Gonzales v. United States

Mr. Chief Justice Warren,

with whom Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Douglas, and Mr. Justice Brennan join, dissenting.

I cannot agree with the decision of the Court, for I believe that petitioner has been deprived of a right which is his by statute and regulation — the right to a full hearing. The facts of this case not only indicate a miscarriage of justice, but also underline the significance of the hearing rights which petitioner was never accorded.

Petitioner, a youth of 18 at the time, first claimed exemption as a minister of Jehovah’s Witnesses in 1952, *67describing the extent and nature of his religious activities in a detailed letter to the local selective service board. The board, however, classified him 1-A, and, after an unsuccessful appeal, he was ordered to report for induction. Although he refused to comply with the order, his case was reopened after our decision in Sicurella v. United States, 348 U. S. 385.1 He renewed his claim for exemption, asserting that he was a minister and a conscientious objector, but again the local board ruled adversely. On appeal, the case was referred to the Department of Justice, and petitioner appeared before a hearing officer.

The hearing officer’s report, as summarized by the Department of Justice, was as follows:

“The Hearing Officer reported that registrant gave the appearance of being sincere and firm in his beliefs and that he appeared to be well versed in the scriptures. He found that registrant’s objections are based upon his religious training and beliefs but concluded that he is not opposed to participation in war in any form. He further concluded that registrant was opposed to combatant training and service but not opposed to noncombatant training and service. He, therefore, recommended that registrant be exempt from combatant training and service only.”

This was hardly an astonishing recommendation, inasmuch as the summaries of two F. B. I. investigative reports were entirely — and in my judgment conclusively— favorable. At the time of the first report in 1954, petitioner’s grade-school teachers related that he had been “very cooperative [and] mannerly,” and that he had *68“refused to salute the flag on religious grounds.” His former employers “found him an excellent worker, very serious about his religion and sincere and fair in his dealings.” His neighbors stated that he was “a quiet and orderly young man whose character and reputation are good,” that he was a “very active” member of Jehovah’s Witnesses, and that they considered him to be “sincere in his beliefs.” Petitioner’s references and his fellow members in the sect said that he was “a very active, sincere member,” and that they believed he was “in good faith in his conscientious-objector claim.” The second report, dated 1956, incorporated the first and added the following: Petitioner’s employer regarded him as “an excellent worker, completely reliable, dependable and of excellent morals, character and associates.” His acquaintances, neighbors and religious associates “all spoke favorably concerning [his] character and reputation, conduct and morals,” and reported that he was “very active in . . . church affairs . . . and . . . very devoted to his religious beliefs.” They stated that he “lives up to the teachings of the church and is considered to be sincere in his religious beliefs and in his conscientious-objector claim.” The hearing officer was understandably impressed.

However, the Chief of the Conscientious-Objector Section of the Justice Department, who reviewed the file, took a contrary view. He fastened upon a single item in the file — a matter which had neither been mentioned by the hearing officer nor, for all that appears, relied upon by the local board — and recommended to petitioner’s appeal board that the claim not be sustained. The item in question was the local board’s summary of petitioner’s appearance before it in 1956, which the section chief interpreted to state that petitioner at that time had claimed he was still devoting 100 hours a month to preaching, as his 1952 *69letter to the board had stated.2 Since the investigative reports indicated that petitioner’s status as a Jehovah’s Witness “Pioneer” had terminated in 1953, and that from 1954 to 1956 he had devoted only six and one-half hours *70a month to preaching, the section chief concluded that petitioner's “claim as to the amount of his religious activities is so highly exaggerated ... as to cast doubt upon his veracity and, consequently, upon his sincerity and good faith.”

Petitioner was informed of this recommendation, and wrote to the appeal board as follows:

“. . . I would like to state that I did not at such a time [in 1956] make such a statement or any statement implicating the same. The only time I submitted such information was when I was pioneering that was in the period of October 1, 1952 to April 16, 1953. ... I would like to make it plain that I in no manner ever exaggerated my report concerning my activities. The reason being more than just my respect for mere man, but as a Christian and Bible Student I realize I stand before the Higher Authorities Jehovah God and Jesus Christ, I am also fully aware of the consequences to liars as stated at Proverbs 6:16, 17, 19 showing God hates a lying tongue. I also realize that for one to lie would make void his Christian conduct and worship. So please consider the information here submitted, I am sure the record stands behind it all.”

This statement, set against the background of the information of record regarding petitioner’s character, has the ring of truth. Moreover, it is corroborated by the inherent improbability that petitioner’s oral statement in 1956 would have been a word-for-word and sentence-for-sentence carbon copy of the written statement he had sub*71mitted four years before, down to the request for a personal appearance which he was at that very minute receiving.3 And it should be emphasized that the only evidence that petitioner made such a statement was the board memorandum, set forth in note 2, supra. The most likely explanation is that the local board merely intended to say that petitioner had repeated his basic claim to exemption, and that the board utilized petitioner’s prior letter on the assumption that it described that claim. But, so far as appears, no one in the Department took the trouble to ask the local board precisely what its memorandum meant.

Although the Department’s recommendation was based upon this dubious foundation, the appeal board followed that recommendation. Before the date scheduled for petitioner’s induction, he informed the local board that his wife was pregnant, but the board told him that the notification came too late. Petitioner refused to be inducted, was prosecuted, and was convicted.

The striking thing about this case — aside from the dishonoring of petitioner’s claim — is that he never once received a real opportunity to persuade any Department or selective service officer face to face that he had not lied to the local board, for the accusation was never made until petitioner’s opportunity for oral response had passed. The hearing officer never adverted to the matter, and the Department’s recommendation was made on grounds entirely different from the matters which had been explored at the hearing. It is true, as I have indicated, that petitioner was allowed to file a rebuttal before the appeal board; but that rebuttal was written, not oral. See 32 CFR § 1626.25 (e). Since the issue was one of credibility, it can hardly be maintained that this afforded *72petitioner a fair opportunity to meet an accusation determinative of his case.

Nor can it be said that the Department’s recommendation, and the basis therefor, has no significance. On the contrary, the statute makes the Department proceeding an integral and important part of the classification process; for every appeal must be referred to the Department, and, although the appeal board is not bound to follow the Department’s recommendation, it is admonished by the statute to “give consideration to” it.4 The fact appears to be that these recommendations are followed in over 90% of the cases.5 Moreover; the selective service classification which is given administratively cannot effectively be contested in a criminal proceeding in court, in view of the extremely restricted judicial review of that classification. See Witmer v. United States, 348 U. S. 375. These factors reveal the critical importance of the Department’s recommendation, and, in turn, of the inadequate procedures under which petitioner was permitted to present his claim to the Department.

Congress fully recognized the significance of the Department of Justice stage of the proceeding, for it directed that every appeal be referred to the Department “for inquiry and hearing,” and commanded the Department, “after appropriate inquiry,” to “hold a hearing with respect to the character and' good faith of the objections of the person concerned.” An adverse recommendation is to be made only when “after such hearing the Department of Justice finds that his objections are not sustained.” 6 The regulations are in accord. 32 CFR § 1626.25.

*73In requiring a hearing, Congress did not mean, in my opinion, that a guessing contest would suffice. It is true enough that, prior to the hearing, petitioner could have searched the files and discovered the local board memorandum ; but this opportunity hardly measures up to the traditional concept of a hearing as involving notice of charges. And I think it not amiss, in considering this matter, to note that at the time of his appearance before the local board and the hearing officer, petitioner, a laborer with but an eighth-grade education, was a youth of 22 years of age and was unrepresented by counsel. I doubt that anyone would maintain that there would be a hearing in any true sense of the word if such a person were told by the Department that he could appear and say whatever he wished, but that the Department would not indicate to him what it considered pertinent^-indeed, what it considered conclusive unless rebutted. Yet in substance this is exactly what happened here. I cannot believe that this procedure comports with Congress’ intent.

Nor can I reconcile the Court’s decision with precedent. In Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1, the Court held a government rate order void because the stockyards commission men who were affected by it were not given the “full hearing” required by the pertinent statute. There was no question of these individuals not being allowed to argue their case. In fact, there had been a full and lengthy proceeding for the introduction of evidence, and in addition the parties had been granted an oral argument before the Acting Secretary of Agriculture. But this Court nonetheless found that there had not been a hearing within the meaning of the statute, and phrased its holding in language which is uniquely apropos here:

“The right to a hearing embraces not only the right to present evidence but also a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of the opposing party and to meet *74them. The right to submit argument implies that opportunity; otherwise the right might be but a barren one. Those who are brought into contest with the Government in a quasi-judicial proceeding aimed at the control of their activities are entitled to be fairly advised of what the Government proposes and to be heard upon its proposals before it issues its final command.” Id., at 18-19.

I do not believe that the claim of Raymond Gonzales to a full hearing is less worthy of consideration than the rights of the stockyards commission men in Morgan.

In sum, I am unwilling to attribute to Congress any intent other than one which would guarantee to persons like petitioner every procedural safeguard which appears reasonably designed to insure a fair determination of their claims. We must remember that we are dealing here with a system of universal military service which touches, directly or indirectly, practically every person and every family in this country. When the people are thus brought into contact with the Government, the importance to the commonweal of insuring their confidence in the justness of the program cannot be overemphasized, for to them it is not merely the fairness of a program which is involved, but the fairness of their Government. The sensitivity of Congress to this need is nowhere better demonstrated than in the statutory provisions concerning the treatment of persons claiming exemption as conscientious objectors. As Congress has recognized, one of the most fundamental aspects of our national ethic is a recognition of the worth of the person, acting according to the dictates of his own conscience. And thus it is that, even in formulating legislation deemed to be of prime importance to the very existence of the Nation, Congress refrained from impressing into military service those who by religious conviction find war an affront to God and morality. The *75desire of Congress that such beliefs be respected is further reflected by its unwillingness to entrust to á local board the final authority to pass upon the claims of conscientious objectors. Instead, Congress provided for an appeal within the selective service system, together with a hearing in the Department of Justice. In determining what Congress intended by these statutory provisions, we must not forget the nature of the program with which we are dealing, nor must we forget that most of the subjects of governmental action in these cases are inexperienced youths, many only 18 years of age, often unrepresented by attorneys. I am unwilling to give to a statute conceived in such a context a construction which results in a young man of unblemished reputation, who claims religious scruples, being sent to prison for 15 months without having received a full and fair consideration of his case. I say this with assurance that Congress did not intend that these humanitarian benefits of the Act be accorded grudgingly.

I dissent.

In Sicurella, which involved a member of Jehovah’s Witnesses, we held that the petitioner’s willingness to fight in defense of his “ministry, Kingdom Interests, and ... his fellow brethren” was not, under the .circumstances, a sufficient basis upon which to deny him exemption as a conscientious objector.

The local board memorandum reads in full as follows:

“When asked by the members of Local Board No. 9, Boulder, Colorado, if he thought he was entitled to any other classification than that of I-A, Mr. Gonzales replied, T am a minister and as such should be classified 4-D. Also, a minister is automatically classified as a conscientious objector.’ The board replied that this statement was in error.

“Mr. Gonzales then went on to say that he had always made the claim that he was a minister even at the very beginning of his registration. He still made the statement that if I am a minister I am a conscientious objector.

“When asked if he would participate in the conscientious objector work program, he stated definitely not.

“Mr. Gonzales stated ‘I am a regular minister as defined under section 16 G part II of the laws and regulations set out by Selective Service Act of 1948. At present I am devoting an average of 100 hours a month to actual preaching publicly and from house to house, and an additional 60-75 hours in preparation for ministerial duties such as; preparation for home bible studies; calling back on good-will persons; attending congregational meetings, as well as training students to become ministers. I also serve as Stock Servant for the local congregation. As you perhaps already know that the Selective Service National Headquarters has determined that Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society constitutes a recognized religious organization and that all Jehovah’s Witnesses who are regularly and customarily teaching and preaching the doctrines and principles of the Bible as advocated by Jehovah’s Witnesses as a vocation and not incidentally are entitled to exemption as ministers of religion. These are some of the reasons I request a 4~D classification, so I would like for you to further .consider my case as a minister of the gospel or would like to appear in person before the local board members for further consideration or discussion in regard to my case!

“When asked by the board if he had any further information to submit, he stated he submitted no new evidence except what was *70stated above, but would like to submit a certificate of marriage as the only new matter to be brought before the board.”

The italicized portion repeats the statement petitioner made in his 1952 letter to the local board. The significance of this repetition is discussed infra.

See the italicized portion of the board’s memorandum, note 2, supra.

62 Stat. 613, as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. § 456 (j).

See Smith and Bell, “The Conscientious-Objector Program — A Search for Sincerity,” 19 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 695, 702.

Note 4, supra.