dissenting.
Petitioner swore in his application for naturalization that he had never been under arrest when in fact he had been arrested in New Haven, Connecticut, on three separate occasions within an eight-month period. The arrests were for distributing handbills in a public street, making “an oration, harangue, or other public demonstration” in a public park and a “general breach of the peace.” Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals have found that petitioner’s falsification “was an intentional concealment of a material fact and a willful misrepresentation which foreclosed the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the district court from making a further investigation as to whether he had all the qualifications for citizenship . . . .” These findings, as such, are not disputed. It is nowhere suggested, for example, that the petitioner’s falsehoods were the result of inadvertence or forgetfulness — that they were anything but deliberate lies. This Court, however, brushes these findings aside on the ground 1 that the arrests “were not reflections on the char*357acter of the man seeking citizenship.” The Swiss philosopher Amiel tells us that “character is an historical fruit and is the result of a man’s biography.” Petitioner’s past, if truthfully told in his application, would have been an odorous one. So bad that he dared not reveal it. For the Court to reward his dishonesty is nothing short of an open invitation to false swearing to all who seek the high privilege of American citizenship.
The Court first says that arrests of this nature, “the crimes charged, and the disposition of the cases do not bring them, inherently, even close to the requirement of ‘clear, unequivocal, and convincing’ evidence that naturalization was illegally procured.” The Court, of course, knows that this is not the applicable test where one has deliberately falsified his papers and thus foreclosed further investigation. This basis for the reversal, therefore, misses the point involved and should have been of no consequence here.
The test is not whether the truthful answer in itself, or the facts discovered through an investigation prompted by that answer, would have justified a denial of citizenship. It is whether the falsification, by misleading the examining officer, forestalled an investigation which might have resulted in the defeat of petitioner’s application for naturalization. The Courts of Appeals are without disagreement on this point2 and it is, of course, *358a necessary rule in order to prevent the making of misrepresentations for the very purpose of forestalling inquiry as to eligibility. The question as to arrests is highly pertinent to the issue of satisfactory moral character, the sine qua non of good citizenship. Petitioner’s false answer to the question shut off that line of inquiry and was a fraud on the Government and the naturalization court. The majority makes much of the fact that the arrests occurred prior to the five-year statutory period of good behavior, but that is of no consequence. Concealment at the very time of naturalization is the issue here and that act of deliberate falsification before an officer of the Government clearly relates to the petitioner’s general moral character. Indeed, the Congress has long made it a felony punishable by imprisonment for a maximum of five years. Certainly this does not fall within a class of peccadilloes which may be overlooked as being without “reflections on the character of the man seeking citizenship.” In fact it strips an offender of all civil rights and leaves a shattered character that only a presidential pardon can mend.
The Court concludes that the false denial of prior arrests was “neutral” because the petitioner revealed in his preliminary application that he was an employee of the International Workers Order, which the Court adds, “is said to be controlled by the Communist Party.” . What the Court fails to point out is that the sole evidence, in this record, as to the International Workers Order was presented in 1955, 15 years after petitioner’s deception of the examiner. There is no evidence that the examiner knew anything about that organization other than what *359petitioner had told him. And there is nothing whatever in the record that would have even indicated that I. W. 0. was communistic in 1940. What was there to prompt the examiner to investigate it at that time? The truth of the matter is that in his final naturalization application petitioner said he was employed by the “Fraternal Benefit Society of Internation [sic] .Workers Order,” a name which would lead one to believe that it was an insurance society. Surely the Court is not charging the examiner and the naturalization court with the dereliction of admitting petitioner to our citizenship knowing that he was connected with a Communist organization. In fact the testimony at the trial indicates that the Communist Party did not take over the leadership of the International Workers Order until 1941,3 a year after petitioner was naturalized. It is also well to remember that the Attorney General did not list it as subversive until 1947, although lists of subversive organizations had been issued prior to that date.
As I read the record, it clearly supports the findings of the two courts below. Even if petitioner had told the truth, and the conduct causing the arrests was found not to relate to his present fitness for naturalization, it does not follow that citizenship would have been awarded. It might well have been that in checking on the handbills, the harangue in the public park, and the general breach of the peace the investigator would have been led to discover that petitioner was, in 1940, a leader in the Communist Party. I think it more logical than not that the Government would have discovered petitioner’s Communist affiliations through such an investigation, and that the deliberate falsification in 1940 forestalled this revelation *360for 15 years. But whether or not that be the case, the Government was entitled to an honest answer from one who sought admission to its citizenship. We should exact the highest standards of probity and fitness from all applicants. American citizenship is a valuable right. It is prized highly by us who have it and it is sought eagerly by millions who do not. It is asking little enough of those who would be vested with its privileges to demand that they tell the truth.
I would affirm.
The Court says that “[t]he totality of the circumstances surrounding the offenses charged makes them of extremely slight consequence.” However, it overlooks the fact that neither the conte'nt of the handbills or of the harangue in the park nor the nature of the conduct leading to the conviction in the city court for a general breach of the peace appears in the record. Time has served petitioner well, for even the disposition of the cases is not too clear. But *357to extrapolate the character of petitioner’s conduct solely from these meager circumstances smacks of the psychic. Moreover, to say that the offenses “did not . . . involve moral turpitude” is gratuitous. This Court has never so held.
Corrado v. United States, 227 F. 2d 780 (C. A. 6th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U. S. 925; United States v. Montalbano, 236 F. 2d 757 (C. A. 3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Genovese v. United States, 352 U. S. 952; United States v. humantes, 139 F. Supp. 574 (D. C. N. D. Calif.), aff’d per curiam, 232 F. 2d 216 (C. A. 9th Cir.); Stacher v. United States, 258 F. 2d 112 (C. A. 9th Cir.), cert. denied, *358358 U. S. 907; United States v. Accardo, 113 F. Supp. 783 (D. C. D. N. J.), aff’d per curiam, 208 F. 2d 632 (C. A. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U. S. 952. Cf. United States v. Sweet, 106 F. Supp. 634, 635 (D. C. E. D. Mich.), aff’d per curiam, 211 F. 2d 118 (C. A. 6th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U. S. 817.
The sole witness on this point testified that “in 1941 ... a number of us from the Communist Party were sent into that organization by the Communist Party into leadership to give more political content and strength and guidance for that organization.”