dissenting.
In this and other cases in this area of the law, which are coming to us in ever-increasing numbers, we are faced with the resolution of rights basic both to individuals and to society as a whole. Specifically, we are called upon to reconcile the right of the Nation and of the States to maintain a decent society and, on the other hand, the right of individuals to express themselves freely in accordance with the guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Although the Federal Government and virtually every State has had laws proscribing obscenity since the Union was formed, and although this Court has recently decided that obscenity is not within the protection of the First Amendment,1 neither courts nor legislatures have been able to evolve a truly satisfactory definition of obscenity. In other areas of the law, terms like “negligence,” although in common use for centuries, have been difficult to define except in the most general manner. Yet the courts have been able to function in such areas with a reasonable degree of efficiency. The obscenity problem, however, is aggravated by the fact that it involves the area of public expression, an area in which a broad range of freedom is vital to our society and is constitutionally protected,
Recently this Court put its hand to the task of defining the term “obscenity” in Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476. The definition enunciated in that case has generated much legal speculation as well as further judicial interpretation by state and federal courts. It has also been relied upon by legislatures. Yet obscenity cases continue to come to this Court, and it becomes increasingly apparent that we must settle as well as we can the question of what constitutes “obscenity” and the ques*200tion of what standards are permissible in enforcing proscriptions against obscene matter. This Court hears cases such as the instant one not merely to rule upon the alleged obscenity of a specific film or book but to establish principles for the guidance of lower courts and legislatures. Yet most of our decisions since Roth have been given without opinion and have thus failed to furnish such guidance. Nor does the Court in the instant case- — which has now been twice argued before us — shed any greater light on the problem. Therefore, I consider it appropriate to state-my views at this time.
For all the sound and fury that the Roth test has generated, it has not been proved unsound, and I believe that we should try to live with it — at least until a more satisfactory definition is evolved. No government — be it federal, state, or local — should be forced to choose between repressing all material, including that within the realm of decency, and allowing unrestrained license to publish any material, no matter how vile. There must be a rule of reason in this as in other areas of the law, and we have attempted in the Roth case to provide such a rule.
It is my belief that when the Court said in Roth that obscenity is to be defined by reference to “community standards,” it meant community standards — not a national standard, as is sometimes argued. I believe that there is no provable “national standard,” and perhaps there should be none. At all events, this Court has not been able to enunciate one, and it would be unreasonable to expect local courts to divine one. It is said that such a “community” approach may well result in material being proscribed as obscene in one community but not in another, and, in all probability, that is true. But communities throughout the Nation are in fact diverse, and it must be remembered that, in cases such as this one, the Court is confronted with the task of reconciling con*201flicting rights of the diverse communities within our society and of individuals.
We are told that only “hard core pornography” should be denied the protection of the First Amendment. But who can define “hard core pornography” with any greater clarity than “obscenity”? And even if we were to retreat to that position, we would soon be faced with the need to define that term just as we now are faced with the need to define “obscenity.” Meanwhile, those who profit from the commercial exploitation of obscenity would continue to ply their trade unmolested.
In my opinion, the use to which various materials are put — not just the words and pictures themselves — must be considered in determining whether or not the materials are obscene. A technical or legal treatise on pornography may well be inoffensive under most circumstances but, at the same time, “obscene” in the extreme when sold or displayed to children.2
Finally, material which is in fact obscene under the Roth test may be proscribed in a number of ways — for instance, by confiscation of the material or by prosecution of those who disseminate it — provided always that the proscription, whatever it may be, is imposed in accordance with constitutional standards. If the proceeding involved is criminal, there must be a right to a jury trial, a right to counsel, and all the other safeguards necessary to assure due process of law. If the proceeding is civil in nature, the constitutional requirements applicable in such a case must also be observed. There has been *202some tendency in dealing with this'area of the law for enforcement agencies to do only that which is easy to do — for instance, to seize and destroy books with only a minimum of protection. As a result, courts are often presented with procedurally bad cases and, in dealing with them, appear to be acquiescing in the dissemination of obscenity. But if cases were well prepared and were conducted with the appropriate concern for constitutional safeguards, courts would not hesitate to enforce the laws against obscenity. Thus, enforcement agencies must realize that there is no royal road to enforcement; hard and conscientious work is required.
In light of the foregoing, I would reiterate my acceptance of the rule of the Roth case: Material is obscene and not constitutionally protected against regulation and proscription if “to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.” 354 U. S., at 489. I would commit the enforcement of this rule to the appropriate state and federal courts, and I would accept their judgments made pursuant to the Roth rule, limiting myself to a consideration only of whether there is sufficient evidence in the record upon which a finding of obscenity could be made. If there is no evidence in the record upon which such a finding could be made, obviously the material involved cannot be held obscene. Cf. Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U. S. 199. But since a mere modicum of evidence may satisfy a “no evidence” standard, I am unwilling to give the important constitutional right of free expression such limited protection. However, protection of society’s right to maintain its moral fiber and' the effective administration of justice require that this Court not establish itself as an ultimate censor, in each case reading the entire record, viewing the accused material, and making an independent de novo judgment on the question of obscenity. There*203fore, once a finding of obscenity has been made below under a proper application of the Roth test, I would apply a “sufficient evidence” standard of review — requiring something more than merely any evidence but something less than “substantial evidence on the record [including the allegedly obscene material] as a whole.” Cf. Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Board, 340 U. S. 474. This is the only reasonable way I can see to obviate the necessity of this Court’s sitting as the Super Censor of all the obscenity purveyed throughout the Nation.
While in this case, I do not subscribe to some of the State’s extravagant contentions, neither can I say that the courts below acted with intemperance or without sufficient evidence in finding the moving picture obscene within the meaning of the Roth test. Therefore, I would affirm the judgment.
Mr. Justice Harlan,dissenting.
While agreeing with my Brother Brennan’s opinion that the responsibilities of the Court in this area are no different from those which attend the adjudication of kindred constitutional questions, I have heretofore expressed the view that the States are constitutionally permitted greater latitude in determining what is bannable on the score of obscenity than is so with the Federal Government. See my opinion in Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 496; cf. my opinion in Manual Enterprises, Inc., v. Day, 370 U. S. 478. While, as correctly said in Mr. Justice Brennan’s opinion, the Court has not accepted that view, I nonetheless feel free to adhere to it in this still developing aspect of constitutional law.
The more I see of these obscenity cases the more convinced I become that in permitting the States wide, but not federally unrestricted, scope in this field, while holding the Federal Government with a tight rein, lies the best promise for achieving a sensible accommodation between *204the public interest sought to be served by obscenity laws (cf. my dissenting opinion in Bantam Books, Inc., v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, 76, 77) and protection of genuine rights of free expression.
I experience no greater ease than do other members of the Court in attempting to verbalize generally the respective constitutional tests, for in truth the matter in the last analysis depends on how particular challenged material happens to strike the minds of jurors or judges and ultimately those of a majority of the members of this Court. The application of any general constitutional tests must thus necessarily be pricked out on a case-by-case basis, but as a point of departure I would apply to the Federal Government the Roth standards as amplified in my opinion in Manual Enterprises, supra. As to the States, I would make the federal test one of rationality. I would not prohibit them from banning any material which, taken as a whole, has been reasonably found in state judicial proceedings to treat with sex in a fundamentally offensive manner, under rationally established criteria for judging such material.
On this basis, having viewed the motion picture in question, I think the State acted within permissible limits in condemning the film and would affirm the judgment of the Ohio Supreme Court.
Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476.
In the instant case, for example, the advertisements published .to induce the public to view the motion picture provide some evidence of the film’s dominant theme: “When all conventions explode . . . in the most daring love story ever filmed!” “As close to authentic amour as is possible on the screen.” “The frankest love scenes yet seen on film.” “Contains one of the longest and most sensuous love scenes to be seen in this country.”