Concurring opinion of
Mr. Justice Stone.In view of earlier decisions of the Court, I acquiesce in the result. But I cannot yield assent to the reasoning by which the present forbidden tax on the use of property in interstate commerce is distinguished from a permissible *253tax on property, measured by its use or use value in interstate commerce. Cudahy Packing Co. v. Minnesota, 246 U. S. 450, 456; Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 439, 445; Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U. S. 194, 220; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Missouri, 190 U. S. 412, 422; cf. Pullman’s Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18. Nor can I find any practical justification for this distinction or for an interpretation of the commerce clause which would relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their fair share of the expense of government of the' states in which they operate by exempting them from the payment of a tax of general application, which is neither aimed at nor discriminates against interstate commerce. It “ affects commerce among the States and impedes the transit of persons and property from one State to another just in the same way, and in no other, that taxation of any kind necessarily increases the expenses attendant upon the use or possession of the thing taxed.” Delaware Railroad Tax, 18 Wall. 206, 232.
Me. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandéis concur in this opinion.