.concurring.
Although I join the opinion and judgment of the Court, I wish to emphasize certain of the principles which I believe to be central to the determination of this case, and which I think are implicit in the Court’s decision.
The attitude of government toward religion must, as this Court has frequently observed, be one of neutrality. Neutrality is, however, a coat of many colors. It requires that “government neither engage in nor compel religious practices, that it effect no favoritism among sects or between religion and nonreligion, and that it work deterrence of no religious belief.” Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 305 (concurring opinion of Goldberg, J.). Realization of these objectives entails “no simple and clear measure,” id., at 306, by which this or any case may readily be decided, but these objectives do suggest the principles which I believe to be applicable in the present circumstances. I would hold that where the contested governmental activity is calculated to achieve nonreligious purposes otherwise within the competence of the State, and where the activity does not involve the State “so significantly and directly in the realm of the sectarian as to give rise to . . . divisive influences and inhibitions of freedom,” id., at 307, it is not forbidden by the religious clauses of the First Amendment.
*250In my opinion, § 701 of the Education Law of New York does not employ religion as its standard for action or inaction, and is not otherwise inconsistent with these principles.