dissenting.
We have had but seven days to consider the important constitutional questions presented by these cases. The rationale of the opinion of the Court, based both on the Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of association, will apply to all elections, national, state, and local. Already, litigants from Alabama, California, Illinois, and Virginia have requested similar relief virtually on the eve of the 1968 presidential election. I think it fair to say that the ramifications of our decision today may be comparable to those of Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962), a case we deliberated for nearly a year.1 Appellants’ belated requests for extraordinary relief have compelled all members of this Court to decide cases of this magnitude without the unhurried deliberation which is essential to the formulation of sound constitutional principles.
*64I.
1 cannot agree that the State of Ohio should be compelled to place the candidates of the American Independent Party on the ballot for the impending presidential election. Nor can I draw a distinction between this Party and the Socialist Labor Party. Both suits were filed in July of this year, and both were decided on August 29, 1968. The following week the American Independent Party petitioned the Circuit Justice for its Circuit for provisional relief, which was granted on September 10. The Socialist Labor Party sought similar relief only three days after the September 10 order was issued. Mr. Justice Stewart granted provisional relief to one, but denied it to the other. No Ohio statutory deadline compelled that result, and presumably Ohio could have complied with an order granting the same relief to both Parties.2 Both Parties should be treated alike; otherwise, we are bowing to a show of strength rather than applying constitutional principles.
Appellants have invoked the equity jurisdiction of the federal courts. Placed in this context, the litigation be*65fore us presents an issue not treated by the opinion of the Court: did the District Court abuse its discretion in denying the extraordinary equitable relief requested by appellants?3 A review of the facts before the District Court convinces me that it did not, and therefore the emergency relief sought by appellants should be denied.
The Socialist Labor Party has been an organized political party in Ohio since the end of the 19th century, and although it has not achieved ballot position since the enactment in 1948 of the laws it challenges,4 not until July 2, 1968, did it press its claims for equitable relief. Similarly, the supporters of George C. Wallace did not institute their action until July 29, 1968, although early in 1967 Governor Wallace had expressed interest in the Presidency,5 and, in the spring of that year, he voiced concern for the restrictive nature of Ohio’s qualifying laws.6
Nevertheless, neither the American Independent Party nor the Socialist Labor Party made an effort to comply with Ohio’s election laws. Nor has either timely invoked the jurisdiction of the courts. That both had the opportunity to do so cannot be denied. Because the *66State of Ohio does not challenge the validity of the signatures gathered by the American Independent Party, a majority of this Court assumes they reflect the strength of that Party in Ohio. However, since the signatures were not submitted to Ohio in timely compliance with the State’s election laws, they have never been verified; in fact, appellants in No. 543 did not seek to file their signatures until over five months after the statutory filing date.7
Despite these delays in instituting suit and the failure of either party to make an effort to comply with any of Ohio’s election laws, the District Court ordered Ohio to provide for write-in voting. This relief guaranteed that each Ohio voter would have the right to vote for the candidate of his choice, including the candidates of these two Parties. At worst, therefore, denying appellants a position on the ballot for the 1968 election prevented their candidates from competing on a completely equal basis with the candidates of the two major parties.
The imminence of the election, the Parties’ failure to comply with Ohio law and the District Court’s grant of partial relief must be considered in conjunction with the need to promote orderly federal-state relationships. Our reports are replete with decisions concerning the nature of the relief to be afforded in these sensitive areas, yet the opinion of the Court does not address itself to the principles of these cases. In the analogous area of legislative apportionment, we have often tolerated a temporary dilution of voting rights to protect the legitimate interests of the States in fashioning their own elec*67tion laws, see, e. g., Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, 377 U. S. 713, 739 (1964); cf. Davis v. Mann, 377 U. S. 678, 692-693 (1964); and in the area of school desegregation we have demonstrated even greater deference to the States. On occasion, we have even counseled abstention where First Amendment rights have been allegedly infringed by state legislation. See Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U. S. 167 (1959).
For example, in WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U. S. 633 (1964), holding unconstitutional the apportionment of New York’s Legislature, we stated that on remand the District Court “acting under equitable principles, must now determine whether, because of the imminence of that election and in order to give the New York Legislature an opportunity to fashion a constitutionally valid legislative apportionment plan, it would be desirable to permit the 1964 election of legislators to be conducted pursuant to the existing [unconstitutional] provisions, or whether under the circumstances the effectuation of appellants’ right to a properly weighted voice in the election of state legislators should not be delayed beyond the 1964 election.” 8 Id., at 655. (Emphasis added.)
*68Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S. 430 (1968), decided only last Term, provides an even more striking example of our concern for the need to refrain from usurping the authority of the States in areas traditionally entrusted to them. Green reached this Court 13 years after Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294 (1955), required that schools be established free of racial discrimination with “all deliberate speed.” Although we held in Green that the particular “freedom-of-choice” plan adopted by the school board did not pass constitutional muster, the case was remanded to the District Court so that the school board could once again attempt to formulate a constitutional plan.
The result achieved here is not compatible with recognized equitable principles, nor is it compatible with our traditional concern, manifested in both the reapportionment and school desegregation cases, for preserving the properly exercised powers of the States in our federal system. Moreover, in none of these analogous areas did we deal with an express constitutional delegation of power to the States. That delegation is unequivocal here. II. S. Const., Art. II, § 1.
The net result of the Court’s action is that this Court is writing a new presidential election law for the State of Ohio without giving the Legislature or the courts of that State an opportunity to appraise their statutes in litigation9 or to eliminate any constitutional defects *69prior to a decision by this Court. Given both the lateness of the hour and the legitimate demands of federalism, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the extraordinary relief appellants demanded.
II.
Although I believe that the court below properly exercised its discretionary equitable powers, this litigation involves far more than a resolution of whether either Party is entitled to ballot position for the 1968 election. Appellants’ request for declaratory relief, challenging the constitutionality of Ohio’s system of conducting presidential elections, has raised a question which may be fairly classified as one of first impression: 10 to what extent may a State, consistent with equal protection and the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of association, impose restrictions upon a candidate’s desire to be placed upon the ballot? As I have already stated, the principles which would of necessity evolve from an answer to this question could not be confined either to the State of Ohio or to presidential elections.
Both the opinion of this Court and that of the District Court leave unresolved what restrictions, if any, a State can impose. Although both opinions treat the Ohio statutes as a “package,” giving neither Ohio nor the courts any guidance, each contains intimations that a State can by reasonable regulation condition ballot posi*70tion upon at least three considerations — a substantial showing of voter interest in the candidate seeking a place on the ballot, a requirement that this interest be evidenced sometime prior to the election, and a party structure demonstrating some degree of political organization. With each of these propositions I can agree. I do not believe, however, as does Mr. Justice Stewart, that the Equal Protection Clause has only attenuated applicability to the system by which a State seeks to control the selection of presidential electors.
Whatever may be the applicable constitutional principles, appellants and the State of Ohio are entitled to know whether any of the various provisions attacked in this litigation do comport with constitutional standards. As demonstrated by Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U. S. 241 (1967),11 this matter should be first resolved by the court below. Given the magnitude of the questions presented and the need for unhurried deliberation, I would dispose of appellants’ request for declaratory relief in a manner consistent with Zwickler by a remand to the District Court for a clearer determination of the serious constitutional questions raised in these cases.
I must therefore dissent from the failure of the Court’s opinion to explore or dispose adequately of the declaratory judgment actions, as well as from the grant of extraordinary relief in No. 543.
Baker was originally argued on April 19-20, 1961. On May 1, 1961, it was set for reargument and was reargued on October 9, 1961. Our decision was not announced until March 26, 1962, over 11 months after the original argument.
Mr. Justice Stewart based his denial of the Socialist Labor Party’s request for provisional relief upon the following considerations: “the late date on which this motion wras presented, the action already taken by the Ohio authorities, the relief already granted the appellants by the district court, and the fact that the basic issues they present will be fully canvassed in the argument of the appeal in Williams v. Rhodes . . . He did not suggest that the State of Ohio made any representations that it could not comply with an order granting the Socialist Labor Party the sam,e relief already granted the American Independent Party.
I do not think any significance should be given to the fact that the interim relief granted by Mr. Justice Stewart made it physically possible to place the American Independent Party on the ballot. This relief, as explicitly recognized by Mr. Justice Stewart, was granted solely to allow Ohio to comply with all possible orders of this Court.
This is the traditional standard for review of the denial of equitable relief. See, e. g., Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. M.-K.-T. R. Co., 363 U. S. 528, 535 (1960); United Fuel Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 278 U. S. 322, 326 (1929).
Appellants' Complaint in No. 544, pp. 1-2.
New York Times, Jan. 26, 1967, p. 20, col. 3.
Commencing in late April 1967, Governor Wallace began a four-day tour of selected northern States. At a press conference in Pittsburgh on April 27 he stated that he expected to run for President in all 50 States and that it might be necessary to institute suit in States where third parties had difficulty obtaining ballot position. Aides to the Governor mentioned California and Ohio as States in which difficulty might be encountered. New York Times, April 28, 1967, p. 28, col. 5.
The Ohio election laws require that petitions for a position on the Ohio ballot be filed 90 days before the state primary. Ohio Rev. Code §§3513.256-3513.262, 3517.01 (1960 Repl. Vol.). Appellants in No. 543 concede in their brief that their deadline was February 7, 1968, yet they apparently did not attempt to file their petitions until late in July. Appellants’ Brief 86.
The prior history of Preisler v. Secretary of State, 279 F. Supp. 952 (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1967), probable jurisdiction noted sub nom. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 390 U. S. 939 (1968), aptly demonstrates the deference we have paid legislative action in this area. On January 4, 1965, the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri held that the 1961 Missouri Congressional Redistricting Act was unconstitutional, but it refused to grant any additional relief “until the Legislature of the State of Missouri has once more had an opportunity to deal with the problem . . . Preisler v. Secretary of State, 238 F. Supp. 187, 191 (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1965). The Missouri General Assembly then enacted the 1965 Congressional Redistricting Act. On August 5, 1966, the District Court held this new plan unconstitutional, but it nevertheless permitted the 1966 Missouri congressional elections to be conducted under the void act. Preisler v. Secretary of State, 257 F. Supp. 953 *68(D. C. W. D. Mo. 1966). We affirmed on January 9,1967, sub nom. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 385 U. S. 450. In 1967, the Missouri General Assembly made still another attempt to enact a constitutional plan, but on December 29, 1967, this plan was also invalidated. 279 F. Supp. 952.
Cf. Scott v. Germano, 381 U. S. 407, 409 (1965), in which we stated that the “power of the judiciary of a State to require valid reapportionment or to formulate a valid redistricting plan has not only been recognized by this Court but appropriate action by the States in such cases has been specifically encouraged.”
MacDougall v. Green, 335 U. S. 281 (1948), did contest the constitutionality of Illinois’ system of nominating candidates representative of new political parties. However, MacDougall was decided during the reign of Colegrove v. Green, 328 U. S. 549 (1946). Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962), and its progeny have substantially modified the constitutional matrix in this area. Fortson v. Morris, 385 U. S. 231 (1966), although concerning the constitutionality of state election laws, involved consideration of a State’s post-election procedure, not state requirements for initial ballot qualification.
“We hold that a federal district court has the duty to decide the appropriateness and the merits of the declaratory request irrespective of its conclusion as to the propriety of the issuance of the injunction.” 389 U. S., at 254.