dissenting.
I agree with the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas but wish to emphasize two objections to the opinion of the Court:
1. Our per curiam opinion in Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U. S. 56, in no way stands for the principle for which the Court cites it today. In Gerende, we upheld a Maryland law that had been interpreted by the highest court of that state to require only an oath' that a candidate “is not a person who is engaged ‘in one way or another in the attempt to overthrow the government by force or violence,’ and that he is not knowingly a member of an organization engaged in such an attempt.” The oath and affidavit in the present case are obviously not so limited.
2. The opinion of the Court creates considerable doubt as to the continued vitality of three of our past decisions: Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333; United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303. To *731this extent it weakens one more of the Constitution’s great guarantees of individual liberty. See, e. g., Dennis v. United States, ante, p. 494, and Breard v. Alexandria, ante, p. 622, decided this day.