delivered the opinion of the Court.
On the night of January 2, 1936, Dr. Silber C. Peacock, a Chicago physician, left his Edgewater Beach apartment in response to an emergency telephone call to attend a sick child. He never returned. The next day his lifeless body was found in his automobile on a Chicago street. It was apparent that he had been brutally murdered. On Wednesday, March 25, 1936, the petitioner, *434Emil Reck, and three others were arrested by the Chicago police on suspicion of stealing bicycles. Late the following Saturday afternoon Reck confessed to participation in the murder of Dr. Peacock. The. next day he signed another written confession. At Reek’s subsequent trial in the Criminal Court of Cook County, Illinois, the two confessions were, over timely objection, received in evidence against him. The jury found Reck guilty of murder, and he was sentenced to prison for a term of 199 years.
The conviction was affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court, People v. Reck, 392 Ill. 311, 64 N. E. 2d 526. Several years later Reck filed a petition under the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act, alleging that his confessions had been procured by coercion and that their use as evidence at his trial had, therefore, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 After a hearing, the Criminal Court of Cook County denied relief. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the Criminal Court’s finding that due process had not been violated at Reek’s trial. Reck v. People, 7 Ill. 2d 261, 130 N. E. 2d 200. This Court denied certiorari “without prejudice to an application for a writ of habeas corpus in an appropriate United States District Court.” Reck v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 942.
Reck then filed a petition for habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The writ issued, and at the hearing the District Court received in evidence the transcripts of all relevant proceedings in the Illinois courts.2 In an opin*435ion reviewing in detail the circumstances surrounding Reek’s confession, the District Court held “the Due Process Clause not violated in the instant case.” 172 F. Supp. 734. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, one judge dissenting, 274 F. 2d 250, and we granted certiorari, 363 U. S. 838. The only question presented is whether the State of Illinois violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by using as evidence at Reek’s trial confessions which he had been coerced into making.
The question whether there has been a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by the introduction of an involuntary confession is one which it is the ultimate responsibility of this Court to determine. See Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401, 404; Thomas v. Arizona, 356 U. S. 390, 393; Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49, 51-52. After thoroughly reviewing the record in this case, we are satisfied that the district judge’s summary of the undisputed facts is accurate and complete. Neither in brief nor oral argument did the respondent take issue with these findings. No useful purpose would be served by attempting to paraphrase the district judge’s words:
“. . . Emil Reck was at the 'time of this horrible crime but nineteen years old. Throughout his life he had been repeatedly classified as mentally retarded and deficient by psychologists and psychiatrists of the Institute for Juvenile Research in Chicago. At one time he had been committed to an institution for the feebleminded, where he had spent a year. He dropped out of school at the age of 16, never having completed the 7th grade, and was found to have the intelligence of a child between 10 and 11 years of age at the time of his trial. Aside from his retardation, he was never a behavior problem and bore no criminal record.
*436“Reek was arrested in Chicago without a warrant at 11:00 a. m.- Wednesday, March 26, 1936, on suspicion of stealing bicycles. He was then shuttled between the North Avenue Police Station and the Shakespeare Avenue Police Station until 1:15 p. m., at which time he was returned to the North Avenue Police Station and there interrogated mainly about bicycle thefts until 6:30 or 7:00 p. m. He was then taken to the Warren Avenue Police Station where he spent the night. During this time he was fed a ham sandwich and coffee at the North Avenue Station and a bologna sausage sandwich at the North Avenue Station and a bologna sausage sandwich at the Warren Avenue Station.
“On Thursday, at 10:00 a. m., Reck was brought back to the North Avenue Station where he was interrogated some six or seven hours about various crimes in the District. Afterwards, he was sent to the Shakespeare Station and later that evening he was taken downtown to the Detective Bureau where he was exhibited at a so-called ‘show-up.’ The record does not indicate where Reck spent the night. The record shows that Reck was fed an egg sandwich and a glass of milk on Thursday but apparently nothing else.
“The record is silent as to where Reck spent Friday morning but it is clear that interrogation was resumed sometime in the early afternoon. Friday evening over one hundred people congregated in the North Avenue Police Station where Reck was exhibited on the second floor. Shortly after 7:00 p. m. Reck fainted and was brought to the Cook County Hospital where he was examined by an intern who found no marks or bruises upon his body and rejected him for treatment. Reck was then taken directly back *437to the North Avenue Station where he was immediately again placed on exhibition. He again became sick and was taken to an unfurnished handball room, where a Sergeant Aitken, assigned to the Peacock murder investigation, questioned him about the Peacock murder for a short period of time. Reck again became sick and a Dr. Abraham was called who later testified that Reck was' extremely nervous, that he was exposed and that his shirt was unbuttoned and hanging outside of his pants. He was rubbing his abdomen and complaining of pain in that region. After an examination of 60 to 90 seconds, Dr. Abraham left and Reck was questioned intermittently and exhibited to civilians until approximately 9:30 p. m. when he became ill and vomited a considerable amount of blood on the floor.
“Reck was again brought to the Cook County Hospital at 10:15 p. m. on Friday where he was placed in a ward and given injections of morphine, atropine, and ipecac twice during the evening. At about 2:00 a. m. two physicians, Doctor Scatliff and Doctor Day, who were members of a Chicago Medical Society which had been assisting the police in the Peacock murder came at the request of Prosecutor Kearney to see if there were any marks of brutality on Reck. They found the door to Reek’s room barred by a police officer. After securing permission from one, Police Captain O’Connell, they went in and found Reck asleep and therefore made only a cursory examination in the dark which revealed nothing conclusive. At 9:00 a. m. on Saturday, Reck told Dr. Zachary Felsher of the Cook County Hospital that the police had been beating him in the stomach. He also told Dr. Weissman of the same hospital that he had been beaten in the abdomen and chest over *438a three-day period. This was the first time since his arrest some 70 hours before that Reck had conversed with any civilian outside the presence of police officers. His father had attempted to see Reck on Thursday and Friday at the North Avenue Police Station and on Saturday at the Cook County Hospital. Each time he was refused.
“At 9:30 a. m. on Saturday, Reck was removed from the hospital in a wheelchair and was questioned about the Peacock murder as soon as he was transferred into Captain O’Connell’s car to be transported to the North Avenue Police Station, where the questioning continued until the afternoon, when he was taken to the State’s Attorney’s office at approximately 2:00 p.m.
“Previously to this, on Friday evening, two of the boys, Nash and Goeth, who had been arrested with Reck, had confessed to the murder of Dr. Peacock, implicating Reck and one other boy, Livingston. At about 3:00 a. m. on Saturday, Livingston also agreed to sign a confession. (Upon arraignment, Livingston pleaded not guilty and alleged that he was subjected to physical abuse by the police.)
“On Saturday afternoon, Reck was questioned about the whereabouts of the gun which Goeth had told police that Reck possessed. After intensive interrogation, Reck admitted that Goeth had told him of the Peacock murder. About 4:30 p. m. in front of a group of officers and prosecutors, Reck was confronted with Nash and Goeth. Nash told the story which became his signed confession. Reck denied participation in the crime. Goeth then made the statement that Nash was telling the truth and implicated Reck. At this point Reck stated that he was present at the crime but that Livingston and not he struck Dr. Peacock.
*439“At 5:55 p. m. of the same Saturday, March 28, 1936, a joint confession was taken, at which time Reck was very weak and sick looking. At this point, Reck had been in custody almost 80 hours without counsel, without contact with his family, without a court appearance and without charge or bail. The text of this joint confession reveals mostly yes and no answer in the case of Reck. The interrogation did not deal with the gun or the automobile used in the crime and was signed by all that Saturday night.
“On Sunday, Reck was again interrogated in the State’s Attorney’s office and at 4:30 p. m. his individual statement was taken which was more or less a reiteration of the joint confession. The boys then washed up and were given clean clothes. Thereafter, in a formal ceremony in front of numerous officers and prosecutors as well as twelve invited civilians, the statements were read to the boys, they were duly cautioned and the confessions were then signed. The boys did not know there were civilians present and were not permitted counsel. At this time Reck had been without solid food since Friday when he had an egg sandwich. He was placed on a milk diet by the doctor Friday night at the hospital.
“Reck was held in custody Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday, March 30 through April 1. Why, is not revealed in the record. On Thursday, April 2, 1936, Reck was arraigned in open court and pleaded not guilty. He had not seen his father or other relatives or any lawyer during this entire period.”3
*440As the district judge further noted, the record “carries an unexpressed import of police brutality. . . .” Reck testified at length to beatings inflicted upon him on each of the four days he was in police custody before he confessed. His testimony was corroborated. The police, however, denied beating Reck, and, in view of this conflict in the evidence, we proceed upon the premise, as did the District Court, that the officers did not inflict deliberate physical abuse or injury upon Reck during the period they held him in their custody.4 See Thomas v. Arizona, 356 U. S. 390, 402-403; Stein v. New York, 346 U. S. 156, 183-184; Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143, 152-153; Ward v. Texas, 316 U. S. 547, 551-552.
But it is hardly necessary to state that the question whether a confession was extracted by coercion does not depend simply upon whether the police resorted to the crude tactic of deliberate physical abuse. “[T]he blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition.” Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U. S. 199, 206. The question in each case is whether a defendant’s will was overborne at the time he confessed. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227; Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49, 52, 53; Leyra v. Denno, 347 U. S. 556, 558. If so, the confession cannot be deemed “the product of a rational intellect and a free will,” Blackburn, swpra, at 208. In resolving the issue all the circumstances attendant upon the confession must be taken into account. See Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U. S. 191, 198; Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U. S. 560, 567. Physical mistreatment is but one such circumstance, albeit a circumstance which by itself weighs heavily. But other circumstances may combine to pro*441duce an effect just as impellingly coercive as the deliberate use of the third degree. Such, we think, were the undisputed circumstances of this case, as set out in detail by the District Court.
At the time of his arrest Reck was a nineteen-year-old youth of subnormal intelligence. He had no prior criminal record or experience with the police. He was held nearly eight days without a judicial hearing. Four of those days preceded his first confession. During that period Reck was subjected each day to six- or seven-hour stretches of relentless and incessant interrogation. The questioning was conducted by groups of officers. For the first three days the interrogation ranged over a wide variety of crimes. On the night of the third day of his detention the interrogation turned to the crime for which petitioner stands convicted. During this same four-day period he was shuttled back and forth between police stations and interrogation rooms. In addition, Reck was intermittently placed on public exhibition in “show-ups.” On the night before his confession, petitioner became ill while on display in such a “show-up.” He was taken to the hospital, returned to the police station and put back on public display. When he again became ill he was removed from the “show-up,” but interrogation in the windowless “handball court” continued relentlessly until he grew faint and vomited blood on the floor. Once more he was taken to the hospital, where he spent the night under the influence of drugs. The next morning he was removed from the hospital in a wheel chair, and intensive interrogation was immediately resumed. Some eight hours later Reck signed his first confession. The next afternoon he signed a second.
During the entire period preceding his confessions Reck was without adequate food, without counsel, and without the assistance of family or friends. He was, for all practical purposes, held incommunicado. He was physically *442weakened and in intense pain. We conclude that this total combination of circumstances “is so inherently coercive that its very existence is irreconcilable with the possession of mental freedom by a lone suspect against whom its full coercive force is brought to bear.” Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143, 154.
It is true that this case lacks the physical brutality present in Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278, the threat of mob violence apparent in Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U. S. 560, the thirty-six hours of consecutive questioning found in Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143, the threats against defendant’s family used in Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U. S. 68, or the deception employed in Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 315, and Leyra v. Denno, 347 U. S. 556. Nor was Reek’s mentality apparently so irrational as that of the petitioner in Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U. S. 199. However, it is equally true that Reek’s youth, his subnormal intelligence, and his lack of previous experience with the police make it impossible to equate his powers of resistance to overbearing police tactics with those of the defendants in Stein v. New York, 346 U. S. 156, or Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219.
Although the process of decision in this area, as in most, requires more than a mere color-matching of cases, it is not inappropriate to compare this case with Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U. S. 62, where we held a confession inadmissible on a record disclosing circumstances less compelling. Decision in Turner rested basically on three factors: the length of detention, the amount and manner of interrogation, and the fact that Turner had been held incommunicado by the police. Turner had been in custody for four nights and five days before he confessed. He had been questioned intermittently, as much as six hours in a day, sometimes by one, sometimes by several officers. He had been interrogated a total of some twenty-three hours. Reck was held the same length of time, under basically the same circumstances, before his second con*443fession. He was held some twenty-four hours less than Turner before his first confession, but during that period he was subjected to more concentratedly intensive interrogation, in longer stretches. He also spent considerable periods of time on public display in “show-ups,” a factor not present in Turner. In addition, Reck was weakened by illness, pain, and lack of food. Finally, unlike Turner, Reck must be regarded as a case of at least borderline mental retardation. The' record here thus presents a totality of coercive circumstances far more aggravated than those which dictated our decision in Turner. See also Johnson v. Pennsylvania, 340 U. S. 881; Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U. S. 191.
It cannot fairly be said on this record that “[t]he inward consciousness of having committed a murder and a robbery and of being confronted with evidence of guilt which [petitioner] could neither deny nor explain seems enough to account for the confessions here.” Stein v. New York, 346 U. S. 156, 185. It is true that, as in Stein, Reck did not confess until confronted with the incriminating statements of his companions. But beyond this the circumstances in Stein bear little resemblance to those involved in this case. The defendants in Stein were questioned a total of twelve hours during a thirty-two-hour detention. Part of that time was spent working out a “bargain” with police officers. Neither defendant was “young, soft, ignorant or timid.” Stein, supra, at 185. Nor were they “inexperienced in the ways of crime or its detection” or “dumb as to their rights.” Id., at 186. By contrast, Reck was in fact young and ignorant. He was in fact inexperienced in the ways of crime and its detection. Moreover, he was subjected to pressures much greater than were the defendants in Stein. He was held incommunicado and questioned over a much longer period. He was physically ill during much of that time, in pain, and weakened by lack of food. Confrontation with the confessions of his companions in these circumstances could *444well have been the event which made further resistance seem useless to Reck, whether he was guilty or not. On this record, therefore, the fact that his confession came hard upon the confessions of others who implicated him has little independent significance.
The State has made no effort to distinguish between the Saturday and Sunday confessions. Nor could it properly do so. The coercive circumstances preceding the first confession existed through Sunday. Reck remained in police custody, without a judicial hearing. He was subjected to further interrogation. He did not see counsel, family or friends between Saturday afternoon and Sunday afternoon. There are no other facts in the record suggesting that the Sunday confession was an act independent of the confession extracted on Saturday. Both confessions are subject to the same infirmities. Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment neither was admissible at Reek’s trial.
The petitioner’s detention is in violation of the Constitution of the United States, and he is therefore entitled to be released. The judgments of the Court of Appeals and the District Court are vacated and the case remanded to the latter. On remand, the District Court should enter such orders as are appropriate and consistent with this opinion allowing the State a reasonable time in which to retry the petitioner. Cf. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U. S. 534, 549; Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717, 729.
Vacated and remanded.
So far as the record shows, this was the first time after the trial that petitioner raised this issue.
The transcripts of the pre-trial sanity proceedings, of the proceedings at the hearing on the admissibility of the confessions conducted by the trial judge outside 'the presence of the jury, of the trial proceedings in the presence of the jury, and of the proceedings at the post-conviction hearing.
The brief factual summary in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois affirming the denial of post-conviction relief is entirely consistent with these findings:
“Petitioner was in the custody of the police for a week, during which time he was frequently ill, fainted several times, vomited blood *440on the floor of the police station and was twice taken to the hospital on a stretcher. During that week no formal charge was placed against petitioner, and he was confined practically incommunicado.” 7 Ifl. 2d 261, 264, 130 N. E. 2d 200, 202.
This was also the implicit finding of the trial judge.