dissenting.
For the reasons set forth herein and in the dissenting opinion of my Brother Douglas, I dissent and would reverse the judgment below.
In February 1968 appellant, who was then 17 years old, was charged under the laws of Nebraska with being a “delinquent child” 1 because he had a forged bank check which he intended to use for his own purposes.2 At the hearing on this charge he asked for a jury trial, arguing that this was a right guaranteed him by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution and that a statute prohibiting juries in “delinquency” proceedings3 was therefore unconstitutional.
This Court in In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1 (1967), held that juveniles charged with being “delinquents” as a *34result of committing a criminal act were entitled to certain constitutional safeguards — namely, notice of the issues involved, benefit of counsel, protection against compulsory self-incrimination, and confrontation of the witnesses against them. I can see no basis whatsoever in the language of the Constitution for allowing persons like appellant the benefit of those rights and yet denying them a jury trial, a right which is surely one of the fundamental aspects of criminal justice in the English-speaking world.
The Court here decides that it would not be “appropriate” to decide this issue in light of DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U. S. 631 (1968). That case held that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial- — made applicable to the States in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968) — did not apply in state proceedings held prior to May 20, 1968. Mr. Justice Douglas and I dissented in that case as we have in every case holding that constitutional decisions would take effect only from the day they were announced.4 I think this doctrine of prospective-only application is nothing less than judicial amendment of the Constitution, since it results in the Constitution’s meaning one thing the day prior to a particular decision and something entirely different the next day even though the language remains the same. Under our system of government such amendments cannot constitutionally be made by judges but only by the action of Congress and the people. Depriving defendants of jury trials prior to Duncan violated the Constitution just as much as would similar deprivations after *35that decision, yet this Court treats these equal deprivations with clearly unequal justice. I cannot agree to such refusals to apply what appear to me to be the clear commands of the Constitution.
Neb. Rev. Stat. §43-201 (4) provides that: “Delinquent child shall mean any child under the age of eighteen years who has violated any law of the state or any city or village ordinance.”
The State charged that appellant “unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly [had] in his possession and custody a certain false, forged and counterfeited bank check . . . with the intent ... to utter and publish said false, forged and counterfeited bank check as true and genuine, knowing the same to be a false, forged and counterfeited bank check, and with the intent then and there and thereby to prejudice, damage and defraud . . . , well knowing the same to be falsely made, forged and counterfeited, contrary to the form of the Statutes in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Nebraska.” App. 1-2. It is undisputed that such acts constitute the crime of forgery under state law. Neb. Rev. Stat. §28-601 (2).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-206.03 (2) provides that juvenile hearings “shall be conducted by the judge without a jury in an informal manner . . . .”
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 640 (1965) (dissenting opinion); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U. S. 719, 736 (1966) (dissenting opinion); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293, 302, 303 (1967) (dissenting opinions); DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U. S. 631, 635 (1968) (dissenting opinion); Holliday v. United States, 394 U. S. 831, 835 (1969) (dissenting opinion); see also Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244, 254 (1969) (concurring in judgment).