delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellant is engaged in the business of reselling tickets of admission to theatres and other places of entertainment in the City of New York. It employs a large number of salesmen, messenger boys and others. Its expenses are very large, and its sales average approximately 300,000 tickets per annum. These tickets are obtained either from the box office of the theatre or from other brokers and distributors. It is duly licensed under § 168, c. 590, New-York Laws, 1922, and has given a bond under § 169 of that chapter in the penal sum of $1,000 with sureties, conditioned, among other things, that it will not be guilty of any fraud or extortion. See Weller v. New York, 268 U. S. 319, 322.
*427Section. 167 of chapter 690 declares that the price of or charge for admission to theatres, etc., is a matter affected with a public interest and subject to state supervision in order to safeguard the public against fraud, extortion, exorbitant rates and similar abuses. Section 172 forbids the. resale of any ticket or other evidence of the right of entry to any theatre, etc., “ at a price in excess of fifty cents in advance of the price printed on the face of such ticket or other evidence of the right of entry,” such printing being required by that section. Both sections are reproduced in the margin.* .
This suit was brought to enjoin respondents from proceeding either at law or in equity to enforce the last named section, and from, revoking plaintiff’s license, enforcing by suit or otherwise the penalty of the bond or prosecuting criminally appellant or any of its officers or agents fop reselling or attempting to resell any ticket or other evidence of the right of entry to any theatre, etc., at a price in excess of fifty cents in advance of the printed' *428price. The bill alleges threats on the part of appellees to enforce the statute against appellant, to forfeit its license, enforce the penalty of its bond and institute criminal prosecutions against appellant, its officers and agents. It is further alleged that the terms of the statute are so drastic and the penalties for its violation so great [imprisonment for one year or a fine of $250 or both] that appellant may not resell any ticket pr-evidence of the right of entry at a price beyond that fixed by the statute even for the purpose of testing the validity of the law; and that appellant will be compelled to submit to the statute whether valid or invalid unless its suit be entertained, and thereby will be deprived of its property and liberty without due process of law and denied the equal protection of the law, in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution.. Following the rule frequently announced by this court, that “ equitable jurisdiction exists to restrain criminal prosecutions under unconstitutional enactments, when the prevention of such prosecutions is essential to the safeguarding of rights of property,” we sustain the jurisdiction of the district court. Packard v. Banton, 264 U. S. 140, 143, and' cases there cited.
The case was heard below by a statutory court of three judges and a decree rendered denying appellant’s prayer for a temporary injunction and holding the statute assailed to be valid and constitutional. The provision of. the statute in question also has been upheld in a judgment of the New York state court of appeals, People v. Weller, 237 N. Y. 316, brought here on. writ of error. That case, ■however, directly involved only § 168, requiring a license, and although it was insisted that § Í72 restricting prices should also be considered, upon the ground that the two provisions were inseparable, this court held otherwise, sustained the validity of the license section and declined to *429pass upon the-other one. Weller v. New York, 268 U. S. 319, 325.
Strictly, the question for determination relates only to the maximum price for which an entrance ticket to a theatre, etc., may be resold. But the answer necessarily must be to a question of greater breadth. The statutory declaration (§ 167) is that the price of. or charge for admission to a theatre,-place of amusement or entertainment or other place where public exhibitions, games, contests'or performances are held, is a matter affected with a public interest. To affirm the validity of § 172 is to affirm this declaration completely, since appellant’s business embraces the resale of entrance tickets to all forms of entertainment therein enumerated. And since the ticket broker is a mere appendage of the theatre, etc.', and the price of or charge for admission is the. essential element in the statutory declaration, it results that the real inquiry is whether every public exhibition, game, contest or performance, to which an admission charge is made, is clothed with a public interest, so as to authorize a law-making body to fix the maximum amount of the charge, which its natrons may be required to pay.
In the endeavor to reach a correct conclusion in respect of this inquiry, it will be helpful, by way of preface, to state certain pertinent considerations. The first of these is that the right of the owner to fix; a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself, Case of the State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232, 278, and, as such, within the protection of the due process of law clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth ■Amendments. See City of Carrollton v. Bazzette, 159 Ill. 284, 294. The power to regulate property, services or business can be invoked only under special circumstances; and it does not follow that because the power may exist to regulate in some particulars it exists to regulate in others or in all.
*430The authority, to regulate the conduct of a business or to require a license, comes from a branch of the police power which may be quite distinct from the power to fix prices. The latter, ordinarily, does not exist in respect of merely private property or business, Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Manning, 186 U. S. 238, 246, but exists only where the business or the property involved has become “ affected with a public interest.” This phrase, first used by Lord Hale 200 years ago, Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 126, it is true, furnishes at best an indefinite standard, and attempts to define it have resulted, generally, in producing little more than paraphrases, which themselves require elucidation. Certain properties and kinds of business it obviously includes, like common carriers, .telegraph and telephone companies, ferries, wharfage, etc. Beyond these, its application not only has not been uniform, but many of the decisions disclose the members of the same court in radical disagreement. ■ Its full meaning, like that of many other generalizations, cannot be exactly defined;— it can only be approximated.
A business is not affected with a public interest merely because it is large or because the public are warranted in having a feeling of concern in respect of its maintenance. Nor is the interest meant such as arises from the mere fact that the public derives benefit, accommodation, ease or enjoyment from the existence or operation of the business; and while the word has not always been limited narrowly as strictly denoting “ a right,” that synonym more nearly than any other expresses the sense in which it is to be understood.
The characterizations in some decisions of businesses as “quasi public,” People v. King, 110 N. Y. 418, 428, “not ‘strictly’ private,” Aaron v. Ward, 203 N. Y. 351, 356, and the like, while well enough for the purpose for which they were employed, namely, as a basis for upholding police regulations in respect of the conduct of particular *431businesses, cannot be accepted as equivalents for the description “ affected with a public interest,” as that phrase is used in the decisions of this court as the basis for legislative regulation of prices. The latter power is not only a more definite and serious invasion of the rights 'of property and the freedom of contract, -but its exercise cannot always be justified by circumstances which have been held to justify legislative regulation of the manner in which a business shall be carried on.
And, finally,' the mere declaration by the legislature that a particular kind of property or business is affected with a public interest is not conclusive upon the. question of the validity of the regulation. The matter is one which is always open to judicial inquiry. Wolff Co. v. Industrial Court, 262 U. S. 522, 536.
■In the Wolff case, this court held invalid the wage fixing provision of the compulsory arbitration statute of Kansas as’ applied to a meat packing establishment. The power of a legislature, under any circumstances, to fix prices or wages in the business of preparing and selling food was seriously doubted, but the court concluded that, even if the legislature could do so in a public emergency, no such emergency appeared, and, in any event, the power would not extend to giving compulsory continuity to the business by compulsory arbitration. In the course of the opinion (p. 535), it was said that business characterized as clothed with a public interest might be divided into three classes:
“(1) Those which are carried on under the authority of a' public grant of privileges which either expressly or impliedly imposes the affirmative duty of rendering a public service demanded by any member of the public. Such are the railroads, other common carriers and public utilities.
“(2) Certain occupations, regarded as exceptional, the public interest attaching to which, recognized from earliest *432times, has survived the period of arbitrary laws by Parliament or Colonial legislatures for regulating all trades and callings. Such are those of the keepers of inns, cabs and grist mills. State v. Edwards, 86 Me. 102; Terminal Taxicab Co. v. District of Columbia, 241 U. S. 252, 254.
“(3) Businesses which though not public at their inception may be fairly said to have risen to be such and have become subject in consequence to some government regulation. They have come to hold such a peculiar relation to the public that this is superimposed upon them. In the language of the cases, the owner by devoting his business to the public use, in effect grants the public an interest in that use and subjects himself to public regulation to the extent of that interest although the property continues to belong to its private owner and to be entitled to protection accordingly.” Citing the Munn case and others.
If the statute now under review can be sustained as valid, it must be in virtue of the doctrine laid down in the third paragraph; and it will aid in the effort to reach a correct conclusion in that respect if we shall first consider the principal decisions of this court where that doctrine has been applied. The leading, as well as the earliest, definite decision dealing with a business falling within that class is Munn v. Illinois, supra, which sustained the validity of an Illinois statute fixing the maximum charge to be made for the use of elevators and warehouses for the elevation and storage of grain.
As ground for that decision the opinion recites, among other things, that grain came from the west and northwest by water and rail to Chicago where the greater part of it was shipped by vessel to the seaboard and some of it by railway to eastern ports; that Chicago had been-made the greatest grain market in the world; and that the business had created a demand for means by which the immense quantity of grain could be handled or stored and these had been found in grain elevators. Tn this way the largest *433traffic between the country north and west of Chicago and that lying on the Atlantic coast north of Washington, was in grain passing through the elevators at Chicago. The trade in grain between seven or eight of the great states of the west and four or five of those lying on the sea-shore, formed the largest part of the interstate commerce in these states. The elevators in Chicago were immense structures, holding from 300,000 to 1,000,000 bushels at one time. Under these circumstances, it was said that the elevators stood in the very “ gateway of commerce ” and took toll from all who passed; that their business certainly tended to a common charge and had' become a thing of public interest and use; that every bushel of grain for its passage paid a toll, which was a common charge; and, finally,. that if any business could be clothed “ with a public interest, and cease to be juris privati only,” this had been made so by the facts.
There is some general language in the opinion which, superficially, might seem broad enough to cover cases like the present one. It was said, for example (p. 126): “ Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make it of public consequence, and affect the community at large.” Literally, that would include all the large industries and some small ones; but in accordance with the well settled rule the words must be limited to the case under consideration. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 399; Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 461, 474. Indeed, the language quoted is qualified immediately by a statement of the general rule, that— “When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created.”
The significant requirement is that the property shall be devoted to a. use in which the public has an, interest, *434which simply means, as in terms it is expressed at page 130, that it shall be devoted to “ a public use.” Stated in another form, a business or property, in order to be affected with a public interest, must be such or be so employed as to justify the conclusion that it has been devoted to a'public use and its use thereby, in effect, granted to the public. See Louisville &c. R. R. Co. v. West Coast Co., 198 U. S. 483, 500. The subsequent elevator and warehouse cases, Budd v. New York, 143 U. S. 517, and Brass v. Stoeser, 163 U. S. 391, while presenting conditions of less gravity, rest upon the authority of the Munn case. The differences among the three cases are in matters of degree.
In Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., &c., 183 U. S. 79, 85, Mr. Justice Brewer, speaking on that point for himself and two other members of the court, ’said that, tested by-the Munn case, the stock yards of the company, situated in one of the gateways of commerce and so located that they furnished important facilities to all seeking transportation of cattle,- were subject to governmental price regulation. But the majority of the court, without referring to this view, .assented to a reversal upon a ground specifically stated (pp. 114-115); and the authority of the case must be limited by the terms of that statement.
German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Kansas, 233 U. S. 389, carries the doctrine further and marks the extreme limit to which this court thus far has gone in sustaining price fixing legislation. There the court said that a business might be affected with a public interest so as to permit price regulation although no public trust was impressed upon the property and although the public might, not have a legal right to demand and receive service; -and it was held that fire insurance was such a business. Mr. Justice McKenna, speaking for the court, pointed out that in ,an insurance business each risk was not individual; *435that “ there can be standards and classification of risks, determined by the law of averages,” and, while there might be variations, that rates are fixed and accommodated to such standards. Discussing the question whether the business was affected with a public interest so as to justify regulation of rates, it was then said (p. 406):
“And we mean a broad and definite public interest. In some degree the- public interest is concerned in every transaction between men, the sum of the transactions constituting the activities of life. But there is something more special than this, something of more definite consequence, which makes the public interest that, justifies regulatory legislation.”
The business of common carriers, transmission of intelligence,. furnishing water ,and light, gas and electricity, were cited as examples, and the Munn, Budd and Brass cases reviewed. The fact that the contract of fire insurance was personal in character, it w,as said, did not preclude regulation, and in that connection it was pointed out that insurance companies were so regulated by state legislation as to show that the law-making bodies of the country, without exception, regarded the business of insurance as so far affecting the public welfare as to invoke and require governmental regulation. And it was then said (p. 412-413):
“Accidental fires are inevitable and the extent of loss very great. The effect of insurance — indeed, it has been said to be its fundamental object — is to distribute the loss over as wide an area as possible. In other words, the loss is spread over the country, the disaster to an individual is shared by many, the disaster to a community shared by other communities; great catastrophes are thereby lessened, and, it may be, repaired. In assimilation of insurance to a tax, the companies have been said to be the mere machinery by which the inevitable losses by fire are distributed so as to fall as lightly as *436possible on the-public at large,, the body of the insured, not the companies, paying the tax.”
And again (p. 413):
“ Contracts of insurance, therefore, have greater public consequence than contracts between individuals to do or not to do a particular thing whose effect stops with the individuals.”
And again (p. 414):
“We have shown that the business of insurance has very definite characteristics, with a reach of influence and consequence beyond and different from that of the ordinary businesses of the commercial world, to pursue which a greater liberty may be asserted. The transactions of the latter are independent and individual, terminating in their effect with the instances. The.contracts of insurance may be said to be interdependent. They cannot be regarded singly, or isolatedly, and the effect of their relation is to create a fund of assurance and credit, the companies becoming the depositories of the money of the insured, possessing great power thereby and charged with great responsibility.”
Answering the objection that the reasoning of the opinion would subject every act of human endeavor and the price, of every article of human use to regulation, it was said (p. 415) :
“And both by the expression of the principle and the citation of the examples we have tried to confine our decision to the regulation of the business of insurance, it having become £ clothed with a public interest,’ and therefore subject ‘to be • controlled by the public for the common good.’ ”
This observation fairly may be regarded'as a warning at least to be cautious about invoking the decision as a precedent for the determination of cases involving other kinds of business. And this view is borne out by a general consideration of the case. The decision proceeds *437upon the ground that the insurance business is to be distinguished from ordinary private business; that an insurance- company, in effect, is an instrumentality which gathers funds upon the basis of equality of risk from a great number of persons — sufficiently large in number to cause the element of chance to step out and the law of averages to step in as the controlling factor, — and holds the numerous amounts, so collected as a general fund to be paid out to those who shall suffer losses. Insurance companies do not sell commodities; — they do not sell anything. They are engaged in making contracts with and collecting premiums from a large number of persons, the effect of their activities being to constitute a guaranty against individual loss and to put a large number of individual contributions into a common fund for the purpose of fulfilling the guaranty. In this fund all are interested, not in some vague or sentimental way, but'in a very real, practical and definite sense. It was from the foregoing and other considerations peculiar to the insurance business that the court drew its conclusion that the business was clothed with a public interest.
Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332 (involving the Adamson law), Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, and Marcus Brown Co. v. Feldman, 256 U. S. 170 (the rental'cases), are relied upon to sustain the statute now under review. But in these cases the statutes involved were of a temporary character, to tide over grave emergencies, Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 551-552, the emergency in the New case being of nation-wide extent; and it is clear that, in the opinion of this court, at least the business of renting houses and apartments is not so affected with a public interest as to justify legislative fixing of prices unless some great emergency exists. Block v. Hirsh, supra, p. 157; Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U. S. 543, 548. And even with the emergency, the stat*438utes “ went to the verge of the law.” Penna. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 416.
Nor is the sale of ordinary commodities of trade affected with a public interest so as to justify legislative price fixing. This court said in Wolff Co. v. Industrial Court, supra, p. 537:
“ It has never been supposed, since the adoption of the Constitution, that the business of 'the butcher, or the baker, the tailor, the wood chopper, the mining operator or the miner was clothed with such a public interest that the price of his product or his wages could be fixed by State regulation. It is true that in the days of the early common law an omnipotent Parliament did regulate prices and wages as it chose, and occasionally a Colonial legislature sought to exercise the same power; but nowadays one does not devote one’s property or business to the public use or clothe it with a public interest merely because one makes commodities- for, and sells to, the public in the common callings of which those above mentioned are instances.”
See also, United States v. Bernstein, 267 Fed. 295, 296.
From the foregoing review it will be seen .that each of the decisions of this court upholding governmental price regulation, aside from cases involving legislation to tide over temporary emergencies, has turned upon the existence of conditions, peculiar to the business under consideration, which bore such a substantial' and definite relation to the public interest as to justify an indulgence of the legal fiction of a grant by the. owner to the public of an interest in the use.
Lord Hale’s statement that when private- property is “ affected with a public interest, it ceases to be. juris privati only,” is accepted by this court as the guiding principle in cases of this character. That this phrase was not intended by its author to include private undertakings, like those enumerated in. the statute now under consid*439eration, is apparent when we consider the connection m which it was used. ' It occurs in Lord Hale’s manuscript, De Portibus Maris, 1 Harg. Law Tracts, 78, in which the three-fold rights of the proprietor, the public and the king in ports are considered. It first is pointed out that no man can erect a public port without the king’s license; though if he set up a port for his private advantage he may take what rates he and his customers can agree upon. But, it is said, if the king or the subject have a public wharf, to which all persons must come, because it is the wharf only licensed by the king, or there is no other wharf in that port, arbitrary and excessive charges cannot be made. For it is then affected with a public interest'and ceases to be juris privati only; “as if-a.man set out a street in new building on .his own land, it is now no longer bare private interest, .but it is affected with a public interest:”
It is clear that, as there announced, the rule is confined to conveniences made ^public because the privilege of maintaining them has been granted by 'government or because there has arisen what may be termed a constructive grant of the use to the public. That this is what Lord Hale had in mind is borne out, and the question now under consideration is illuminated, by the illustration, which he evidently conceived to be pertinent, of a street opened to the public, in which case the' assumed grant and resulting public right of use is very apparent.
A theatre or other place of entertainment does not meet this conception of Lord Hale’s aphorism or fall within the reasons of the decisions of this court based' upon it. A theatre is a private enterprise, which, in its relation to the public, differs obviously and widely, both in character and degree, from a grain elevator, standing at the', gateway of commerce and exacting toll, amounting to a common charge, for every bushel of grain which passes on its way among the states; or stock yards, standing in *440like relation to the commerce in live stock; or an insurance company, .engaged, as a sort of common agency, in collecting and holding a guaranty fund in which definite and substantial rights are enjoyed by a considerable portion of the public sustaining interdependent relations in respect of their interests in the fund. Sales of theatre tickets bear no relation to the commerce of the country; and they are not interdependent transactions, but stand, both in form and.effect, separate and apart from each other, “ terminating in their effect with the instances.” And, certainly, a place of entertainment is in no legal sense a public utility;' and, quite as certainly, its activities are not such that their enjoyment can be regarded under any conditions from the. point of view of an emergency.
The interest of the public in theatres and other places of entertainment may be more nearly, and with better reason, assimilated to the like interest in provision stores and markets and in the rental of houses and apartments for residence purposes; although in importance it falls below such an interest in the proportion that food and shelter are of more moment than amusement or instruction. As we have shown, there is no legislative power to fix the prices of provisions or clothing or the rental charges for houses or apartments, in the absence of some controlling emergency; and we are unable to perceive any dissimilarities of such quality or degree as to justify a different rule in respect of amusements and entertainments.
A theatre ticket may be in the form of a revocable license or of a contract. If the former, it may be revoked at the will of the proprietor; if the latter, it may be made hon-transferable or otherwise conditioned. A theatre, of course, may be regulated so as to preserve the public peace, insure good order, protect public morals, and the like. A license -may be required, but such a license is *441not a franchise which puts the proprietor under the duty of furnishing entertainment to the public or, if furnished, of admitting everyone who applies. See Collister v. Hayman, 183. N. Y. 250, 253. How far the power of the. legislature máy be exerted to prevent discriminating selection by the proprietor of his patrons upon the basis of race, color, creed, etc., People v. King, 110 N. Y. 418, need not be determined; for in any event such power andythe other powers of regulation just enumerated fall far short of the one here invoked to fix prices.
The contention that, historically considered) places of entertainment may be regarded as so affected with a public interest as to justify legislative regulation of their charges, does not seem to us impressive. It may be true, as asserted, that, among the Greeks, amusement and instruction of the people through- the drama was one of the duties of government. But certainly no such duty devolves upon any American government. The most that can be said is that the theatre and other places of entertainment, generally have been regarded as of high value to the people, to be encouraged, but, at the same time, regulated, within limits, already stated. While'theatres have existed for centuries and have been regulated in a variety of ways, and while price fixing by legislation is an old story, it does not appear that any attempt hitherto has been made to fix their charges by law. This is a fact of some significance in connection with the historical argument, and, when set in contrast with the practice in respfect of inn-keepers and others, whose charges have been subjected to legislative regulation from a very early period, it persuasively suggests that by general legislative acquiescence theatres, • historically, have been regarded as falling outside the classes of things, which shoul^ be thus controlled. It will not do to say that this failure of legislative bodies to act in the matter has been due to the absence of complaints on the part of the' public, *442for it hardly is probable that a privilege as ancient and as amply exercised as that of complaining about prices in general, has not been freely indulged in the matter of charges for entertainment. Indeed, it is judicially recorded that, as long ago as 1809, there was a riot in the Royal Theatre, London, for the purpose of compelling a reduction in prices -:.f admission. In deciding a case growing out of the disturbance, Clifford v. Brandon, 2 Campb. 358, 368, the court summarily disposed of the claim that people had a right to express their disapprobation of high prices in such a tumultuous manner, by saying that “ the proprietors of a theatre have a right to manage their property in their own way, and to fix what prices of admission they think most for their own advantage/’ and that any person who did not approve could stay away.
If it be within the legitimate authority of government to fix maximum charges for admission to theatres, lectures (where perhaps the lecturer alone is concerned), baseball, football and other games of all degrees of interest, circuses, shows (big and little), and every possible form of amusement, including the lowly merry-go-round with its adjunct, the hurdy-gurdy, Commonwealth v. Bow, 177 Mass. 347, it is hard to see where the limit of power in respect of price fixing is to be drawn.
It is urged that the statutory provision under review may be upheld as an appropriate method of preventing fraud, extortion, collusive arrangements between the management and those engaged in reselling tickets, and the like. That such evils exist in some degree in connection with the theatrical business and its ally, the ticket broker, is undoubtedly true, as it unfortunately is true in respect of the same or similar evils in other kinds of business. 'But evils are to be suppressed or prevented by legislation which comports with the Constitution, and not by such as strikes down those essential rights of private property protected by that instrument against undue governmental *443interference. One vice of the contention is that the statute itself ignores the righteous distinction between guilt and innocence, since it applies wholly irrespective of the existence of fraud, collusion or extortion (if that word can have any legal significance as applied to transactions of the kind here dealt with—Commonwealth v. O’Brien & others, 12 Cush. 84, 90), and fixes the resale price as well where the evils are absent as where- they are present. It is not permissible to enact a law which, in effect, spreads an all-inclusive net for the feet of everybody upon the chance that, while the innocent will surely be entangled in its meshes, some' wrong-doers also may be caught.
What this court said in Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590, 594, in the course of its opinion holding invalid a statute of Washington penalizing the collection of fees for securing employment, is apposite:
. - “ Because abuses may, and probably do, grow up in connection with this business, is adequate reason for hedging it about by - proper regulations. But this is not enough to justify destruction • of. one’s right to follow a distinctly useful calling in an upright way. Certainly there is no profession, possibly no business, which does not offer peculiar opportunities for reprehensible practices; and as to every one of them, no doubt, .some can be found quite ready earnestly to maintain that its suppression would be in the public interest. Skillfully directed agitation might also bring about apparent .condemnation of any one of them by the public. Happily for all, the fundamental guaranties of the Constitution cannot be freely submerged if .and whenever some ostensible justification is advanced and the police power invoked.”
The evil'of collusive alliances between the, proprietors of theatres, and ticket brokers or scalpers seems to have been effectively dealt with in Illinois by an ordinance *444which required (1) that the price of every theat e ticket shall be printed on its face and (2) that no proprietor, employee, etc., of a theatre shall receive or enter into any arrangement or agreement to receive more. This ordinance was sustained as valid by the state supreme court in The People v. Thompson, 283 Ill. 87, 97; and that decision is cited here in support of the present statute. But the important distinction between that case and this is that the ordinance did not forbid the resale of the ticket by a purchaser of it for any price he was able to secure, or forbid the fixing of any price by the proprietor which he thought fit, provided that price was printed bn the face of the ticket.
' That court had. held in the earlier ease of The People v. Steele, 231 Ill. 340, 344, that the business of conducting a theatre was a private one; that the legislature had the power to regulate it as a place of public amusement and might require a license; that the legislature had the same power to regulate such a business as it had to regulate any other private business, and no more. And an act which prohibited the resale of tickets for more than the price printed thereon was held to be invalid as an arbitrary and unreasonable interference, with the rights of the ticket broker. It was distinctly held that the intending purchaser of the ticket had no right to buy at any price except that fixed by the holder; that the manager might fix the price arbitrarily, and raise or lower it at his will; that having advertised a performance, he was not bound to give it, and having advertised a price, he was not bound to sell at that price; and that the business of dealing in theatre tickets and the right to contract with regard to them were entitled to protection. . To the same effect, see Ex parte Quarg, 149 Cal. 79.
This doctrine was reaffirmed in the Thompson case, but held to have no application to the ordinance there considered and not to be inconsistent with the holding (p. 97) *445that the manager of a place of public entertainment might “ be compelled to treat patrons impartially by putting an end to an existing system by which theatre owners and ticket scalpers are confederated together to compel a portion of the public to pay a different price from others.”
It should not be difficult similarly to define and penalize in specific terms other practices of a fraudulent character, the existence or apprehension of which is suggested in brief and argument. But the difficulty or even the impossibility of thus dealing with the evils, if that should be conceded, constitutes no warrant for suppressing them by methods precluded by the' Constitution. Such subversions are not only illegitimate but are fraught with the danger that, having begun on the ground of necessity, they will continue on the score of expediency, and, finally, as a mere matter of course. Constitutional principles, applied as they are written, it must be assumed, operate justly and wisely as a general thing, and they may not be remolded by lawmakers or judges to save exceptional cases of -inconvenience, hardship or injustice.
We are of opinion that the statute assailed contravenes the Fourteenth Amendment and that the decree must be
Reversed.
§ 167. Matters of Public Interest. It is hereby determined and declared that the price of or charge for admission to theatres, places of amusement or entertainment, or other places where public exhibitions, games, contests or performances are held is a matter affected with a public interest and subject to the supervision of the state for the purpose of safeguarding the public against fraud, extortion, exorbitant rates and similar abuses.
§ 172. Restriction as to Price. No licensee, shall resell any such ticket or other evidence of the right of entry to any theatre, place of. amusement or entertainment, or other place where public exhibitions, games, contests or performances are given at a price in excess of fifty cents in advance of the price printed on the face of such ticket or ether evidence of the right of entry. Every person, firm, or corporation who owns, operates or controls a theatre, place of amusement or entertainment, or otnér place where public exhibitions, games, contests or performances are held shall, if a price be charged for admission thereto, print on the face of each such ticket or other evidence of the right of éntry the price charged therefor by such person, firm or corporation..