delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a writ of error to review a judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of .Alabama, affirming a judgment of conviction in the Montgomery City Court. The statute, upon which the conviction was based, is assailed as in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States upon the ground that it deprived the plaintiff in error of his liberty without due process of law and denied him the equal protection of the laws, and also of the Thirteenth Amendment and of the act of Congress providing for the enforcement of that Amendment, in that the effect of the statute is to enforce involuntary servitude by compelling personal service in liquidation of a debt.
The statute in question is § 4730 of the Code of Alabama of 1896, as amended in 1903 and 1907. The section of the Code as it stood before the amendments provided that any person who with intent to injure or defraud his employer entered into a written contract for service and thereby obtained from his employer money or other personal property, and with like intent and without just cause, and without refunding the money or paying for the property refused to perform the service, should be punished as if he had stolen it. In 1903 (Gen. Acts, Ala., 1903, p. 346) the section was amended so as to make the refusal or failure to perform the service, or to refund the money or pay for the property, without just cause, prima facie evidence of the intent to injure or defraud. This amendment was enlarged by that of 1907. Gen. Acts, Ala., 1907, p. 636. The section, thus amended, reads as follows:
“Any person, who with intent to injure or defraud his *228employer, enters into a contract in writing for'the performance of any act of service, and thereby, obtains money or other personal property from such employer, and with like intent, and without just cause, and without refunding such money, or paying for such property, refuses or fails to perform such act or service, must on conviction be punished by a fine in double the damage suffered by the injured party, but not'more than $300, one-half of said fine to go to the county and one-half to the party injured; and any person, who with intent to injure or defraud his landlord, enters into any contract in writing for the rent of land, and thereby obtains any money or other personal property from such landlord, and with like intent, without just cause, and without refunding such money, or paying for such property, refuses or fails to cultivate such land, or to comply with his contract relative thereto, must on conviction be punished by fine in double the damage suffered by the injured party, biit not more than $300, one-half of said fine to go to the county and one-half to the party injured. And the refusal or failure of any person, who enters into such contract, to perform such act or service or to cultivate such land, or refund such money, or pay for such-property without just cause shall be pruna facie evidence of the intent to injure his employer or landlord or defraud him. That all laws and parts of laws in conflict with the provisions hereof be and the same are hereby repealed.”
There is also a rule of evidence enforced by the courts of Alabama which must be regarded as having the same effect as if read into the statute itself, that the accused, for the purpose of rebutting the statutory presumption, shall not be allowed to testify “as to his uncommunicated motives,.purpose or intention.” Bailey v. The State, 161 Alabama, 77, 78.
Bailey, the plaintiff in error, was committed for detention on the charge of obtaining fifteen dollars under a *229contract in writing with intent to injure or defraud his employer. He sued out a writ of habeas corpus challenging the validity of the statute. His discharge was refused and the Supreme Court of thé State affirmed the order, holding the statute to be constitutional. 158 Alabama, 18. On writ of error from this court it was held that the case was brought here prematurely, and the questions now presented were expressly reserved. Bailey v. Alabama, 211 U. S. 452.
Having failed to obtain his release on habeas corpus, Bailey was indicted on the following charge:
“The Grand Jury of said County charge, that before the finding of this indictment Alonzo Bailey with intent to injure or defraud his employer The Riverside Company, a corporation, entered into a written contract to perform labor or services for The Riverside Company, á corporation and obtained thereby the sum of Fifteen Dollars from the said The Riverside Company, and after-wards with like intent, and without just cause, failed or refused to perform such labor or services or to refund such money against the peace and dignity of the State of Alabama.”
Motion. to quash and a demurrer to the indictment were overruled. Upon the trial the following facts appeared: On December 26, 1907, Bailey entered into a written contract with the Riverside Company, which provided:
“That I Lonzo Bailey for and in consideration of the sum of Fifteen Dollars in money, this day in hand paid to me by said The Riverside Co., the receipt whereof, I do hereby acknowledge, I, the said Lonzo Bailey do. hereby consent, contract and agree to work and labor for the said Riverside Co. as a farm hand on their Scotts Bend Place in Montgomery County, Alabama, from the 30 day of Dec. 1907, to the 30 day of Dec. 1908, at and for the sum of 12.00 per month.
*230“And the said Lonzo Bailey agrees to render respectful and faithful service to the said The Riverside Co. and to perform diligently and actively all work pertaining to such employment, in accordance with the instructions of the said The Riverside Co., or ag’t.
“Anjd the said The Riverside Co. in consideration of the agreement above mentioned of the said Lonzo Bailey hereby employs the said Lonzo Bailey, as such farm hand for the time above set out, and agrees to pay the said Lonzo Bailey the sum of $10.75 per month.”.
The manager of the employing company testified that, at the time of entering into this contract there were present only the witness and Bailey and that the latter then obtained, from the company the sum of fifteen dollars; that Bailey-worked under the contract throughout the month of January and for three or four days in February, 1908, and then, “without just cause and without refunding the money, ceased to work for said Riverside Company, and has not since that time performed any service for said Company in accordance with or under said contract, and has refused and failed to perform any further service thereunder, and' has, without just cause, refused and failed to refund said fifteen dollars.” He also testified, in response to a question from the ^attorney for the defendant and against the objection of the State/ that Bailey was a negro. No other evidence was introduced.
The court, after defining the crime in the language of fhe- statute, charged the jury, in accordance with its terms, as follows:
“And the refusal of any person who enters into such contract to perform such act or service,-or refund such money, or pay for such property, without just cause, shall' be prima facie evidence of the intent to injure his employer, or to defraud him.”
Bailey excepted "'to these instructions, and requested the court to instruct the jury thdt the statute, and the *231provision creating the presumption, were invalid, and further that “the refusal or failure of the defendant to perform the service alleged in the indictment, or to refund the money obtained from the Riverside Co. under the contract between it and the defendant, without cause, does not of itself make out a prima facie case of the defendant’s intent to injure or defraud said Riverside Company.”
The court refused these instructions and Bailey took exceptior
The jury found the accused guilty, fixed the damages sustained by the injured party at fifteen dollars, and assessed a fine of thirty dollars. Thereupon Bailey was sentenced by the court to pay the fine of thirty dollars and the costs, and in default thereof to hard labor “for twenty days in lieu of said fine and one hundred and sixteen days on account of said costs.”
On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State the constitutionality of the statute was again upheld and the judgment affirmed. 161 Alabama, 75.
We at once dismiss from consideration the fact that the plaintiff in error is a black man. While the action of a State through its officers charged with the administration of a law, fair in appearance, may be of such a character as to constitute a denial of the equal protection of the laws (Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 373), such a conclusion is here neither required nor justified. The statute, on its face, makes no racial discrimination, and the record fails to show its existence in fact. No question of a sectional character is presented, and we may view the legislation in the same manner as if it had been enacted in New York or in Idaho. Opportunities for coercion and oppression, in varying circumstances, exist in all parts of the Union, and the citizens of all the States are interested in the maintenance of the constitutional guarantees, the consideration of which is here involved.
*232Prior to the amendment of the year 1903, enlarged in 1907, the statute did not make the mere breach of the contract, under which the eniployé had obtained from his employer money which was not refunded or property which was not paid for, a crime. The essential ingredient of the offense was the intent of the accused to injure or defraud. To justify conviction, it was necessary that this intent should be established by competent evidence, aided only by such inferences as might logically be derived from the facts proved, and should not be the subject of mere surmise or arbitrary assumption.
This was the construction which the Supreme Court of Alabama placed upon the statute, as it then stood, in Ex parte Riley, 94 Alabama, 82. In that case the court said (pp. 83, 84):
“The ingredients of this statutory offense are: (1) a contract in writing by the accused for the performance of any act or service; (2) an intent on the part of the accused, when he entered into the contract, to injure or defraud his employer; (3) the obtaining by the accused of money or other personal property from such employer by means of such contract entered into with such intent; and (4) the refusal by the accused, with like intent, and without just cause, and without refunding such money, or paying for such property, to perform such act or service. This statute by no means provides that a person who has entered into a written contract for the performance of services, under which he has obtained money or other personal property, is punishable as if he had stolen such money or other personal property, upon his refusal to perform the contract, without refunding the money or paying for the property. A mere breach of a contract is not by the statute made a crime. The criminal feature of the transaction is wanting unless the accused entered into the contract with intent to injure or-defraud his employer, and unless his refusal to perform *233was with like intent and without just cause. That there was an intent to injure or defraud the employer, both when the contract was entered into and when the accused refused performance, are facts' which must be shown by the .evidence. As the intent is the design, purpose, resolve or determination in the mind of the accused, it can rarely be provéd by direct evidence, but must be ascertained by means of inferences from the facts and circumstances developed by the proof. Carlisle v. The State, 76 Alabama, 75; Mack v. The State, 63 Alabama, 136. In the absence, however, of evidence from which such inferences may be drawn, the jury are not justified in indulging in mere unsupported conjectures, speculations or suspicions as to intentions which were not disclosed by any visible or tangible act, expression or circumstance.— Green v. The State, 68 Alabama, 539.” See also Dorsey v. The State, 111 Alabama, 40; McIntosh v. The State, 117 Alabama, 128.
We pass then to the consideration of the amendment, through the operation of which under the charge of the trial court this conviction was obtained. No longer was it necessary for the prosecution to comply with the rule of the Riley case (supra) in order to establish the intent to injure or defraud which, as the court said, constituted the gist of the offense. It was “the difficulty in proving the intent, made patent by that decision” which “suggested the amendment of 1903.” Bailey v. The State, 158 Alabama, p. 25. By this amendment it was provided, in substance, that the' refusal or failure to perform the service contracted for, or to refund the money obtained, without just cause, should be prima facie evidence of the intent to injure or defraud.
But the refusal or failure to perform the service, without just cause, constitutes the breach of the contract. The justice of the grounds of refusal or failure must, of course, be determined „by the contractual obligation as*234sumed. Whatever the reason for leaving the service, if, judged by the terms of the contract, it is insufficient in law, it is not “just cause.” The money received and repayable, nothing more being shown, constitutes a mere debt. The asserted difficulty of proving the intent to injure or defraud is thus made the occasion for dispensing with such proof, so far as the prima facie case is concerned. And the mere breach of a contract for personal service, coupled with the mere failure to pay a debt which was to be liquidated in the course, of such service, is made sufficient to warrant a conviction.
It is no answer to say that the jury must find, and here found, that a fraudulent intent existed. The jury by their verdict cannot add to the facts before them. If nothing be shown but a mere breach of a contract of service and a mere failure to pay a debt, the jury have nothing else to go upon, and the evidence becomes nothing more because of their finding. • Had it not been for this statutory presumption, supplied by the amendment, no one would be heard to say that Bailey could have been convicted.
Prima facie evidence is sufficient evidence to outweigh • the presumption of innocence and if not met by opposing evidence to support a verdict of guilty. “It is such as, in judgment of law, is sufficient to, establish the fact; and, if not rebutted, remains sufficient for the purpose.” Kelly v. Jackson, 6 Pet. 632.
We are not impressed with the argument that the Supreme Court of Alabama'has construed the amendment to mean that the jury is not controlled by the presumption, if unrebutted, and still may find the accused not guilty. That court, in its opinion, said: “Again, it must be borne in mind that the rule of evidence fixed by the statute does not make it the duty of the jury to convict on the evidence referred to in the enactment, if unrebutted, whether satisfied thereby of the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt or not. On the con*235trary, with such evidence before thefn, the jury are still left free to find the accused guilty or not guilty, according as they may be satisfied of his guilt or not, by the whole evidence.” 161 Alabama, 78. '
But the controlling construction of the statute is the affirmance of this judgment of conviction. It is not sufficient to declare that the statute does not make it the duty of the jury to convict, where there is no other evidence but- the breach of the contract and the failure to pay the debt. The point is that, in such a case, the statute authorizes the jury to convict. It is not enough to say that the jury may not accept that evidence as alone sufficient; for the jury may accept it, and they have the express .warrant of the statute to accept is as a basis for their verdict. And it is in this light that the validity of the statute must be determined.
It is urged that the time and circumstances of the departure from service may be such as to raise not only an inference, but a strong inference, of fraudulent intent. There was no need to create a statutory presumption and it was not. created for such a case. Where circumstances are shown permitting a fair inference of fraudulent purpose, the case falls within the rule of Ex parte Riley (supra) which governed prosecutions under the statute before the amendment was made. The “difficulty,” which admittedly the amendment was intended to surmount, did not exist where natural inferences sufficed. Plainly the object of the statute was to hit cases which were destitute of such inferences, and to provide that the mere breach of the contract and the meré failure to pay the debt might do duty in their absence.
While in considering the natural operation and effect of the statute, as amended, we are not limited to the particular facts of the case at the bar, they present an illuminating illustration. We may briefly restate them. Bailey made a contract to work for a year at $12 a month. He *236received $15 and he was to work this out, being entitled monthly only to $10.75 of his wages. No one was present, when he made the contract but himself and the manager of the employing company. There is not a particle of evidence of any circumstance indicating that he made the contract or received the money with any intent to injure or defraud his employer. On the contrary, he actually worked for upwards of a month. His motive in leaving does not appear, the only showing being that it was without legal excuse and that he did not repay the money received. For this he is sentenced to a fine of $30 and to imprisonment at hard labor in default of the payment of the fine and costs for 136 days. Was not the case the same in effect as if the statute had made it a criminal act to leave the service without just cause and without liquidating the debt? To say that he has been found guilty of an intent to injure or defraud his employer, and not merely for breaking his contract and not paying his debt, is a distinction without a difference to Bailey.
Consider the situation of the accused under this statutory presumption. If at the outset nothing took place but the making of the contract and .the receipt of the money, he could show nothing else. If there was no legal justification for his leaving his employment, he could show none. If he had not paid the debt there was nothing to be said as to that. The law of the State did not permit him to testify that he did not intend to injure or defraud. Unless he were fortunate enough to be able to command evidence of circumstances affirmatively showing good faith, he was helpless. He stood, stripped by the statute of the presumption of innocence, and exposed to conviction for fraud upon evidence only of breach of contract and failure to pay.
It is said that we .may assume that a fair jury would convict- only where the circumstances sufficiently indicated a fraudulent intent. Why should this be assumed *237in the face of the statute and upon this record? In the present case the jury did convict, although there is an absence of evidence sufficient to establish fraud under the familiar rule that fraud will not be presumed, and the obvious explanation of the verdict is that the trial court in accordance with the statute charged the jury that refusal to perform the service, or to repay the money, without just cause, constituted prima facie evidence of the commission of the offense which the statute defined. .That is, the jury were told in effect that the evidence, under tíie ■ statutory rule, was sufficient, and hence they treated it as such. There is no basis for an assumption that the jury would have acted differently if Bailey had worked for three -months, or six months, or nine months, if in fact his debt had not been paid. The normal assumption is that the jury will follow the statute and, acting in accordance with the authority it confers, will accept as sufficient what-the statute expressly.so describes.
It may further be observed that under the statute there is no punishment for the alleged fraud if the service is performed or the money refunded. If the service is rendered in liquidation of the debt there is no punishment, and if it is not rendered and the money is not refunded that fact alone is sufficient for conviction. By a statute passed by the legislature of Alabama in 1901 it was made a misdemeanor for any person, who had made a written contract to labor for or serve another for any given time, to leave the service before the expiration of the contract and without the consent of the employer, and to make a second contract of similar nature with another person without giving the second employer notice of the existence of the first contract. This was held unconstitutional upon the ground that it interfered with freedom of contract. Toney v. The State, 141 Alabama, 120. But, judging it by its necessary operation and obvious effect, the" fundamental purpose plainly was to compel, under the sanction *238of the criminal law, the enforcement of- the contract for personal service, and the same purpose,. tested by liké criteria, breathes despite its different phraseology through the amendments of 1903 and 1907 of the statute here in question.
We cannot escape the conclusion that, although the statute in terms is to punish fraud, still its natural and inevitable effect is to expose to conviction for crime those who simply fail or refuse to perform contracts for personal service in liquidation of a debt, and judging its purpose by its effect that it seeks in this way to provide the means of compulsion through which performance of such service may be secured. The question is whether such a statute is constitutional.
This court has frequently recognized the general power of every legislature to prescribe the evidence which shall be received, and .the effect of that evidence in the courts of its own government. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 749. In the exercise of this power numerous, statutes have been enacted providing that proof of one fact shall be prima facie evidence of the main fact in issue; and where the inference is not purely arbitrary and thére is a rational relation between the two facts, and the accused is not deprived of a proper opportunity to submit all the facts bearing upon the issue, it has been 'held that such statutes do not violate the requirements of due process of law. Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585; Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City Railroad Co. v. Turnipseed, decided December 19, 1910, ante, p. 35.
The latest expression upon this point is found in the ■ case last cited, where the court, by Mr. Justice Lurtón, .said: “That a legislative presumption of one fact from evidence of another may not constitute a denial of due process of law or a denial of the equal protection of the Jaw it ip only essential that there • shall be some rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact *239presumed, and that the inference of one fact from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate.. So, also, it must not, under guise of regulating the presentation of evidence, operate to preclude the party from the right to present his defense to the main fact thus presumed. If a legislative provision not unreasonable in itself prescribing a rule of evidence, in either criminal or civil cases, does not shut out from the party affected a reasonable opportunity to submit to the jury in his defense all of the facts bearing upon the issue, there is no ground for holding that due process of law has been denied him.”
In this class of cases where the entire subject-matter of the legislation is otherwise within state control, the question has* been whether the prescribed rule of evidence interferes with the guaranteed equality- before the law or violates those fundamental rights and immutable principles of justice which are embraced within the conception of due process of law. But where the conduct or fact, the existence of Which is made the basis of the statutory presumption, itself falls within the scope of a provision of the Federal Constitution, a further question arises. It is apparent that a constitutional prohibition cannot be transgressed indirectly by the creation of a statutory presumption any more than it can be violated by direct enactment. The power to create presumptions is not a means of escape from constitutional restrictions. And the State may not in this way interfere with matters withdrawn from its authority by the Federal Constitution or subject an accused to conviction for conduct which it is powerless to proscribe.
In the present case it is urged that the statute as amended, through the operation of the presumption for which it provides, violates the Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and the act of Congress passed for its enforcement.
*240The Thirteenth Amendment provides:
“Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
“Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”
Pursuant to the authority thus conferred, Congress passed the act of March 2, 1867, c. 187, 14 Stat. 546, the provisions of which are now found in §§ 1990 and 5526 of the Revised Statutes, as follows:
“Sec. 1990. The holding of any person to service or labor under the system known as peonage is abolished and forever prohibited in the Territory of New Mexico, or in any other Territory or State of the United States-; and all acts, laws, resolutions, orders, regulations, or usages of the Territory of New Mexico, or of any other Territory or State, which have heretofore established, maintained, or enforced, or by virtue of which any attempt shall hereafter be made to establish, maintain, or enforce, directly or indirectly, the voluntary or involuntary service or labor of any persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt or obligation, or otherwise, are declared null and void.”
“Sec. 5526. Every person who holds, arrests, returns, or causes to be held, arrested, or returned, or in any manner aids in the arrest or return of any person to a condition of peonage, shall be punished by a fine of not less than one thousand nor more than five thousand' dollars, or by Imprisonment not less than one year nor more than five years, or by both.”
The language of . the Thirteenth Amendment was not new. It reproduced the historic words of the ordinance of 1787 for the government of the Northwest Territory and gave them unrestricted application within the United States and all places subject to their jurisdiction. While the immediate concern was with African slavery, the *241Amendment was not limited to that. It was a charter of universal civil freedom for all persons, of whatever race, c$lor or estate, under the flag.
The words involuntary servitude have a “larger meaning than slavery.” “It was very well understood that in the form of apprenticeship for long terms, as it had been practiced in-the West India Islands, on the abolition of slavery by the English government, or by reducing the slaves to the condition of serfs attached to the plantation, the purpose of the article might have been evaded, if only the word slavery had been used.” Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. p. 69. The plain intention was to abolish slavery of whatever name and form and all its badges and incidents; to render impossible any state of bondage; to make labor free, by prohibiting that control by which the personal service of one man is disposed of or coerced for another’s benefit which is'the essence of involuntary servitude.
While the Amendment was self-executing, so far as its terms were applicable to any existing condition, Congress was authorized tci secure its complete enforcement by appropriate legislation. As was said in' the Civil Bights cases: “By its own unaided force and effect it abolished slavery, and established universal freedom. Still, legislation may be necessary and proper to meet all the various cases and circumstances to be affected by it, and to prescribe proper modes of redress for its violation in letter or spirit.- And such legislation may be primary and direct in its character; for the Amendment is not a mere prohibition of state laws establishing or upholding slavery, but an absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist in any part of the United States.” 109 U. S. 20.
The act of March 2, 1867 (Rev. Stat., §§ 1990, 5526, supra), was a valid exercise of this express authority. Clyatt v. United States, 197 U. S. 207. It declared that all laws of any State, by virtue of which any attempt should be made “to establish, maintain, or enforce, directly or *242indirectly, the voluntary or involuntary service or labor of any persons as peons, in liquidation of ¿ny debt or obligation, or otherwise,” should be null and void.
Peonage is a term descriptive of a condition which has existed in Spanish America, and especially in Mexico. The essence of the thing is compulsory service in payment of a debt. A peon is one who is compelled to work for his creditor until his debt is paid. And in this explicit and comprehensive enactment, Congress was not concerned with mere names or manner of description, or with a particular place or section of the country. It was concerned with a fact, wherpver it might exist; with a condition, however named and wherever it might be established, maintained or enforced.
The fact that the debtor contracted to perform the labor which is sought to be compelled does not withdraw the attempted enforcement from the condemnation of the statute. The full intent of the constitutional provision could be defeated with' obvious facility if, through the guise of contracts under which advances had been made, debtors could be held to compulsory service. It is the compulsion of the service that the statute inhibits, for when that occurs the condition of servitude is created,, which would be not less involuntary because of the original agreement to work out the indebtedness. The contract exposes the débtor to liability for the loss due to the breach, but not to enforced labor. This has been so clearly stated b.y this court in the case of' Clyatt, supra, that discussion is unnecessary. The court there said:
“The constitutionality.and scope of sections 1990 and 5526 present the first questions for our consideration. They prohibit peonage. What is peonage? It may bé defined as a status or condition of compulsory service, based upon the indebtedness of the peon to the master. The basal fact is indebtedness. As said by Judge Benedict, delivering the opinion in Jaremillo v. Romero, 1 N. Mex. *243190, 194: ‘One fact existed universally; all were indebted to their masters. This was the cord by which they seemed bound to their masters’ service.’ Upon this is based a condition of compulsory service. Peonage is sometimes classified as voluntary or involuntary, but this implies simply a difference in the mode of. origin, but none in the character of the servitude. The one exists where the debtor voluntarily contracts to.enter the service of his creditor. The other is forced upon the debtor by some provision of law. But peonage, however created, is compulsory service, involuntary servitude. The peon can release himself therefrom, it is true, by the payment of . the debt, but otherwise the service is enforced. A clear distinction exists between peonage and the voluntary performance of labor or rendering of services in payment of a debt. In the latter case the debtor, though contracting to pay his indebtedness by labor or service, and subject like any other contractor to an action for damages for breach of that contract, can elect at any time to break it, and no law or force compels performance or a continuance of the service. We need not stop to consider any possible limits or exceptional cases, such as the service of a sailor, Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275, or the obligations of a child to its parents, or of an apprentice to his master, or the power of the legislature to make unlawful and punish criminally an abandonment by an employé of his post of labor in any extreme cases. That which is contemplated by the statute is compulsory service to secure the payment of & debt.” 197 U. S. pp. 215, 216.
The act of Congress, nullifying all state laws by which it should be attempted to enforce the “service or labor of any persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt or obligation, or otherwise,” necessarily embraces all legislation which seeks to compel the service or labor by making it a crime to refuse or fail to perform it. Such laws would furnish the readiest means of compulsion. The Thirteenth *244Amendment prohibits involuntary servitude except as punishment for crime. But the exception, allowing full latitude for the enforcement of penal laws, does not destroy the prohibition. It does'-not permit slavery or involuntary servitude to be established or maintained through the operation of the criminal law by making it a crime to refuse to submit to the one or to render the service which would constitute the other. The State may impose involuntary servitude as a punishment for crime, but it may not cohipel one man to labor for another in payment of a debt, by punishing him as a criminal if he does not perform the service or pay the debt.
■.If the statute in-this case had authorized the employing company to seize the. debtor and hold him to the service until he paid the fifteen dollars, o^ had furnished the equivalent in labor, its invalidity would not be questioned. It would be equally clear that the State could not authorize its constabulary to prevent the servant from escaping and to force him to work out his debt. But the State could not avail itself of the sanction of the criminal law to supply the compulsion any more than fit could use or authorize the use of physical force. “In contemplation of the law the compulsion to such service by the fear of punishment under a criminal statute is more powerful than any guard which the employer could station.” Ex parte Hollman (S. Car.), 60 S. E. Rep. 24.-
What the State may not do directly it may not do indirectly. If it cannpt punish the servant as a criminal for the mere failure or refusal to serve without paying his debt, it is not permitted to accomplish the same result by creating a statutory presumption which upon proof of no other fact exposes him to conviction and punishment. Without imputing any actual motive to oppress, we must consider the natural opération of the statute here in question (Henderson v. Mayor, 92 U. S. p. 268), and it is apparent that it furnishes a convenient instrument for the coer*245cion which the Constitution and the act of Congress forbid; an instrument of compulsion peculiarly effective as against the poor and the ignorant, its most likely victims. There is no more important concern than to safeguard the freedom of labor upon which alone can enduring prosperity be based. The provisions désigned to secure it would soon become a barren form if it were possible to establish a statutory presumption of this sort and to hold over the heads of laborers the threat of punishment for crime, under the name of fraud but merely upon evidence of failure to work out their debts. The act of Congress deprives of effect all legislative measures -of any State through which directly or indirectly the prohibited thing, to wit, compulsory service to secure the payment of a debt may be established or maintained; and we conclude that §4730, as amended, of the Code of Alabama, in so far as it makes the refusal or failure to perform the act or service, without refunding the money or paying for the property received, prima facie evidence of the commission of the crime which the section defines, is in conflict with . the Thirteenth Amendment and the legislation authorized by that Amendment, and is therefore invalid.
In this view it is unnecessary to consider the contentions which have been made under the Fourteenth Amendment. As the case was given to the jury under instructions which authorized a verdict in accordance with the statutory presumption, and the opposing instructions requested by the accused were refused, the judgment must be reversed.
Reversed and cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.