after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
The International Coal Company operated a mine in the Clearfield District and, with its competitors, shipped' between 1890 and 1902 large quantities of coal in interstate commerce. In 1904 it sued the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, basing its action, in part, on the fact that prior to April 1, 1899, the Railroad Company had paid other *195shippers rebates of from Í5 to 45 cents per ton, while paying plaintiff a rebate of only 10 to 25 cents per 'ton.' Its claim for a sum equal to the difference between the rebate paid to it and that given other shippers was eliminated by the trial judge on the ground that “courts do not sit to measure the difference in degree in violation of the law in favor of one party or the other. The question of the money value that each of them received in their violation of the law will not be looked into, . . . not for the purpose of relieving the defendant, but because the plaintiff is just as culpable . . . and as much a violator of the law as the defendant.”-
In view of this ruling, the case, as finally submitted to the jury, involved plaintiff’s right to recover on account of shipments made after April 1,1899. On that date the carrier increased the rates and discontinued the payment of rebates, except that for the purpose of saving shippers against loss, it made a difference between what is called. “free coal” and “contract coal.” Under this practice, where "coal had been sold for future delivery, the carrier collected the published tariff rate, but rebated the difference between it and the lower rate in force when the contract of sale had been made. When after April 1, 1899, the plaintiff applied for allowances, its demand was rejected, with the statement that all its contract coal would be protected in the same manner as others in the Clearfield District. The International Coal Company had no overlapping or unfulfilled contracts and claiming that it did not learn of the practice to protect such contracts until, in 1904, it brought this suit'. It proved that between April 1, 1899, and April 1, 1901, it had shipped about 40,000 tons on which it had paid the full tariff rate, while other' companies- shipping from and to the same ■places at the same time had been allowed on their contract coal rebates of 5, 10, 15, 25 or 85 cents per ton'. Plaintiff recovered a verdict.
*1961. In the court below the Railroad made no question of jurisdiction. But on the argument here it insisted that the case should be remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that courts had no power to adjudicate the administrative question as to whether a carrier could make a difference in rate between shipments of free and contract coal. It argued that this was a. rate-making question and'that it was for the Commission, as the rate-regulating body, to determine not only whether a dissimilarity existed, but. whether the rates were properly adjusted to meet that dissimilarity..
Under the statute there are many acts of the carrier which are lawful or unlawful according as they are reasonable or unreasonable, just or unjust. The determination of such issues involves a comparison of .rate with service, and calls for an exercise of the discretion of the administrative and rate-regulating body. For the reasonableness of rates, and the permissible discrimination based upon difference in conditions are not matters of law-. So far as the determination depends upon facts, no jurisdiction to pass upon the administrative -questions involved has been conferred upon the courts. That power has been vested in a single body so as to secure uniformity and to prevent the varying and sometimes conflicting results that would flow from the different views of the same-facts that might be taken by different tribunals!
None of these considerations, however, operates' to defeat the courts’ jurisdiction in the present case. -For even if a difference in rates could be made between free and contract coal, none was made in the only way in which, it could have been lawfully done.- The published tariffs made no distinction between contract coal and free coal, but named one rate for all alike. That being true, only that single rate could be charged. When collected, it was unlawful, under any pretense or for any cause, however equitable or liberal, to pay a part back to one shipper or to *197every shipper. The statute required the carrier to abide absolutely by the tariff. It did not permit the Company to decide that it had charged too much and then make a corresponding rebate; nor could it claim that it had charged too little and insist upon a larger sum being paid by the shipper. (February 4, 1887, 24 Stat. 379, c. 104, § 2; March 2, 1889, 25 Stat. 855, c. 382, § 6. Armour Co. v. United States, 209 U. S. 56, 83.) The tariff, so long as it' was of force, was, in this respect, to be treated as though it had been a statute, binding as such upon Railroad and shipper alike. If, as a fact, the rates were unreasonable the shipper was nevertheless bound to pay and the carrier to retain what had been paid, leaving, however, to the former the right to apply to the Commission for reparation.
1. n view of this imperative obligation to charge, collect and retain the sum named in the tariff, there was- no call for the exercise of the rate-regulating discretion of the administrative body to, decide whether the carrier could make a difference in rates between free and contract coal. For whether it could do so or not, the refund of any part of the tariff rate collected was unlawful. It could not have been legalized by any proof, nor could the Commission by any order have made it valid. The rebate being unlawful it was a matter where the court, without administrative ruling or reparation order, could apply the fixed law to the established fact that the carrier had charged all shippers the published or tariff rate and refunded a part to a particular class. This departure from the published tariff was forbidden, and § 8 (24 Stat. 382) expressly provided that any carrier doing any act prohibited by the statute should be “liable to the person injured thereby for the full amount of damages sustained in consequence of any such violation, together with reasonable attorneys-’ fees.”
2. But although this .suit was brought to enforce a cause of action given by this section to any person injured, it is a noticeable fact that in its pleading the plain*198tiff does not claim to have been damaged and there is neither allegation nor- proof, that it suffered any injury. ■It contends, however, that this was not necessary for the reason that, as matter of law, it was entitled to recover as damages the same rate per ton on all plaintiff’s shipments as had been rebated any other person,, on any of his tonnage, shipped at the same time over the same route. And such a right of action was expressly given in § 2 of the original Bill to Regulate Commerce, which, as it passed the Senate May 12, 1886, did provide that the carrier “shall be liable to all persons who have been charged a higher rate than was charged' any other person or persons-for."the difference between-such higher rate and the lowest rate charged upon like shipments during the same period; or if such lower rate was made on any time contract or understanding, the said common carrier shall be liable to pay a like rebate or drawback to all other shippers over the same route between the same points who have shipped goods during the. time that such contract or understanding was in operation.”
The fact that this provision measuring the amount of recovery by rebate was omitted from the Act, as finally reported to -both Houses and passed, is not only significant, but so conclusive against the contention of the plaintiff that it quotes — not the report of the conference committee — but a statement,1 made by a member of *199the Senate Conference Committee, to support the present argument that § 8 means the same thing as the omitted clause. But while they may be looked at to explain doubtful expressions, not even formal reports — much less the language of a member of a Committee — can be resorted to for the purpose of construing a statute contrary to its plain terms, -or to make identical that which is radically different. United States v. Freight Association, 166 U. S. 290, 318; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 601. Section 2 of the original Senate Bill said nothing about damages but in case of rebating gave a shipper a right, in the nature of an action, for a penalty to be measured by the difference between the lawful and the unlawful rate, whether damage resulted or not. That provision was stricken out and § 8 of the Act, as passed by both Houses of Congress and approved by the President, gave a right of action for damages and attorneys’ fees to “the person injured” — and, of course, to the extent of the injury.
3. There were many provisions in the statute for *200imprisonment and fines. On the'civil side the Act provided for compensation — not punishment. Though the Act has been held to be intíiany respects highly penal, yet there was no fixed measure of damage in favor of the plaintiff. But, as said in Parsons v. Chicago & N. W. Railway, 167 U. S. 447, 460, construing this section (8) “before'any party can recover under the.act he must show not merely the wrong of the carrier, but that that wrong has in fact operated to his injury.” Congress had not then and has not since given any indication of an intent that persons not injured might, nevertheless, recover what though called damages- would really be a penalty, in addition to the penalty payable to the Government. On the contrary, and in answer to the argument that damages might be a cover for rebates, the act of June 18, 1910 (36 Stat. 539, c. 309), provided that where a carrier misquotes a rate it should pay a penalty of $250, not to the shipper, but to the Government, recoverable by . a civil action brought by the United States.' 35 Stat. 166. Congressional Record (1910), 7569. The danger that payment of damages for violations of the law might be used as a means of paying rebates under the name of damages is also pointed out by the Commission in 121. C. C. 418-421, 423; 14 I. C. C. 82.
4. It is said,- however, that it-is impossible to prove the damages occasioned one shipper by the payment of rebates to another; and that if the plaintiff is not entitled to recover as damages the same drawback that was paid to its competitor, the statute not only gives no remedy but deprives the plaintiff of a right.it had at common law to recover this difference between the lawful and the unlawful rate.
We are cited to no authority which shows that there was any such ancient measure of damages, and no case has been found in which damages were awarded for such discrimination. Indeed, it is exceedingly doubtful whether there was at common law any-right of action for any sort *201of damages in a case like this, while this, statute does give a clear, definite and positive right to recover for. unjust discrimination. It thereby either first created the right or removed the doubt as to whether such suit could be brought. The English courts had held that a shipper, who paid a reasonable rate,' had no cause of action because.the carrier had charged a lower rate ,to another. Great Western R. R. v. Sutton, L. R. 4 H. L. 226, 238. The American decisions were conflicting, though “ the weight of authority in this country was in favor of an equality of charge to all persons for similar services.” I. C. C. v. B. & O., 145 U. S. 263, 275. - But even in those American courts, which held that the rates must not only be reasonable but equal, the doctrine had not been so far developed as to settle what was the measure of damages. Hays v. Pennsylvania Co., 12 Fed. Rep. 309, decided at Circuit, is favorable to plaintiff’s contention. But Union Pacific Ry. v. Goodridge, 149 U. S. 680; Louisville E. & St. L. R. R. v. Wilson, 132 Indiana, 517; Messenger v. R. R., 8 Vroom, 37 N. J. L. 531; Cook v. Chicago &c. Ry., 81 Iowa, 551; Great Western Ry. v. Sutton, L. R. 4 H. L. 226; London &c. Ry. v. Evershed, 3 App. Cas. 1029; Denaby v. Manchester &c. Ry., 11 App. Cas. 97, relied on by plaintiff, do not support the proposition that damages can be recovered without proof of what pecuniary loss had been suffered as a result of the discrimination.
In one of these cases the suit was "brought by a shipper to recover damages because the railroad refused to carry out a contract to discriminate in his favor. In others the court treated the low rate as evidence of what was a reasonable rate and' thereupon gave judgment for" damages as for an overcharge. Union Pacific R. R. v. Goodridge, 149 U. S. 680, 709, involved the construction of the Colorado statute, which did not, as does the Commerce Act, compel the carrier to adhere to published rates, but required the railroad to make the same concessions and *202drawbacks to all persons alike, and for a failure to do so made the carrier liable for three times the actual damage sustained or overcharges paid by the party aggrieved. This distinction is also to be noted in the English cases cited. The Act of Parliament did not require the carrier to maintain its published tariff but made the lowest rate the lawful rate. Anything in excess of such lowest rate was extortion and might be recovered in an action at law as for an overcharge. Denaby v. Manchester Ry., L. R. 11 App. Cases, 97, 116. But the English courts make a clear distinction between overcharge and damages, and the same is true under the Commerce Act. For if the plaintiff here had been required to pay more than the tariff rate it could have, recovered the excess, not as damages but as overcharge, and while one count of the complaint asserted a claim of this nature, the proof did not justify a verdict thereon, for the plaintiff admitted that' it had on]y paid the lawful rates named in the tariff. Of course, no part of such payment of lawful rates can be treated as an overcharge or as an extortion.
Having paid only the lawful rate plaintiff was not overcharged, though the favored shipper was illegally undercharged. For that'violation of law, the carrier was subject to the payment of a fine to the Government and, in addition, was liable for all damages it thereby occasioned, the plaintiff or any other shipper. But under § 8, it was only liable for damages. Making an illegal undercharge to one shipper did not license the carrier to make a similar undercharge to other shippers, and if having paid a rebate of 25 cents a ton to one customer, the carrier in order to. escape this suit had made a similar undercharge or rebate to the plaintiff, it would have been criminally liable, even though it may have been done in order to equalize the two companies. For, under the statute, it was not liable to the plaintiff for the amount of the rebate paid on contract coal, but only for the damages such illegal payment *203caused the plaintiff. The measure of damages was the pecuniary loss inflicted on the plaintiff as the result of the rebate paid.' Those damages might be the same as the rebate, or less than the rebate, or many times greater than the rebate; but unless they were proved they could not be recovered. Whatever they were they could be recov- - ered, because § 8 expressly declares that wherever the carrier did an act prohibited or failed to do any act required, it should be “liable to the person injured thereby for the full amount of damages sustained in consequence of such violation, . . . together with reasonable attorney's fee.” In view of this language it becomes necessary to inquire what the-evidence shows was the injury inflicted or the' damage sustained by the plaintiff in 1901 in consequence of paying rebates in 1901 on contract coal sold in 1899.
5. On various dates between April 1, 1899, and April 1, 1901, the International Company made shipments of coal from the Clearfield District to points in New Jersey, Massachusetts, and New York, its heaviest shipments being to South Amboy, New York Harbor. The aggregate was 40,000 tons, on which the lawful rate was paid. During the same period four other companies shipped to the. same points, receiving rebates of from 5 to 35 cents per ton, but tbe amount of tonnage on which such rebates were paid does not appear. There was no proof of injury — no proof of decrease in business, loss of profits, expense incurred or damage of any sort suffered — the plaintiff claiming that, as matter of law, the damages should be assessed to it on the basis of giving to it the same rate, on all its tonnage, that had been allowed on any contract coal shipped, on the same dates, whether such tonnage was great or small.
Considering the multitude of instances in which discrimination has been practiced by carriers, in ancient and modern times, it is remarkable how little is to be'found in decisions or text books , which treat of the elements and measure of damages in such cases. In the absence of any *204Settled rule on the subject, the new question must be determined on general principles.
. The statute gives a right of action for damages to the injured party, and by the use of these legal terms clearly indicated that the damages-recoverable were those known to the law and intended as compensation for the injury sustained. It is elementary that in a suit at law both the fact and the amount of the damage must be proved. And although the plaintiff insists that in all cases like this the fact and amount of the pecuniary loss is matter of law, yet this contention is not sustained by the language of the act, nor is it well founded in actual experiencé, as will appear by considering .several usual and every-day instances suggested by testimony in this record. For example:—
If plaintiff and one of the favored companies had both shipped coal to the same market on the same day, the rebate on contract coal may have given an advantage which may have prevented the plaintiff from selling, may have directly caused it expense,, or may have diminished or totally destroyed its profits. The plaintiff, under the present statute, in any such case being then entitled to recover the full damages sustained;—
But the plaintiff may have sold at the usual profit all Or a part of its 40,000 tons at the regular market price, the purchaser, on his own account, paying freight to the ppint of delivery. In that event not, the shipper but the purchaser,'who paid the freight, would have been the person injured, if any damage resulted from giving rebates. To say that seller and buyer, shipper and consignee, could both recover would mean that damages had been awarded to two wher.e bnly one had suffered;— •
Or, to take another exampié — a favored dealer may have shipped 10,000 tons of coal to the open New York market, receiving thereon a rebate of 35 cents a ton, or $3,500. The plaintiff at the same time may have shipped 20,000 tons and sold the same at the regular market price. *205Under the rule contended for it would then be entitled to 35 cents a ton on 20,000 tons, or $7,000 as damages. Such a verdict, instead of compensating it for losses sustained, would have given to the plaintiff a profit on the carrier’s crime in paying a rebate of $3,500 and would haye made it an adyantage to it instead of an-injury for the carrier to violate the law.
In order to avoid this anomalous, yet-logical, result it is now suggested that, as in the overcharge cases (Denaby v. Manchester Ry., L. R. 11 App. Cases, 97), the plaintiff should only recover a rebate on 10,000 tons, or on the same weight upon which the carrier had allowed a drawback to the competitor. But, while less drastic, this is still' an arbitrary measure and ignores the fact that the -same anomalous result would follow if there had been, say, ten dealers, each shipping 10,000 tons on the same day. For each of the ten would have been as much entitled as plaintiff to recover $3,500 on their several shipments of 10,000 tons, and the ten verdicts would aggregate $35,000, because of the payment of $3,500 to the favored shipper.
It is said, however, that while there may be no presumption that a shipper was injured because the carrier paid-a rebate on a single shipment, or on an occasional shipment, yet it could recover if rebates had been so habitually given as to establish a practice of discrimination. .P’roof that rebates were customarily paid, would come nearer showing that injury was suffered but would still fall short of proving the extent of the damage, and is not the theory on which the plaintiff proceeds. For it argues that whenever it showed that a lower rate had been charged on contract coal sold in 1899 it was entitled to recover the same, rate on shipments made by it to the,same place on the same day in 1901, even though there had been no competition in (lie two..sales and without proof that there had been any fall in' market, prices, diminution in its profits, decrease in its business, or increase ..in its expenses. It *206claimed that it was a mere matter of. mathematics and that for every rebate on contract coal, plaintiff was entitled to a like reduction on every ton of its coal without further proof of damage or injury.
6. To adopt such a rule and arbitrarily measure damages by rebates would create a legalized, but endless, chain of departures from the tariff; would extend the effect of the original crime, would destroy the equality and certainty of rates, and, contrary to the statute, would make the carrier liable for damages beyond those inflicted and to persons not injured. The limitation of liability to the persons damaged and to an amount equal to the injury-suffered is not out of consideration for the carrier who has violated the statute. On the contrary, the act imposes heavy penalties, independent of the amount of rebate paid, and as each shipment-constitutes a separate offense, the law in its measure of fine and punishment is a terror to evil doers. But for the public wrong and for the interference with the equal current of commerce these penalties or fines were made payable to the Government. If by the same act a private injury was inflicted a private right of action was given. But the public wrong did not necessarily cause private damage, and when it did, the pecuniary loss varied with the character of the property, the circumstances of the shipment and the state of the-market, so that instead of giving the shipper the right to recover a penalty fixed in amount or measure, the statute made the guilty carrier liable for the full amount of damages sustained, — whatever they-might be. and whether greater or less than the rate of rebate paid.
7. This conclusion, that the right to recover is limited to the pecuniary loss suffered and proved, is demanded by the language of the statute, the construction put upon it years ago in the Parsons Case, and is the view taken in the only other case we find in which this question, - under the Act to Regulate Commerce, has been construed. In *207Knudsen v. Michigan Central R. R., 148 Fed. Rep. 968, 974, it was said by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit that to “support a recovery under this section there must be a showing of some specific pecuniary injury. A cause of action does not necessarily arise from those' acts or omissions of a common carrier that may subject it to a criminal prosecution by the Government or to corrective or coercive proceedings at the instance of the Commission.” A similar principle was applied in Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 183 Fed. Rep. 548, 550, and in Central Coal Co. v. Hartman, 111 Fed. Rep. 96, where the suit was to recover damages caused by a violation of the Anti-trust Act.
Another case, on facts quite like those here involved, is that of Hoover v. Pennsylvania R. R., 156 Pa. St. 220, where the statute, like the Commerce Act, gave the party injured a right of action for damages suffered. In violation of the state law the railroad allowed a manufacturing company a rebate of 20 cents a ton on coal shipped. In a suit for- the recovery of damages the trial court charged the jury that the difference between the high and low rate was the measure of recovery. This was reversed, the court saying (p. 244): “The amount of injury suffered is the measure of the single damages to be allowed. But it does not at all follow that the amount of injury suffered is the difference in the rates charged. It might be, or it might not be, but, in any event, it must be a subject of proof. ... It does not appear that the plaintiffs sold their coal for any less than the current market price, . . . except when they and the other dealers were engaged in a war of prices and sold it far below the actual cost, in a struggle to capture the market.”
In view of the express provisions of § 8 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, it was error to refuse to charge that .“to entitle the plaintiff to recover, the jury must be satisfied that it sustained some loss or injury due to the fact *208that the defendant was carrying at the same time at lower rates coal shipped by other shippers.” The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed and the ease remanded to the District Court, with directions to grant a new trial.'
Reversed.
Mr. Cullom. Before action on my motion, I desire to make a statement of the changes in the bill. The following is a statement of the changes in the bill as passed by the Senate which have been agreed to and are recommended by the committee of conference:
* ** *' * * * * * ' sfc
“Sections 2, 3, and 4 of the Senate bill, prohibiting discriminations, contained provisions in relation to the recovery of damages. These have been stricken out of said sections, and have been grouped-together in one section, which is made section 8 of the committee.bill. Except as to this rearrangement, substantially the only change made has been the addition of the provision of the House bill that a reason*199able counsel or attorney’s fee’ shall be allowed by the court in every case of the recovery of damages. The parts of said sections which are stricken out in consequence of the rearrangement referred to are all of section 2 after the word ‘unlawful,’ in line 13, all of section 3 after the word ‘business,’ in line 18, and lines 23 to 27, both inclusive, in section.4. No other change is made in section 2.” 49 Cong. Rec. 2d Sess., vol. 18, Part. 1, p. 170.
.Section 7 of the House Bill (H. R. 5667) provided that if any carrier should do an act forbidden or omitted to do an act required, or should violate the statute, such carrier should be “held to pay to the person or persons injured the full amount of damages so sustained . . ' . with reasonable counsel or attorney’s fees. . . .” This bill was before the Conference Committee, and the House members, as required by the rules of the Bouse, made a written statement of the action of the Conference, in which it was said (vol, 18, Part IT, Cong. Rec., 49th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 695, 6-98, 774) that “the eighth section of the substitute bill” — being the eighth section of the present act — “contains the substance of the seventh section of the House Bill in regard to damages and counsel fees but expressed in somewhat different language.”