concurring in the result.
To treat a denaturalization proceeding, whether procedurally or otherwise, as if it were nothing more than a suit for damages for breach of contract or one to recover overtime pay ignores, in my view, every consideration of justice and of reality concerning the substance of the suit and what is at stake.
To take away a man’s citizenship deprives him of a right no less precious than life or liberty, indeed of one which today comprehends those rights and almost all others.1 To lay upon the citizen the punishment of exile *617for committing murder, or even treason, is a penalty thus far unknown to our law and at most but doubtfully within Congress’ power. U. S. Const., Amend. VIII. Yet by the device or label of a civil suit, carried forward with none of the safeguards of criminal procedure provided by the Bill of Rights, this most comprehensive and basic right of all, so it has been held, can be taken away and in its wake may follow the most cruel penalty of banishment.
No such procedures could strip a natural-born citizen of his birthright or lay him open to such a penalty. I have stated heretofore the reasons why I think the Constitution does not countenance either that deprivation or the ensuing liability to such a punishment for naturalized citizens. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118, concurring opinion 165; Knauer v. United States, 328 U. S. 654, dissenting opinion 675.
Those views of the substantive rights of naturalized citizens have not prevailed here. But the Schneiderman decision and Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U. S. 665, required a burden of proof for denaturalization which in effect approximates the burden demanded for conviction in criminal cases, namely, proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the charges alleged as cause for denaturalization.2 This was in itself and to that extent recognition that ordinary civil procedures, such as apply in suits upon contracts and to enforce other purely civil liabilities, do not suffice for denaturalization and all its consequences. *618More than this it was not necessary to decide in the cases cited. No less should be required, in view of the substantial kinship of the proceedings with criminal causes, whatever their technical form or label. Cf. Knauer v. United States, 328 U. S. 654, dissenting opinion 675, 678.
This case, however, presents squarely the issue whether, beyond any question of burden or weight of proof, the ordinary civil procedures can suffice to take away the naturalized citizen’s status and lay him open to permanent exile with all the fateful consequences following for himself and his family, often as in this case native-born Americans. The question in its narrower aspect is indeed whether those consequences can be inflicted without any proof whatever.
Under our system petitioner could not be convicted or fined for mail fraud, overceiling sales, or unlawfully possessing gasoline ration coupons upon a judgment taken by default, much less under the circumstances this record discloses to have been responsible for the default. Yet his basic right to all the protections afforded him as a citizen by the Constitution can be stripped from him, so it is now urged, without an iota of proof, without his appearance or presence in court, without counsel employed or assigned to defend that right, and indeed with no real opportunity on his part to prepare and make such a defense. The case thus goes far beyond the Court’s ruling in Knauer v. United States, supra. And, in my opinion, it brings to clearer focus whether, beyond the matter of satisfying the burden of proof required by the Schneiderman and Baumgartner cases, the Knauer case rightly permitted denaturalization through the civil procedures there pursued.3
*619If, in deference to the Court’s rulings, we are to continue to have two classes of citizens in this country, one secure in their status and the other subject at every moment to its loss by proceedings not applicable to the other class, cf. Schneiderman v. United States, supra, concurring opinion at 167; Knauer v. United States, supra, dissenting opinion at 678, I cannot assent to the idea that the ordinary rules of procedure in civil causes afford any standard sufficient to safeguard the status given to naturalized citizens. If citizenship is to be defeasible for naturalized citizens, other than by voluntary renunciation or other causes applicable to native-born citizens,4 the defeasance it seems to me should be surrounded by no lesser protections than those securing all citizens against conviction for crime. Regardless of the name given it, the denatu-ralization proceeding when it is successful has all the consequences and effects of a penal or criminal conviction, except that the ensuing liability to deportation is a greater penalty than is generally inflicted for crime.
Regarding the proceeding in this light, I do not assent in principle that the judgment of denaturalization can be taken by default or that the rules of civil procedure applicable in ordinary civil causes apply to permit such a result.
The grounds which I have stated for these conclusions logically would lead to casting my vote to reverse the judgment with instructions to dismiss the proceedings. Since, however, that disposition does not receive the concurrence of a majority, I join with those who, on other grounds, think that the judgment should be reversed and remanded for a new trial, in voting so to dispose of the cause. Accordingly I concur in the Court’s judgment. I may add that, upon the assumption that rules of civil *620procedure may apply in denaturalization proceedings, I am substantially in accord with the views expressed by Mr. Justice Black.
Cf. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276, 284; Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118, 122, and concurring opinion 165; Knauer v. United States, 328 U. S. 654, dissenting opinion 675.
See Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118, 125, 136, 153, 154, 158, 159. At page 158 we said: “We conclude that the Government has not carried its burden of proving by ‘clear, unequivocal, and convincing’ evidence which does not leave ‘the issue in doubt,’ that petitioner obtained his citizenship illegally.” The concurring opinion in Knauer v. United States, 328 U. S. 654, 674, went upon the basis of satisfaction “beyond all reasonable doubt” concerning the proof of the grounds asserted for denaturalization.
In the view of those dissenting, as well as that of the majority in the Knauer case, the Government had satisfied fully the burden of proof required by the Schneiderman and Baumgartner decisions. See 328 U. S. 654, 675.
See Knauer v. United States, 328 U. S. 654, dissenting opinion 675, 676.