concurring in the result.
The Submerged Lands Act in § 3 (a) grants to the States “ownership of the lands beneath navigable waters within the boundaries of the respective States . . . .” 67 Stat. 30, 43 U. S. C. § 1311. The critical term “boundaries” is. given three alternative definitions in § 2 (b) of the Act:
1. “boundaries ... as they existed at the time such State became a member of the Union,” or
2. “boundaries ... as heretofore approved by the Congress,” or
*1623. “boundaries ... as extended or confirmed pursuant to section 4,” i. e., “three geographical miles distant from [the State’s] coast line . . . .”1
We deal here with the first of these three alternative definitions of “boundaries” in § 2 (b). In United States v. Louisiana, 363 U. S. 1, this Court upheld Texas’ claim to a historic boundary based on the Republic of Texas Boundary Act of 1836, which was in effect at the time of the Annexation Resolution of 1845. That Act described Texas’ boundary in the Gulf of Mexico as running “three leagues from land.”
Texas now contends that the location of its historic boundary is to be determined by measuring out three leagues from harbor jetties constructed sometime after 1845. This seemingly anomalous result is required, Texas argues, by the second California case, United States v. California, 381 U. S. 139. I cannot agree. The second California case dealt with a single issue: the meaning of the term “coast line” for purposes of the third alternative definition of “boundaries” in § 2 (b).2 But Texas does not claim a boundary under that definition, and the term “coast line” simply does not appear in the definition of “boundaries” under which Texas does assert its claim. The second California case is, therefore, basically irrelevant.
My Brother Harlan reaches the result urged by Texas but for very different reasons. He construes the statu*163tory phrase “boundaries as they existed” as referring to the “three leagues from land” formula of the Texas Boundary Act, and then applies this 1845 formula to present Texas shore conditions. The Court, on the other hand, construes “boundaries as they existed” as referring, not to the 1845 formula, but to a particular line — the line resulting from the application of the 1845 formula to 1845 conditions.
The difference between majority and dissent thus turns on a narrow question: whether the word “boundaries” in the first alternative definition in § 2 (b) refers to an operative definition or to a line. I adopt the latter construction because I think the former plays havoc with the ordinary understanding of the word “boundaries” and because the legislative history does not persuade me that Congress meant to use that word in an unusual sense. It is, of course, true that boundaries may shift when a constant operative definition is applied to changing conditions. But the ordinary understanding of the word “boundaries” is the resultant line, not the operative definition. Finally, when the phrase “as they existed” is appended to the word “boundaries,” it simply does not make semantic sense to interpret “boundaries” as a general definition rather than a particular line.
For these reasons, I concur in the conclusions of the Court in this case.
A proviso to § 2 (b) establishes a maximum for any of the three boundary definitions: “[I]n no event-shall the term 'boundaries’ . . . be interpreted as extending from the coast fine more than three geographical miles into the Atlantic Ocean or the Pacific Ocean, or more than three marine leagues into the Gulf of Mexico
Presumably the construction there adopted would also apply to the term “coast line” in the maximum proviso of §2 (b), n. 1, supra, but the United States does not contend that Texas’ claim exceeds the § 2 (b) maximum.