I concur in the result. But in doing so I feel impelled to say two things.
One is that in my view § 1404 (a), taken broadly to include “any civil action,” does effect a partial repeal of. *73§ 6 of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act and of the other statutes mentioned by Mr. Justice Douglas, including the venue provisions (§ 12) of the Clayton Act involved in our decision in United States v. National City Lines, 334 U. S. 573.
The legislative history, for example, of the Clayton Act venue provisions demonstrates that the change '! 1404 (a) is said to have made was more than the mere removal of a judicial gloss. I think we should not now impugn the validity of our decisions in National City Lines, supra, and in Kepner and Miles1 by characterizing each as a mere “judicial gloss” upon the pertinent statute. Those decisions in. my opinion were true reflections of congressional intent as stated in the respective statutes and, accordingly, the changes made in them by ! 1404 (a) were in the nature of repeals, to the extent that the plaintiffs were deprived of their rights under the preTexisting statutes to have their causes of action tried in the forums where they were properly brought.
In the second place, those changes, although entirely within Congress’ power to make, were neither insubstantial nor noncontrovérsial, in view of the legislative history of the original provisions, for example, the venue provisions of the Clayton Act. Nor do I think the legislative history of ! 1404 (a) demonstrates either the insubstantial or the noncontrovérsial nature of the changes in ! 1404 (a), although they seem to have been so treated by those in charge of the bill.2 It is to be noted, moreover, that *74specific attention was drawn to the effect of § 1404 (a) upon § 6 of the Employers’ Liability Act through reference to the Kepner and Miles decisions, but no like specific reference was made to the venue provisions of the Clayton Act and the National City Lines decision.
These matters make it impossible for me to concur in the view that Congress was in fact “fully informed as to the significance of § 1404 (a).” This, however, is a matter affecting congressional procedure and the manner of conducting legislative business. Accordingly, notwithstanding my doubts that Congress intended to go so far, I acquiesce in the Court’s decisions.
[This is also a concurrence in the result in No. 233, Misc.., Kilpatrick v. Texas & P. R. Co., post, p. 75, and No. 269, Misc., United States v. National City Lines, post, p. 78.]
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U. S. 44; Miles v. Illinois Central R. Co., 315 U. S. 698.
“At the same time great care has' been exercised to make no changes in' the existing law which would not meet with' substantially unanimous approval.” S. Rep. No. 1559, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 2. “. . .1 may say that the purpose of this bill is primarily to revise and codify-and to enact into positive law, with such corrections as *74were deemed by the [Senate Judiciary] committee to be of substantial and noncontroversial nature.” 94 Cong. Rec. 7928. For similar expressions by members of the House of Representatives, see Hearings before House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 1600 and H. R. 2055, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, 11. A member of the House Judiciary Committee told the House that the only “controversial aspects” of the 1947 draft of the code were certain subsequently deleted provisions concerning the Tax Court. 93 Cong. Rec. 8390. But cf. the .legislative history of the contemporaneously pending Jennings Bill, citations to which are made in the Court’s opinion.