dissenting.
I adhere to the view that only the State of the debtor’s incorporation has power to “escheat” intangible property when the whereabouts of the creditor are unknown. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U. S. 71, 80 (separate memorandum). The sovereign’s power to escheat tangible. property has long been recognized as extending only to the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Intangible property has no spatial existence, but consists of an obligation owed one person by another. The power to escheat such property has traditionally been thought to be lodged in the domiciliary State of one of the parties to the obligation. In a case such as this the domicile of the creditor is by hypothesis unknown; only the domicile of the debtor is known. This Court has thrice ruled that where the creditor has. disappeared, the State of the debtor’s domicile may escheat the intangible property. Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U. S. 428; Anderson Nat. Bank v. Luckett, 321 U. S. 233; Security Savings Bank v. California, 263 U. S. 282. Today the Court overrules all three of those cases. I would not do so. Adherence to settled precedent seems to me far better than giving the property to the State within which is located the one place where we know the creditor is not.