De Sylva v. Ballentine

*583Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom Mr. Justice Black joins,

concurring.

The meaning of the word “children” as used in § 24 of the Copyright Act is a federal question. Congress could of course give the word the meaning it has under the laws of the several States. See Hutchinson Investment Co. v. Caldwell, 152 U. S. 65, 68-69; Poff v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 327 U. S. 399, 401. But I would think the statutory policy of protecting dependents would be better served by uniformity, rather than by the diversity which would flow from incorporating into the Act the laws of forty-eight States. Cf. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U. S. 363, 367; National Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 323 U. S. 454, 456; Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U. S. 726, 732; United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U. S. 301, 307.

An illegitimate child was given the benefits of the Federal Death Act by Middleton v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., 70 F. 2d 326, 329-330, where the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit said:

“There is no right of inheritance involved here. It is a statute that confers recovery upon dependents, not for the benefit of an estate, but for those who by our standards are legally or morally entitled to support. Humane considerations and the realization that children are such no matter what their origin alone might compel us to the construction that, under present day conditions, our social attitude warrants a construction different from that of the early English view. The purpose and object of the statute is to continue the support of dependents after a casualty. To hold that these children or the parents do not come within, the terms of the act would be to defeat the purposes of the act. The benefit conferred beyond being for such beneficiaries is for *584society’s welfare in making provision for the support of those who might otherwise become dependent. The rule that a bastard is nullius filius applies only in cases of inheritance. Even in that situation we have made very considerable advances toward giving illegitimates the right of capacity to inherit by admitting them to possess inheritable blood.”

I would take the same approach here and, regardless of state law, hold that illegitimate children were “children” within the meaning of § 24 of the Copyright Act, whether or not state law would allow them dependency benefits.

With this exception, I join in the opinion of the Court.