delivered the opinion of the Court.
The questions presented by this case are similar to those involved in No. 28, Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, decided today, ante, p. 36.
' In 1954 petitioner, George Anastaplo, an instructor and research assistant at the University of Chicago, having previously passed his Illinois bar examinations, was denied admission to the bar of that State by the Illinois Supreme Court.1 The denial was based upon his refusal to answer *84questions of the Committee on Character and Fitness as to whether he was a member of the Communist Party.2 This Court, two Justices dissenting, refused review. 348 U. S. 946. In 1957, following this Court’s decisions in the earlier Konigsberg case, 353 U. S. 252, and in Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, 353 U. S. 232, Anastaplo sought to have the Character Committee rehear his application for certification. The Committee, by a divided vote, refused, but the State Supreme Court reversed and directed rehearing.3
*85The ensuing lengthy proceedings before the Committee,4 at which Anastaplo was the only witness, are perhaps best described as a wide-ranging exchange between the Committee and Anastaplo in which the Committee sought to explore Anastaplo’s ability conscientiously to swear support of the Federal and State Constitutions, as required by the Illinois attorneys’ oath, and Anastaplo undertook to expound and defend, on historical and ideological premises, his abstract belief in the “right of revolution,” and to resist, on grounds of asserted constitutional right and scruple, Committee questions which he deemed improper.5 The Committee already had before it uncontroverted evidence as to Anastaplo’s “good moral character,” in the form of written statements or affidavits *86furnished by persons of standing acquainted with him, and the record on rehearing contains nothing which could properly be considered as reflecting adversely upon his character or reputation or on the sincerity of the beliefs' he espoused before the Committee.6 Anastaplo persisted, however, in refusing to answer, among other inquiries,7 the Committee’s questions as to his possible membership in the Communist Party or in other allegedly related organizations.
Thereafter the Committee, by a vote of 11 to 6, again declined to certify Anastaplo because of his refusal to answer such questions, the majority stating in its report to the Illinois'Supreme Court:
“his [Anastaplo’s] failure to reply, in our .view, (i) obstructs the lawful processes of the Committee, (ii) prevents inquiry into subjects which bear intimately upon the issue of character and fitness, such as loyalty to our basic institutions, belief in representative government and bona fides of the attorney’s oath and (iii) results in his failure to meet the burden of establishing that he possesses the good moral character and fitness to practice law, which are conditions to the granting of a license to practice law.
“We draw no inference of disloyalty or subversion from applicant’s continued refusal to answer questions concerning Communist or other subversive affiliations. We do, however, hold that there is a strong public interest in our being free to question applicants for admission to the bar on their adherence to our basic institutions and form of government *87and that such public interest in the character of its attorneys overrides an applicant’s private interest in keeping such views to himself. By failing to respond to this higher public interest we hold that the applicant has obstructed the proper functions of the Committee. ... We cannot certify the applicant as worthy of the trust and confidence of the public when we do not know that he is so worthy and when he has prevented us from finding out.”
At the same time the full Committee acknowledged that Anastaplo
“is well regarded by his academic associates, by professors who had taught him in school and by members of the Bar who know him personally . . ;
that it had
“not been supplied with any information by any third party which is derogatory to Anastaplo’s character or general reputation . .
and that it had
“received no information from any outside source which would cast any doubt on applicant’s loyalty or which would tend to connect him in any manner with any subversive group.”
Further, the majority found that Anastaplo’s views
“with respect to the right to overthrow the government by force or violence, while strongly libertarian and expressed with an intensity and fervor not necessarily shared by all good citizens, are not inconsistent with those held by many patriotic Americans both at the present time and throughout the course of this country’s history and do not in and of themselves reveal any adherence to subversive doctrines.”
*88Upon review, the Illinois Supreme Court, over three dissents,8 confirmed the Committee’s report and refusal to certify Anastaplo, reaffirming in its per curiam opinion the court’s
“. . . earlier conclusion that a determination as to whether an applicant can in good conscience take the attorney’s oath to support and defend the constitutions of the United States and the State of Illinois is impossible where he refuses to state whether he is a member of a group dedicated to the overthrow of the government of the United States by force and violence.” 18 Ill. 2d 182, 200-201, 163 N. E. 2d 429, 439.
We granted certiorari, 362 U. S. 968, and set the matter for argument along with the Konigsberg case, ante, p. 36, and Cohen v. Hurley, post, p. 117.
Two of the basic issues in this litigation have been settled by our contemporary Konigsberg opinion. We have there held it not constitutionally impermissible for a State legislatively, or through court-made regulation as here and in Konigsberg, to adopt a rule that an applicant will not be admitted to the practice of law if, and so long as, by refusing to answer matérial questions, he obstructs a bar examining committee in its proper functions of interrogating and cross-examining him upon his qualifications. That such was a proper function of the Illinois Character Committee is incontestably established by the opinions of the State Supreme Court in this case. 3 Ill. *892d, at 476, 121 N. E. 2d, at 829; 18 Ill. 2d, at 188, 163 N. E. 2d, at 432.9
We have also held in Konigsberg that the State's interest in enforcing such a rule as applied to refusals to answer questions about membership in the Communist Party outweighs any deterrent effect upon freedom of speech and association, and hence that such state action does not offend the Fourteenth Amendment.10 We think that in this respect no valid constitutional distinction can be based on the circumstance that in Konigsberg there was some, though weak, independent evidence that the applicant had once been connected with the Communist Party, while here there was no such evidence as to *90Anastaplo. Where, as with membership in the bar, the State may withhold a privilege available only to those possessing the requisite qualifications, it is of no constitutional significance whether the State’s interrogation of an applicant on matters relevant to these qualifications— in this case Communist Party membership — is prompted by information which it already has about him from other sources, or arises merely from a good faith belief in the need for exploratory or testing questioning of the applicant. Were it otherwise, a bar examining committee such as this, having no resources of its own for independent investigation, might be placed in the untenable position of having to certify an applicant without assurance as to a significant aspect of his qualifications which the applicant himself is best circumstanced to supply. The Constitution does not so unreasonably fetter the States.11
Two issues, however, do arise upon this record which are not disposed of by Konigsberg. The first is whether Anastaplo was given adequate warning as to the consequences of his refusal to answer the Committee’s questions relating to Communist Party membership. The second is whether his exclusion from the bar on this ground was, in the- circumstances of this case, arbitrary ■ or discriminatory.
I.
The opinions below reflect full awareness on the part of the Character Committee and the Illinois Supreme Court of Anastaplo’s constitutional right to be warned in advance of the consequences of his refusal to answer.12 *91Cf. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U. S., at 261. On the part of Anastaplo, he stands in the unusual position of one who had already been clearly so warned as a result of his earlier exclusion from the bar for refusal to answer the very question which was again put to him on rehearing. See note 2, supra. Anastaplo nevertheless, contends in effect that he was lulled into a false, sense of security by various occurrences at the Committee hearings: (1) several statements by Committee members indicating that all questions asked and refused an answer should not be considered as bearing the same level of importance in the eyes of the Committee;13 and (2) a statement by one of the principal Committee members that Illinois had no “per se” rule of exclusion, that is that Anastaplo’s refusal to answer would not automatically operate to exclude him from the bar.14
*92These suggestions, whether taken separately or together, can only be viewed as insubstantial. The sum and substance of the matter is that throughout the renewed proceedings petitioner was fully aware that his application for admission had already once been rejected on the very ground about which he now professes to have been left in doubt, and that the Committee made manifest both that it continued to attach special importance- to its Communist Party affiliation questions, and that adverse *93consequences might well follow if Anastaplo persisted in refusing to answer them.
What follows will suffice to show that statements to the effect that the Committee as a whole did not necessarily approve or adopt every question asked by any of its members can hardly be taken as having left petitioner in doubt as to the central importance and general approval of questions about Communist Party membership. At an early stage of the proceedings Anastaplo was informed:
“Now you have asked for a warning when we put a question to you that we think is a pivotal, important question in connection with your qualification. I must tell you that we consider that question, ‘Are you a member of the Communist Party,’ such a question; and that the refusal to answer it may have serious consequences to your application.”
And at the last hearing one of the leading Committee members responded to Anastaplo’s insistence on being told even more explicitly what refusals to answer would be of significance to the Committee, by pointing out that
“The Supreme Court of Illinois has ruled that it is proper for us to ask you whether you are a member of the Communist Party. You have refused to answer the question.”15
Further, petitioner’s repeated objections throughout the hearings to the effect that there was no basis for the Committee’s evident purpose to give much greater emphasis to questions about Communist Party membership than to other unanswered inquiries, dispel any doubt that *94Anastaplo was quite aware that Communist-affiliation questions were to be treated differently from other questions he had refused to answer.
The other aspect of petitioner’s claim on lack of adequate warning is equally untenable. It is true that the Committee told Anastaplo that his refusal to answer questions would not ipso jacto result in his exclusion from the bar, but only that it “could and might.” This, however, certainly did not give rise to constitutional infirmity. Even as to one charged with crime due process does not demand that he be warned as to what specific sanction will be applied to him if he violates the law. It is enough that he know what sanction “could and might” be visited on him. Anastaplo was entitled to no more. It is of course indubitable that by reason of the original rejection of his application, Anastaplo knew of Illinois’ rule of exclusion for refusal to answer relevant questions — indeed the very questions involved here.16
Petitioner having been fairly warned that exclusion from admission to practice might follow from his refusal to answer, it must be found that this requirement of due process was duly met.
II.
Petitioner’s claim that the application of the State’s exclusionary rule was arbitrary and discriminatory in the circumstances of this case must also be rejected. It is contended (1) that Anastaplo’s refusal to answer these *95particular questions did not obstruct the Committee’s investigation, because that body already had before it uncontroverted evidence establishing petitioner’s good character and fitness for the practice of law; and (2) that the real reason why the State proceeded as it did was because of its disapproval of Anastaplo’s constitutionally protected views on the right to resist tyrannical government. Neither contention can be accepted.
It is sufficient to say in answer to the first contention that even though the Committee already had before it substantial character evidence altogether favorable to Anastaplo, there is nothing in the Federal Constitution which required the Committee to draw the curtain upon its investigation at that point. It had the right to supplement that evidence and to test the applicant’s own credibility by interrogating him. And to those ends the Committee could insist upon unprivileged answers to relevant questions, such as we have held in our today’s Konigsberg opinion those relating to Communist affiliations were, even though as to them the Committee could not, as it did not, draw an unfavorable inference from refusal to answer. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, supra.
As to the second contention, there is nothing in the record which would justify our holding that the State has invoked its exclusionary refusal-to-answer rule as a mask for its disapproval of petitioner’s notions on the right to overthrow tyrannical government.17 While the Committee’s majority report does observe that there was “a serious question” whether Anastaplo’s views on the right to resist judicial decrees would be compatible with his taking of the attorney’s oath, and that “certain” members of the Committee thought that such views affirma*96tively demonstrated his disqualification for admission to the bar,18 it is perfectly clear that the Illinois Bar Committee and Supreme Court regarded petitioner’s refusal to cooperate in the Committee’s examination of him as the basic and only reason for a denial of certification.19
A different conclusion is not suggested by the circumstances that the Committee when it reheard Anastaplo evinced its willingness to consider the effect of petitioner’s refusal to answer in light of what might transpire at the hearings, and that it continued to explore petitioner’s views on resistance and overthrow long after it became clear that he would refuse to answer Communist-affiliation questions. These factors indicate no more than that the Committee was attempting to exercise an informed judgment as to whether the situation was an appropriate one for waiver of the Committee’s continuing requirement, earlier enforced after the first Anastaplo hearings, that such questions must be answered. Finally, contrary to the assumption on which some of the arguments on behalf of Anastaplo seem to have proceeded, we do not understand that Illinois’ exclusionary requirement will continue to operate to exclude Anastaplo from the bar any longer than he continues in his refusal to answer. We *97find nothing to suggest that he would not be admitted now if he decides to answer, assuming of course that no grounds justifying his exclusion from practice resulted. In short, petitioner holds the key to admission in his own hands.
We conclude with observing that our function here is solely one of constitutional adjudication, not to pass judgment on what has been done as if we were another state court of review, still less to express any view upon the wisdom of the State’s action. With appropriate regard for the limited range of our authority we cannot say that the State’s denial of Anastaplo’s application for admission to its bar offends the Federal Constitution.20 The judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court must therefore be
Affirmed.
The Illinois procedure for admission to the bar was thus summarized by the State Supreme Court (3 Ill. 2d, at 475-476, 121 N. E. 2d, at 829):
“In the exercise of its judicial power over the bar, and in discharge of its responsibility for the choice of personnel who will compose that bar, this court has adopted Rule 58, (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 110, par. 259.58,) which governs admissions and provides, among other things, that applicants shall be admitted to the practice of law by this court after satisfactory examination by the Board of Examiners and certification of approval by a Committee on Character and Fitness. Section IX of the rule provides for the creation of such committees and imposes upon them the duty to examine applicants who appear before them for moral character, general fitness to practice law and good citizenship. Still another condition precedent to admission to practice law in this State, imposed by the legislature, is the taking of an oath to support the constitution of *84the United States and the constitution of the State of Illinois. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 13, par. 4.)”
On that occasion the State Supreme Court said (3 Ill. 2d, at 480, 121 N. E. 2d, at 831):
“It is our opinion, therefore, that a member of the Communist Party may, because of such membership, be unable truthfully and in good conscience to take the oath required as a condition for admission to practice, and we hold that it is relevant to inquire of an applicant as to his membership in that party. A negative answer to the question, if accepted as true, would end the inquiry on the point. If the truthfulness of a negative answer were doubted, further questions and information to test the veracity of the applicant would be proper. If an affirmative answer were received, further inquiry into the applicant’s innocence or knowledge as to the subversive nature of the organization would be relevant. Under any hypothesis, therefore, questions as to membership in the Communist Party or known subversive 'front’ organizations were relevant to the inquiry into petitioner’s fitness for admission to the bar. His refusal to answer has prevented the committee from inquiring fully into his general fitness and good citizenship and justifies their refusal to-issue a certificate.”
In remanding the matter to the Character Committee, the Illinois Supreme Court stated (see 18 Ill. 2d, at 186, 163 N. E. 2d, at 431):
“ 'The principal question presented by the petition for rehearing concerns the significance of the applicant’s views as to the overthrow of government by force in the light of Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U. S. 252, and Yates v. United States, 1 L. ed. 2d 1356, 77 S. Ct. 1064. Additional questions presented concern the applicant’s activities since his original application was denied, and his present reputation.
*85“ 'We are of the opinion that the Committee should have allowed the petition for rehearing and heard evidence on these matters, and the Committee is requested to do so, and to report the evidence and its conclusions.’ ”
The proceedings consumed six hearing days, and resulted in a transcript of over 400 pages.
More particularly: petitioner was first asked routine questions about his personal history. He refused, on constitutional grounds, to answer whether he was affiliated with any church. He answered all questions about organizational relationships so long as he did not know that the organization was “political” in character. He refused, on grounds of protected free speech and association, to answer whether he was a member of the Communist Party or of any other group named in the Attorney General's list of “subversive” organizations, including the Ku Klux Klan and the Silver Shirts of America.
Much of the ensuing five sessions was devoted to discussion of Anastaplo’s reasons for believing that inquiries into such matters were constitutionally privileged, and to an unjustifiable attempt, later expressly repudiated by the Committee, to delve into the consistency of petitioner’s religious beliefs with an attorney’s duty to take an oath of office.
A substantial part of the proceedings revolved around Anastaplo’s views as to the right to revolt against tyrannical government, and the right to resist judicial decrees in exceptional circumstances.
Although the transcript of the prior Committee proceedings has not been made part of the record before us, it is evident that it contained nothing which affirmatively reflected unfavorably on petitioner’s character or reputation.
See note 5, supra.
Two dissenting opinions were filed. Justice Bristow dissented on constitutional grounds. 18 Ill. 2d, at 201, 163 N. E. 2d, at 439. Justices Schaefer and Davis, joining in a single opinion, did not reach the constitutional questions. 18 Ill. 2d, at 224, 163 N. E. 2d, at 928.
In its second opinion, the State Supreme Court stated (18 Ill. 2d, at 188, 163 N. E. 2d, at 432):
“The committee further advises us that it has conducted no independent investigation into Anastaplo’s character, reputation or activities. For the very practical reason that the committee has no personnel or other resources for any such investigation, the committee states that it has traditionally asserted the view that it cannot be expected to carry the burden of establishing, by independent investigation, whether .an applicant possesses the requisite character and fitness for admission to the bar and that a duty devolves upon the applicant to establish that he possesses the necessary qualifications and that it is then the duty of the committee to test, by hearings and questioning of the applicant, the worth of the evidence which he proffers. We agree, and have held that the discretion exercised by the Committee on Character and Fitness will not ordinarily be reviewed. In re Frank, 293 Ill. 263.”
The fact that in Konigsberg the materiality of questions relating to Communist Party membership rested directly on the existence of a California statute disqualifying from membership in the bar those advocating forcible overthrow of government, whereas here materiality stemmed from their bearing upon the likelihood that a bar applicant would observe as a lawyer the orderly processes • that lie at the roots of this country’s legal and political systems, cf. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S. 109, is of course a circumstance of no significance.
Cf. Garner v. Los Angeles Board, 341 U. S. 716; American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382.
The Committee's majority report states:
“The Committee repeatedly warned the applicant that questions regarding Communist affiliation were viewed as important by the *91Committee members and that his failure to respond to them could adversely affect his application for admission to the bar.”
The Illinois Supreme Court stated (18 Ill. 2d, at 196, 163 N. E. 2d, at 436):
“. . .no problem exists as to inadequate notice of the consequences of a refusal to answer; the applicant was specifically notified both by the Illinois Supreme Court in its opinion in 3 111. 2d 471, and by the committee on rehearing that his continued refusal to answer might lead to the denial of his application.”
It was stated at one point in the Committee hearings: “It has been pointed out before to you, that the mere fact that a question is asked does not indicate that. other people would have asked or approved that question, nor does it indicate that any particular weight will be attached to the answer or failure to answer the question; do you understand?” It should be observed, however, that this remark, as was also the case with an earlier similar remark, was made in the context of questions involving petitioner’s religious beliefs. See note 5, supra.
This aspect of Anastaplo’s contention is based on the following episode relating to the Committee’s Communist Party questions:
“Mr. Anastaplo: ... I would like to find out exactly what this *92entails. You are not suggesting that refusal to answer that question would per se block my admission to the bar?
“Commissioner Stephan: No, I am saying your refusal to answer that question as to whether you are a member of the Communist Party, could and might.
“Mr. Anastaplo: I see.
“Commissioner Stephan: To us, it is relevant to your character and fitness. If you should answer the question 'yes,' I am not at all sure that would end the inquiry. I think if you should answer it 'yes,' the committee should be entitled to probe further and find out what kind of Communist Party member the applicant might be, whether he is an active member, whether he is a dues-paying member, whether he is a policy-making member, whether he is an officer in a local group, or just what he is. So I would point out the seriousness of that issue to you at this time.
“Mr. Anastaplo: I assume that the committee does not care to state why this is a particularly serious issue with respect to me? I mean — I notice you say nothing about the Ku Klux Klan or the Silver Shirts of America, about which you have also asked with the same amount of emphasis up to this point, and which I have refused to answer for the same reasons. Would you care to indicate why you say this about this question and not about the other ones?
“Commissioner Stephan: I think there is an easy answer to that. This committee has not come into being — this committee cannot completely ignore the history of this proceeding.
“Commissioner-: But the history includes that question, and that question has been before two of the high courts of the country.
“Commissioner Stephan: Whatever the relevance of other questions, we consider that one quite relevant.”-
The particular importance which the Committee attached to its Communist Party questions was still further brought home to Anastaplo by the fact that after this Court’s decisions in Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U. S. 399, and Lerner v. Casey, 357 U. S. 468, had come down, the Committee wrote Anastaplo specifically drawing his attention to them.
We find it difficult to understand how it can be seriously suggested, as it further is, that petitioner was put off guard by the fact that instead of standing on petitioner’s mere refusal to answer such questions, the Committee proceeded to interrogate him widely. Not only are subsequent events generally irrelevant to an earlier warning, but a large part of the questioning which Anastaplo now complains led him astray was in fact devoted to exploring' the bearing of these questions on his fitness for admission to the bar and his reasons for declining to answer them.
Both the Committee’s report and the State Supreme Court’s opinion make it apparent that this area of Anastaplo’s views played no part in his exclusion from the bar. See pp. 86-88, supra; 18 Ill. 2d, at 188, 163 N. E. 2d, at 432.
This of course could hardly be so in the context of the illustrations which Anastaplo gave of his views as to when a right to resist might arise. These were: Nazi Germany; Hungary during the 1956 revolt against Russia; a hypothetical decree of this Court establishing “some dead pagan religion as the official religion of the country . . .”; a capital sentence of Jesus Christ. Asked to give a more realistic instance of when resistance would be proper, Anastaplo summarized: “I know of no decree, off hand, in the history of American government, where such a single instance has occurred. No — I grant that it is hard -to find these instances. I think it is important to insist that there might be such instances.” Nothing in the State Court’s opinion remotely suggests its approbation of these views of “certain” Committee members.
Supra, pp. 86-88.
Apart from anything else, there is of course no room under our Rules for the suggestion made in petitioner’s brief that he be admitted to the Bar of this Court, “independently of the. action Illinois might be induced to take.” See Rule 5, Revised Rules of this Court.