delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent, a retail druggist in Columbus, Georgia, was charged in two counts of an information with a violation of § 301 (k) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938. That section prohibits “the doing of any . . . act with respect to, a . . . drug ... if such act is done while such article is held for sale after shipment in interstate commerce and results in such article being misbranded.” 1 Section 502 (f) of the Act declares a drug *691“to be misbranded . . . unless its labeling bears (1) adequate directions for use; and (2) such adequate warnings against use . . . dangerous to health, or against unsafe dosage ... as are necessary for the protection of users.” The information charged specifically that the respondent had performed certain acts which resulted in sulfathiazole being “misbranded” while “held for sale after shipment in interstate commerce.”
The facts alleged were these: A laboratory had shipped in interstate commerce from Chicago, Illinois, to a consignee at Atlanta, Georgia, a number of bottles, each containing 1,000 sulfathiazole tablets. These bottles had labels affixed to them, which, as required by § 502 (f) (1) and (2) of the Act, set out adequate directions for the use of the tablets and adequate warnings to protect ultimate consumers from dangers incident to this use.2 Respondent bought one of these properly labeled bottles of sulfathiazole tablets from the Atlanta consignee, transferred it to his Columbus, Georgia, drugstore, and there held the tablets for resale. On two separate occasions *692twelve tablets were removed from the properly labeled and branded bottle, placed in pill boxes, and sold to customers. These boxes were labeled “sulfathiazole.” They did not contain the statutorily required adequate directions for use or warnings of danger.
Respondent’s motion to dismiss the information was overruled, a jury was waived, evidence was heard, and respondent was convicted under both counts. 67 F. Supp. 192.
The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 161 F. 2d 629. The court thought that as a result of respondent’s action the sulfathiazole became “misbranded” within the meaning of the Federal Act, and that in its “broadest possible sense” the Act’s language “may include what happened.” However, it was also of the opinion that the Act ought not to be taken so broadly “but held to apply only to the holding for the first sale by the importer after interstate shipment.” Thus the Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted the statutory language of § 301 (k) “while such article is held for sale after shipment in interstate commerce” as though Congress had said “while such article is held for sale by a person who had himself received it by way of a shipment in interstate commerce.” We granted certiorari to review this important question concerning the Act’s coverage. 332 U. S. 753.
First. The narrow construction given § 301 (k) rested not so much upon its language as upon the Circuit Court’s view of the consequences that might result from the broader interpretation urged by the Government. The court pointed out that the retail sales here involved were made in Columbus nine months after this sulfathiazole had been shipped from Chicago to Atlanta. It was impressed by the fact that, if the statutory language “while such article is held for sale after shipment in interstate commerce” should be given its literal meaning, the criminal provisions relied on would “apply to all intra*693state sales of imported drugs after any number of intermediate sales within the State and after any lapse of time; and not only to such sales of drugs, but also to similar retail sales of foods, devices and cosmetics, for all these are equally covered by these provisions of the Act.” The court emphasized that such consequences would result in far-reaching inroads upon customary control by local authorities of traditionally local activities, and that a purpose to afford local retail purchasers federal protection from harmful foods, drugs and cosmetics should not be ascribed to Congress in the absence of an exceptionally clear mandate, citing Federal Trade Commission v. Bunte Bros., 312 U. S. 349. Another reason of the court for refraining from construing the Act as applicable to articles misbranded while held for retail sale, even though the articles had previously been shipped in interstate commerce, was its opinion that such a construction would raise grave doubts as to the Act’s constitutionality. In support of this position the court cited Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 30, and Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495.
A restrictive interpretation should not be given a statute merely because Congress has chosen to depart from custom or because giving effect to the express language employed by Congress might require a court to face a constitutional question. And none of the foregoing cases, nor any other on which they relied, authorizes a court in interpreting a statute to depart from its clear meaning. When it is reasonably plain that Congress meant its Act to prohibit certain conduct, no one of the above references justifies a distortion of the congressional purpose, not even if the clearly correct purpose makes marked deviations from custom or leads inevitably to a holding of constitutional invalidity. Although criminal statutes must be so precise and unambiguous that the ordinary person can know how to avoid unlawful conduct, see Kraus & Bros., *694Inc. v. United States, 327 U. S. 614, 621-622, even in determining whether such statutes meet that test, they should be given their fair meaning in accord with the evident intent of Congress. United States v. Raynor, 302 U. S. 540, 552.
Second. Another consideration that moved the Circuit Court of Appeals to give the statute a narrow construction was its belief that the holding in this case with reference to misbranding of drugs by a retail druggist would necessarily apply also to “similar retail sales of foods, devices and cosmetics, for all of these,” the court said, “are equally covered by the same provisions of the Act.” And in this Court the effect of such a possible coverage of the Act is graphically magnified. We are told that its application to these local sales of sulfathiazole would logically require all retail grocers and beauty parlor operators to reproduce the bulk container labels on each individual item when it is taken from the container to sell to a purchaser. It is even prophesied that, if § 301 (k) is given the interpretation urged by the Government, it will later be applied so as to require retail merchants to label sticks of candy and sardines when removed from their containers for sale.
The scope of the offense which Congress defined is not to be judicially narrowed as applied to drugs by envisioning extreme possible applications of its different misbranding provisions which relate to food, cosmetics, and the like. There will be opportunity enough to consider such contingencies should they ever arise. It may now be noted, however, that the Administrator of the Act is given rather broad discretion — broad enough undoubtedly to enable him to perform his duties fairly without wasting his efforts on what may be no more than technical infractions of law. As an illustration of the Administrator’s discretion, § 306 permits him to excuse minor violations with a warning if he believes that the public interest will thereby be ade*695quately served. And the Administrator is given extensive authority under §§ 405, 503 and 603 to issue regulations exempting from the labeling requirements many articles that otherwise would fall within this portion of the Act. The provisions of § 405 with regard to food apparently are broad enough to permit the relaxation of some of the labeling requirements which might otherwise impose a burden on retailers out of proportion to their value to the consumer.
Third. When we seek the meaning of § 301 (k) from its language we find that the offense it creates and which is here charged requires the doing of some act with respect to a drug (1) which results in its being misbranded, (2) while the article is held for sale “after shipment in interstate commerce.” Respondent has not seriously contended that the “misbranded” portion of § 301 (k) is ambiguous. Section 502 (f), as has been seen, provides that a drug is misbranded unless the labeling contains adequate directions and adequate warnings. The labeling here did not contain the information which § 502 (f) requires. There is a suggestion here that, although alteration, mutilation, destruction, or obliteration of the bottle label would have been a “misbranding,” transferring the pills to non-branded boxes would not have been, so long as the labeling on the empty bottle was not disturbed. Such an argument cannot be sustained. For the chief purpose of forbidding the destruction of the label is to keep it intact for the information and protection of the consumer. That purpose would be frustrated when the pills the consumer buys are not labeled as required, whether the label has been torn from the original container or the pills have been transferred from it to a non-labeled one. We find no ambiguity in the misbranding language of the Act.
Furthermore, it would require great ingenuity to discover ambiguity in the additional requirement of § 301 (k) *696that the misbranding occur “while such article is held for sale after shipment in interstate commerce.” The words accurately describe respondent’s conduct here. He held the drugs for sale after they had been shipped in interstate commerce from Chicago to Atlanta. It is true that respondent bought them over six months after the interstate shipment had been completed by their delivery to another consignee. But the language used by Congress broadly and unqualifiedly prohibits misbranding articles held for sale after shipment in interstate commerce, without regard to how long after the shipment the misbranding occurred, how many intrastate sales had intervened, or who had received the articles at the end of the interstate shipment. Accordingly we find that the conduct of the respondent falls within the literal language of § 301 (k).
Fourth. Given the meaning that we have found the literal language of § 301 (k) to have, it is thoroughly consistent with the general aims and purposes of the Act. For the Act as a whole was designed primarily to protect consumers from dangerous products. This Court so recognized in United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U. S. 277, 282, after reviewing the House and Senate Committee Reports on the bill that became law. Its purpose was to safeguard the consumer by applying the Act to articles from the moment of their introduction into interstate commerce all the way to the moment of their delivery to the ultimate consumer. Section 301 (a) forbids the “introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate commerce” of misbranded or adulterated drugs; § 301 (b) forbids the misbranding or adulteration of drugs while “in interstate commerce”; and § 301 (c) prohibits the “receipt in interstate commerce” of any misbranded or adulterated drug, and “the delivery or proffered delivery thereof for pay or otherwise.” But these three paragraphs alone would not supply protection all the way to the consumer. The words of paragraph (k) “while *697such article is held for sale after shipment in interstate commerce” apparently were designed to fill this gap and to extend the Act’s coverage to every article that had gone through interstate commerce until it finally reached the ultimate consumer. Doubtless it was this purpose to insure federal protection until the very moment the articles passed into the hands of the consumer by way of an intrastate transaction that moved the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce to report on this section of the Act as follows: “In order to extend the protection of consumers contemplated by the law to the full extent constitutionally possible, paragraph (k) has been inserted prohibiting the changing of labels so as to misbrand articles held for sale after interstate shipment.” 3 We hold that § 301 (k) prohibits the misbranding charged in the information.
Fifth. It is contended that the Act as we have construed it is beyond any authority granted Congress by the Constitution and that it invades the powers reserved to the States. A similar challenge was made against the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, 34 Stat. 768, and rejected, in McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U. S. 115. That Act did not contain § 301 (k), but it did prohibit misbranding and authorized seizure of misbranded articles after they were shipped from one State to another, so long as they remained “unsold.” The authority of Congress to make this requirement was upheld as a proper exercise of its powers under the commerce clause. There are two variants between the circumstances of that case and this one. In the McDermott case the labels involved were on the original containers; here the labels are required to be put on other than the original containers — the boxes to which the tablets were transferred. Also, in the McDermott case the possessor of the labeled cans held for sale had *698himself received them by way of an interstate sale and shipment; here, while the petitioner had received the sulfathiazole by way of" an intrastate sale and shipment, he bought it from a wholesaler who had received it as the direct consignee of an interstate shipment. These variants are not sufficient we think to detract from the applicability of the McDermott holding to the present decision. In both cases alike the question relates to the constitutional power of Congress under the commerce clause to regulate the branding of articles that have completed an interstate shipment and are being held for future sales in purely local or intrastate commerce. The reasons given for the McDermott holding therefore are equally applicable and persuasive here. And many cases decided since the McDermott decision lend support to the validity of § 301 (k). See, e. g., United States v. Walsh, 331 U. S. 432; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111; United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U. S. 110; United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100; see United States v. Olsen, 161 F. 2d 669.
Reversed.
“Sec. 301. The following acts and the causing thereof are hereby prohibited:
“(k) The alteration, mutilation, destruction, obliteration, or removal of the whole or any part of the labeling of, or the doing of *691any other act with respect to, a food, drug, device, or cosmetic, if such act is done while such article is held for sale after shipment in interstate commerce and results in such article being misbranded.” 52 Stat. 1042, 21 U. S. C. § 331 (k).
The following inscription appeared on the bottle labels as a compliance with §502 (f) (1) which requires directions as to use: “Caution. — To be used only by or on the prescription of a physician.” This would appear to constitute adequate directions since it is required by regulation issued by the Administrator pursuant to authority of the Act. 21 C. F. R. Cum. Supp. §2.106 (b) (3). The following appeared on the label of the bottles as a compliance with § 502 (f) (2) which requires warnings of danger: “Warning. — In some individuals Sulfathiazole may cause severe toxic reactions. Daily blood counts for evidence of anemia or leukopenia and urine examinations for hematuria are recommended.
“Physicians should familiarize themselves with the use of this product before it is administered. A circular giving full directions and contraindications will be furnished upon request.”
H. R. Rep. 2139, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 3.