dissenting.
I am of opinion that the District Court had jurisdiction. •
So far as concerns the validity of the tax, the^University is the State. It is an instrumentality carrying on the state’s program of public education. The holding of the athletic contests in question is an integral part of that program and does not cease to be such because it produces income. The tax is imposed directly on and bur-, dens that activity of the State. The Court assumes the facts above stated and decides the case on that basis. The tax is laid on the charge paid for admission, is, to be borne by the person paying for admission, and is to be collected by the State and handed over to the tJnited States. It is hard to understand how the collection by the State of fees for the privilege of attendance brings, even for the púrpose^of federal taxation, its work of education to the level of selling intoxicating liquor, South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437; Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 360, operating a railway, Helvering v. Powers, 293 U. S. 214, or conducting any other commercial activity. The tax seems plainly within the rule of state immunity from federal taxation as hitherto understood and applied. I would affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals.
Mr. Justice McReynolds concurs in this opinion.