after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
The only question involved here is in regard to the taxability of the Ohio notes in the State of Indiana.
The plaintiff in error asserts that the simple physical.presence *400of the Ohio notes in Indiana'payable to and not endorsed by the decedent, did not. constitute taxable property there,, because'such notes'were given and were payable and were paid in Ohio by residents of Ohio, and to a non-resident of Indiana, and for-loans made in Ohio, the capital represented by such notes jnevfer having been used in business in Indiana, and he insists that a ’tax upon such capital or upon the notes therm selves as representing that capital is an illegal tax,.and that t'o take property inpayment of .such-an illegal tax is to také it-, without due process, of law . and constitutes a violation of the Fodrteenth Amendment. -
.. If the, facts in this case constituted the debts evidenced by the Ohio notes property in the jurisdiction of the State of. Indiana at' the- time when such taxes' Were imposed, then the tax was valid, if there, werfe statutory- authority of that. State for the same. The state court Has held that there was such authority, Buck v. Miller, 147 Indiana, 586; Buck v. Beach, 164 Indiana, 37, being the case at bar, and that construction of the statute concludes this court. Delaware &c. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 198 U. S. 341, 352,
The sole question then for this court is whether the mere presence of the notes-in Indiana constituted the. debts of which thé notes were the written .evidence, property within ‘‘the jurisdiction of that State, so that such debts could be' therein taxed.-
Generally,' property in order to be ,the subject of taxation must be within the jurisdiction of the power-assuming to tax. State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300; Erie Railroad v. Pennsylvania, 153 U. S. 628, 646; Savings Society v. Multnomah County, 169 U. S. 421, 427; Louisville &c. v. Kentucky, 188 U. S. 385; Delaware &c. v. Pennslyvania, 198 U. S. 341; Union Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194; Metropolitan Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, 205 U. S. 395.
• In-,regard to tangible property the old’rule was mobilia sequunter pers'oham, by which' personal property was supposed to-follow the person of its-owner, and-to be subject to the. law *401of the owner’s domicil. Por the purpose.of taxation, however, it has long been held- that. personal property may be separated from its'owner, and he may-be taxed on its.account.át the place where the property is, although it is not the place of his own domicil, and even if he is not a citizen or resident of the State which imposes the tax. Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18, 22; Tappan v. Merchants’ National Bank, 19 Wall. 490; People ex rel. Hoyt v. The Commissioner of Taxes, 23 N. Y. 224, 240. The same rule applies to intangible property. Generally speaking,' intangible property in the nature of a debt may be regarded, for the purposes of taxation, as situated at the domicil of .the-creditor and within the jurisdiction of the State where he has such domicil. It is property within that State. Thus it has been held that a debt owned by a citizen of one State, against a- citizen of another State and eyidenced by the bond of the debtor, secured by a deed of trust or_mort-gage upon real estate situated in the State where the debtor resides, is properly taxed by the State of the residence of the, creditor, if the statute of that State so provides, and such tax violates no provision of the Federal Constitution. Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 491, 498.
Rejecting the fiction of law- in regard to the sities of personal property, including, therein 'choses in action, the courts of Indiana have asserted jurisdiction by reason of the statute of that State over these Ohio notes -for the purpose of taxation in Indiana, founded upon the.simple fact that such .notes were placed in the latter State by the Ohio agent of the decedent under the circumstances- above set forth. The Supreme Court of Indiana refused to accept the testimony of the agents that the Ohio- notes were sent to' Lafayette merely for safe keeping, and for clerical convenience, and skid that “the court bélow-was authorized to make the opposite deduction from the. uniform course of the business in respect to the keeping of said notes and mortgages and from the evidence that decedent gave the direction which established the -practice that was pursued in that particular-. Mqre than that, the evidence *402clearly warranted the conclusion that Buck was vested with a control of said notes and securities for the purposes of enabling decedent to escape taxation in Ohio. We must, therefore, conclude, in support of the general. finding, that the court below found that in the conducting of the business of the Ohio agency the decedent separated from said business the possession of said notes and mortgages and vested the right to such possession in said Buck. There was no return for taxation of said notes, or of the investments represented by them, either in Ohio or in New York during the lifetime of the decedent.”
Taking this to be a finding of fact by the Supreme Court of the State, it is plain that the action of the decedent in sending the Ohio notes into the State of Indiana for the purpose stated (whether successful or not), was improper and unjustifiable. The record does show; however, that the executors subsequently paid the Ohio authorities- over $40,000 for taxes on the moneys invested in Ohio.
But an attempt to escape proper taxation in Ohio does not confer jurisdiction to tax property asserted to be in Indiana, which really lies outside and beyond the jurisdiction of that State. Jurisdiction of the State of Indiana to tax is not conferred or strengthened by reason of the motive which may have prompted the decedent to send into the State of Indiana these evidences of debts owing him by residents of Ohio. The question still remains, was there any property within the jurisdiction of the State of Indiana,' so as to permit that State to tax it, simply because of the presence of the Ohio notes in that State? It was not the value of the paper as a tangible, thing, on which these promises to pay the debts existing in Ohio were written, that was taxed by that State. The property really taxed was the debt itself, as each - eparate note was taxed at the full amount of the debt named therein or due thereon. And jurisdiction over these debts for the purr pose of taxation was asserted and exercised solely by reason of the physical presence in Indiana of the notes themselves, *403although they were only- written evidence of the existence of the debts which were in fact thereby taxed.
A distinction has been sometimes taken between bonds and other specialty debts belonging to the deceased, on the one hand, and simple contract debts on the other, for the purpose of probate jurisdiction, and the probate court, where the bonds are found, has been held to have jurisdiction to grant probate, while in the other class of debts. (including promissory, notes) jurisdiction has attached to the probate court where the debtor resided at the death of the creditor. 1-Williams on Executors, 6th Am. from 7th English ed., bottom paging 288, 290, note [h]; Wyman v. Halstead Adm’r, 109 U. S. 654. See also Beers v. Shannon, 73 N. Y. 292, 299; Owen v. Miller, 10 Ohio St. 136.
Under such rule, the debts here in question were not property within the State of Indiana, nor were the*-promissory notes themselves, which were only evidence of such debts. The rule giving jurisdiction where the_ specialty may be found, has no' application to a promissory note. Assuming such a rule, the case here is not covered by it.
Questions of the validity of state taxation with reference to the Federal Constitution have become quite frequent in this court within the last few years. The case of Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. The City of New Orleans, 205 U. S. 395, is the latest. The question there was in relation to the validity of certain taxes assessed in the city of New Orleans against the-Metropolitan Life Insurance Company by reason- of the company doing business in lending money to the holders of its policies in New -Orleans. The domicil of the company was in the city of New York, and the evidences of the credits,. in the form of notes, were kept most of the time in New York, being sent to New-Orleans when due. The tax was, under the laws of the State of Louisiana, levied on the “ credits, money loaned, bills receivable,” etc., of the plaintiff in error and its amount was ascertained by computing the sum of the face value of all the notes held by the. company in New Orleans *404at the time of the assessment. The assessment was made under an act which provided that “ bills receivable, obligations, or credits arising from the business .done in this State,” shall be assessable at the business domicil of. the non-resident, the assessment being made in such a way under the statute as would “'represent in their aggregate a fair average on the-capital,, both cash and credits, employed in the business of the party or parties to be assessed.” The tax was sustained because, as is stated in the opinion of the court, which was delivered by Mr. Justice Moody,. “ the insurance company chose to enter into the business of lending money within the State, of Louisiana, and employed a local .agent to conduct' that business. It was,conducted under the laws of the State. The State undertook to tax the capital employed in the business precisely as it taxed the capital of its. own citizens'in like situation. For the purpose of arriving at the amount of capital actually employed, it caused the credits arising out of the business to be assessed. We think the State had the power, to do this, and that the foreigner-doing business cannot escape taxation upon his capital by' removing temporarily from the State evidences-, of credits in the form of notes. Under such circumstances, they have a taxable- situs in the State of their origin.” The temporary absence of the notes, given for the loans, from the State (being in New York, the domicil of the company) except when they, became due, was regarded as unimportant. The law, it was said, regarded the place of the'ir origin as their true home, to which they would return to be paid, and their temporary absence, however long continued, wais. left put of account.
The prior cases of New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U. S. 309, and Board of Assessors v. Comptoir National, 191 U. S. 388, were also cited. In the first there was a, tax on credits, evidenced by notes (secured by mortgages on real estate in New Orleans) which the owner a non-resident, who had - inherited them, left in Louisiana in the possession of an agent, who collected the principal and interest as they became due: The *405capital of the owner was thus invested in the State, and was thereby subject to taxation there, and the notes did not alter the nature of the. debt, but were merely evidence of it. In the latter case a foreign .banking company did business in-New Orleans, and through an agent lent money which was evidenced by checks, drawn upon the agent, treated as overdrafts and- secured by collateral, the checks and collateral rémáining in the hands of the agent until the transactions were closed. The credits thus evidenced were held taxable in Louisiana. -The corporation was held to be doing business and had capital employed in the city of New Orleans,' to the extent of the assessment made upon it therein.
In Bristol v. Washington County, 177 U. S. 133, the assessment was upheld because it appeared that the person assessed was-doing business in Minnesota'through an agent, in lending money in that State, which was secured by mortgages on real property therein. The amount of money thus invested in that State was held to be properly taxable therein.
In Savings & Loan Society v. Multnomah County, 169 U. S. 421, the assessment was upon the real estate mortgaged, the interest of- the mortgagee therein being -taxed to him and the rest to the mortgagor, and it was held by this court that the fact that the mortgage was. owned by a citizen of another State, and in his possession outside of the State .of Oregon, where the real estate was situated, did not.violate the-Fourteenth Amendment. It was stated that “The State may tax real estate mortgaged, as -it may. all other property within its' jurisdiction, at its full value. It.may do this,'either by taxing the whole To the mortgagor, or by taxing to the'mortgagee the interest therein represented by the. mortgage, and to the mortgagor the remaining• interest ;in the land. .And it. may, for the purposes of taxation, .either treat the mortgage debt as personal property, to be taxed like other choses in action, to the creditor at his domicil; or treat the mortgagee’s interest in the land as real éstate, to be taxed to- him, like other, real property.at its situs.” Under the statute of Oregon *406the assessment was made against the mortgagee upon- his interest in the land as real estate.
There are no cases in this court where an assessment such as the one before us has been involved. We have not had a case where neither the party assessed nor the debtor was a resident of or present in the State where the tax was imposed, and where no business was done therein by the owner of the notes or his agent relating in any way to the capital evidenced by the notes assessed for taxation. We cannot assent to the doctrine that the mere presence of evidences of debt, such as these notes, under the circumstances already stated, amounts to' the presence of property within the. State for taxation. That promissory notes may be the subject of larceny, as stated in 48 N. Y. cited below, does not make the debts evidenced by them, property liable to taxation within the State where there is no other fact than the presence of the notes upon which to base the claim.
In People v. The Board of Trustees &c., 48 N. Y. 390, it was. held that money due upon a contract for the sale of land was personal property, and that where such contract belonging to a non-resident was in the hands of a resident agent, it might, for the purposes of municipal taxation, be assessed to the agent and taxed. In the opinion Judge Earl said: “The debts due upon these contracts are personal estate, the same as if they were due upon notes or bonds; and such personal estate may be said to exist where the obligations for payment are held.” The contracts spoken of in that case were contracts for the sale of land by a non-resident owner to persons within the county where the lands were situated. The debtors resided within the State, and the agent of the non-resident for the sale of the land resided in the State and had possession of the contracts. A different case as to its facts from the one before us.
In People v. Smith, 88 N. Y. 576, jurisdiction to tax in New York was denied under the statute of that State, because the personal estate was not within the State, although the *407same principle, page 581 as contained in 48 N. Y., supra, was asserted.
If payment of these notes had to be enforced it would not be to the courts of Indiana that the owner would resort. He would have to go to Ohio to find the debtor as well as the lands mortgaged as security for the payment of the notes. It is true that if the notes were stolen while in.Indiana, and they were therein a subject of larceny, the Indiana courts would havé to be resorted to for the punishment of the thieves. That would be in vindication of the general. criminal justice of the State. This consideration, however, is not near enough to the question involved to cause us to - change our views of the law in regard to the taxation of property, and make that property within the State, which we think is clearly outside it.
Although public securities, consisting of state bonds and. bonds of municipal bodies, and circulating notes of banking institutions have sometimes been treated as property in the place where they were found, though removed from the domi-cil of _ the owner, State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300, 324, it has not been held in this court that simple contract debts, though evidenced by promissory notes, can under the facts herein stated be treated as property and taxed in the State where the notes may be found.
As is said in the above cited case at page 320: “All the property there can be in the nature of things in debts of corporations, belongs to the creditors, to whom they are payable, and follows their domicil, wherever that may be. Their debts can have no locality separate from the parties to whom they are due. This principle might be stated in many .different ways, and supported by citations from numerous adjudications, but no number of authorities, and no forms of expressions could add anything to its obvious truth, which is recognized upon its simple statement.”
The cases cited in Metropolitan Insurance Co. case, supra, show that this rule is enlarged to the extent of holding that . capital, evidenced by written instruments, invested in a *408State may be taxed- by the authorities of the State, although their owner is a non-resident and such evidences of debt are temporarily outside of the State when the assessment is made. Although the language of the opinion in the case of State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds, supra, has been somewhat restricted so far as regards the character of the interest of the mortgagee in the land mortgaged, Savings &c. Society v. Multnomah County, 169 U. S. 421, 428, the principle upon which the case itself was decided has not been otherwise shaken by the later cases. New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U. S. 309, 319, 320; Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189, 206. In the Stempel case, supra, the notes, as we have said, represented the capital of the owner invested in the State, and the capital was taxed, although the owner was a non-resident.
Cases arising under collateral inheritance tax of succession tax 'acts have been cited as affording foundation for the right .to tax as herein asserted. The foundation upon which such acts rest is different from that which exists where the assessment is levied upon property. The succession or inheritance tax is not a tax on property, as has been frequently held by this court, Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, and Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189, and therefore the decisions arising under such inheritance tax cases are not' in point.
Our decision in this case has no tendency to aid the owner of taxable property in any effort to avoid - or evade proper and legitimate taxation. The presence of the notes in Indiana-formed no bar to the right, if it otherwise existed, of taxing the debts, evidenced by the notes, in Ohio. It does,' however, tend to prevent the taxation in one State of property in the shape of debts- not existing there and which if so taxed would make double taxation almost sure, which is certainly not to be desired and ought, wherever possible, to be prevented.
For the reason that as the assessment in this case was made upon property which was never within the jurisdiction of the State of Indiana the State had no power to tax it, and the *409enforcement of such a tax would be the taking of property without due process of law.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Indiana is reversed and the case rexhanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion of this court.
Reversed.