delivered the opinion of the Court.
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236 (1959), established the general principle that the National Labor Relations Act pre-empts state and federal court jurisdiction to remedy conduct that is arguably protected or prohibited by the Act. That decision represents the watershed in this Court’s continuing effort to mark the extent to which the maintenance of a general federal law of labor relations combined with a centralized administrative agency to implement its provisions necessarily supplants the operation of the more traditional legal processes in this field. We granted certiorari in *277this case, 397 U. S. 1006 (1970), because the divided decision of the Idaho Supreme Court demonstrated the need for this Court to provide a fuller explication of the premises upon which Garmon rests and to consider the extent to which that decision must be taken to have modified or superseded' this Court’s earlier efforts to treat with the knotty pre-emption problem.
I
Respondent, Wilson P. Lockridge, has obtained in the Idaho courts a judgment for $32,678.56 against peti-. tioners, Northwest Division 1055 of the Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America and its parent international association,1 on the grounds that, in procuring Lockridge’s discharge from employment, pursuant to a valid union security clause in the applicable collective-bargaining agreement, the Union breached a contractual obligation embodied in the Union’s constitution and bylaws.
From May 1943 until November 2, 1959, Lockridge was a member of petitioner Union and employed within the State of Idaho as a bus driver for Western Greyhound Lines, or its predecessor. At the time of Lockridge’s dismissal from the Union, § 3 (a) of the collective-bargaining agreement in effect between the Union and Greyhound provided:
“All present employees covered by this contract shall become members of the ASSOCIATION [Union] not later than thirty (30) days following *278its effective date and shall remain members as a condition precedent to continued employment. This section shall apply to newly hired employees thirty (30) days from the date of their employment with the COMPANY.” App. 88.
In addition, § 91 of the Union’s Constitution and General Laws provided, in pertinent part, that:
“All dues ... of the members of this Association are due and-payable on the first day of each month for that month .... They must be paid by the fifteenth of the month in order to continue the member in good standing. ... A member in arrears for his dues . . . after the fifteenth day of the month is not in good standing . . . and where a member allows his arrearage ... to run into the second month before paying the same, he shall be debarred from benefits for one month after payment. Where a member allows his arrearage ... to run over the last day of the second month without payment, he does thereby suspend himself from membership in this Association. Where agreements with employing companies provide that members must be in continuous good financial standing, the member in arrears one month may be suspended from membership and removed from employment, in compliance with the terms of the agreement.” App. 91-92.
Prior to September 1959, Lockridge’s dues had been deducted from his paycheck, by Greyhound, pursuant to a checkoff arrangement. During that year, however, Lockridge and a few other employees were released at their request from the checkoff, and thereby became obligated to pay their dues directly to the Union’s office in Portland, Oregon. On November 2, 1959, C. A. Bank-head, the treasurer and financial secretary of the union local, suspénded Lockridge from membership on the sole ground that since respondent had not yet paid his October *279dues he was therefore in arrears contrary to § 91. Bank-head simultaneously notified Greyhound of this determination and requested that Lockridge be removed from employment. Greyhound promptly complied. Lock-ridge’s wife received notice, of the suspension from membership in early November, while her husband was on vacation, and on November 10, 1959, tendered Bankhead a check to cover respondent’s dues for October and November, which Bankhead refused to accept.
This chain of events, combined with the disparity between the above-quoted terms of the collective-bargaining agreement and the union constitution and general laws, generated this lawsuit. Lockridge has contended, and the Idaho courts have so held, that because he was less than two months behind in his payment of dues, respondent had not yet “suspended himself from membership” within the meaning of the Union’s rules, but instead had merely ceased to be a “member in good standing.” And, because the collective-bargaining agreement required only that employees “remain members,” those courts held that neither that agreement nor the final sentence of § 91 justified the Union’s action in procuring Lockridge’s discharge. Therefore, the Idaho courts have held, Lockridge’s dismissal violated a promise, implied in law, that the Union would not seek termination of his employment unless he was sufficiently derelict in his dues payments to subject him to loss of his job under the terms of the applicable collective-bargaining agreement.
Although the trial court made no formal findings of fact on this score,2 it appears likely that the Union pro*280cured Lockridge’s dismissal in the mistaken belief that the applicable union security agreement with Greyhound did, in fact, require employees to remain members in good standing and that the Union insisted on what it thought was a technically valid position because it was piqued by Lockridge’s obtaining his release from the checkoff. The trial court did find specifically that “almost without, exception” it had been the past practice of this local division of the Union merely to suspend delinquent members from service, rather than to strip them of membership, and to put them back to work without loss, of seniority when their dues were paid.
Lockridge initially made some efforts, with Bankhead’s assistance, to obtain reinstatement in the Union but these proved unsuccessful.. No charges were filed before the National Labor Relations Board.3 Instead, Lockridge *281filed suit in September 1960 in the Idaho State District Court against the Union and Greyhound, which was later dropped as a party. That court, on the Union’s motion, dismissed the complaint in April 1961 on the grounds that it charged the Union with the commission of an unfair labor practice and consequently fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. A year later, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed, holding that the state courts had jurisdiction under this Court’s decision in Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U. S. 617 (1958), and remanded for trial' on the merits. Lockridge v. Amalgamated Assn. of St., El. Ry. & M. C. Emp., 84 Idaho 201, 369 P. 2d 1006 (1962).
In 1965 Lockridge filed a second amended complaint which has since served as the basis for this lawsuit. Its first count alleged that
“in suspending plaintiff from membership in the [Union] which resulted in plaintiff’s loss of employment, the [Union] . . . acted wantonly, wilfully and wrongfully and without just cause, and . . . deprived plaintiff of his . . . employment with Greyhound Corporation that accrued to him and would accrue to him by reason of his employment, seniority and experience, and plaintiff has been harassed and subject to mental anguish . . . .” App. 46-47.
Count Two, sounding squarely in contract, alleged that
“in wrongfully suspending plaintiff from membership in the [Union], which resulted in plaintiff’s discharge from employment with the Greyhound Corporation, the [Union] . . . acted wrongfully, wantonly, wilfully and maliciously and without just cause and violated the constitution and general laws of the [Union] which constituted a contract between the plaintiff as a member thereof and the [Union], and as a result of said breach of contract plaintiff has been deprived of his . . . employment with . . ; *282Greyhound Corporation . . . and plaintiff has been embarrassed and subjected to mental anguish . . . .” App. 48.
The complaint sought damages in the amount of $212,000 “and such other and further relief as to the court may appear meet and equitable in the premises.” Ibid.
After trial, the Idaho District Court found the facts as stated above and held that they did, indeed, amount to a breach of contract. The court felt itself bound by the prior determination of the Idaho Supreme Court to consider that it might properly exercise jurisdiction .over the controversy and to “decide [the] case on the theories of” Machinists v. Gonzales, supra. Consequently, the trial judge concluded that Lockridge was entitled to a decree restoring him to membership in the Union, “although plaintiff has never sought such remedy.” Lock-ridge was also awarded $32,678.56 as compensation for wages actually lost due to his dismissal from Greyhound’s employ, but his requests for future damages arising from continued loss of employment, compensation for loss of. seniority or fringe benefits, and punitive damages were all denied. On appeal the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed, over one dissenting vote, except that it also ordered restoration of respondent’s seniority rights. 93 Idaho 294, 460 P. 2d 719 (1969). Having granted certiorari for the reasons stated at the outset of this opinion, we now reverse.
II
A.
On the surface, this might appear to be a routine and simple case. Section 8 (b) (2) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 141, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (b)(2), makes it an unfair labor practice for a union
“to cause or attempt to cause an employer to dis*283criminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a)(3) ... or to discriminate against an employee with respect to wThom membership in such organization has been denied or terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly r'equired as a' condition, of acquiring or retaining'membership.”
Section 8 (b)(1)(A), 29 U. S. C. § 158 (b)(1)(A), makes it an unfair labor practice for a union “to restrain or .qoerce . . . employees in the exercise of the rights-guar-anteed in. section 7,” which includes the right not only* “to form, join, or assist labor organizations” but also “the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8 (a) (3).” 61 Stat. 140, 29 U. S. C. § 157. Section 8 (a) (3) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer
“by discrimination in regard.to hire or tenure of employment ... to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: Provided, That nothing in this Act . . . shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization ... to require as a condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or the effective date-of such agreement, whichever is the later . . . : Provided further, That no employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee for nonmémbership in a labor organization ... if he has reasonable grounds for believing that membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly re*284quired as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership . . . .” 29 U. S. C. § 158 (a)(3).
Further, in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S., at 245, we held that the National Labor Relations Act pre-empts the jurisdiction of state and federal courts to regulate conduct “arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act.” On their face, the above-quoted provisions of the Act at least arguably either permit or forbid' the .union conduct dealt with by the judgment below. For the evident thrust of this aspect of the federal statutory scheme is to permit the enforcement of union security clauses, by dismissal from employment, only for failure to pay dues. Whatever other sanctions may be employed to exact compliance with those internal union rules unrelated to dues payment, the Act seems generally to exclude dismissal from employment. See Radio Officers’ Union v. NLRB, 347 U. S. 17 (1954). Indeed, in the course of rejecting petitioner’s pre-emption argument, the Idaho Supreme Court stated that, in its opinion, the Union “did most certainly -violate 8 (b)(1)(A), did most certainly violate 8 (b) (2) . . . and probably caused the employer to violate 8 (a) (3).” 93 Idaho, at 299, 460 P. 2d, at 724. Thus, given the broad pre-emption principle enunciated in Garmon, the want of state court power to resolve Lockridge’s complaint might well seem to follow as a matter of course.
The Idaho Supreme Court, however, concluded that it nevertheless possessed jurisdiction in these eimumstances: That determination, as we understand it, rested upon three separate propositions, all of which are urged here by respondent. The first is that the Union’s conduct was not only, an unfair labor practice, but a breach of its contract with Lockridge as well. “Pre-emption is not established simply by showing that the same-facts will sustain two different legal wrongs.” 93 Idaho, at 300, *285460 P. 2d, at 725. In other words Garmon, the state court and respondent assert, states a principle applicable only where the state law invoked is designed specifically to regulate labor relations; it has no force where the State applies its general common law of contracts to resolve disputes between a union and its members. Secondly, it is urged that the facts that might be shown to vindicate Lockridge’s claim in the Idaho state courts differ from those relevant to proceedings governed by the National Labor Relations Act. It is said that the conduct regulated by the Act is union and employer discrimination; general contract law takes into account only the correctness of competing interpretations of the language embodied in agreements. 93 Idaho, at 303-304, 460 P. 2d, at 728-729. Finally, there recurs throughout, the state court opinion, and the arguments-of respondent here, the theme that the facts of the instant case render it virtually indistinguishable from Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U. S. 617 (1958), where this Court upheld the exercise of state court jurisdiction in an opinion written only one Term prior to Garmon, by the author of Garmon and which was approvingly cited in the Garmon opinion itself.
We do not believe that any of these arguments suffice to overcome the plain purport of Garmon as applied to the facts of this case. However, we have determined to treat these considerations at some length because of the understandable confusion, perhaps in a measure attributable to the previous opinions of this Court, they reflect over the jurisprudential bases upon which the Garmon doctrine rests.
B
The constitutional principles of pre-emption, in whatever particular field of law they operate, are designed with a common end in view: to avoid conflicting regulation of conduct by various official- bodies which might *286have some authority over the subject matter. A full understanding of the particular pre-emption rule set forth in Garmon especially requires, we think, appreciation of the precise nature and extent of the potential for injurious conflict that would inhere in a system unaffected by- such a doctrine, and also the setting in which the general problem of accommodating conflicting claims of competence to resolve disputes touching upon labor relations has been presented to this Court.
The course of events that eventuated in the enactment of a comprehensive national labor law, entrusted for its administration and development to a centralized, expert agency, as well as the very fact of that enactment itself, reveals that a primary factor in this development was the perceived incapacity of common-law courts and state legislatures, acting alone, to provide an informed and coherent basis for ■ stabilizing labor relations conflict and for equitably and delicately structuring the balance of power among competing forces so as to further the common good.4 The principle of pre-emption that informs our general national labor law was born of this Court’s efforts, without the aid of explicit congressional guidance, to delimit state and federal judicial authority over labor disputes in order to preclude, so far as reasonably possible, conflict between the exertion of judicial and administrative power in the attainment of the multifaceted policies underlying the federal scheme.
As it appears to us, nothing could serve more fully to defeat the congressional goals underlying the Act than to subject,-without, limitation, the relationships it seeks to create to the concurrent jurisdiction of state and fed- ' eral courts free to apply the general local law. Nor *287would an approach suffice that sought merely to avoid disparity in the content, of proscriptive behavioral rules. As the Court observed in Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U. S. 485, 490-491 (1953), Congress in establishing overriding federal supervision of labor law
“did not merely lay down a substantive rulé of law .to be enforced by any tribunal competent to apply law generally to the parties. It went on to confide primary interpretation and application of its rules to a specific and specially constituted tribunal and prescribed a particular procedure for investigation, complaint and notice, and hearing and decision .... Congress evidently considered that centralized administration of specially designed procedures was necessary to obtain uniform application of its substantive rules and to avoid these diversities and conflicts likely to result from a variety of local procedures and attitudes toward labor controversies. ... A multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of procedures are quite as apt to produce incompatible or conflicting adjudications as are different rules of substantive law.”
Conflict in technique can be fully as disruptive to the system Congress erected as conflict in overt policy. As the passage from Garner indicates, in matters of dispute concerning labor relations a simple recitation of the formally prescribed rights and duties of the parties constitutes an inadequate description of the actual process for setfclément Congress has provided. The technique of administration and the range and nature of those remedies that are and are not available is a fundamental part and parcel of the operative legal system established by the National Labor Relations Act. “Administration is more than a means of regulation; administration is regulation. We have been concerned with conflict in its *288broadest sense; conflict with a complex and interrelated federal scheme of law, remedy, and administration.” Garmon, 359 U. S., at 243.
The rationale for pre-emption, then, rests in large measure upon our determination that when it set down a federal labor policy Congress plainly meant to do more than simply to alter the then-prevailing substantive law. It sought as well to restructure fundamentally the processes for effectuating that policy, deliberately placing the responsibility for applying and'developing this comprehensive legal system in the hands of an expert administrative body rather than the federalized judicial system.5 Thus, that a local court, while adjudicating a *289labor dispute also within the jurisdiction of the NLRB, may purport to apply legal rules identical to those prescribed in the federal Act or may eschew the authority to define or apply principles specifically developed to regulate labor relations does not mean that all relevant potential for debilitating conflict is absent.
A second factor that has played an important role in our shaping of the pre-emption doctrine has been the necessity to act without specific congressional direction. The precise extent to which state law must be displaced to achieve those unifying ends sought by the national legislature has never been determined by the Congress. This has, quite frankly, left the Court with few available options. We cannot declare pre-empted all local regulation that touches or concerns in any way the complex interrelationships between employees, employers, and unions; obviously, much of this is left to the States. Nor can we proceed on a case-by-case basis to determine whether each particular final judicial pronouncement does, or might reasonably be thought to, conflict in some relevant manner with federal labor policy. This Court *290is ill-equipped to play such a role and the federal system dictates that this problem be solved with a rule capable of relatively easy application, so that lower courts may largely police' themselves in this regard. Equally important, such a principle would fail to take account of the fact, as discussed above, that simple congruity of legal rules does not, in this area, prove the absence of untenable conflict. Further, it is surely not possible for this Court to treat the National Labor Relations Act section by section, committing enforcement of some of its provisions wholly to the NLRB and others to the concurrent domain of local law. Nothing in the language or underlying purposes of the Act suggests any basis for such distinctions. Finally, treating differently judicial power to deal with conduct protected by the Act from that prohibited by it would likewise be unsatisfactory.6 Both areas equally involve conduct whose legality is governed by federal law, the application of which Congress committed to the Board, not courts.
This is not to say, however, that these inherent limitations on this Court’s ability to state a workable rule that comports reasonably with apparent congressional objectives are necessarily self-evident. In fact, varying approaches were taken by the Court in initially grappling with this pre-emption problem. Thus, for example, some early cases suggested the true distinction lay between judicial application of general common law, which was permissible, as opposed to state rules specifically designed to regulate labor relations, which were pre-empted. See, *291e. g., Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U. S. 634, 645 (1958). Others made pre-emption turn on whether the States purported to apply a remedy not provided for by the federal scheme, e. g., Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U. S. 468, 479-480 (1955), while in still others the Court undertook a thorough scrutiny of the federal Act to ascertain whether the state courts had, in fact, arrived at conclusions inconsistent with its provisions, e. g., Automobile Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U. S. 245 (1949). For the reasons outlined above none of these approaches proved satisfactory, however, and each was ultimately abandoned. It was, in short, experience — not pure logic — which initially taught that each of these methods sacrificed important federal interests in a uniform law of' labor relations centrally administered by an expert .agency without yielding anything in return by way of predictability or ease of judicial application.
The failure of alternative analyses and the interplay of the foregoing policy considerations, then, led this Court to hold in Garmon, 359 U. S., at 244:
“When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a State purports to regulate are protected by § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, or constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8, due regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction .must yield. To leave the States free to regulate conduct so plainly within the central aim of federal regulation involves too great a danger of conflict between power asserted by Congress and requirements imposed by state law.” '
C
Upon these premises, we think that Garmon rather clearly. dictates reversal of the judgment below. None of the propositions asserted to support that judgment *292can withstand an application, in light of those factors that compelled its promulgation, of the Garmon rule.
Assuredly the proposition that Lockridge’s complaint was not subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB because, it charged a breach of contract rather than an unfair labor practice is not tenable. Pre-emption, as shown above, is designed to shield the system from conflicting regulation of conduct. It is the conduct being regulated, not the formal description of governing legal standards, that is the proper focus of concern. Indeed, the notion that a relevant distinction exists for such purposes between particularized and generalized labor law was explicitly rejected in Garmon itself. 359 U. S., at 244.
The second argument, closely related to the first, is that the state courts, in resolving this controversy, did deal with different conduct, i. e., interpretation of contractual terms, than would the NLRB which would be required to decide whether the Union discriminated against Lockridge. At bottom, of course, the Union’s action in procuring Lockridge’s dismissal from employment is the conduct which Idaho courts have sought to regulate. Thus, this second point demonstrates at best that Idaho defines differently what sorts of such union conduct may permissibly be proscribed. This is to say either that the regulatory schemes, state and federal, conflict (in which case pre-emption is clearly called for) or that Idaho is dealing with conduct to which the federal Act does not speak. If the latter assertion was intended, it is not accurate. . As pointed out in Part II-A, supra, the relevant portions of the Act operate to prohibit a union from causing or attempting to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee because his membership in the union has been terminated “on some ground other than” his failure to pay those dues requisite to member*293ship. This has led the Board routinely and frequently to inquire into the proper construction of union regulations in order to ascertain whether the union properly found an employee to have been derelict in his dues-paying responsibilities, where his discharge was procured on the asserted grounds of nonmembership in the union. See, e. g., NLRB v. Allied Independent Union, 238 F. 2d 120 (CA7 1956); NLRB v. Leece-Neville Co., 330 F. 2d 242 (CA6 1964); Communications Workers v. NLRB, 215 F. 2d 835 (CA2 1954); NLRB v. Spector Freight System, Inc., 273 F. 2d 272 (CA8 1960). See generally 3 CCH Lab. L. Rep. ¶ 4525 (Labor Relations). That a union may in good faith have misconstrued its own rules has not been treated by the Board as a defense to a claimed violation of § 8 (b)(2). In the Board's view, it is the fact of misapplication by a union of its rules, not the motivation for that discrimination, that constitutes an unfair labor practice. See, in addition to the authorities cited above, Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers v. NLRB, 113 U. S. App. D. C. 342, 347, 307 F. 2d 679, 684 (1962), and Teamsters Local v. NLRB, 365 U. S. 667, 681 (1961) (concurring opinion).
From the foregoing, then, it would seem that this case indeed represents one of the clearest instances where the Garmon principle, properly understood, should operate to oust state court jurisdiction. There being no doubt that the conduct here involved was arguably protected by § 7 or prohibited by § 8 of the Act, the full range of very substantial interests the pre-emption doctrine seeks to protect is directly implicated here.
However, a final strand of analysis underlies the opinion of the Idaho Supreme Court, and the position of respondent, in this case. Our decision in Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U. S. 617 (1958), it is argued, fully survived the subsequent reorientation of pre-emption doc*294trine effected by the Garmon decision, providing, in effect, an express exception for the exercise of judicial jurisdiction in cases such as this.
The fact situation in Gonzales does resemble in some relevant regards that of the instant case. There the California courts had entertained a complaint by an individual union member claiming he had been expelled from his union in violation of rights conferred upon him by the union’s constitution and bylaws, which allegedly constituted a contract between him and his union. Gonzales prevailed on his breach-of-contract theory and was awarded damages for wages lost due to the revocation of membership as well as a decree providing for his reinstatement in the union. This Court confirmed the California courts’ power to award the monetary damages, the only aspect of the action below challenged in this Court. The primary rationale for the result reached was that California should be competent to “fill out,” 356 U. S., at 620, the reinstatement remedy by utilizing “the comprehensive relief of equity,” id., at 621, which the Board did not fully possess. Secondarily, it was said that the lawsuit “did not purport to remedy or regulate union conduct on the ground that it was designed to bring about employer discrimination against an employee, the evil the Board is concerned to strike at as an unfair labor practice under §8 (b)(2).” Id., at 622.
Although it was decided only one Term subsequent to Gonzales, Garmon clearly did not fully embrace the technique of the prior case. It was precisely the realization that disparities in remedies and administration could produce substantial conflict, in the practical sense of the term, between the relevant state and federal regulatory schemes and that this Court could not effectively and responsibly superintend on a case-by-case basis the exertion of state power over matters arguably governed by the National Labor Relations Act that impelled the some*295what broader formulation of the pre-emption doctrine in Garmon. It seems evident that the full-blown rationale of Gonzales could not survive the rule of Garmon. Nevertheless, Garmon did not cast doubt upon the result reached in Gonzales, but cited it approvingly as an example of the fact that state court jurisdiction is not preempted “where the activity regulated was a merely peripheral concern of the . . . Act.” 359 U. S., at 243.
Against this background, we attempted to define more precisely the reach of Gonzales within the more comprehensive framework Garmon provided in the companion cases of Plumbers’ Union v. Borden, 373 U. S. 690 (1963), and Iron Workers v. Perko, 373 U. S. 701 (1963).
Borden had sued his union in state courts, alleging that the union had arbitrarily refused to refer him to a particular job which he had lined up.- He recovered damages, based on lost wages, on the grounds that this conduct constituted both tortious interference with his right to contract for employment and a breach of promise, implicit in his membership arrangement with the union, not to discriminate unfairly against any member or deny him the right to work. Perko had obtained a large money judgment in the Ohio courts on proof that the union had conspired, without cause, to deprive him of employment as a foreman by demanding his discharge from one such position he had held and representing to others that his foreman’s rights had been suspended. We held both Perko’s and Borden’s judgments inconsistent with the Garmon rule essentially for the same reasons we have concluded that Lockridge could not, consistently with the Garmon decision, maintain his lawsuit in the state courts. We further held there was no necessity to “consider the present vitality of [the Gonzales] rationale in the light of more recent decisions,” because in those cases, unlike Gonzales, “the crux of the action [s] . . . concerned alleged interference with the plaintiff’s exist*296ing or prospective employment relations and was not directed to internal union matters.” Because no specific claim for restoration of membership rights had been advanced, “there was no permissible state remedy to which the award of consequential damages for loss of earnings might be subordinated.” Perko, 373 U. S., at 705. See also Borden, 373 U. S., at 697.
In sum, what distinguished Gonzales from Borden and Perko was that the former lawsuit “was focused on purely internal union matters,” Borden, supra, at 697, a subject the National Labor Relations Act leaves principally to other processes of law. The possibility that, in defining the scope of the union’s duty to Gonzales, the state courts would directly and consciously implicate principles of federal law was at best tangential and remote. In the instant case, however,- this possibility was real and immediate. To assess the legality of his union’s conduct toward Gonzales the California courts needed only to focus upon the union’s constitution and by-laws. Here, however, Lockridge’s entire case turned upon the construction of the applicable union security clause, a matter as to which, as shown above, federal concern is pervasive and its regulation complex. The reasons for Gonzales’ deprivation of union membership had nothing to do with matters of employment, while Lockridge’s cause of action and claim for damages were based solely upon the procurement of his discharge from employment. It cannot plausibly be argued, in any meaningful sense, that Lock-ridge’s lawsuit “was focused on purely internal union matters.” Although nothing said in Garmon necessarily-suggests that States cannot regulate the general conditions which unions may impose on their membership, it surely makes crystal clear that Gonzales does not stand for the proposition that resolution of any union-member conflict is within state competence so long as one of the *297remedies provided is restoration of union membership. This much was settled by Borden and Perko, and it is only upon such an unwarrantably broad interpretation of Gonzales that the judgment below could be sustained.
Ill
The pre-emption doctrine we apply today is, like any other purposefully administered legal principle, not without exception. Those same considerations that underlie Garmon, have led this Court to permit the exercise- of judicial power over conduct arguably protected or prohibited by the Act where Congress has affirmatively indicated that such power should exist, Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U. S. 195 (1962); Teamsters Union v. Morton, 377 U. S. 252 (1964), where this Court cannot, in spite of the force of the policies Garmon seeks to promote, conscientiously presume that Congress meant to intrude so deeply into areas traditionally left to local' law, e. g., Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U. S. 53 (1966); Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U. S. 634 (1958),7 and where the particular rule of law sought to be invoked before another tribunal is so structured and administered that, in virtually all instances, it is safe to presume that judicial supervision will not disserve the. *298interests promoted by the federal labor statutes; Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171 (1967).8
In his brief before this Court, respondent has argued for the first time since this lawsuit was started that two of these exceptions to the Garmon principle independently justify the Idaho courts’ exercise of jurisdiction over this controversy. First, Lockridge contends that his action, properly viewed, is one to enforce a collective-bargaining agreement. Alternatively, he asserts the suit, in essence, was one to redress petitioner’s breach of its duty of fair representation. As will be seen, these contentions are somewhat intertwined.
In- § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 156, Congress authorized federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over suits brought to enforce collective-bargaining agree- . ments. We have held that such actions are judicially cognizable, even where the conduct alleged was arguably protected or prohibited by the National Labor Relations Act because the history of the enactment of § 301 reveals that “Congress deliberately chose to leave the' enforcement of collective agreements 'to the usual processes of the law.’ ” Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U. S. 502, 513 (1962). It is firmly established, further, that state courts retain concurrent jurisdiction to adjudicate such claims, Charles Dowd Box Co., supra, and that individual employees have standing to protect rights conferred upon them by such agreements, Smith v. Evening News, supra; Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U. S. 335 (1964).
Our cases also clearly establish that individual union members may sue their employers under § 301 for breach ' of a promise embedded in the collective-bargaining agree*299ment that was intended to confer a benefit upon the individual. Smith v. Evening News, supra. Plainly, however, this is not such a lawsuit. Lockridge specifically dropped Greyhound as a named party from his initial complaint and has never reasserted a right to redress from his former employer.
This Court has further held in Humphrey v. Moore, supra, that § 301 will support, regardless of otherwise applicable pre-emption considerations, a suit in the state courts by a union member against his union that seeks to redress union interference with rights conferred on individual employees by the employer’s promises in the collective-bargaining agreement, where it is proved that such interference constituted a breach of the duty of fair representation. Indeed, in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171 (1967), we held that an action seeking damages for injury inflicted by a breach of a union’s duty of fair representation was judicially cognizable in any event, that is, even if the conduct complained of was arguably protected or prohibited by the National Labor Relations Act and whether or not the lawsuit was bottomed on a collective agreement. Perhaps Count One of Lockridge’s second amended complaint could be construed to assert either or both of these theories of recovery. However, it is unnecessary to pass upon the extent to which Garmon would be inapplicable if it were shown.that in these circumstances petitioner not only breached its contractual obligations to respondent, but did so in a manner that constituted a breach of the duty of fair representation. For such a claim to be made out, Lockridge must have proved “arbitrary or bad-faith conduct “on the part of the Union.” Vaca v. Sipes, supra, at 193. There must be “substantial evidence of fraud, deceitful action or dishonest conduct.” Humphrey v. Moore, supra, at 348. Whether these reqúisite elements have been proved is a matter of .federal law. Quite *300obviously, they were not even asserted to be relevant in the proceedings below. As the Idaho Supreme Court stated in affirming the verdict for Lockridge, “[t]his was a misinterpretation of a contract. Whatever the undér-lying motive for expulsion might have been, this case has been submitted and tried on the interpretation of the contract, not on a theory of discrimination.” 93 Idaho, at 303-304, 460 P. 2d, at 728-729. Thus, the trial judge’s conclusion of law in sustaining Lockridge’s claim specifically incorporates the assumption that the Union’s “acts . . . were predicated solely upon the ground that [Lockridge] had failed to tender periodic dues in conformance with the requirements of the union Consti- ■ tution and employment contract as they interpreted [it] . . . .” App. 66. Further, the trial court excluded as irrelevant petitioner’s proffer of evidence designed to show that the Union’s interpretation of the contract was reasonably based upon its understanding of prior collective-bargaining agreements negotiated with Greyhound. Tr. 259-260.
Nor can it be fairly argued that our resolution of respondent’s final contentions entails simply attaching variegated labels to matters of' equal substance. We have exempted § 301 suits from the Garmon principle because of the evident congressional determination that courts should be free to interpret and enforce collective-bargaining agreements even where that process may involve condemning or permitting conduct arguably subject to the protection or prohibition of the National Labor Relations Act. The legislative determination that courts are fully competent to resob e labor relations disputes through focusing on the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement cannot be said to sweep within it the same conclusion with regard to the terms of union-employee contracts that are said to be implied in law. That is *301why the principle of Smith v. Evening -News is applicable only to. those disputes that are governed by the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement itself.
Similarly, this Court’s refusal to limit judicial competence to rectify a breach of the duty of fair representation rests upon our judgment that such actions cannot; in the vast majority of situations where they occur, give rise to actual conflict with the operative realities of federal labor policy. The duty of fair representation was judicially evolved, without the participation of the NLRB, to enforce fully the important principle that no individual union member may suffer invidious, hostile treatment at the hands of the majority of his coworkers. Where such union conduct is proved it is clear, beyond doubt, that the conduct could not be otherwise regulated by the substantive federal law. And the fact that the doctrine was originally developed and applied by courts, after passage of the Act, and carries with it the need to adduce substantial evidence of discrimination that is intentional, severe, and unrelated to .legitimate • union objectives ensures that the risk of conflict with the general congressional policy favoring expert, centralized administration, and remedial action is tolerably slight. Vaca v. Sipes, supra, at 180-181. So viewed, the duty of fair representation, properly defined, operates to limit the scope of Garmon where the sheer logic of the preemption principle might otherwise cause it to be extended to a point where its operation might be unjust. Vaca v. Sipes, supra, at 182-183.If, however, the congressional policies Garmon seeks to promote are not to be swallowed up, the very distinction, embédded within the instant lawsuit itself, between honest, mistaken conduct, on the one hand, and deliberate and severely hostile - and irrational treatment, on the other, needs strictly to be maintained.
*302IV
Finally, we deem it appropriate to discuss briefly two other considerations underlying the conclusion we have reached in this case. First, our decision must not be taken as expressing any views on the substantive claims, of the two parties to this controversy. Indeed, our judgment is, quite simply, that it is not the task of federal or state courts to make such determinations. Secondly, in our explication of the reasons for the Garmon rule, and the various exceptions to it, we noted that, although largely of judicial making, the labor relations pre-emption doctrine finds its basic justification in the presumed intent of Congress. While we do not assert that the Garmon doctrine is without imperfection, we do think that it is founded on reasoned principle and that until it is altered by congressional action or by judicial insights that, are born of further experience with it, a heavy burden rests upon those who would, at this late date, ask this Court to abandon Garmon and set out again in quest of a system more nearly perfect. A fair regard for considerations of stare decisis and the coordinate role of the Congress in defining the extent to which federal legislation pre-empts state law strongly support our conclusion that the basic, tenets of Garmon should not be disturbed.9
For the reasons stated above, the judgment below is
Reversed.
The local and its parent are, of course, separate legal entities for many purposes and were joined as codefendants below so that each, appears as a petitioner in this Court. However both will be jointly described throughout this opinion as “the petitioner”.or “the Union” since the parent was held liable on the theory that it was responsible for the acts of the local here involved, not on the basis of any separate acts committed only by the parent.
Because the Idaho courts treated as irrelevant the actual motivation for the Union’s conduct, see Part III, infra, the trial court did not incorporate in its formal findings of fact and conclusions of law any reference to this checkoff dispute. However, some such evidence was allowed at trial, as well as testimony about the Union’s past *280practice regarding dues-delinquent members, on the theory that this might ultimately bear on the issue whether Lockridge had properly exhausted his administrative remedies. The trial judge in his initial memorandum decision, however, did indicate his belief that “the true facts are” as-stated in the text accompanying this footnote.
It appears that at least one other person, Elmer Day, was similarly suspended from membership in the Union and discharged from Greyhound. On November 12, 1959, he filed a formal charge with the Board’s Regional Director. On December 15, 1959, the Director advised Day, by letter, that “it appears that, because there is insufficient evidence of violations, further proceedings are not warranted at this time. I am therefore refusing to issue Complaint in these matters.” The Director further informed Day that “you may obtain a review of this action by filing a request for such review with the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board . . . .” Day did not seek review. Instead, he filed suit against the Union in the Circuit Court of Multnomah County, Oregon, for tortious interference with employment, and obtained a jury award for general and punitive damages. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Oregon (two judges dissenting) reversed, holding the conduct complained of to be within the Board’s exclusive jurisdiction. Day v. Northwest Division 1055, 238 Ore. 624, 389 P. 2d 42 (1964). (Some of these facts are taken from the dissenting opinion in that ease.)
For a discussion of these problems that formed a backdrop for the federal act, see H. Wellington, Labor and the Legal Process, c. 1 (1968). See also Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1297, 1302-1304, 1315-1317 (1954).
This appears to be the precise point of difference between our assessment of congressional*purpose and that of Mr. Justice White. While it is not clear how he would treat the Garmon principle where the conflict is between unions and employers, he expressly argues that state power to regulate union conduct harmful to its-members that is- within the compass of the National Labor Relations Act should be unlimited, except- by the obvious qualification that States -may not punish conduct affirmatively protected by federal law. Thus, in his view, when it enacted the NLRA, Congress would have fully served those interests it intended to promote in the conduct of union-member relations had it simply declared that the States may not proscribe certain, defined conduct. Certainly, he is prepared to adopt a judicial construction of the Act that is consistent only with such a view of congressional intent. At bottom, what his position seems to imply is that giving the National Labor' Relations Board jurisdiction to enforce federal law regulating the use of union security clauses was largely, if not wholly, without rational purpose. As we have explained at some length above, we do not understand how courts may properly take such a limited view of congressional intent in the face of legislation that is in fact much more wide ranging, and in the absence of a contrary expression of intention from Congress itself.
Further, Mr. Justice White apparently regards the remedial aspects of the federal scheme as unimportant to those who designed it. For example, assuming arguendo that petitioner’s conduct was prohibited under both federal and state law, he would deem it of no *289national significance if one State punished such conduct with a jail sentence, and another utilized punitive damages, while the NLRB merely awarded back pay. His position apparently is that Congress considered any state tribunal equally capable, with the Board, of assessing the appropriateness of a given remedy and was unconcerned about disparities in the reactions of the States to unlawful union behavior. This argument, too, seems incompatible with the simple fact that Congress committed enforcement of the federal law here involved to a centralized agency.
For these reasons, Mr. Justice White’s analogies do not persuade us. Unlike the problem here under review, Congress did not put enforcement of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 into the hands of the Board. 73 Stat. 519. And it affirmatively expressed an intention that the Board not possess preemptive jurisdiction over suits to enforce collective bargaining agreements. See Part III, infra.
The objections raised to this latter point, post, at 325-332 (White, J.; dissenting), seem largely irrelevant to the case under review. This, is not a situation where the sole argument for preemption is that the union's conduct was arguably protected. Clearly, if the facts are as respondent believes them to be, there is ample reason to conclude that petitioner probably committed an unfair labor practice.
Garmon itself recognized that Russell permitted state courts “to grant compensation for the consequences, as defined by the traditional law of torts, of conduct marked by violence and imminent threats to the public order.” 359 U. S., at 247. However, whereas the Court in Russell had justified that result principally upon the broad grounds that state law not specifically relating to labor relations per se was not pre-empted by the Act, the Court in Garmon restated this result as dictated by “the compelling state interest, in the scheme of our federalism, in the maintenance of domestic peace [which] is not overridden in the absence of clearly expressed congressional direction.” Ibid. It is," of course, this .latter and narrower rationale that survives today..
It may be that a similar exception would arise where the Board affirmatively indicates that, in its view, pre-emption would not be appropriate. Cf. post, at 310-312, 319 n. 2 (White, J., dissenting). As the Board’s amicus brief in the instant case makes clear, no such question is now before us.
Indeed, Mr, Justice White’s dissenting opinion fails to demonstrate the need for such a departure from our traditional judicial role. On the contrary, he affirmatively establishes that Congress has taken an active, conscious role in apportioning power to deal with controversies implicating 'federal labor law among various competent tribunals.