The petitions for writs of certiorari are granted, except that in No. 84 the writ is granted as to petitioner Franzese only and denied as to the other petitioners, and in No. 317 the petition is granted as to petitioners Mirro and McDonnell only and denied as to the other petitioners. † The judgments of the Courts of Appeals in these cases are vacated, and the cases remanded to the respective District Courts for further proceedings in conformity with Alderman v. United States, Ivanov v. United States, and Butenko v. United States, ante, p. 165. It is not evident from the records in some of these cases whether the surveillances at issue were unlawful. It may be that the overhearings in some instances were not achieved by trespass, see Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967); Desist v. United States, ante, p. 244, and Kaiser v. New York, ante, p. 280, or for some other reasons were not unlawful. As we held in Alderman, Ivanov, and Butenko, ante, at 170, n. 3, “the District Court must develop the relevant facts and decide if the Government’s electronic surveil*313lance was unlawful.” Of course, a finding by the District Court that the surveillance was lawful would make disclosure and further proceedings unnecessary. Similarly, it is not clear that each petitioner has standing to assert the illegality of the surveillance or of the introduction of its fruits. As in Alderman, Ivanov, and Butenko, these issues are to be resolved by the District Courts in the first instance.
Mr. Justice Black dissents, except in Nos. 895 and 911, in the consideration and disposition of which he took no part. Mr. Justice White took no part in the consideration or disposition of Nos. 546, 895, and 911. Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or disposition of Nos. 28, 106, 129, 168, 271, 546, 895, and 911.We read the papers filed by the United States in these two cases as stating that the surveillances neither invaded the premises of the other petitioners nor overheard their conversations.