With respect to the contempt count that was sustained by the Court of Appeals, this case involves nothing more than an ordinary exercise of the District Court’s contempt power in aid of maintaining discipline and decorum in the courtroom. The most, I think, that could appropriately be said of the conviction on this count is that petitioner’s unlawyer-like conduct did not merit a jail sentence. The Court of Appeals has removed all basis for criticism on that score by reducing the sentence to a $100 fine. In other respects its opinion displays an alert regard for the undoubted fact that the contempt power should always be exercised circumspectly and dispassionately, particularly when called into play by the conduct of an attorney in the course of sharply contested litigation.
I can hardly believe that the Court intends its opinion to mean that only a physical obstruction of pending judicial proceedings is punishable under 18 U. S. C. § 401. For a court’s power to punish summarily for contempt has always been available as a sanction against the use of abusive and insulting language in a courtroom. See, e. g., Offutt v. United States, 348 U. S. 11; Fisher v. Pace, 336 U. S. 155, 159-160; Ex parte Terry, 128 U. S. 289, 307-309. And it can scarcely be supposed that Congress’ enactment of 18 U. S. C. § 401 was intended to abrogate this power, even as the forerunner to that section was construed in In re Michael, 326 U. S. 224, 228. Cf. Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U. S. 378, 383.
This routine intracircuit affair presents nothing calling for the exercise of this Court’s supervisory power, and the case would have been much better left with the Court of Appeals by a denial of certiorari.
I would affirm.