concurring.
My brother Burton has stated with great force reasons for not invalidating the Virginia statute. But for me Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485, is controlling. Since it was decided nearly seventy years ago, that case on several occasions has been approvingly cited and has never been questioned. Chiefly for this reason I concur in the opinion of the Court.
The imposition upon national systems of transportation of a crazy-quilt of State laws would operate to burden commerce unreasonably, whether such contradictory and confusing State laws concern racial commingling or racial segregation. This does not imply the necessity for a nationally uniform regulation of arrangements for passengers on interstate carriers. Unlike other powers of Congress (see Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, concerning “Duties, Imposts *389and Excises”; Art. I, § 8, cl. 4, concerning “Naturalization”; Art. I, § 8, cl. 4, concerning “Bankruptcies”), the power to regulate commerce does not require geographic uniformity. Congress may devise a national policy with due regard to varying interests of different regions. E. g., 37 Stat. 699, 27 U. S. C. § 122; Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R. Co., 242 U. S. 311; 45 Stat. 1084, 49 U. S. C. § 60; Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U. S. 431. The States cannot impose diversity of treatment when such diverse treatment would result in unreasonable burdens on commerce. But Congress may effectively exercise its power under the Commerce Clause without the necessity of a blanket rule for the country.