151In Hinson v. Lott, 8 Wall. 148, decided at the same time, it was adjudged that a state statute which prohibited any dealers, introducing any intoxicating liquors into the State, from offering them for sale, without first paying a tax of fifty cents a gallon, and imposed a like tax on liquors manufactured within the State, was valid, as applied to liquors brought from another State, and held and offered for sale in the same barrels or packages in which they were brought in; because, in the words of Mr. Justice Miller, who delivered the opinion of the court in both cases, it was not “ an attempt to regulate commerce, but an appropriate and legitimate exercise of the taxing power of the State.” 8 Wall. 153. These two cases we. cited by the court in Low v. Austin, 13 Wall. 29, 34, and in Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U. S. 566, 573, in which, in accord with the opinions. in the License Cases, state taxation upon original cases of wines imported from a foreign country, and upon which duties had been paid under acts of Congress, was held to be invalid.
In Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, the point decided was that a state statute, requiring the payment of a license tax from persons selling, by going from place to place within the State for the purpose, goods not the growth or'manufacture of the State, and not from persons so selling goods -which , were the growth or manufacture of the State, was unconstitutional and void, by reason of the discrimination; and in Machine Co. v. Gage, 100 U. S. 676, a state statute imposing a like tax, without discriminating as to the place of growth or produce of material or manufacture, was adjudged to be constitutional and valid, as applied to machines made in and brought from another State.
In Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622, it was decided that coal, mined in Pennsylvania and' brought in boats by river from Pittsburg to New Orleans, to be there sold by the boat-load on account of the Pennsylvania owner, and remaining afloat in its original condition and original packages, was subject, in-common with all other property in the city, to taxation under the general tax laws of Louisiana; and the court referred to Woodruff v. Parham, above cited, as upholding the validity *152of a “tax" laid on auction sales of all property indiscriminately,” and “which had no relation to the movement of goods from one State to another.” 114 U. S. 634.
In Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S. 446, the statute of Michigan, which was held to be an unconstitutional restraint of interstate commerce, imposed a different tax upon persons engaged within the State in the business of selling or soliciting the sale of intoxicating liquors to be sent into the State, from that imposed upon persons selling or soliciting the sale of such liquors manufactured within the State; and the court declared that the statute would be perfectly justified as “ an exercise by the legislature of Michigan of the police power of the State for the discouragement of' ,the use of intoxicating liquors, and the preservation of the health and morals of the people,” “ if it did not discriminate • against the citizens and products of other States in a matter of commerce between the States, and thus usurp, one of the prerogatives of the national legislature.” 116 U. S. 460.
In Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557, the only point decided was that a State had no power to regulate the rates of freight of any part of continuous transportation upon railroads partly within the State and partly in other States. In Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489, a state law requiring the payment of a license tax by drummers and persons not having a regularly licensed' house of business within the taxing district, offering for- sale or selling any goods by sample, was decided to be unconstitutional as applied to persons offering to sell goods on behalf of merchants residing in other States, because, as the majority of the court held, its effect was “to tax the sale-of such goods, or the offer to sell them, before they are brought into the State.” 120 U. S. 497. Neither of those cases appears to us to ténd to limit the police power of the State to protect the public health, the public morals and the public peace within its own borders.
As was said by this court in Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99, 103, “In conferring upon Congress the .regulation of commerce, it was never intended to cut the States off from legislating on all subjects relating to the health, life and safety of *153their citizens, though the legislation might indirectly affect the commerce of the country. Legislation, in a great variety of ways, may affect commerce and persons engaged in it, without constituting a regulation of it, within the meaning of the Constitution.” It was accordingly held in that case that an action against a carrier engaged in interstate commerce might be maintained under a state statute giving a civil remedy, unknown to the common law, for negligence causing death; and in subsequent cases that ,what a State might punish or afford redress for, it might seek by proper precautions to prevent; and consequently, that a state statute requiring, under a penalty, engineers of all railroad trains within the State to be examined and licensed by a state board, either as to their qualifications generally, or as to their capacity to distinguish between color signals, was.not in its nature a regulation of commerce, but was a constitutional exercise of the.power reserved to the States, and intended to secure the safety' of persons and property within their territorial limits, and, so far as it affected interstate commerce, not in conflict with any express enactment of Congress upon the subject, nor contrary to any intention of Congress to be presumed from its silence. Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465; Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway v. Alabama, 128 U. S. 96.
In Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465, it was expressly conceded, in the opinion of the court delivered by Mr. Justice Strong, that a State, in the exercise of its police power, could “legislate to prevent the spread of crime, or pauperism, or disturbance of the peace,” as well as “ justify the exclusion of property, dangerous to the property of citizens of the State; for example, animals-having contagious or infectious diseases.” 95 U. S. 471. And the decision, by which the statute of Misx>uW, forbidding the introduction of any Texas, Mexican or rndian cattle into the State, was held to be an unconstitutional interference with interstate commerce, rested, as clearly appears in' the opinion in that case, and -has sjnce been -distinctly recognized by the court, upon the ground that the statute made no distinction, in the transportation forbidden, betsyeen cattle which might be diseased- and those which were not. Kimmish v. Ball, 129 U. S. 217, 221. "
*154The authority of the States, in the exercise of their policé power, and for the protection of life and health, to pass laws affecting things which are lawful subjects' or instruments of commerce, and even while they are actually employed in commerce, has been expressly recognized by Congress in the acts regulating the transportation of nitro-glycerine, ás well as in the acts for the observation and execution of the quarantine and health laws of the States. Rev. Stat. §§ 4278-4280; 4792-4796.
In Morgan's Steamship Co. v. Louisiana Board of Health, 118 U. S. 455, 465, the system.of quarantine laws established by the State of Louisiana was held, in accordance with earlier opinions, to be a. constitutional exercise of the police power and it was said by the court: “ Quarantine laws belong to that class of state legislation which, whether passed with intent to regulate commerce or not, must be admitted to have that effect, and which are valid until displaced or contravened by some legislation of Congress. The matter is one in which the rules that should govern it may in .many respects be different in different localities, and for that reason be better understood and more wisely established by the local authorities. The practice which should control a quarantine station on the Mississippi River, a hundred miles from the sea, may be. widely and wisely different from that which is best. for. the harbor of New York.” It was added that in this respect the case fell within the principle of Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., Cooley v. Board of Wardens, Gilman v. Philadelphia, Pound v. Turck, and other cases.
In Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, the court' said: “ In the License Cases, 5 How. 504, the question was, whether certain. statutes of Massachusetts, Rhode Island • and New Hampshire, relating to the sale of spirituous liquors, were repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. In determining that question, it became necessary to inquire whether there was any conflict between the exercise by Congress of its power to regulate commerce with foreign countries, or among the several States, and the exercise by a State of what are called police powers. Although the members of the court did *155not fully agree as to the* grounds upon whioh the decision should be placed, they were umnimous in holding that the statutes then under examination were not inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, or withany act of Congress.” 123 U. S. 657, 658.
In Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway, 125 U. S. 465, the point, and the only point decided, Was that a statute-of Iowa, which forbade common carriers to bring intoxicating •liquors into the State from any other State, without first obtaining a certificate from a county officer of Iowa, that the consignee .-was authorized by the laws of Iowa to séll. such liq'uors, was an unconstitutional regulation of. interstate commerce. While Mr. Justice Field in his separate opinion (p.' 507) intimated, and three .dissenting justices (pp. 514, 515)-fearéd, that the decision was in effect inconsistent with thé decision in the License Cases, Mr. Justice Matthews, who delivered the judgment of the majority of the court, not only-cautiously avoided committing the court to any such conclu- ‘ sion, but took great pains to mark the essential difference.- . between the two decisions. On the one hand, after making d careful analysis of the opinions in the License Gases, he said:1 “ From this analysis it is apparent that the question presented' in this case was not decided in the License Cases. The point in judgment in them was strictly confined to the right of the States to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquor after it had been brought within their territorial limits. The right to' bring it within the States was not questioned.” On the other hand, in stating the reasons for holding the statute of Iowa,' prohibiting the transportation of liquors from another State,' not to be a legitimate exertion of the police power of the'1 State of Iowa, he said: “ It. is not an exercise of the jurisdiction of the State over persons and property within its limits. On the contrary, it is an attempt to exert that jurisdiction-over persons and property within the limits of other States.' It seeks to prohibit and stop their passage and importation into its own limits, and is designed as a regulation for the conduct of commerce- before the merchandise is brought to its border.” “ But. the right to prohibit sales, so far as conceded. *156to the States, arises only after the., act of transportation has terminated, becáuse the sales which the • State may forbid are of things within its jurisdiction. Its power over them does not begin to operate until they are brought within the territorial limits which circumscribe it.” 125 U. S. 479, 498, 499.
In the opinion of the majority of the court in that case, it. was noted that the omission of Congress to legislate might not so readily justify an inference of its intention to exclude state, legislation in matters affecting interstate commerce,'as •in those- affecting foreign commerce; Mr. Justice Matthews saying: “ The organization of our state and federal system of government is such that the people of the several States can have no relations with foreign powers in respect to commerce or any other subject, except through the government of the United States and its laws and treaties. The same necessity .perhaps does not exist equally in reference to commerce among the States. The power conferred upon Congress to regulate commerce among the States is indeed contained in the samé clause of the Constitution which confers upon it power to regulate commerce with foreign nations-. The grant is conceived in the same terms, and the two powers are undoubtedly of th'e same class and character and equally extensive. The .actual exercise of its power over either subject is equally and necessarily, exclusive .of that of the States, and paramount oyer all -the powers of the States; so that state legislation, however legitimate in its origin or object, when it conflicts with, the positive legislation of Congress, or its intention reasonably implied from its silence, in respect to the subject of commerce of both kinds, must fail. And yet, in respect to commerce among the States, it may be, for the reason already assigned, that, the same, inference is. not always to be drawn, frqm the absence of congressional legislation -as might be in the case of commerce with foreign nations.- • The question, therefore, may be still considered in each. case as it arises, whether the fact that Congress has failed in' the particular instance to provide by law a regulation of commerce among th,e States is conclusive of its intention that the subject shall bé free¡from all positive regulation, or that, until it positively. *157interferes, such commerce may be left to be freely dealt with by the respective States.” 125 U. S. 482, 483.
In Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1, a statute of Iowa, prohibiting the manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquors, except for mechanical, medicinal, culinary and sacramental purposes only, and authorizing any building used for their unlawful manufacture to be abated as a nuisance, was unanimously held to be constitutional, as applied to a case in which the liquors were manufactured for exportation and were sold outside the State; and the court; in showing how impracticable. it would be for .Cohgress to regulate the manufacture of goods in one State to be sold in another, said: “ The demands of such a supervision would require, not uniform legislation generally applicable throughout the United States, but a swarm of statutes only locally applicable and utterly inconsistent.” “ A situation mqre paralyzing to the state governments, and more provocative of conflicts between the general government and the States, and less likely to have been what the framers of the Constitution intended, it would be difficult to imagine.” 128 U. S. 21, 22.
The language thus applied to congressional supervision of the manufacture within- one State of intoxicating liquors intended to be sold in other States appears to us to apply with hardly less force to the regulation by Congress of the sale within one State of intoxicating liquors brought from another State. How far the protection of the public order, health and - morals demands the restriction or prohibition of the sale of intoxicating liquors -is a question peculiarly appertaining to the legislatures of the several States, and to be determined by them upon their own views of public policy, taking into consideration the needs, the education, the habits and the usages,. of people of various races and origin, .and living in regions far apart and widely differing in climate and in physical characteristics. The local option laws prevailing in many of the States indicate the judgment of as many legislatures, that the sale of intoxicating liquors does not admit of regulation by- a uniform rule over so large an- area as a single State, ,much less over the area of: a continent. It is manifest that the regulation *158of the sale, as of the manufacture, of such 'liquors manufactured in one State to be sold in another, is a subject .which, far from requiring, hardly admits of a uniform system or plan throughout the United ‘States'. It is, in its very nature,'not national, but local; and must, in order to be either reasonable or éffective, conform to the local policy and legislation concerning the sale, or the manufacture, of intoxicating liquors generally. Congress cannot regulate this subject under the police power, because that power has not been conceded to Congress, but remains in the several States; nor under the commercial power, without either prescribing .a general rule unsuited to the nature and requirements of the subject, or else departing from that uniformity of regulation which, as declared by this court in Kidd v. Pearson, above cited, it was the object of the commercial clause of ’.the Constitution to secure.-
The above review of the judgments of this court since the .'decision in the License Cases appears to us to demonstrate that, that decision, while often referred to, has never been overruled or its authority impugned.
It only remains to sum up the reasons which have' satisfied us that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Iowa in the case at bar should be affirmed.
The protection of the. safety, the health, the morals, the good order and the general welfare of the people is the chief end,of government. - Solus populi suprema lex. The police power is inherent in the States, reserved to them by the Constitution, and necessary to their existence as organized governments. The Constitution of the United States and the laws made in pursuance thereof being the supreme law of the land, all statutes of a State must, of course, give way, so far as they are repugnant to the national Constitution and laws. But an intention is not lightly to-be imputed to the framers of the Con-.’ stitution, or to the Congress of the United States, to subordinate. the,' protection of the safety, health arid morals of the people' to the promotion of trade and commerce.
The police power extends to the control and regulation of things which, when used in a lawful and proper manner, are *159.subjects of property and of commerce, and yet may be used so as to be injurious or dangerous to the public safety, the public health or the public morals: Common experience has shown that the general and unrestricted use of intoxicating liquors tends to produce idleness, disorder, disease, pauperism apd crime.
The power of regulating or prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors appropriately belongs, as a branch of the police power, to the legislatures of the several States, and can be judiciously and effectively exercised by them alone, according to their views of public policy and local needs; and cannot practically, if it can constitutionally, be wielded by Congress as part of a national and uniform system.
The statutes in question were enaéted by the State of Iowa in the exercise of its undoubted power to protect its inhabitants against the evils, physical, moral and social, attending the free use of intoxicating liquors. They are not aimed at interstate commerce; they have no relation to the movement of goods from one State to another, but operate only on intoxicating liquors within the territorial limits of the State; they include all such liquors without discrimination, and do not even mention where they are made or whence they come. They affect commerce much more remotely and indirectly than laws of a State, (the validity of which is unquestioned,) authorizing the erection of bridges and dams across navigable waters within its limits, which wholly obstruct the course of commerce and navigation ; or than quarantine laws, which operate directly upon all ships and merchandise coming into the ports of the State.
If the statutes of a State, restricting or prohibiting the sale .of intoxicating liquors within its territory, are to be held inoperative and void as applied to liquors sent or brought, from another State and sold by the importer in what are called original packages, the consequence must be that an in-, habitant of any State may, under the pretext of interstate, commerce, and without license or supervision of any public authority, carry or send into, and sell in, any or all of the other States of the Union intoxicating liquors of whatever descrip*160tion, in oases or kegs, or. even in single bottles or flasks, despite any legislation of those States on the subject, and although his. own State should be the only one which had not enacted similar laws. It would require positive and explicit legislation on the part of Congress, to convince us that it contemplated or intended such a result.
The decision in the License Cases, 5 How. 504, by which the court, maintaining these views, unanimously adjudged that a general statute of a .State, prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors without license from municipal authorities, included liquors brought from another State and sold by the importer in the original barrel or package, should be upheld, and followed; because it was made upon full argument and great consideration ; because it established a wise and just rule, regarding a most delicate point in our complex system of government, a point, always difficult of definition and adjustment, the contact between the paramount commercial power granted to Cortgress and the inherent police power reserved to the States ; because it is in accordance with the usage and practice which have prevailed during the century since the adoption of the Constitution; because it has been accepted and acted on for forty years by Congress, by the state legislatures, by the courts and by the people ; and because to hold otherwise would add nothing to the dignity and supremacy of the powers of Congress, while it would cripple, not to say destroy, the whole control of every State over the sale of intoxicating liquors within its borders.
The silence and inaction of Congress upon the subject, during the long period since the decision in the License Cases, appear to us to require the inference that Congress intended that the law should remain as thereby declared by this court; rather than to warrant the presumption that Congress intended that commerce among the States should be free from the indirect effect of such an exercise of the police power for the public safety, as had been adjudged by that decision to be within the constitutional authority of the States.
For these reasons, we are compelled to dissent froin the opinion and judgment of the majority of the court.