dissenting.
There can be no doubt, apart from the limitations of 28 U. S. C. § 2283,1 that the District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1337 2 to issue the injunction sought by the union in this case. This Court so held in Capital Service v. Labor Board, 347 U. S. 501. It is true that the plaintiff in Capital Service was the National Labor Relations Board, but § 1337 is general in terms and makes no distinction between public and private plaintiffs.
Thus, as in Capital Service, the question is whether § 2283, on the facts of this case, precludes the exercise of *522jurisdiction under § 1337. In Capital Service, the Court stated (347 U. S., at 505, n. 2):
“In view of our ruling, we find it unnecessary to consider whether, apart from the specific exceptions contained in § 2283, the District Court was justified in enjoining this intrusion on an exclusive federal jurisdiction. Cf. Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503, 510-511.”
That question is now here.
In the Willingham case, a landlord had obtained-a state court injunction restraining the Price Administrator from issuing certain rent orders under the Emergency Price Control Act. The Price Administrator brought an action in a federal district court to enjoin enforcement of the state court injunction. Exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of rent orders, the Administrator argued, was vested by Congress in the Emergency Court of Appeals. This Court upheld the Administrator’s position. As one ground for its decision that § 265 of the Judicial Code3 — the predecessor of § 2283 — was no bar to the injunction sought by the Administrator, the Court stated (321 U. S., at 511):
“Congress thus preempted jurisdiction in favor of the Emergency Court to the exclusion of state courts. The rule expressed in § 265 which is designed to avoid collisions between state and federal authorities (Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., supra) thus does not come into play.”
*523Thus stood .the law in 1948 when § 265 was succeeded by the present § 2283.4
Contrary to the suggestion of the majority opinion, § 2283 is not broader in scope than its predecessor, § 265. Indeed, the express purpose of § 2283 was to contract — not expand — the prohibition of § 265. The Revisers stated that “An exception as to Acts of Congress relating to bankruptcy was omitted and the general exception substituted to cover all exceptions.” 5 (Italics added.) The only substantive change noted by the Revisers was an overruling of this Court’s decision in Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U. S. 118. The Toucey decision held that § 265 barred a federal court from enjoining a state court in personam proceeding involving a claim previously adjudicated by the federal court. The Revisers, expressly approving the Toucey dissent, stated that “the revised section restores the basic law as generally understood and interpreted prior to the Toucy [sic] decision. Changes were made in phraseology.”6 By enacting § 2283, Congress thus rejected the Toucey decision and its philosophy of judicial inflexibility.7 However imprecise may be the language of § 2283, its legislative history makes it abundantly clear that the provision was not intended to repeal pre-existing exceptions to § 265.
To read § 2283 literally — as the majority opinion does— ignores not only this legislative history but also over a century of judicial history.8 In addition, for the reasons *524pointed out by Mr. Justice Douglas in his dissenting opinion, such a literal interpretation seriously frustrates a comprehensive regulatory scheme established by Congress for the resolution of the kind of labor dispute involved here. The Board, although clearly having exclusive jurisdiction of the subject matter, cannot adjudicate the dispute as long as the employer does not file an unfair labor practice charge; and the employer has no incentive to do so as long as the state court injunction is outstanding. I would reverse.
Section 2283 provides:
“A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.”
Section 1337 provides:
“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade and commerce against restraints and monopolies.”
Section 265 provided :
“The writ of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the United States to stay proceedings in any court of a State, except in cases where such injunction may be authorized by any law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy.” 36 Stat. 1162.
See also Hale v. Bimco Trading Co., 306 U. S. 375, 378; Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, 254 U. S. 175, 183.
H. R. Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. A181.
Id., p. A182.
See Moore’s Commentary on the U. S. Judicial Code (1949) 407, 410; Note, 48 Nw. U. L. Rev. 383 (1953).
See Hart and Wechsler, The Federal Courts and The Federal System (1953), 1075-1076; Moore’s Commentary on the U. S. Judicial Code (1949) 395-407, 410.