delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent, an American citizen, brought this suit against the Alien Property Custodian and the Treasurer of the United States to recover from the assets of the Assicurazioni Generali di Trieste e Venezia, an Italian *406insurance company, the unpaid portion of a claim for legal services rendered that company. The assets of the company had vested in the Alien Property Custodian in 19421 and the vested assets had been delivered to him. The suit was sought to be maintained under § 9 (a) of the Trading with the Enemy Act (40 Stat. 411, as amended 41 Stat. 977, 50 U. S. C. App. § 9 (a)) which allows “Any person not an enemy or ally of enemy ... to whom any debt may be owing from an enemy or ally of enemy whose property or any part thereof shall have been conveyed, transferred, assigned, delivered, or paid to the Alien Property Custodian” to sue the Custodian or the Treasurer of the United States in the federal courts. Petitioners moved to dismiss on the ground that the claim did not qualify under § 9 (e) of the Act. Sec. 9 (e), which was added to the Act in 1920 (41 Stat. 980) and amended in 1928 (45 Stat. 271), provides that no debt shall be allowed under § 9 “unless it was owing to and owned by the claimant prior to October 6, 1917” nor “unless notice of the claim has been filed, or application therefor has been made, prior to the date of the enactment of the Settlement of War Claims Act of 1928.” In view of those provisions of § 9 (e) the District Court dismissed the complaint. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 148 F. 2d 737. The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari which we granted because of the public importance of the question presented.
If § 9 (e) is applicable here, the suit may not be maintained since the debt was not in existence on October 6, *4071917, nor had notice of the claim been filed or application therefor been made prior to the date of the enactment of the Settlement of War Claims Act of 1928. We would have quite a different case if § 9 (a) and (e) had been enacted after the outbreak of the recent war. For we may assume that Congress could set up such barriers as it chose to the enforcement of the claims of an alien’s creditors against the seized property. But the doubt as to the applicability of § 9 (e) to the present situation arises because that provision was part of the legislation enacted after the outbreak of World War I to deal with the claims against property seized during that period. That legislation was not reenacted when the recent war broke out. It automatically went into effect again at that time.2 Hence the argument that these provisions of § 9 (e) are limited to claims against property seized during World War I. Our conclusion is that they are so limited.
In the first place, § 9 (e) disallows recovery “to any person who is a citizen or subject of any nation which was associated with the United States in the prosecution of the war, unless such nation in like case extends reciprocal rights to citizens of the United States.” When it is recalled that § 9 (e) was first added to the Act in 1920, it seems tolerably clear that the words “was associated with the United States in the prosecution of the war” refer to World War I. The use not only of the past tense but *408also of the concept of “associate” is significant. As Judge Learned Hand speaking for the Court below said, the word “associate” was used during World War I “in sedulous avoidance of any implication” that we had “allies.” In the second place, the time limitations contained in § 9 (e) point the same way. As the United States says, some sections of the Act were explicitly restricted to situations growing out of World War I, as, for example, §3 (d). But it seems to us that the provisions of § 9 (e) with which we are now concerned carry almost as plain a hallmark. For the restriction of suits to debts which were owing to and owned by the claimant prior to October 6, 1917 and as respects which a notice of claim had been filed prior to the date of the enactment of the Settlement of War Claims Act of 1928 strongly suggests that Congress was dealing exclusively with World War I claims, not with claims which might arise in some future war. As of 1920 and 1928 the time limitations written into § 9 (e) had no other relevancy. The Committee Reports,3 accompanying the legislation by which § 9 (e) was added to the law, while not explicit on the precise point, show that Congress was concerned solely with the handling of claims which then existed. There is not the slightest suggestion that Congress was drafting a statute of limitations likewise applicable to claims which might be asserted in case the United States at some future time again went to war. These considerations indicate to us that it would be a *409distortion to read § 9 (e) as if Congress in December 1941 decided that the statute of limitations applicable to World War I claims should likewise be applicable to World War II claims. If we gave § 9 (e) that broad interpretation, we would, in the third place, deprive § 9 (a) of all meaning so far as World War II claims were concerned. That we hesitate to do, for the Act was not only designed to operate in the first World War; it was also to become effective at the time of any future war unless repealed or superseded. Yet the remedy afforded by § 9 (a) would be quite illusory and ineffective so far as it applies to World War II claims if § 9 (e) were read literally without regard to its history. It was for this reason particularly that the court below refused “to make a fortress out of the dictionary” and to read § 9 (e) strictly and literally. The policy as well as the letter of the law is a guide to decision. Resort to the policy of a law may be had to ameliorate its seeming harshness or to qualify its apparent absolutes as Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U. S. 457 illustrates. The process of interpretation also misses its high function if a strict reading of a law results in the emasculation or deletion of a provision which a less literal reading would preserve.
The United States, however, contends that such a construction of § 9 (e) would gravely interfere with the efficient administration of alien property controls in accordance with policies adopted by Congress in relation to World War II. It points out that by virtue of amendments to § 5 (b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act which were made on December 18, 1941 by the First War Powers Act (55 Stat. 839, 50 U. S. C. App,, Supp. IV, § 616), the Executive is now armed with far more comprehensive power over alien property and the property of other foreign interests than in World War I. Now there is the “freezing” or “blocking” of foreign funds aimed at the immobilization of foreign assets in the United States by prohibiting, *410without a license, any transactions involving them — a program initiated after the invasion by Germany of Denmark and Norway and administered by the Treasury.4 If the Treasury refuses a license permitting payment of creditors out of blocked funds, neither the creditor nor the owner has any remedy as a matter of right under the Act. It is said that to allow creditors of certain aliens whose property has been vested in the Alien Property Custodian to maintain suits but to disallow suits by creditors of aliens whose funds are merely frozen is to destroy consistency in the position of creditors under the Trading with the Enemy Act. Moreover, § 9 (a) permits suits on debt claims only if the debt is one “owing from an enemy or ally of enemy” whose property has been taken. By the 1941 amendment to § 5 (b) the vesting power has not been so limited but extends to “any property or interest of any foreign country or national.” The argument is that to construe § 9 (e) so as to permit creditors of an enemy to sue is to discriminate without warrant against creditors of non-enemy foreign nationals who are given no such remedy. Moreover, it is said that if § 9 (e) is not a barrier to suits, a race of diligence would be started with no guarantee of any equitably ordered priority in the payment of the claims out of the seized property. It is also argued that if these suits are allowed the operations of the Custodian would be burdened with litigation.
We have concluded that however meritorious these considerations are, they raise questions of policy for Congress. We are concerned only with the right to sue on a debt under § 9. Congress granted that right to some claimants and withheld it from others. Whether its choice was wise or not is not for us to say. The right to sue, explicitly granted by § 9 (a), should not be read out of the law *411unless it is clear that Congress by what it later did withdrew its earlier permission. We can find no indication in the 1941 legislation that Congress by amending § 5 (b) desired to delete or wholly nullify § 9 (a). On-the contrary, the normal assumption is that where Congress amends only one section of a law, leaving another untouched, the two were designed to function as parts of an integrated whole. We should give each as full a play as possible. Moreover, we are able to find in the amendment to § 5 (b) no suggestion or indication that Congress was writing a different statute of limitations than was then contained in § 9 (e). The 1941 amendment is as silent on that score as it is on the right to sue afforded by § 9 (a).
It is true that § 5 (b) gave a broader grant of authority to the Executive than had existed under the original Act.5 As respects the seizure of property it provides:
*412“any property or interest of any foreign country or national thereof shall vest, when, as, and upon the terms, directed by the President, in such agency or person as may be designated from time to time by the President, and upon such terms and conditions as the President may prescribe such interest or property shall be held, used, administered, liquidated, sold, or otherwise dealt with in the interest of and for the benefit of the United States, and such designated agency or person may perform any and all acts incident to the accomplishment or furtherance of these purposes.” (Italics added.)
It is said that the survival of the privilege of satisfying debt claims as a matter of right out of vested property is inconsistent with the new power granted the Executive by § 5 (b) to make any affirmative use of the property that the national interest in time of war might require. But we are here concerned solely with the right to sue on a debt, not with the right to sue to reclaim property nor with any question concerning the satisfaction of any judgment which may be obtained. We only hold that the right to sue on a debt granted by § 9 (a) has not been wholly withdrawn and that § 9 (e) is not applicable to this class of claims. We cannot see that the allowance of *413a suit on a debt as prescribed by § 9 (a) collides with the policy of § 5 (b). That does not in any way cause interference with the administration of the vested property pursuant to § 5 (b). Sec. 9 (a), to be sure, contains a provision which prescribes how any judgment obtained in the suit against the Custodian or Treasurer shall be satisfied;6 and also allows suits to reclaim property.7 Whether those provisions have been superseded by § 5 (b) or whether § 5 (b) contains a grant of authority which may be so exercised as to prevent the reclamation of property or the payment of the judgment or to alter the procedure for reclamation or payment as prescribed in § 9 (a) are distinct questions. Here we are dealing solely with the right to maintain a suit on a debt, a right which is not shown to collide with § 5 (b). We reserve decision on the other questions.
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.See Vesting Order 218, dated October 7, 1942, 7 Fed. Reg. 9466; Vesting Order 468, dated December 9, 1942, 8 Fed. Reg. 1038. For the establishment of the office of Alien Property Custodian and the definition of his functions as respects the vesting of alien property, see Executive Order 9193, dated July 6, 1942, 7 Fed. Reg. 5205, amending Executive Order 9095, dated March 11, 1942, 7 Fed. Reg. 1971.
As the Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out, that followed from several circumstances: (a) § 2 (c) defined “the beginning of the war” to mean “midnight ending the day on which Congress has declared or shall declare war or the existence of a state of war”; (b) § 302 of the First War Powers Act, approved December 18, 1941 (55 Stat. 838,840) assumed that the Trading with the Enemy Act had not been in force before December 8, 1941, and that it went into effect again at that time; and (c) § 5 (b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act was amended December 18, 1941, by the First War Powers Act without any mention of the other parts of the earlier Act. 55 Stat. 839.
See H. Rep. No. 1089, 66th Cong., 2d Sess.; S. Rep. No. 273, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 29; H. Rep. No. 17, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 20. In S. Rep. No. 273, supra, it was stated: “Under the existing law a creditor of a person whose property was seized by the Alien Property Custodian may file a claim and institute proceedings for the payment of the debt, under certain conditions. Inasmuch as these claimants have had more than 10 years in which to file their claims, this provision is amended by subsection (b) of section 12 of the proposed bill so as to permit payment only where the claim was filed prior to the date of the enactment of the bill.”
This program, initiated by Executive Order 8389, dated April 10, 1940, 5 Fed. Reg. 1400, was ratified by Congress on May 7, 1940, by Joint Resolution. 54 Stat. 179.
As stated in H. Rep. No. 1507, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 2-3:
“Section 5 (b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act has been continued down to the present time. The existing system of foreign property control (commonly known as freezing control) is based on that subdivision as last amended on May 7, 1940. That subdivision of section 5 as it is now in effect, however, does not give the broad powers to take, administer, control, use, liquidate, etc., such foreign-owned property that would be given by section 301 of the bill.
“At present the Government exercises supervision over transactions in foreign property, either by prohibiting such transactions or by permitting them on condition and under license. It is, therefore, a system which can prevent transactions in foreign property prejudicial to the best interests of the United States, but it is not a system which can affirmatively compel the use and application of foreign property in those interests.
“Section 301 remedies that situation by adding to the existing freezing control, in substance, the powers contained in the Trading With the Enemy Act with respect to alien property, extending those powers, and adding a flexibility of control which experience under the original act and the recent experience under freezing control have demonstrated to be advisable. The provisions of section 301 *412would permit the establishment of a complete system of alien property treatment. It vests flexible powers in the President, operating through such agency or agencies as he might choose, to deal with the problems that surround alien property or its ownership or control in the manner deemed most effective in each particular case. In this respect the bill avoids the rigidity and inflexibility which characterized the alien property custodian law enacted during the last war. The necessity for flexibility in legislation on this subject is accentuated by the vastness of the alien property problem confronting the Government today. At the peak of his activity, the Alien Property Custodian of the last war administered property valued at something over $500,000,000. Today there is over $7,000,000,000 worth of property already subject to the existing control.”
And see S. Rep. No. 911, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2.
“If suit shall be so instituted, then such money or property shall be retained in the custody of the Alien Property Custodian, or in the Treasury of the United States, as provided in this Act, and until any final judgment or decree which shall be entered in favor of the claimant shall be fully satisfied by payment or conveyance, transfer, assignment, or delivery by the defendant, or by the Alien Property Custodian, or Treasurer of the United States on order of the court, or until final judgment or decree shall be entered against the claimant or suit otherwise terminated.”
Sec. 9 (a) allows suits by “Any person not an enemy or ally of enemy claiming any interest, right, or title in any money or other property which may have been conveyed, transferred, assigned, delivered, or paid to the Alien Property Custodian or seized by him hereunder and held by him or by the Treasurer of the United States,” as well as suits by any such person to whom a debt may be owing from any enemy or ally of enemy whose property has been seized.
S. 1940, EL R. 4840 and H. R. 5031 were introduced in the 78th Congress. H. R. 1530 was introduced in the 79th Congress, January-16, 1945. See Hearings on H. R. 4840 before Subcommittee No. 1 of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., Serial No. 18, June 9-15, 1944.