concurring.*
Inevitably, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964), by imposing on libel and slander plaintiffs the burden of showing knowing or reckless falsehood in specified situations will result in extending constitutional protection to lies and falsehoods which, though neither knowing nor reckless, do severe damage to personal reputation. The First Amendment is not so construed, however, to award merit badges for intrepid but mistaken or careless reporting. Misinformation has no merit in itself; standing alone it is as antithetical to the purposes of the First Amendment as the calculated lie. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64, 75 (1964). Its substance contributes nothing to intelligent decisionmaking by citizens or officials; it achieves nothing but gratuitous injury. The sole basis for protecting publishers who spread false information is that otherwise the truth would too often be suppressed. That innocent falsehoods are sometimes protected only to ensure access to the truth has been noted before, St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U. S. 727, 732 (1968), and it is well that the thought is repeated today in Time, Inc. v. Pape, ante, p. 279, at 292.
This opinion applies also to No. 62, Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, ante, p. 265.