delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a ’suit brought in a state court in Georgia to restrain the enforcement of an ordinance of the City of Augusta fixing rates for water power supplied' from a canal owned and maintained by the city. The plaintiff is a manufacturing company which operates a mill adjacent to the canal with water power supplied therefrom. The objection- urged against the ordinance is that it is repugnant to the contract clause of the Constitution of the United States, and therefore invalid, in that it impairs the obligation of a prior contract whereby the city undertook to supply water power for the plaintiff’s mill in perpetuity at a lower rate than that fixed in the ordinance. The court of first instance held the ordinance valid and accordingly dismissed the suit. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State, 164 Ga. 306; and the case is *102here on writ of error allowed by the Chief Justice of that court.
.Counsel on both sides treat the case as one which •rightly may be brought to this Court on writ of error, but some members of the Court doubt that it is such a case. Therefore this question will be given immediate consideration.
The jurisdiction of this Court to review on writ óf error judgments or decrees of state’courts of last resort is defined by § 237(a) of the Judicial Code, as set forth in the amendatory act of February 13, 1925, c. 229, 43 Stat. 936. -As there defined this jurisdiction extends to two classes of cases—
(1) “where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States, and the decision is against its validity;”
(2) “where is drawn in question the validity óf a statute of any State on the ground of its being repugnant tó the Constitution, treaties or'laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity.”
Plainly the present case is not within., the first provision. Is it within the second? This depends on the sense in - which the words “ a statute of any State ” are used therein.' If they are used as narrowly comprehending only an enactment of the state legislature, the case is excluded; but if they are used as broadly• comprehending any legislation proceeding from the law-making agencies of the State, the case is included...
In usage “ statute ” is a term which has both a restricted and a broad signification. This is reflected in the following excerpt from Bouvier’s Law. Dictionary, Rawle’s Revision:
1 “ Statute. A law established by the act of the legislative power. An act of the legislature. The written will of the. legislature, solemnly expressed according to the forms necessary t<¡) constitute it the law of the state.
*103“This word is used to designate the written law in contradistinction to the unwritten law.
“Among the civilians, the term statute is generally applied to laws and regulations of every sort; every provision of law which ordains, permits or prohibits anything is designated a statute, without considering from what source it arises.”
The Constitution of the United States does not use the term “ statute,” but it does employ the term “ law,” often regarded as an equivalent, to describe an exertion of legislative power. Thus- it is declared that a bill presented in either house of Congress, if receiving prescribed favorable consideration, shall “ become a law,” Art. I, § 7; that Congress may “ make all laws ” necessary and proper for carrying into executipn various enumerated powers, Art. I, § 8, cl. 18; that no State “ shall pass ” any “ex post jacto law ór law impairing the obligation of contracts,” Art. I, § 10, cl. 1; that no State “ shall make or enforce any law” abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, Fourteenth Amendment, § 1; that the Constitution, “laws” and treaties of the United States shall be the supreme law of the land and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or “ laws ” of any State to the contrary notwithstanding, Art. 6,' cl. 2, and that the judicial power of the United States shall extend, among others,, to all cases in law and equity arising under the Constitution, “ laws ” and treaties of the United States, Art. 3,'§ 2.
It of course rests with each State to determine in what form and by what agencies its legislative power may be exerted. It may legislate little or much in its' constitution, may permit the electorate to make laws by direct vote, may entrust, its legislature with wide law-making functions and may delegate legislative authority to subordinate agencies, such as municipal councils and state corm-*104missions. But whether this power be exerted in one form or another, or by one agency or another, the enactments put forth, whether called constitutional provisions, laws, ordinances or orders, are in essence legislative acts of the State; they express its will and have no force otherwise. As respects their validity under the Constitution of the United States all are on the same plane. If they contravene the restraints which that instrument places on the legislative power of a State they are invalid, no matter what their form or by what agency put forth; for, as this Court has said, the protection which these restraints afford applies, “whatever the form in which the legislative power is exerted; that is, whether it be by a constitution, an act of the legislature, or an act of any subordinate instrumentality of the State exercising delegated legislative .authority, like an ordinance of a municipality or an order of a commission.” Standard Scale Company v. Farrell, 249 U. S. 571, 577.
The jurisdictional provision we are considering is designed to be in aid of such protection. It proceeds on the theory that through inadvertence or design those who are entrusted with the legislative power of a State may exercise the same in a' manner forbidden by the Constitution of the United States, and that the state courts may uphold such legislation when it should be held invalid. Unlike other state action, legislation consists of rules having continuing force and intended to be observed and applied in the future; and this regardless of the state agency from which it proceeds.
Were the question an open one, these considerations would afford impelling reasons for holding that the jurisdictional provision uses the words “ a statute of any State ” in their larger sense and is not intended to make a. distinction between acts of a state legislature and other exertions of the State’s law-making power, but rather to include every act legislative in character to which the *105State gives its sanction. But the question is not an open one; it heretofore has been resolved in keeping with the view just indicated.
The jurisdictional provision originally was part of § 25 of the act of September 24, 1789, c. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 85, which authorized this Court to review on \55rit of error judgments and decrees of state courts of last resort in cases —
(1) “ where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under, the United States, and the decision is against their validity; ”
(2) “ where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under, any State, on the ground of their being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of such their validity; ”
(3) “ where is drawn in question the construction of any clause of the Constitution, or of a treaty, or statute of, or commission held under, the United States, and the decision is against the title, right, privilege or commission specially set up or claimed by either party under, such clause of said Constitution, treaty, statute or commission.”
By the act of February 5, 1867, c. 28, 14 Stat. 385, that section was reenacted — the first and second provisions without change and the third to read as follows:
(3) “ where any title, right, privilege or immunity is claimed under the Constitution, or any treaty or statute of, or commission held, or authority exercised under, the United States, and the decision is against the title, right, privilege, or immunity specially set. up or claimed by either party under such Constitution, treaty, statute, commission, or authority.”
The three provisions — the third as so amended — were carried into § 709 of the Revised Statutes of 1873 and into § 237 of the^ Judicial Code of 1911. By the act of September 6,1916, c. 448, 39 Stat. 726, the third provision was *106eliminated so far as a review on writ of error is concerned; and by the act of February 13, 1925, supra, the first and second provisions were amended by omitting from both the words “ or an authority exercised under ” and with that change were reenacted in § 237(a).
. In order .that the second provision — the material one in this case — and the change made therein may be accurately in mind we now quote the provision in both its original and its amended form—
[Act 1789] “ where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised, under, any State on the ground of their being repugnant! to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, and the States, and the decision is in favor of its validity.”
[Act 1925] “ Where is drawn in question the validity of á statute of any State on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the.United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity.”
It will be seen that the phrase “ a statute of any State ” has been in the provision from the time of its original enactment, and that this phrase was retained in the reenactment of 1925 without change or qualification. So, its meaning before the reenactment is its meaning now.
Before coming to decided cases which we deem relevant it is well to' refer to some which, although cited as in point, appear to us not to be so. Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 449 and Home Insurance Company v. Augusta, 93 U. S. 116, are examples. .The first is a case where a tax ordinance of Charleston was sustained by the statf court over the objection that it was in conflict with the Constitution of the United States. This Court’s jurisdic tion was invoked, and was by it sustained, p. 463, on th ground that' the city’s action in adopting the ordinanc was the “ exercise of an authority ” under the Stab Whether the ordinance was a statute of the State w; riot considered. . The other case also involved a municip *107ordinance which the state court had upheld against the contention that it was in conflict with the contract clause of the Constitution. This Court took jurisdiction, p. 121, on the grounds (a) that the validity of an authority exercised under the State was in question and (b) that a right claimed under the Constitution was denied. There was no negation of other grounds.
Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U. S. 176, is the first case in which the phrase “ a statute of any State ” in the jurisdictional provision was considered and construed. There a debt arising on contract and owing by a citizen of Virginia to citizens of Pennsylvania had been sequestrated during the Civil War under an enactment of the Confederate States and collected from the debtor by that Government. After the war the creditors brought a suit against the debtor’s administrator in a state court in Virginia to collect the debt. The defendant interposed pleas setting up the sequestration and collection under the confederate enactment. Judgment went for the defendant on these pleas over the plaintiffs’ objection that the confederate enactment was invalid under the Constitution; and the Supreme Court of Appeals sustained that ruling. The case was brought to this Court on writ of error, its jurisdiction being invoked on the grounds that the case was one (a) where the validity of both a statute of the State and an authority under the State was drawn in question as repugnant to the Constitution and was sustained,' and (b) where a right, privilege and immunity claimed under the Constitution was denied. The jurisdiction was contested, but was sustained expressly on “ both ” grounds in a considered opinion by Mr. Justice Field, speaking for entire Court. In sustaining the first ground he said pp. 182-183:
“ The pleas aver that a confederation was formed by Virginia and other States, called the Confederate States of America, and that under a law of this confederation, *108enforced in Virginia, the debt due to the plaintiffs was sequestrated. Now, the Constitution of the United States prohibits any treaty, alliance, or confederation by one State with another. The organization whose enactment is pleaded cannot, therefore, be regarded in this Court as having any legal existence. It follows that whatever efficacy the enactment possessed in Virginia must be attributed to the sanction given to it by that State. Any enactment from whatever source originating, to which a State gives the force of • law is a statute of the State, within the meaning of the clause cited relating to the jurisdiction of this Court. It would be a narrow construction to limit the term to such enactments as have gone through various stages of consideration by the legislature. There may be many acts authorized by the constitution of a State, or by the convention that framed it, which have not been submitted to the consideration of its legislature, yet have all the efficacy of laws. By the only authority which can be. recognized as having any legal existence, that is, the State of Virginia, this act of the unauthorized confederation was enforced as a law of the Commonwealth. Its validity was drawn in question on the ground that it was repugnant to the Constitution of the United States; and the decision of the court below was in favor of its validity.”
Ford v. Surget, 97 U. S. 594, is much like the case just cited. The plaintiff sued in a state court in Mississippi to recover for cotton belonging to him which the defendant had destroyed in that State during the Civil War in obedience to an enactment of the Confederate States. By special pleas the defendant set up that enactment in justification of the trespass; and the plaintiff insisted by demurrers that the enactment was contrary to the Constitution. The demurrers were overruled and judgment was given for the defendant, which the Supreme Court affirmed. The case was brought to this Court by *109writ'of error. The jurisdiction, although contested, was sustained in an . opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan. He quoted with approval the above extract from Williams v. Bruffy, and added, p. 603:.
“ The general orders of the state court overruling the demurrers must/be accepted, in every essential sense, as an adjudication iñvfavor of the validity of an act of the confederate ^congress, recognized and enforced as law in Mississippi, and which act, according to the rule' laid down in that case, must be, therefore, regarded by us as a statute of that State, within the meaning of the provisions of the act declaring the appellate jurisdiction of this court. It results that we have power to review the final judgment of the Supreme Court of Mississippi.”
Stevens v. Griffith, 111 U. S. 48, is a case where the Supreme Court of Tennessee had given effect to an enactment of the Confederate States. . This Court there said, after reciting its ruling in Williams v. Bruffy, p. 51:
“So, in this case the Confederate enactment, under which the confiscation of the money was had, can be treated only as a statute of Tennessee, by whose sanction it was enforced as a law of that State.” > ■ ■
New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana Sugar Refining Co., 125 U. S. 18, is a case wherein this Court was asked on writ of error to review a judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana giving effect to an ordinance of New Orleans against the contention that it impaired the obligation of a contract. The opinion was by Mr. Justice Gray. After stating that, to be within the contract clause of the Constitution, the impairment must be “by a law of the State,” and that this Court “has no jurisdiction to review a judgment of the highest court of a State, on the ground that the obligation of a contract has been impaired,, unless some legislative act of the State has been upheld by the judgment sought to be reviewed/-. and after quoting with approval the statement *110in Williams v. Bruffy — “Any enactment, from whatever source originating, to which a State gives the force of law, is a statute of the State, within the meaning of the clause cited relating to the jurisdiction of this Court,” he said, p. 31:
“ So a by-law or ordinance of a municipal corporation may be such an exercise of legislative power delegated by the legislature to the corporation as a political subdivision of the State, having all the force of law within the limits of the municipality, that it may properly be considered as a law, within the meaning of this article of the Constitution of the United States.”
In North American Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U. S. 306, which came to this Court from a Circuit Court of the United States, the question was. presented whether a municipal ordinance was state action within the clause in the Fourteenth Amendment prohibiting “ any State ” from denying due process or equal protection. The Court said, p. 313:
“ In this case the ordinance in question is to be regarded as in effect a statute of the State, adopted under a power granted by the state legislature, and hence it is an act of the State within the Fourteenth Amendment.”
The construction which was put on the phrase “ a statute of any State ” in the jurisdictional provision by the decisions in Williams v. Bruffy, Ford v. Surget and Stevens v. Griffith did not stop with those cases, but has been approvingly followed and applied in later cases.
In Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Goldsboro, 232 U. S. 548, this Court was asked to review on writ of error a judgment of the Supreme Court of North Carolina giving effect to a municipal ordinance over the objection that it was invalid under the Constitution of the United States. Mr. Justice Pitney, speaking for the entire court, sustained its jurisdiction and on that point said, p. 555:
*111“A municipal by-law or ordinance, enacted by virtue of power for that purpose delegated by the legislature of the State, is a state law within the meaning of the Federal Constitution. [Citing cases.]
“And any enactment, from whatever source originating, to which a State gives the force of law, is a statute of the State, within the meaning of the pertinent clause of § 709, Rev. Stat.; Judicial Code, § 237; which confers jurisdiction on this court. Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U. S. 176, 183.”
Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U. S. 171, came here from the Supreme Court of Arkansas on writ of error. The sole question involved was the validity of a municipal ordinance, which the state court had sustained against the objection that it was in conflict with the Constitution of the United States. Mr. Justice Pitney again speaking for the entire court said, p. 176:
“ The decision of the state court of last resort is conclusive upon the point that the ordinance under consideration is within the scope of the powers conferred by the state legislature upon the city council of Little Rock. It must therefore be treated, for- the purposes of our jurisdiction, as an act of legislation proceeding from the law-making.power of the State; for a municipal ordinance passed under authority delegated by the legislature is á state law within the meaning of the Federal Constitution; and any enactment, from whatever source originating, to which a State gives the force of law, is a statute of the State within the meaning of Judicial Code, § 237, which confers jurisdiction upon this court. Atlantic Coast Line v. Goldsboro, 232 U. S. 548, 555, and cases cited.”
Zucht v. King, 260 U. S. 174, was brought here on writ of error solely on the ground that the state court had upheld a municipal ordinance against the contention that *112it was invalid under the Constitution of the United States. This Court dealt with the initial question of jurisdiction as follows, p. 176:
“The validity of the ordinances under the Federal Constitution was drawn in question by objections properly taken below. Á city ordinance is a law of the State within the meaning of § 237 of the Judicial Code as amended, which provides a review by writ of error where the validity of a law is sustained by the highest court of the State in which a decision in the suit could be had. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Goldsboro, 232 U. S. 548, 555.”
Further applying the ruling in Williams v. Bruffy this Court repeatedly has held that an order of a state commission made in the exercise of delegated legislative authority is a statute of the State in the sense of the jurisdictional provision. Excerpts from some of the cases — all brought here from state courts on writs of error-r — will suffice to show the course of decision.
“ Such an order, being legislative in its nature and made by an instrumentality of the State, is a state law within the meaning of the Constitution of United States and the laws of Congress regulating our jurisdiction.” Lake Erie & Western R. R. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 249 U. S. 422, 424.
“ The validity of the order prescribing the rates was directly challenged on constitutional grounds, and it was held valid by the highest court of the State. The prescribing of rates is a legislative act. The commission is an instrumentality of the State, exercising delegated powers. Its order is of the same force as would be a like enactment by the legislature. If, as alleged, the prescribed rates are confiscatory, the order is void. Plaintiff in error is entitled to bring the case here on writ of error and to have that question decided by this Court. The motion to dismiss will be denied.” Bluefield Waterworks & Improvement Co. v. Public Service Commission, 262 *113U. S. 679, 683, specifically followed and applied in Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Department of Public Works, 268 U. S. 39, 42.
“ The cause is here upon writ of error. Considering the circumstances disclosed by the record we have no jurisdiction unless it affirmatively appears that- in the court below there was duly drawn in question the validity of a statute or an authority exercised under the State because of repugnance to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States. Jud. Code, § 237, as amended Sept. 6, 1916. Under repeated rulings here, for jurisdictional purposes the order of the Commission must be treated as though an Act of the Legislature.” Live Oak Water Users Ass’n v. R. R. Commission, 269 U. S. 354, 356.
“ The authority of the Dock Commissioner and the Sink-, ing Fund trustees, under the Act of 1871 [they exercised delegated legislative power], is such as to make the plan and the refusal equivalent to a statute of the State, and, assuming that it is in conflict with the grant and covenants of relators’ deeds, it is a law of the State impairing a contract obligation under § 10, Article I, of the Federal Constitution. [Citing New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana Sugar Refining Co., 125 U. S. 18; Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U. S. 176, 183; and other cases.] We have jurisdiction of the writ of error under § 237 of the Judicial Code.” Appelby v. Delaney, 271 U. S. 403, 409.
A like view of an order, legislative in nature, of a state commission haS been taken in other related cases. Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 221 U. S. 400, 403; Louisville and Nashville R. R. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U. S., 298, 318; Arkadelphia Milling Co. v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 249 U. S. 134, 141; Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U. S. 290, 292.
In no case has the phrase “ a statute of any State ” in the jurisdictional provision been construed otherwise than as shown in the foregoing review. With its use else*114where — especially in connections indicative of its use in a different sense — we are not now concerned.
It is said that the act of February 13, 1925, which amended the jurisdictional provision was enacted with the purpose of contracting the obligatory jurisdiction of this Court. We recognize that there was such a purpose and that effect should be given to it. But the act dealt with several jurisdictional provisions, including those relating to cases coming to this Court from the Circuit Courts of Appeals, the District Courts, the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia and the Court of Claims. It shows that the purpose was to cut down and change our jurisdiction in particular respects and to leave' it as before in others. We are concerned here with a particular jurisdiction, as to which there was no cutting down or change. The terms whereby it was defined in the original provision were retained, and thus it was left as before.
We accordingly hold that the ordinance in question is a statute of the State within the meaning of the jurisdictional provision, and therefore that this case is rightly here on writ of error.* So we turn to the merits.
The adoption and terms of the ordinance are not in dispute. Nor is it questioned that the city became obligated long before the ordinance to supply water power from its canal for the plaintiff’s mill. But it is questioned that there was any engagement for a designated price or rate in perpetuity. Both courts below found for the city on this point. That finding is entitled to respect, but is not conclusive; for it rests with this Court in eases like this, where contract obligations are said to have been impaired by subsequent legislation contrary to the constitutional restriction, to determine whether there was a contract and what obligations arose from it. St. Paul Gas Light Com*115pany v. St. Paul, 181 U. S. 142, 147; Appleby v. New York, 271 U. S. 364, 379-380. It is admitted that there was here no formal contract. But it is insisted that a contract arose from conversations and correspondence between representatives of the plaintiff and officers of the city, and that it included an engagement for a designated price or rate in perpetuity. The proofs have been considered. It would serve no purpose to review them in this opinion We think they fall short of showing any engagement respecting the rate, other than that it was to be the established rate for users in general. The rate had been fixed by ordinance when the plaintiff obtained the right to have water power supplied to its mill, but there was, as we construe the proofs, no engagement that that rate should continue indefinitely. The city may be under a duty to supply the power at a reasonable rate [See Millers v. Augusta, 63 Ga. 772], but that question is not in this case. The plaintiff’s objection is confined to the asserted impairment of a prior contract.
Judgment affirmed.
Followed in Sprout v. South Bend and Nectow v. Cambridge, decided this day, post, pp. 163, 183.